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Table Of Contents:

Analysing Israel-Hamas Conflict Based on Game Theory Approach	Abdullah Hamida	Beijing University of Posts and Telecommunications, PRC	5
	Yongsheng Jin		
Conciliation: Culture Making Byproduct	Slobodan Dan Paich	Artship Foundation, San Francisco, USA / University of Medicine and Pharmacy, Romania	16
Controlling the menace of high-tech weapons: A new direction for arms control	Ryan R. Swan	Rhenish Friedrich Wilhelm University of Bonn, Germany	17
	Haig Hovanness	Peace Action Committee of the Green Party of the United States, USA	
Encircling Transnational Peace through Khaita – Joyful Dances	Eva Leick	University of Salzburg, Austria	28
Game Theory and Dealing with Water Conflict	Seyede Simin Mirhashemi Dehkordi	Tarbiat Modares University, Iran	44
	Hojjat Mianabadi		
Global Citizenship Education (GCED) in The Digital Era: The Unexpected Tool for Peacebuilding. How 21st-century fluencies can shape sustainable global peace?	Nezha El Massoudi	Center for Diplomatic and Strategic Studies-Paris, France	45
Improving social capital, a solution to manage water conflicts	Behavar Deylami	Tarbiat Modares University, Iran	62
Making the Soft Power Hard: Nepal's Internal Ability in Safeguarding National Interest	Pitambar Bhandari	Tribhuvan University, Nepal	65
Reflections on Preliminary Fieldwork: The Militarisation of Public Space in Srinagar and its Impact on Rhythms of Everyday Life	Arshita Nandan	University of Kent, UK	66
Rethinking security: An analytical study to explore the correlation between military expenditure and human security in arms importing (developing) states	Anant Saria	Mumbai, India	67
Study On The Situation Between France And The South China Sea From The Perspective Of Balance Of Power Theory	Zhenyi Chen	University of Nottingham, Ningbo, People's Republic of China	85
Tending To The Devastating Wounds Of Nigerian Girls And Women	Safiya Ibn Garba	Generations For Peace, Jordan	94
The American Perception of the Palestine-Israel Conflict	Israa Daas	University of Missouri - Kansas City, USA	107
Theory of Institutional Peace and Peacebuilding in transboundary river basins	Reihane Nofeli	Tarbiat Modares University, Iran	129
	Seyede Simin Mirhashemi Dehkordi		
	Hojjat Mianabadi		
UNAMID: A Path Towards Hybrid Peacekeeping?	Francisco Thó Monteiro	ISCTE - Lisbon University Institute, Portugal	130

Index Of Authors:

Bhandari, Pitambar	65
Chen, Zhenyi	85
Daas, Israa	107
Dehkordi, Seyede Simin Mirhashemi	44
Dehkordi, Seyede Simin Mirhashemi	129
Deylami, Behavar	62
Garba, Safiya Ibn	94
Hamida, Abdullah	5
Hovaness, Haig	17
Jin, Yongsheng	5
Leick, Eva	28
Massoudi, Nezha El	45
Mianabadi, Hojjat	44
Mianabadi, Hojjat	129
Monteiro, Francisco Thó	130
Nandan, Arshita	66
Nofeli, Reihane	129
Paich, Slobodan Dan	16
Saria, Anant	67
Swan, Ryan R.	17

Analysing Israel-Hamas Conflict Based on Game Theory Approach

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ABSTRACT

The Islamic Resistance Movement (AKA: Hamas) has taken control over Gaza Strip, Palestine, in 2007. Since then, the organization was in a continues hit-run conflict against the Israeli Defence Forces (IDF). The conflict is very resistant to any sort of resolution, and Hamas and Israel engage frequently in what it seems an endless cycle of resentment and violence. Despite numerous mediations by global and regional powers, this conflict appears to be further away than ever. This particular conflict can't be addressed according to the common negotiation theories that based on rationality and hard politics, which seems not that functional. Instead, a model based on the game theory approach is presented in this study to explain this phenomenon. In this work, some facts about Israel - Hamas regional concerns are explained. Moreover, the study analyses the reasons behind Hamas enforcing calm in Gaza, even though Hamas considers Israel as its arch enemy. The presented model shows that whenever Israel and Hamas reach an agreement, both sides can collaborate in maintaining a state of calm. Moreover, results show that the proposed model is applicable to analyse a conflict in terms of actions, duration and terms of settlement.

