

UNAMID: A Path Towards Hybrid Peacekeeping?

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ABSTRACT

In 2007, the United Nations - African Union Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID) was established as the first joint peacekeeping operation (PKO) of the United Nations (UN), with the African Union (AU) in Darfur, Sudan, which became known as the first hybrid PKO, bringing together two of the largest international organizations and taking over AMIS (African Union Mission in Sudan).

In this paper, we want to understand the purpose of this bilateral relationship, since this hybrid operation opened a window of opportunity for future operations to adopt this typology. Firstly, the responsibility of managing certain conflicts is distributed among other regional organizations, giving them more autonomy and responsibility. Secondly, the “burden” – human and financial – of the UN is somehow eased.

To this end, we will gather and process the data relating to the strengths and weaknesses of this PKO typology, with the help of a SWOT analysis, to find clues and bring evidence to light that demonstrate the possibility of this model being replicated in future situations, while respecting the due differences inherent to each mission and each country and region.

We concluded that the hybridization of more PKOs could be a reality, albeit dependent on a greater investment by regional organizations in adapting to UN procedures, namely through diverse types of training. In addition, it will always be necessary a prior and careful analysis regarding the implementation of a PKO of this typology, with a concrete and clear definition of the roles of each organization.

KEYWORDS: hybrid peacekeeping; United Nations; peacekeeping operations; UNAMID; African Union.

1 INTRODUCTION

Bearing in mind that a Peacekeeping Operation (PKO) with a hybrid format was held for the first time with the implementation of the United Nations - African Union Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID), in which two of the largest international organizations joined, it is our intention, in the first instance, to understand the purpose of this bilateral relationship based on this particular case.

Next, with the end of UNAMID, it seems to us that a research and treatment, although in an exploratory way, of the strengths and weaknesses of this PKO typology, with the help of a SWOT analysis, may raise clues and to find evidence that demonstrates the possibility of this model being replicated in future situations, respecting the appropriate differences inherent to each mission and each country and region.

In this sense, for the present paper, we posed the following starting question: **it would be possible to replicate, in the future, the implementation of a PKO between the UN and the AU, *mutatis mutandis*, taking into account the experience of UNAMID?**

For our investigation, we outline the following objectives: i) to understand the nature of the conflict in Darfur, which led to the implementation of UNAMID; ii) to understand the reasons that led to the creation of a hybrid PKO; iii) to analyze the successes, failures, opportunities and challenges to this typology of PKO, based on UNAMID.

We will start our article with a chapter dedicated to the nature of the conflict in Darfur, where we will seek to geographically characterize the country and the region and understand the reasons that led to the conflict that led the Security Council (SC) to take the decision to implement UNAMID. In a second phase, we will try to analyze the existing history between the UN and the AU, with regard to the situation in Darfur, in order to understand the work developed between both organizations that culminated in the implementation of a hybrid operation, with shared leadership.

Finally, we intend to examine the results that, so far, can be verified, of this operation, to understand if this model can be replicated in the future or if it will be a unique event, not desirable in the near future.

2 CONFLICT NATURE

As we will see further on, the nature of the conflict that emerged in the Darfur area, on one of the strands, is intimately linked with the geographic characteristics of the country and, specifically, of the region. Therefore, it is important to briefly characterize Sudan and the Darfur region, for a better understanding of the conflict itself.

In this sense, according to the official UN website, Sudan is located in northeast Africa, with a total area of 1,882,000 km², being the third largest African country in terms of territory, with and an estimated 34 million people to live in the country. It borders seven countries, Egypt and Libya to the North, Ethiopia and South Sudan to the South, the Central African Republic (CAR) and Chad to the West and Eritrea to the East, where it is also bathed by the Red Sea (about 885km). The Nile River crosses the territory from North to South, passing through the center of the country.

It should also be noted that 97% of the population is Muslim, with Arab culture being dominant in the country, despite the fact that in Darfur the majority of the population is of Central African origin, of different ethnicities and religions [1][2].

With specific regard to Darfur, it occupies the region located in the Northwest of Sudan, which borders Libya, Chad and CAR, with a land area of around 440,000 km² and a population of approximately 7.4 million of inhabitants. The region's soil is mostly arid, especially in the North, although in the center of the region stands out the *Marrah* mountain

range, which, due to its altitude, has a favorable climate for the development of agriculture and livestock, as well as the creation of water sources, due to the constant rain fall.

