

RETHINKING SECURITY: AN ANALYTICAL STUDY TO EXPLORE THE CORRELATION BETWEEN MILITARY EXPENDITURE AND HUMAN SECURITY IN ARMS IMPORTING (DEVELOPING) STATES

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ABSTRACT

The following research seeks to identify a correlation between increasing military expenditure and the simultaneous changes observed in the levels of human security in arms importing states under the world military order. Identification of such trends is needed because leaders use the narrow understanding of security in terms of military strength to justify the higher global military expenditure. However, it is also understood that growing military expenditure increases insecurity amongst states. This paradox excludes consideration of other factors that impact human lives and need to be secured. The research uses case studies analyzed with quantitative data and analysis to determine any correlation between the two variables - military expenditure and human security. It is found that in arms importing states, there is generally an inverse proportionality, causing a negative correlation between military expenditure and human security. Therefore, higher military expenditure causes a drop in human security in importing states due to various structural factors of the global arms hierarchy. This illustrates a need to rethink the understanding of security to include other factors of human security: economic, political, personal, community, health, food, and environmental security for a holistic security approach to human lives in contemporary security studies.

KEYWORDS: arms control, security studies, military expenditure, international order, global arms trade, human security, humanitarianism, neo-imperialism, militarism, world military order

1 INTRODUCTION

After the end of the Cold War, the world rejoiced in the anticipation of prolonged global peace. Despite progress in negotiation about disarmament, development and arms control during the cold war [1], military expenditure has gradually increased after the end of the Cold War. 2019 saw the highest annual increase in collective global military expenditure (3.6% higher than in 2018) in a decade [2]. Governments have remained dedicated to military expenditure and arms trade even amidst the COVID-19 crisis. 2020 saw the highest rise in military burden as a share of gross domestic product (GDP) even while the global GDP shrank due to the global pandemic [3]. This prioritization of arms and military capability has raised questions about the strategy, investments and structures put in place by global leaders for the prioritization and facilitation of human security.

The primary issue with security studies is the understanding of security in terms of military power alone [4]. Alongside the doubling of the global military expenditure since the end of the cold war, international transfers of major weapons have shown a steady increase since the beginning of the 21st century [5, p. 4]. The flow of arms has historically been able to decide the global hierarchical power structure [4, pp. 38-39]. Scholars identify this hierarchy based on the flow of arms as ‘world military order’ [6][7]. Therefore, major arms manufacturers – primarily western states - enjoy the top position in the world military order, part producers remain in the middle, while the non-producers – primarily underdeveloped or developing nations - remain at the bottom of the international structure [4, p. 47].

While military expenditure grows, human security goals like climate change goals and Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) suffer immensely in their achievability for the lack of investment. The COVID-19 pandemic and increasing civil wars and conflicts throughout the world have brought to the forefront the lack of prioritization of human security needs. This paper will explore and analyze the correlation between military expenditure – using the total estimated amount of government spending on military and the share of government spending used on military affairs - and human security – using human rights scores (HRS) and human development index (HDI) – with use of case studies.

The paper is going to discuss its results in section 2. Section 3 will comprise discussions that will encompass a literature review and conceptual analysis, along with case studies of Rwanda, Ukraine and Venezuela and exceptional cases of the United States of America (USA) and South Sudan. The methodology used for the paper will briefly be discussed in section 4 of the paper before the paper concludes with recommendations in section 5.

2 RESULTS

The case studies were conducted to analyze the correlation between high military expenditure and human security in arms importer states through a quantitative lens while drawing parallels in the datasets and the empirical events. The key findings of this study can be summarized in the following points:

- A negative correlation between military expenditure and human security in arms importing countries.
- Reiteration of the importance placed on military strength and growth by governments.
- Prioritization of military expenditure and growth even amidst a crisis, instead of diverting resources towards improving factors that impact human lives.
- A minor trend of prioritization of the military that is shared by a manufacturing state – the USA – in special circumstances (the 9/11 attacks).

- Absence of the same trend in arms importing state – example, South Sudan under exceptional circumstances.

The importance of military strength and growth in the understanding of security.

The analysis reiterated the importance given to military capacity and growth in quantitative terms of growing military expenditure. This is seen in the growing trends of rising military expenditure even while the governments are dealing with an economic crisis, civil wars and conflicts as observed in the case studies of Rwanda, Ukraine, and Venezuela. This is primarily because of the importance given to military capability for the maintenance of territorial integrity. This prioritization of military capability and military expenditure amidst crisis and decreasing human security is increasingly detrimental to the human security in the importing states that are already chasing development and improving the lives of citizens. A similar trend of militarism is seen when observing the COVID-19 crisis - when despite the pandemic causing a healthcare crisis globally, governments continued to invest economic resources to military expenditure [8].

Negative Correlation between military expenditure and human security in arms importing states.