KEYWORDS: Israel; Israeli-Palestinian conflict; Hamas; Gaza strip; Game theory

1 INTRODUCTION

The Palestinian-Israeli conflict is indeed one of the longest conflicts in our world's modern history. It has been an intractable ongoing conflict for more than seventy years (since 1948). The conflict has entered another phase ever since Hamas's victory in the 2006 parliamentary election. Hamas is a Palestinian political organization, which is widely accepted in Palestinian society and attracts large support from the Palestinian public. Hamas's civilian wing offers many services for the Palestinian population, especially living in Gaza, and many Palestinians show appreciation to the organization. On the other hand, the military struggle against Israel had made Hamas's military wing highly popular, despite its heavy cost for Palestinian population. This popularity made Hamas's first won the parliamentary elections in 2006, presenting their first experience in politics and governance under the Palestinian Authority (PA). This experience compelled Hamas to change its behaviour and adapt to the new political environment to become later a dual-purposed faction that maintains its politics and governance role alongside its armed resistance. Since Hamas's election victory, the movement has shown its willingness to be open to discuss the solution of a Palestinian state. Hamas officials called for diplomatic efforts with different western organizations. Even though these calls were mostly denied due to the background of the organization, it shows the dramatic changes in Hamas's views towards having political backgrounds despite the isolation it lives in today.

Hamas has made some diplomatic changes dealing with international and regional organizations. However, it continued its refusal to abandon the armed struggle against Israel. The ongoing conflict is regarded as extreme and considered as an influential, deviant, as well as a critical case in the present literature [1]. Many studies have investigated the obstacles that restrain the Palestinian-Israeli peace process. Bar-Siman-Tov devoted an entire volume to define the "barriers to a peaceful resolution" addressing the Israeli-Palestinian conflict [2]. Landman was one of the contributors who argued that the basic issue between Palestinians and Israelis has originated from the parties' unwillingness to make compromises about values that are "sacred" rather than from their incapability to achieve a peaceful solution on aspects of realistic concern [3]. While There is no shortage of scholarly studies on ways and means to resolve the Palestinian-Israeli conflict [4]. There is a dearth of research on the possibility of a Hamas-Israel settlement, probably due to the conflict dynamics and negotiation model natures. Thus, new approaches and models are needed to deliver better understanding to the conflict nature and scenarios.

Game theory is a mathematical and analytical study of both cooperation and conflict. The main purpose of applying game theory in any case is to formulate, construct, analyse, and gain insight into strategic scenarios. Game theory was used and applied in problems of war and politics, driven a revolution in economics, sociology and psychology, and established links with evolution and biology, and more [5-9]. In political science, game theory has been adopted in many applications, such as: examining the importance of honour and symbols in international politics [10], applying the complexity theory in public policy [11], examining the institutional changes and various political strategies [12], analysing negotiation process for a potential agreement [13]. For example: De Mesquita presents an interesting game theoretic model explaining the increase in terrorism after government concessions, considering the concessions are only accepted by moderates and not extremist [14].

The concepts of game theory provide a language to formulate, structure, analyse, and understand strategic scenarios. In addition, game theory has been used to study a wide variety

of human behaviours. Increasingly, political scientists apply game theory to analyse strategic scenarios across different settings including political economy, public choice, war bargaining, international relations, negotiations, positive political theory, and social choice theory. Focusing on negotiations, game theory considered as a guide since it may provide insights that can lead to practical results. Game theory does not only offer options and strategic decisions but also it provides explanations to most of political actions and interactions.

This study proposes a game theoretic approach to analyse the interaction between the Hamas-led government in Gaza and the Israeli government. The proposed approach shows the analytical views of different scenarios in both calm and conflict. The established model attempts to explain the decisions made by both parties considering a given situation. Furthermore, the model focuses on the interactions between the two parties on the instrumental or material values which are subject of rational thinking. Sacred values are not part of this study due to the complications they might entail.

2 MODEL AND ANALYSIS

The proposed game theoretic model captures the interaction between the Israeli government (I) and Hamas-led government (G) in Gaza. Hamas seeks to benefit from any situation to lift the ongoing siege over Gaza, while the Israeli government tries to avoid any conflict that might cause trouble, and to minimize concessions offered for calm in the area. The game starts by the assumption that the Israeli government making an offer to Hamas which will be deciding later whether to accept or reject it. The second move is for Hamas whether to accept the offer or reject it. Accepting the offer means that Hamas agrees to keep the area in calm and stop any militant activity against Israel. Hamas is also supposed to enforce any understanding reached by the negotiation process on other Palestinian organization, moderates or extremists, from engaging in actions against Israel. Rejecting the offer means Hamas and other organizations operating in Gaza Strip are in war with Israel and can choose a preferred level of responsive actions. The level of responsive actions on Hamas's side varies, depending on the Israeli aggregation in a given period of time. Furthermore, the assumption is when Hamas accept the offer, it is unable to violate the agreement due to pressure of international mediators and the amount of responsive actions Israel can use against the Gaza territory and the organization itself.