Sudan (corresponding to the actual South Sudan and Sudan) proclaims its independence in 1956, after a period of Anglo-Egyptian rule, which had occurred since the end of the 19th century, causing natural, social and political changes, especially in the Darfur region, as Salih [3] argues, since:

- i) It gave rise to new alliances based on the ethnic origin of political parties;
- ii) A strong competition for resources began – sources of water and pastures – due to the exponential increase in population and livestock, accompanied by constant droughts;
- iii) The control of political power, which resided in the hands of the *Umma* party, began to be frequently contested by regional movements.

Since its independence, the country has been plagued by conflicts. The first one dates back a year before independence, in 1955, which lasted until 1972 [1]. The fact that the region is controlled by an elite based in the capital, the absence of a national self-identification and the differences between African and Arab culture [2] were also at the origin of the outbreak of successive conflicts. Despite these difficulties that Sudan, as a country, was going through, the Darfur region was frankly less developed compared to the east of the country, at various levels [2][4][5].

Following the above, Young, Osman, Aklilu, & Dale [4] report that Darfur “was governed by commissioners who neglected the basic needs of the population and only corresponded to the interests of the central government”. This was also the case with deputies from the capital, who represented Darfurian interests in the National Assembly, but who “had little or no concern for the region [4] with a clear negligence strategy in relation to Darfur [5][6].

This policy of marginalization dragged on for several decades, as can be seen in Table 1, in which we see that the distribution of wealth in Sudan was disproportional, with Darfur being, by far, the poorest region, despite having marked a growth from the 1960s to the 1980s, although not significant.

Table 1 Wealth Distribution [4]

Region	Income 1967/68	Income 1982/83
Khartoum	236	283
Middle (including the Blue Nile)	183	201
Eastern (including Port Sudan and Kassala)	180	195
Kordofan (including South Kordofan)	153	164
Nothern Region	124	130
Darfur	98	102
Standard Deviation	44.5	57

Alongside the adoption of these policies by the central government, according to Etefa [5], ethnic conflicts in Darfur began to escalate into violence in the 1980s, “culminating with rebel attacks on the government in 2003”, albeit there was a history of disputes in the region over the “rights of land and water tenure between farmers and pastors”. It should be noted that there was a clear dispute over resources, since farmers were already on the land and pastors (nomads) constantly invaded the land of the former, thus creating a natural dispute between them. Danielová [2] states that the main conflicts were between Arabs and non-Arabs.

During a second civil war that started in 1985, and accused of oppressing the country's non-Arab people, in 2003, the Sudanese government is confronted with the rebellion of two armed groups – Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) and the Sudan Liberation Movement/Army (SLM/A) -, made up mainly of rebels from non-Arab communities [7], to

which the Government responded with the creation of the *Janjaweed* Arab militia and the Sudanese Armed Forces.

In view of the ongoing conflicts, a mission in Sudan, called African Union Mission in Sud (AMIS), was established by the AU in 2004 after the US Government declared that the conflict in Darfur evidenced the existence of genocide and that the responsibility to resolve the issue should be imputed to the AU. Later it would be proved that AMIS had neither the means nor the resources to resolve the conflict [8].

For this reason, in March 2005, the United Nations Mission in the Sudan (UNMIS) is implemented to support AMIS, namely in the establishment of a peace agreement between the parties involved in the conflict. On 9 July 2011, the UNMIS was replaced by the United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS).

In the words of Totten [9], he declares that the causes of the genocide witnessed in Darfur were complex, but that they would be based on five factors: “i) extreme drought and desertification; ii) Arab supremacy; iii) authoritarianism; iv) the deprivation of rights of black Africans in the hands of the Sudanese Government; v) a growing bellicosity in the region (within Sudan, Darfur and beyond the borders)”.

Still in 2005, the second civil war would end with the signing of the peace agreement – designated as a *Comprehensive Peace Agreement* – between the Government of Sudan and the Sudan People's Liberation Movement, a movement composed of Sudanese forces from the south of the country, which would later become what is now South Sudan.

However, this peace agreement did not end the conflict that had broken out in the country in 2003, as it, in turn, fueled the conflict in Darfur in various ways, through the “recruitment of Darfur militias to combat in the South, the increased militarization of Darfur and the use of resources in the region and respective marginalization of it” [4].

In May 2006, a peace agreement was signed between the SLM/A and the Government of Sudan – the Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA) -, after two years of negotiations, and in 2010 the SLM/A, once again, broke links with the Government, joining if the remaining rebel groups [10].