The findings of this study reflect a relative negative correlation, illustrating inverse proportionality, between military expenditure and human security in arms importing states. This typically means that when governments of states belonging to the importing category in the world military order choose to prioritize investments in military expenditure for arms acquisition, training, etc., there is a simultaneous decline in the human security levels in the country. Increasing military expenditure is not the cause of such a drop in human security, but the correlation illustrates that such inverse proportionality could be hindering substantial improvements in their domestic human security dimensions.

However, the correlation between military expenditure and human security does not hold in the case studies of the USA and that of South Sudan because the USA is a manufacturing state, and as a global pioneer and supplier of arms technology, stands to benefit from a military-based understanding of security. South Sudan faced exceptional circumstances as an importer state and the youngest independent state in the world. Governments possess limited resources to spend. When they prioritize military capability, they are essentially trading human security measures off.

3 DISCUSSION

3.1 Literature Review

Military growth has been a concern for global security. COVID-19 brought to light the disproportionate expenditure on military affairs by states, and the shortfall of investment in human security infrastructure, such as healthcare [8]. The biggest factor to rationalizing and justifying military expenditure has been the realist understanding of security, primarily in terms of arms acquisition [9, p. 233][10][11]. Such militarism has resulted in the understanding of arms as instruments of national security [12][13]. The counterargument has generally been a conversation about the correlation between economic growth and military expenditure. Several studies claim that higher military expenditure has a negative or no impact on the economic growth and development of a country [14]. Limited arguments claim that under certain conditions, like in the presence of threats, military expenditure can drive growth [15]. When analyzed with a framework accounting for the adverse impacts of hostility and the presence of high levels of corruption and rent-seeking in the circumstances,

Aizenman and Glick (2006) conclude that high military expenditure can drive economic growth for certain states [15]. Despite laying out further possible extensions regarding the analysis, there is an absence of considerations of the impact of the same on human security and the rights of individuals.

Other studies record the relationship between high military expenditure and human rights. Park (1987) attempts to examine the general tendencies of human rights concerning different social, cultural, and political characteristics [16]. He concludes that military expenditure and human rights share a negative relation. Similarly, Davenport (1995) seeks to analyze the effect of the military's influence in a state on the levels of political repression [17]. According to his findings, higher military influence in a state's political system generally results in higher military spending and military control in states hamper human rights [18][19]. Therefore, it was concluded by Davenport (1995) that higher levels of military expenditure, as part of the total government expenditure, results in a rise in political restrictions [17]. However, in another study, Davenport found no significant relations between high military expenditure and human rights when controlling for economic development [20]. The relationship differed in the same study when democracy, coercive capacity, dependency, and lagged repression were considered as additional factors.

The defining problem of the understanding of security is rooted in militarism. Firstly, the understanding of security is extremely limited in scope - being limited to state security. Secondly, military strength and power are understood to be at the centre of such security. This understanding gives rise to the problem of an arms race, making it a vicious cycle of militarism and security [4]. The arms trade is an integral and central part of international affairs with a direct bearing on state security [9, p. 233]. This arms race harms the prospects of global peace, trust, and cooperation. This is backed by historical evidence of wars being preceded by arms races which resemble the contemporary growing military and nuclear capabilities of states. The literature on the arms race causing insecurity and trust deficit is abundant [21][22].

Arms and military weapons have been the cause for the loss of millions of lives in the past, both military and civilian. However, in contemporary politics, following realism, we continue to view security in terms of the military [9, p. 233][10]. There was a period of caution after the end of the Cold War, but we have returned to deterrence-based militarism [9, p. 233]. However, some studies prove that arms acquisition by states also contributes to amplification in domestic political violence [9, pp. 234-235][23][17][24].

There is a need for an understanding of the effects of militarism from a humanitarian perspective. At the same time, there are limited contemporary studies on militarism. Therefore, the paper intends to contribute a resurrection of the study of militarism from a human security lens.

3.2 Conceptual Analysis

The paper conducts its analysis based on 3 central concepts: Military expenditure, Human Security, the World military Order and Arms Importing states.

3.2.1 *Military Expenditure*

Military expenditure is the measure of economic resources devoted to military activities by individual countries. Therefore, it can be used as an effective tool for measuring the prioritization of military and non-military expenditure by states. The biggest challenge to gathering data and measuring military expenditure is the lack of standardization of data being processed by different states [25, p. 270]. Despite the obstacles, the Stockholm International

Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) has been able to gather and report on the military expenditure of states since 1949. SIPRI data on military expenditure includes capital spending on armed forces, defence organizations of the nations, paramilitary forces, and military space activities [26]. They also do accept the limitation of gathering such data and that it generally is an underestimate of the real levels of military expenditure –due to different understandings of what activities do and do not constitute military expenditure [26]. The understanding of human security is much more complicated than the understanding of military expenditure since it is a qualitative concept.

3.2.2 *Human Security – A Working definition for a work in progress*

The definition of human security is contested. Amitav Acharya (2001) discusses the different understandings of the term ‘human security’ [27]. The idea of human security tries to direct the understanding of security to be about individuals and communities instead of states. Therefore, it involves human rights as well as human development [28]. Human security was popularized as an idea in the international sphere with the United Nations Development Programme’s (UNDP) 1994 Human Development report [29]. The report included seven core areas of security: economic, environmental, food, health, personal, community, and political security [29 pp. 22-33] [28, pp. 182-183][30]. The study will use this broader understanding of human security as defined in the UNDP Human Development Report of 1994 using a threat-based approach as illustrated in Table 1.

Table 1: Components of Human Security threats under UNDP definition of Human Security [31, p. 7]

Type of Security	Examples of Main Threats
Economic Security	Persistent poverty, unemployment
Food Security	Hunger, famine
Health security	Deadly infectious diseases, unsafe food, malnutrition, lack of access to basic healthcare
Environmental security	Environmental degradation, resource depletion, natural disasters, pollution
Personal security	Physical violence, crime, terrorism, domestic violence, child labour
Community security	Inter-ethnic, religious and other identity-based tensions
Political security	Political repression, human rights abuses

There is a sense of interconnectedness and fluidity between the threats and responses when addressing the different sources of insecurity to guarantee human security [31]. Therefore, policymaking cannot be done in isolation for tackling individual issues of human insecurity but needs to approach all aspects of human security simultaneously.

3.2.3 *World Military Order and Arms Importing states*

The technological capability of states decides the direction of the flow of arms trades globally. It is also recognized that this spread of technology remains uneven and equal, giving an advantage to some states over others [4, p. 37]. The unequal distribution and manufacturing capability of arms facilitate the creation of a hierarchy between states - the ‘World Military Order’ - depending on their role in the global arms trade [6][7][4][32]. This hierarchy splits the world into three categories of states:

- **Producer or exporter states:** These states are the ones that can produce the entire range of weapons domestically and rely on little or no import of military technology from other states [4]. They are at the top of the world military hierarchy.
- **Part producer states:** These are states that have a significant capability and infrastructure to manufacture arms, unlike the non-producing importer states, but fail to

match the range and quality of arms produced by the primary producers. These lie in the middle [4, pp. 47-49].

- Non-producer and importer states: These states have little to no arms manufacturing or production capability and consists primarily of states that attained independence after the second world war [4, pp. 47-49]. These lie at the bottom of the hierarchy.

This paper is going to use arms importing states to determine the negative effects of high military expenditure on human security in the states that most need the prioritization of economic development and human security.

3.3 Case Studies

3.3.1 Case Study: Rwanda during The Rwandan Genocide

The case study of Rwanda is an intentional analysis to test trends and correlations between military expenditure and human security change during a domestic crisis - the Rwandan Genocide. Racial differences and ethnic tensions played a major role in the genocide.

In the 1990s, Rwanda was one of the most densely populated countries in Africa, with about 85% of the population belonging to the Hutu community, and the rest being part of the Tutsi community and a small number of Twa [33]. As a colony, Rwanda saw the ruling Belgians favouring the minority Tutsi community, leading to tension and violence even before independence. In 1959, a Hutu revolution already forced over 300,000 Tutsis to flee the country, making them an even smaller minority [33]. The Hutus forced the Tutsi monarch of Rwanda into exile. Rwanda attained independence in 1962, and after years of violence, military groups made Major General Juvenal Habyarimana – a moderate Hutu – the sole leader of Rwanda in 1973 [33].

In 1990, Rwandese Patriotic Forces (RPF), consisting primarily of Tutsi refugees, invaded Rwanda from Uganda. Habyarimana accused Tutsi residents of being loyal to the RPF and carried out mass arrests and killings [33]. The government's military spending increased - from 110 million USD in 1990 to 125 million USD in 1992. During the same time, the human rights score dropped, reflecting the use of force and violence. A peace accord was signed between Habyarimana and the RPF in 1993, but it did little to stop the violence [34]. In 1994, Habyarimana's plane was shot down and it set off the genocide that took place in 1994. Despite a drop in government expenditure at that time, the government still prioritized spending on the military. The share of government spending on the military increased from 17.80% in 1992 to 21.40% in 1994. Human Rights Score (HRS) in Rwanda was also the worst in 1994 – from -2.19033 in 1992 to -2.6136 in 1994. Within 100 days of the killing of Habyarimana, around 800,000 Tutsis and moderate Hutus were killed, and the Hutu militia fled to Zaire, with about 2 million Hutu refugees [35]. This caused more military action and interventions in Zaire. This caused a rise in the share of government spending on the military until 1996 before it started decreasing. United Nations (UN) appointed international tribunal started charging and sentencing those responsible for the genocide and a new President then took charge in Rwanda.