As we will see in the next chapter, given the gravity of the conflict, which brought tragedy and suffering to hundreds of thousands of people, including peacekeepers, the UN was forced to establish, together with the AU, the UNAMID, in what would be the first hybrid PKO, on 31 July 2007, through SC Resolution 1769 and which would later formally replace AMIS, on 31 December 2007.

We realized, after the analysis carried out, that the conflict in Darfur has in its genesis three distinct vectors that have been prolonged over the last decades:

- i) Politics: there is political marginalization on the part of the central government, which has dragged on for decades, preventing this region from developing and creating a feeling of revolt against the governing elites;
- ii) Ethnic: there is a dispute between Arabs and non-Arabs. The Arab faction finds itself in the Sudanese power elites, concentrating power within themselves and the darfurians do not feel represented by them;
- iii) Economic: in a region where resources are scarce and droughts are abundant, the constant struggle between farmers (sedentary) and pastors (nomads) to obtain sources of water and arable land, destabilizes the region and leaves many in poverty extreme.

In fact, it is difficult to find a solution to a conflict with this multiplicity of factors, but Salih [3] adds that this will only be possible when the “Sudanese governing elite recognizes that Sudan cannot be governed by one government alone, located in Khartoum”, thus giving voice to the other actors of the regional movements.

3 THE CREATION AND THE MANDATE OF UNAMID

It is at a meeting of the Peace and Security Council (PSC), an AU body, dated January 12, 2006, during the presence of AMIS in Sudanese territory, that the motto is given to a UN-AU partnership, within the scope of a PKO. Thus, it is recognized by the PSC that, given the scenario of the conflict in Darfur, AMIS would be severely limited in financial and logistical terms, although it has "significantly contributed to the protection of the civilian population and to the development of security and humanitarian conditions" (paragraph two – PSC 45th Meeting Communication, PSC/PR/Comm.(XLV).

In paragraph 5 of the same Communication, the PSC declares “the support (...) for a transition of AMIS to a UN operation, within a framework of partnership between the AU and the UN”. In turn, and according to the Security Council Report [11], the Special Representative of the SG – Jan Pronk - and the AU Mediator for the crisis in Darfur – Salim Salim - reported on January 13, 2006 to the SC that the SG and the Chairperson of the AU Commission (CAUC) - Alpha Konaré - would have addressed the need to involve peacekeepers in the Darfur region, but that "any attempt to simply replace AMIS completely with a UN presence" could find strong opposition from the Government of Sudan.

It is also mentioned that the AU would be prepared to increase the organization's presence in Darfur, “possibly through the deployment of UN peacekeepers in a configuration to be determined”, but which, as we know, would become the UNAMID, the first hybrid UN operation.

We consider a hybrid operation to be a “joint operation, in a particular area of responsibility, conducted by forces from different organizations under common command and control, with the purpose of achieving a common goal or purpose, with each force maintaining its organizational identity during the operation” [12].

The conflict in Darfur deteriorated with each passing day, witnessing serious violations of human rights, the use of force against civilians and elements belonging to the AMIS mission, without its resources being sufficient to contain the conflict. The SG Report, November 8, 2006 (S/2006/870), describes the violent scene in Darfur, reiterating that the UN would continue to support the AU mission, but that this would not increase the operation's ability to expand to other locations. That is, this support from the UN only served so that the mission would not end immediately.

In view of these facts, during the month of November, several meetings were held with the presence of the SG, with a view to implementing an PKO involving the AU. Thus, on November 10, it is proposed the implementation of a hybrid PKO, involving the AU and the UN, with the following general lines:

- i) Leadership of a joint AU-UN special representative;
- ii) A substantial involvement of the UN, with regard to the command and control of the PKO;
- iii) UN financing and logistics, on a sustained basis;
- iv) Human resources similar to UNMIS;
- v) PKO based on a robust Protection of Civilians (POC) component and DPA implementation support [13].

Even before the year ended, on December 19, the SC President (S/PRST/2006/55), by decision of the Council, affirmed that the establishment of a hybrid operation in Darfur would be a decision to be taken immediately, given that “the structures and systems of command and control would be provided by the UN”. However, some fundamental aspects for the implementation of the PKO were not detailed, such as the mandate, dimension, duration and cost of the PKO.

During 2007, the activity of both the SC and the SG with regard to Darfur and the promotion of the implementation of UNAMID was significant. For example, on June 5, 2007, the SG and the CAUC prepared a report (S/2007/307/Rev) which contained, in its sixth chapter, a possible mandate for the hybrid PKO which, on June 22, would be approved by the PSC (79th Meeting Communication, PSC/PR/Comm.(LXXIX), accelerating the mission implementation process.