The violence inside Rwanda started fading despite political issues in the country. Between 1996 and 2004 - Rwanda carried out military intervention in Zaire (1996), a change in President (2000), voting to establish 'Gacaca' courts for ordinary Rwandans to judge their peers for the 1994 genocide cases (2001), a new flag and national anthem for unity was adopted (2001), Rwandan withdrawal from Zaire (2002), voters backing a draft resolution banning the incitement of ethnic hatred (2003) and the first presidential elections since the genocide [35]. This period also saw a decrease in military expenditure in value and as a share

of government expenditure, from 99 million USD and 23.70% of government expenditure in 1996 to 68 million USD and 9.70% of government expenditure in 2004. The same period saw marginal improvement in HRS and HDI – an increase from -2.46805 HRS and 0.12 HDI (1995) in 1996 to -1.05807 HRS and 0.22 HDI (2005) in 2004.

Table 2: Military Expenditure (Source: SIPRI), Share of Government spending on military (Source: SIPRI), human rights score (Source: Our World in Data), and human development index (Source: Our World in Data) in Rwanda (1990-2004)

Year	Military Expenditure (in USD millions)	% of Government spending on military	Human Rights Score (HRS) – Scale - 3.8 to 5.4	Human Development Index (HDI) – Scale 0-1
1990	110	-	-2.10974	0.13
1992	125	17.80%	-2.19033	-
1994	41.3	21.40%	-2.6136	-
1996	99	23.70%	-2.46805	0.12 (1995)
1998	100	23.10%	-2.22696	-
2000	86.8	16.30%	-1.70984	0.18
2002	83.7	12.70%	-1.42851	-
2004	68	9.70%	-1.05807	0.22 (2005)

The case study shows that Military Expenditure and Human Security are negatively correlated in the case of Rwanda - where an increase in military expenditure resulted in a decrease in human security and a decrease in military expenditure reflected a rise in human security. The trends of the rise and fall in the indexes of military expenditure and human security for Rwanda between the years 1990 and 2004 are illustrated in Table 2. The factors of human security directly affected in the case study of Rwanda are – community security, personal security and political security due to the targeting of a specific community causing a loss in lives through political power and backing of the government. Rwanda is a developing nation and an arms importer. Limited resources of the government were being spent primarily in growing the military capabilities of the states while the state was seeing human rights violations, community conflicts, etc.

3.3.2 Case Study: Venezuela

Democracy was on a decline in Venezuela in the 1990s when the then Colonel Chavez attempted two coups on the then President Perez amidst an economic crisis. Hugo Chavez then became President in 1998 [36]. The data on the share of government spending is missing in the case of Venezuela due to a lack of transparency. The trends of increases and decreases in the indexes for military expenditure and human security for Venezuela between the years 2000 and 2017 are illustrated in Table 3.

Table 3: Military Expenditure (Source: SIPRI), Share of Government spending on military (Source: SIPRI), human rights score (Source: Our World in Data), and human development index (Source: Our World in Data) in Venezuela (2000-2017)

Year	Military Expenditure (in USD millions)	% of Government spending on military	Human Rights Score (HRS) – Scale - 3.8 to 5.4	Human Development Index (HDI) – Scale 0-1
2000	15.5	-	-1.03214	0.47
2002	11.5	-	-1.1871	-
2004	15.9	-	-1.12914	0.5 (2005)
2006	34.4	-	-1.14226	-
2008	34.6	-	-1.03488	0.55 (2007)
2010	18	-	-0.87796	0.56

2012	25.1	-	-0.90614	-
2014	17.9	-	-0.97435	0.56 (2015)
2016	7.3	-	-1.22921	-
2017	8.7	-	-1.43452	-

Hugo Chavez came to power with the motive to reduce corruption in the domestic institutions, make a more equal society and make the country more autonomous [37]. These policies led to the ‘Bolivarian Revolution’ that began in 2010. In 2001, Chavez used the enabling act to pass laws aimed at redistributing land and wealth, attracting growing concerns about him trying to concentrate economic and political power [36]. Similar socialist policies emerged in 2005. The same year, new media regulations came into effect which enabled a crackdown on any criticism of public figures by the media. The parliament was dominated by parties that were loyal to President Chavez as the opposition boycotted the election [36]. Such policies and intent are reflected in the drop in the HRS of Venezuela from -1.03214 in 2000 to -1.14226 in 2006. 2006 also saw a marginal rise in military expenditure in the country – from 15.9 million USD in 2004 to 34.4 million USD in 2006. This was due to the beginning of closer relations with Russia and distancing from US arms supplies [36][38]. This period saw some improvements in the HDI because, in the short term, the new policies were bridging inequality and improving the lives of its citizens. Further measures implemented by the Chavez government included nationalization of telecommunications (2007), failed attempts to increase government control of the central bank (2007), signing of oil and gas cooperation accord with Russia (2008), joint exercises with Russia (2008) and abolishing of term limits for elected officials (2009). However, the economic crisis of 2008 also hit the country hard and kickstarted economic problems. In 2009, the Venezuelan government also took greater control of the banks in the country [39]. This is now recognized as the Venezuelan banking crisis of 2009-10 [40]. The bolivar currency was devalued in 2010 after the economy shrank by 5.8% in the last quarter of 2009 [36]. Despite the crisis, the government kept extending price controls on more basic goods to fight inflation [36]. There was a major drop in the military expenditure by the government – from 34.6 million USD in 2008 to 18 million USD in 2010 - due to smaller spending power, but the HRS and HDI in the country improved from -1.03488 HRS in 2008 to -0.87796 HRS in 2010 and 0.55 HDI in 2007 to 0.56 HDI in 2010, due to the increased price controls and greater accessibility causing short-term benefits. However, there was a rise in military expenditure by 2012 with the government military spending increasing to 25.1 million USD in 2012 while the HRS fell from -0.87796 in 2010 to -0.90614 in 2012.

President Chavez died in 2013 and Nicolas Maduro was elected president while the opposition contested the results. 2014 onwards, there was incredible damage to the economy of Venezuela. There was also a rise in the suppression of opposition and critics. The Government also announced cuts in public spending as Venezuelan oil prices reached a four-year low [36][41]. In 2015, the opposition coalition won a two-thirds supermajority in parliamentary elections [42]. In 2016, Venezuela saw mass protests for removing President Maduro from office for the economic crisis [43]. This then was followed by the election of a contested constitutional assembly in 2017 [36]. The results of the Presidential election held in 2018 were contested by the opposition as President Maduro won the elections [44]. 2018 saw massive harm to human rights with centralized control and suppression of decent [45]. In the same year, the UN announced that around 2 million Venezuelans fled from Venezuela starting from 2014, to avoid the ongoing economic crisis, which gave rise to a refugee crisis [46]. The above developments correspond with the human rights score in Venezuela dropping to -1.43452 in 2017 from 0.97435 in 2014. Military Expenditure dropped due to the worsening economy from 17.9 million USD in 2014 to 7.3 million USD in 2016 but saw a

rise to 8.7 million USD amidst a worsening economic crisis in 2017. Data about military expenditure is not available for Venezuela post-2017 due to a crackdown on agencies.

The Venezuelan case study is complicated due to the aspects of a major economic crisis, centralization of power and suppression of dissent. However, the general trend shows the prioritization and increase of military expenditure whenever possible, despite, and even while promulgating, reduction of human rights and freedom. This shows an impact on the economic security, human rights (political security), food security and health security of individuals in the country. There was also an impact on the personal (physical) security of the protesters. The HDI reflects minimal change even over a long time – increasing by less than 0.1 points over 15 years – due to the concentration on the military over human security.

3.3.3 Case Study: Ukraine

Ukraine declared independence in 1991 while the Soviet Union collapsed [47]. Presidential elections were held in 1994. In 1995, Ukraine adopted a new democratic constitution, and its local currency was introduced [47][48].

In 2002, the General elections resulted in a hung parliament and there were allegations of election fraud. The Ukrainian government announced its decision to launch a formal bid to join the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) [49]. There was a rise in military expenditure from 1042 million USD in 2000 to 1133 million USD in 2002 with a drop in HRS from -0.28012 in 2000 to -0.30265 in 2002. In 2004, the opposition leader Viktor Yushchenko launched mass protests over election results - the ‘Orange Revolution’ [50]. The elections were annulled by the Supreme Court and in 2005, Viktor Yushchenko became the president. The Global financial crisis hit Ukraine due to a fall in the demand for steel – the country’s main exports. The value of the Ukrainian currency declined marginally [47][51]. This is reflected in the Military expenditure, which saw the only decrease between 2008 and 2010, dropping from 2149 million USD in 2008 to 1967 million USD in 2010 although the share of government spending towards military expenditure remained the same (marking the consistent prioritization of military expenditure). In 2010, the previous president – Viktor Yanukovich – returned to power after the Presidential elections and the Parliament voted to abandon the aspiration to join NATO [47][49][52]. The ‘Maidan Revolution’ began in 2013 with mass protests against the decision to not sign an association agreement with the EU. Russian pressure was blamed for this decision [53]. Security forces killed over 77 protesters and the President flee to Russia. The opposition took over the government [47][54][55]. There is a marginal decrease in the human rights score for Ukraine between 2010 and 2016 – from -0.27944 in 2010 to -1.22003 in 2016. Despite the domestic turmoil, military expenditure continued to rise – from 1967 million USD in 2010 to 3507 million USD in 2016. This period encapsulates the protests, the elections, the Russian annexation of Crimea, another election with Petro Poroshenko winning presidential elections on a pro-Western agenda, Russian troops entering eastern Ukraine and the European Union brokering a ceasefire at talks in Belarus [47].