The following month, in July, the first drafts would begin to be prepared with concrete details of the mission, including attributing the designation of UNAMID. These drafts already reported the duration of the mission, the number of peacekeepers to be sent from each component, the main tasks to be carried out, a reduction in the number of personnel employed in UNMIS and the approximate cost of 2.5 billion euros [14].

Thus, on July 31, 2007, through the SC Resolution 1769 (S/RES/1769), the implementation of UNAMID is formally decided, for an initial period of 12 months, in accordance with paragraph 1, establishing, as mentioned, that “thus as soon as possible and not before December 31, 2007, UNAMID (...) will assume the authority of AMIS” (paragraph 5, letter c).

They also determined that the mandate of the PKO would be the one contained in paragraphs 54 and 55 of the report prepared on June 5, 2007, by the SG and the CAUC - already discussed by us. In this sense, UNAMID would be mandated, generically, to:

- i) Monitor and verify the implementation of peace agreements;
- ii) Support the political process;
- iii) Contribute to the promotion of human rights and the rule of law;
- iv) Monitor and report on situations involving other bordering countries, especially Chad or CAR;
- v) Monitor the existence of weapons, complying with the terms of the provisions of the peace agreements;
- vi) Acting on Chapter VII of the Charter, take the necessary measures to support the execution of the DPA, acting against possible armed attacks and protecting civilians, without jeopardizing the responsibility of the host State.

During the “negotiation” of this hybrid PKO, we were able to perceive that there was always some reluctance on the part of the AU to hand over, in full, the powers of mission management to the UN. This is verifiable when defending the motto of AMIS as African solutions to African problems [11][15] or that the presence of only African militaries in UNAMID would be ideal for mission success [16].

Despite this ambition, several countries across the planet would contribute with troops, police and civilians to UNAMID. However, it should be taken into account that African representation was agreed in the “Senior Leadership of UNAMID, in the staff recruitment process, and in the way of selecting the contributions of the military and police” [17].

We also emphasize, from the analysis carried out, that the establishment of this partnership is due, above all, to an absence of support - financial, logistical and human -, which the AU, through AMIS, showed to deal with the conflict in Darfur, which is why the UN was eventually called to intervene, although it was already present in Sudan.

As we have already mentioned, there was a tendency for some African States, through the AU, to seek to assume a leading role on the international stage, showing that the organization would be able to resolve the conflicts existing on your continent. Therefore, it did not seem to us that there was a clear “will” to establish this PKO on the part of the AU, but there was a “need”, because otherwise the conflict would deteriorate due to the insufficiency and ineffectiveness of AMIS.

4 UNAMID: SUCCESSES, CHALLENGES AND PERSPECTIVES

Considering the POC robust mandate, a greater number of peacekeepers in the field, more adequate funding and an appropriate logistical capacity, the implementation of UNAMID, according to Aguilar & Marquezi [18], was “more proactive and successful”, given that it has increased the level of security in the region and facilitated access to humanitarian assistance.

Nevertheless, the same authors state that, with regard to the resolution of the conflict itself, it is crucial that all parties involved respect the DPA. Also, as a result of the panoply of rebel movements that do not intend to collaborate, it is difficult to mitigate the conflict.

However, this view was not shared, for example, by the International Refugee Rights Initiative (IRRI) which argued that “eight years after deployment, conflict in Darfur not only continues but appears to be on the increase” [19] or by the High-Level Independent Panel on United Nations Peace Operations (HIPPO) which noted, in paragraph 25, that UNAMID was “a mere shadow of its original purpose” [20].

Right from the start of the PKO, there were some challenges linked to the operational capacity of UNAMID, as the Government of Sudan “required that the mission be predominantly African, with only some contributions from China and Pakistan” and imposed some constraints on the execution of the mandate, such as prohibiting night patrols, curfew in some areas or delaying the issuance of entry visas into the country and the entry of military equipment [15][18].

IRRI [19], on the other hand, highlighted the “huge political and logistical challenges” that UNAMID faced from the beginning, which included the inability to put the peacekeepers on the ground, constant attacks on the mission and poor Government collaboration. Government involvement is crucial to the execution of a robust POC mandate, as peacekeepers hardly have the means to ensure full compliance with the mandate, depending on armed actors such as the government to do so [21].