Table 4: Military Expenditure (Source: SIPRI), Share of Government spending on military (Source: SIPRI), human rights score (Source: Our World in Data), and human development index (Source: Our World in Data) in Ukraine (2000-2016)

Year	Military Expenditure (in USD millions)	% of Government spending on military	Human Rights Score (HRS) – Scale: -3.8 to 5.4	Human Development Index (HDI) – Scale: 0-1
2000	1042	6.10%	-0.28012	0.48
2002	1133	5.40%	-0.30265	-
2004	1495	4.90%	-0.29914	0.52 (2005)

2006	1808	4.30%	-0.14625	-
2008	2149	3.90%	-0.26558	0.54 (2007)
2010	1967	3.90%	-0.27944	0.54
2012	2000	3.30%	-0.53768	-
2014	2812	5.00%	-1.09345	0.56 (2015)
2016	3507	7.80%	-1.22003	-

The economy saw fragile growth in 2016. In 2017, Ukraine signed an Association Agreement with the EU to boost its economic and political ties with the EU. Since then, Ukraine has had another general election, won by Television comedian Volodymyr Zelensky and Ukraine has been looking for ways to gain a major economic boost to stimulate industrial revival [47][56][57][58]. Despite the turmoil in domestic situations – economic and political – there was a greater military expenditure. There is a trend of a constant rise in military expenditure (apart from the slowdown caused by the 2008 economic crisis) and a parallel fall in HRS for Ukraine between 2000 and 2016.

The trends of the rise and fall in the indexes of military expenditure and human security for Ukraine between 2000 and 2016 can be observed in Table 4. The aspects of human security impacted in the case of Ukraine were political security, economic security, food security and health security. As a newly independent country, Ukraine had a growing economy, which was minutely hampered by the 2008 crisis. This meant that the quality of life of people in the country was constantly improving minimally. This potentially prevented a dip in the HDI. However, the improvement in the HDI is also not marginal – an improvement of less than 0.1 in over 15 years.

3.3.4 Brief Study: South Sudan – An importing state not following the observed trend

South Sudan is one of the states to gain independence and sovereignty most recently – in 2011. It is an importing state, but being a new state and domestic instability impacts its correlation between military expenditure and HRS. With South Sudan as an exception, this paper will illustrate the drop in military expenditure with a parallel drop in human security.

Table 5: Military Expenditure (Source: SIPRI), Share of Government spending on military (Source: SIPRI), human rights score (Source: Our World in Data), and human development index (Source: Our World in Data) in South Sudan (2011-2017)

Year	Military Expenditure (in USD millions)	% of Government spending on military	Human Rights Score (HRS) – Scale: -3.8 to 5.4	Human Development Index (HDI) – Scale: 0-1
2011	1269	29.00%	-1.82468	-
2012	811	27.70%	-1.93981	-
2013	806	25.90%	-2.25709	-
2014	1051	23.70%	-2.47033	-
2015	844	25.60%	-2.55078	-
2016	246	9.00%	-2.58939	-
2017	106	6.20%	-2.59248	-

Soon after gaining independence in 2011, a civil war started in the new country in 2013 after President Salva Kiir Mayardit announced that he had prevented a coup attempt led by the then Vice-President Riek Machar [59]. This armed civil war fueled domestic instability and gave rise to killings of civilians from both sides, obstruction of humanitarian access and millions of citizens facing food shortages in absence of appropriate healthcare [60]. There was a peace agreement in mid-2015, which only lasted for about a year before the

conflict was refuelled [61]. In 2018, the leaders of the two sides signed a power-sharing agreement to end the domestic conflict and try to form a transitional government.

After independence, South Sudan stood to gain greatly from the control of the oil reserves of Sudan. However, the control of the pipelines remained with Sudan and the tensions with Sudan were high immediately after independence. Despite the oil wealth, the economic situation of South Sudan was among the worst in the world, and it was recognized as one of the least developed countries in the world. The constant violations of human security through the different aspects of economic, food, health insecurity, political, as well as, personal insecurity resulted in deterioration of human security in the region as represented in Table 5. The domestic instability and harsh economic conditions caused a simultaneous drop in military expenditure, as well as, human security. Another way to analyze this case study is the possible importance of human security for development. The hypothesis that human security could be a prerequisite for development or that human security can fuel development and growth in states is one beyond the scope of this paper. However, the case study of South Sudan does demonstrate how the relationship between military expenditure and human security does not always abide by an inverse proportionality.

3.3.5 Brief Study: USA – Arms Exporting State

The United States of America (US) as arms manufacturing western state enjoys a developed economy and high human security while enjoying great influence in the international community [62].

As manufacturers and producers of new arms and military technology, standards for securitization are set by manufacturers. This makes them the primary producers and exporters of arms, through which they gain massive economic and political benefits and can fuel the same into their domestic human security needs, while also being the largest spenders on military capabilities in the world [4, pp. 47-48][63]. Despite the pleasant conditions for the country, the US saw a rise in military expenditure with a parallel drop in HRS between 2002 and 2006. This could be related to the ‘war on terror,’ declared in 2001 [64]. This war on terror meant increased involvement of US troops in foreign territories and interventions with a crackdown on perceived domestic threats causing a drop in HRS in that time [65][66][67].

Table 6: Military Expenditure (Source: SIPRI), Share of Government spending on military (Source: SIPRI), human rights score (Source: Our World in Data), and human development index (Source: Our World in Data) in the United States of America (2000-2016)

Year	Military Expenditure (in USD millions)	% of Government spending on military	Human Rights Score (HRS) – Scale: -3.8 to 5.4	Human Development Index (HDI) – Scale: 0-1
2000	466759	-	1.16208	0.72
2002	528337	10.30%	0.54656	-
2004	655407	12.00%	-0.08974	0.74 (2005)
2006	695474	12.00%	-0.1423	-
2008	765973	12.00%	-0.00318	0.75 (2007)
2010	849867	12.30%	0.0906	0.77
2012	793157	12.00%	0.1763	-
2014	687112	10.40%	0.3772	0.78 (2015)
2016	669448	9.60%	0.25628	-

The trends of changes in the indexes of military expenditure and human security for the USA between 2000 and 2016 can be observed in Table 6. Although the US does not follow the inverse correlation between military expenditure and human security domestically, there is scope for further research on the military expenditure in the US and a drop in human

security in other countries due to intervention, arms supply, or military collaborations. However, an in-depth analysis of this correlation is beyond the scope of this paper and could be a possible research focus for an extended paper.

4 METHODOLOGY

4.1 Methodology for the case study analysis

It is important to highlight that correlation does not equal causation. Therefore, the paper does not conclude that high military expenditure state ‘causes’ a drop in human security but seeks to identify a possible trend that human security reflects with respect to military expenditure. The paper performs an analysis of two indexes – one is quantitative (military expenditure) and the other is qualitative (human security). This is done via the collation of quantitative data tables for each index and parallel analysis of empirical events in the same period. This is for a broader understanding of the numbers and trends observed on the dataset by understanding how they reflect on empirical events.

A desk-based methodology has been used to carry out empirical and data-based analysis using case studies of specific countries to follow the trends of military expenditure and human security for each country. The primary research for this study is the compilation and creation of datasets for the states in the time periods chosen for each. The secondary research used is for theoretical and conceptual analysis of the literature on military expenditure and human security, and the gathering of empirical reports and academic articles for the different events that have taken place in a certain time in each country.

For the study, this paper used case studies of three different arms importing states. These three states are Rwanda (during the Rwandan genocide), Ukraine and Venezuela. These case studies were followed by a brief study of South Sudan as an example of an importing state that fails to observe the same trends as other importing states. The study of South Sudan is followed by a brief study of the United States of America (USA) as an arms manufacturing and exporting state that does not follow the trend of inverse proportionality due to the benefits it reaps from the higher global military expenditure. However, an exceptional crisis like 9/11 has represented a similar short-term trend in that case as well. No state from the part-producing, middle category of states is used as a case study in the paper due to their trends tending to be like those of the importing or exporting states, or having a massive range of mixed nature of states within the category.

4.2 Measuring Military Expenditure

For the quantitative data on military expenditure, SIPRI - one of the most reliable sources of data on military expenditure and arms transfers is used. This is because of the three-tier sourcing of the data: 1) primary sources from official data from government publications and responses to questionnaires; 2) secondary sources that quote the primary data and; 3) additional secondary sources [26]. SIPRI’s understanding of military expenditure includes all capital and current expenditure that states undertake on – armed forces & peacekeeping forces, defence ministry & other agencies dedicated to defence projects, paramilitary forces – when judged to be trained and equipped for military operations, and military space activities [26]. Two measures are used for the quantification of military expenditure – the total value of military expenditure in million US Dollars (denoted as million USD or million \$ throughout the paper) and the share of government expenditure that was spent on military purposes illustrated as a percentage (%) of government spending. The valuation of military expenditure in million USD is constant at 2018 USD prices and

exchange rates after having adjusted for inflation to ensure adjustments that allow comparison over longer periods of time. The data collected is yearly data for countries from around the globe from 1988-2019 for both, the total valuation as well as government expenditure on military spending.