There was a clear division in the Council; while some members strongly criticize the Sudanese Government, demonstrating successive acts of human rights violations, other members – such as China and Russia - believed that “Sudan is working hard to promote stability in the country” [19].

However, this hybrid nature immediately allowed the Government of Sudan, which had always been reticent about placing UN forces in its territory, to authorize the implementation of this PKO, with a distinctly African identity, while without the AU as a partner, the mission would hardly be established [22].

For Mickler [15], UNAMID “reflects the importance and legitimacy of African leadership in regional governance, the material and political constraints faced by the AU and the benefits of shared responsibility”. These factors, together with the motivation of some African states to resolve their own issues, create a “political space” for this organization to assert itself.

It can be said that operations of a hybrid nature place greater responsibility for conflict resolution on countries in the region of the same. According to Bashua [22], the “involvement of a regional organization in a PKO gives the organization a feeling of ownership of the solution to the problem”, creating a feeling of obligation to resolve the conflict between its member states, as well as a feeling of solidarity [23]. In addition, the one author argues that “countries may be more inclined to contribute to a hybrid operation because they tend to have more control over the mandate and policies” [22], compared to an exclusive UN PKO.

On the path of Bashua, Prinsloo & van Niekerk [23] found that UNAMID can be seen as a success story, as “it allowed the AU to work on an equal footing with the international community to face a range of threats to human security and international peace and security”.

With regard to the execution of the PKO, IRRI identified a set of positive indicators arising from the implementation of UNAMID, namely: i) the possibility of adequately protecting civilians; ii) the production of reports, serving as a channel to “pressure” the international community to find solutions for the resolution of the conflict; iii) the transmission of messages to promote peace, information and education, throughout, for example, holding workshops with local communities (i.e. community-based labour intensive projects [24]); iv) support the delivery of humanitarian assistance.

However, one [25] emphasizes that the mandate, by including the POC component, submits peacekeepers to a herculean task, given that they were facing about “5 million civilians (...) [in a region] approximately the size of France”.

In line with the IRRI indicators, some state that “the protection of civilians has clearly improved compared to AMIS”, even though “it was not possible to guarantee an adequate level of security” [15] and that, specifically with regard to conflict resolution and the establishment of a peace agreement between the Government and the rebels, UNAMID does not seem to be successful.

Regarding POC, Spandler [26] is not so optimistic, since he argues that the PKO had some success regarding the humanitarian situation and the resolution of problems related to internally displaced persons, but not regarding the component of POC, as Müller [27] analyzes in an article. Spandler also points out a set of obstacles to achieving the mandate, namely the lack of human and financial resources, management and command/control of the problems and the aforementioned opposition from the Government. In this sense, “the lack of dialogue and a coherent strategy, including the interpretation of the mandate and the incompatibility of some procedures between the UN and the AU” [26], marked some challenges of this type of PKO.

Prinsloo & van Niekerk [17] designed a table in which they verify whether a specified condition – existing or not in PKOs carried out in support/partnership with other organizations - would have contributed to the success of UNAMID, from the perspective of the UN. The conclusion is that it is only with regard to the relationship with the Government of Sudan that benefits can be reaped, since it rejected, from the beginning, the implementation of a PKO led exclusively by the UN.

Bashua [22], highlights some challenges triggered by UNAMID, such as the difficulty of understanding when a shared leadership or different interpretations of the mandate, reflected in different decision-making, contribute to creating fractures between organizations that can be explored by the parties involved in the conflict. Hence, “communication, constant exchange of information, commitment and coordinated decision-making” are factors to be taken into account when developing an PKO with this typology.

The author ends up concluding that it is unlikely that SC will take the decision to implement another hybrid PKO, and that it should continue to support certain PKOs carried out by regional organizations, but without establishing a formal partnership (i.e. African Union Mission in Somalia), despite to consider that the involvement of international organizations in peacekeeping matters is a trend for the future [22].

Having identified the strengths and weaknesses of this type of operation, as well as the challenges and perspectives for the future, we proceed with the following SWOT analysis, from the UN's point of view, as proposed in the introduction to this paper. In this sense, as strengths we point out the ease of obtaining support from the local government, which, as we have seen, would not be possible in Sudan if it were not for an operation of this type. A hybrid PKO promotes a sense of responsibility on the part of the regional

organization and, consequently, of the member countries, which seek to solve their (region) problems with their solutions, creating bonds of solidarity among themselves.