The two measures are used for gauging the changing trends in military expenditure to account for government spending power and economic circumstances. Therefore, a drop in military expenditure might be a result of economic shrinkage. The prioritization of the military can be observed using the share of government expenditure in that case. Such a trend would mean that despite the economic crunch, the government prioritized military expenditure and devoted fewer resources to its citizen's immediate concerns - observed through the indexes for human security.

4.3 Measuring Human security

Human security encompasses various factors impacting human lives across the world. These factors, as further elaborated in the conceptual analysis are economic security, personal security, political security, health security, food security, community security and environmental security. For this study, two different indexes were used – HRS and HDI.

4.3.1 Human Rights Score (HRS)

Human rights include various aspects of human security since they intend to guarantee basic human liberties and basic security. However, it is understood that human rights are a qualitative index. Therefore, the measurement of a qualitative phenomenon like human rights, which is a global norm in contemporary international politics, poses several problems. Measurement of human rights involves inherent problems in collecting such data and information [68] [9, p. 236]. The best way to minimize biases in a study would be to use and combine data from multiple sources. Therefore, this study uses the human rights score available on Our world in data-based at Oxford University, which is a compilation of human rights scores constructed using an econometric model with data from nine different sources [69][70]. Human rights scores recording by Our World in Data is a measure of the protection of the physical integrity of individuals. This includes a measure of how a government protects its citizens' physical integrity, taking into account torture, government killing, political imprisonment, extrajudicial executions, mass killings and disappearances [69]. The values for the recorded human rights score range from -3.8 to about 5.4 and higher scores indicate better upholding of human rights by the government for its people. The data included yearly scored for countries from around the globe from 1946-2017.

4.3.2 Human Development Index (HDI)

The measures for the HDI for this study have been taken from Our World in Data as well. The source for this compilation of the data is the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). The Human Development Index aims to take a more holistic approach towards human lives and tries to measure the average achievement in key dimensions of human development – a long and healthy life, being knowledgeable & gaining an education and having a decent standard of living [71]. The index includes data for countries from around the globe in 5-year intervals from 1980-2017. The scale for HDI is 0-1. Higher scores on that scale represent a better status of human development. HDI provides a great measure that encompasses factors of education, healthy life and standard of living, that impact human

security and such inclusiveness makes it an appropriate index to be used alongside human rights to gain a holistic understanding of human security in a certain state at a certain time.

5 CONCLUSION

This paper aimed to analyze the correlation between the variables of military expenditure and human security in arms importing states. The variables of military expenditure and human security are quantified with the use of 2 measuring indexes for each variable. The correlation is analyzed by using case studies of different states in different periods of time to observe and compare the rise and fall in the indexes to read trends. Based on a quantitative analysis with empirical academic literature and media reports of events, it illustrates an inverse proportionality between human security and military expenditure in importing states. An inverse proportionality means that a rise in military expenditure observes a drop in human security, and a decrease in military expenditure observes a rise in the levels of human security of a state.

The results indicate a need for in-depth inquiry into the causal links for the correlations between human security and military expenditure and a possible need to redefine the understanding of ‘security’ in international relations. With the rise in the global acceptance of the norms of humanitarianism, there is a need for leaders to expand the understanding of security from militarism to humanitarianism. Such an understanding can use the UNDP’s threat-based approach to human security for policymaking to expand the scope of security to include economic, political, personal, community, food, health, and environmental security.

A major problem is that massive military expenditure in a world of limited resources means that a large chunk of the pie will be allocated to accelerating the probability of war and a smaller chunk will be dedicated to directly fighting the troubles that ail humans. There needs to be a revival of dialogue on disarmament for diversification of resource allocation from the military to meeting the goals of human security and development. Such dialogue made ample progress during the cold war, when the Soviet Union tried to attain consensus on mutual disarmament in equal proportions for trust-building and redirecting the freed-up resources to newly independent developing countries to aid their development process [1]. Although the efforts in the UN failed, technological advancements provide greater opportunities today. The progress made by the international community in the cold war years can be leveraged to use the existing structures for furthering possible disinvestment and repurposing of resources towards human security globally. Even little proportions of the global military expenditure can achieve several international goals if repurposed. For example, it is estimated that quality universal primary and secondary education for all – Sustainable Development Goal (SDG) 4 – can be achieved with investment amount barely exceeding 3 per cent of global annual military spending; eliminating extreme poverty and hunger globally – SDG 1 and 2 – would amount to only 13 per cent of the annual global military spending [72]; and reinvesting 5 per cent of the global annual military expenditure would exceed the initial estimated costs for climate change adaptation in developing countries – SDG 13. The UN Secretary General’s Agenda for Disarmament – Securing our Global Future also emphasizes the need to rethink the disproportionate growing military expenditure globally by engaging in more active international diplomacy and cooperation. Rethinking security in broader terms to include human needs globally beyond military capabilities can catapult human security needs into substantial progress into a more peaceful, equal, and cooperative world for all.

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