In terms of weaknesses, we found that the communication between the UN-AU would not be in harmony, reflecting the difficulty of interpreting the mandate, ending up taking divergent measures (means and objectives), which end up confusing the peacekeepers and bringing into it causes the success of the mission itself.

Not only is there little experience in the execution of hybrid PKOs, the AU itself does not have the peacekeeping experience that the UN has and the fact is that, although the AU participates in the mission, the UN is financially responsible for all the expenses of the mission, not seeing any advantage in this aspect.

Strengths	Weaknesses	Opportunities	Threats
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> •Local Government support •Accountability of the regional organization and member countries •Increased felling of solidarity between countries in the same region 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> •Difficulty in strategic communication •Difficulty in implementing mandates •Different means and objectives •Lack of experience •Financial and material charges 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> •Shaping organizations within the scope of the PKOs avoiding to "overload" the UN •Adapt peacekeeping practices to cultures, taking advantage of the knowledge of regional organizations •Strengthen the role of regional organizations 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> •Ineffectiveness of the PKO - waste of time, human, material and financial resources •International organization compromise to Governments interests •Balance UN / regional organization

Figure 1: SWOT Analysis

Hybrid operations can constitute opportunities for the UN because it allows this organization to pass on the experience and know-how in this matter so that international organizations can start to develop more PKOs, autonomously, not "overloading" the UN role and assuming their responsibilities in the region itself.

Furthermore, by incorporating a regional organization into an PKO, it can give a unique identity to the mission. As an example of UNAMID, the presence of an African identity can result in the approximation between citizens and peacekeepers, for sharing similar cultures, for taking advantage of the knowledge that the organization itself has of the region where the conflict occurs and to reinforce its role as actors in the international system, in a legitimate way (by the UN).

As threats, we believe that it is possible, in an eventual "repetition" of a hybrid PKO, to start the entire implementation process and, after a few months, realize that the synergies between the UN and a certain organization are not functional, resulting in a waste of time, as well as material, financial and human resources, even if the mandate is readapted afterwards.

On the other hand, there may be a risk of the regional organization giving in to pressures carried out by the Government where the PKO is established, since the Government may even be in charge of that regional organization that is carrying out the PKO. We can also foresee that the tendency of an imbalance of powers may be registered, with the regional

organization wanting to assume a role that goes beyond its spectrum of competences of the mission in question, to the detriment of the UN.

5 FINAL CONSIDERATIONS

With this work, it became clear that the Darfur region is a region that, over several decades, has been marked by several violent and complex conflicts. However, the conflict that culminates with the implementation of UNAMID, as we have seen, is based on three vectors of a different nature – in part, these vectors already existed in previous conflicts -, which are of a political, ethnic and economic nature.

To face this conflict, the AU wanted to assume, with the establishment of AMIS, a leading role, establishing its position as an African regional organization, claiming that African problems are solved with African solutions. However, it quickly became clear that this would be sufficient, given the escalation of violence in the conflict, which increasingly threatened international peace and security, due, for example, to the high number of displaced people fleeing to neighboring countries such as Chad or CAR.

In this context, it became necessary for the international community to intervene in the darfurian conflict, under the aegis of the UN, implementing UNAMID and fully absorbing AMIS on December 31, 2007. As we have seen, this was not an easy process. The UN begins by encountering resistance from the Government of Sudan, which was perennially against the total replacement of AMIS by a UN PKO. In addition, the AU itself wanted a prominent role and a PKO with an African identity. Nevertheless, UNAMID was effectively put on the ground, but always with great reluctance on the part of the Sudanese Government.

It is in this aspect, in our view, that this AU-UN partnership turns out to be most fruitful, since if there were no shared leadership, most likely the UN would never be able to put a significant device in Darfur, at least with the consent of the Government.

Naturally, this typology of PKO, even for being the first time it was established, has its flaws, namely lack of communication between organizations, different views on how to achieve certain goals or different readings and interpretations of the mandate, but it can also constitute an opportunity for regional organizations to see their role strengthened as an actor, contributing to international security and peace which, after all, is the ultimate goal of all organizations.

In fact, each conflict has a unique nature and vicissitudes, so putting the possibility of replicating this model will always be an open question. A careful analysis of the conflict in question will always have to be made, to understand the advantages and disadvantages, using past experiences and to understand, above all, whether global security would benefit from this partnership. We can, in a way, advance that the hybridization of more operations may be a reality, but regional organizations may have to go through, for example, training and formation within the scope of UN procedures - never losing their organizational identity -, with the intent of the perceptions to be equal with regard to the means to reach certain ends.

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