After describing the general outline, the detailed description of the underlying assumptions could be explained as follows: in round τ , the Israeli government I offers a number of concessions $k^\tau \geq 0$. These concessions include a determined part ($\beta \in (0, 1)$) as public properties, such as easing the siege or allowing facilities, the benefits of which can be gained by Hamas whether they accept the concessions or not. Then the other portion ($1 - \beta$) of the concessions includes private properties that benefits Hamas exclusively if they accept the concessions. For simplicity, we will refer to the benefit Hamas gains after accepting an offer as k , even though not all concessions benefit Hamas exclusively. The Israeli government also attempts to take a planned respond to any militant attack from Gaza. Using these planned actions or strategies, the probability of successfully stopping the attacks is based on two variables: (1) the amount of efforts, planning and funding responsive actions, invested by the Israeli government in round τ ($a^\tau \in [0, a]$), and (2) whether Hamas is able to enforce an agreement on other factions to keep the area in calm ($c^\tau \in \{\underline{c}, \bar{c}\}$), where $\bar{c}$ and $\underline{c}$ represents whether or not Hamas is able to enforce control over Gaza, respectively. The probability of Israeli government defeating Hamas is $\sigma(a, c)$, where: $\sigma : [0, \bar{a}] \cdot \{\underline{c}, \bar{c}\} \rightarrow [0, 1]$, and the

probability of Hamas surviving the Israeli efforts is $1 - \sigma$. The assumption is that the probability of Israel's success to stop threats from Gaza increases as the planned countermeasures are advanced in response to any threat (i.e. $\partial\sigma/\partial a > 0$), and it also increases knowing Hamas has a control to stop any other faction to attempt a security threat to Israel (i.e. $\sigma(a, \bar{c}) > \sigma(a, \underline{c})$, for all a). Following the given facts on the ground, Hamas has a powerful control over other factions operating in Gaza. A scenario in which Hamas reaches to an agreement with Israel, no other Palestinian faction will breach the agreement. Thus, we will refer to this variable in our model as c , without the upper and lower bounds, which also refer to the cost assigned to this control.

For this model, we assume that since Hamas has a control over other factions in Gaza, it will be held responsible for any attempts against Israel once they have reached to an agreement. This would help Israel in the planning process of their responsive actions, since targeting Hamas will be a priority in case of a conflict. That explains the fact that when some breaches occur from Gaza, the Israeli government targets Hamas known places even if the breaches are not made by Hamas. Thus, knowing Hamas is in control would focus the Israeli government efforts. It is also important to know that the Israeli responsive efforts are costly. Israel can accept a cost $Y(a)$, which is a function increases and convex based on a , where a has an effect of $\omega(a)$ on weaken and limiting the militant capabilities of Hamas.

For setting the model, if Israeli government succeed in defeating Hamas, it gets a payoff of (W), otherwise it gets a payoff of 0. Similarly, if Hamas succeed in defeating Israel, it gets a payoff of (P), otherwise it gets a 0. Denote that Israeli government can bear a cost G of attacks from Gaza and a cost k of concessions. Finally, at each round, the Israeli government gets a benefit (x) for not being defeated, and Hamas gets a benefit (y) for surviving. On the other hand, assume that the total amount of attacks attempted from Gaza in round τ by G^τ . The probability of Hamas's success to survive the Israel responsive efforts in round τ , is given by $\pi(G^\tau)$ where $\pi : R^+ \rightarrow [0, 1]$ is a function increases and concaves. For each round τ , there are three potential results with different outcomes: (1) The Israeli government gains success on the conflict with probability σ , leading to ending the game with a resulting payoff of W for Israel and a payoff of 0 for Hamas; (2) Hamas gains success on the conflict with probability $(1 - \sigma) \times \pi$, leading to ending the game with a resulting payoff of 0 for Israel and a payoff of P for Hamas; and (3) Neither Israel nor Hamas concludes the conflict with probability $(1 - \sigma) \times (1 - \pi)$, leading to continuing the game to next round with a payoff of $x - Y - G - k$ for Israel and $y + k - \omega(a) - \eta$ for Hamas, where η is the resources devoted by Hamas to maintain G . In case the game continues as neither side concludes the conflict, the history in round τ can sum up to H^τ , denoting $V_I(H^\tau)$ and $V_G(H^\tau)$ are the continuation value of Israeli government and Hamas in round τ , respectively. Two more assumptions should be emphasized. First, denote $W \geq x + V_I(H^\tau)$ and $P \geq y + V_G(H^\tau)$ for all H^τ and all τ , which means that both the Israeli government and Hamas would always favour wining the conflict instead of having it continued. Second, denote $x + V_I(H^\tau) - Y(a) - \hat{G} - \hat{k} > 0$ and $y + V_G(H^\tau) - \eta - \omega(a) > 0$ for all H^τ , where $\hat{G}$ is the maximum tolerable number of attacks from Gaza and $\hat{k}$ is the total amount of concessions to be offered by Israel in an equilibrium (to be described later). The second assumption indicates that both the Israeli government and Hamas prefer continuing the game instead of losing the conflict. The expected outcome represented in the continuation value of the Israeli government can be given as follows:

$$V_I(H^{\tau-1}) = \sigma(a^\tau).W + (1 - \sigma(a^\tau)).(1 - \pi(G^\tau)).(x - Y(a^\tau) - G^\tau - k^\tau + V_I(H^\tau)) \quad (1)$$

Similarly, the expected outcome represented in the continuation value of Hamas can be given as follows:

$$V_G(H^{\tau-1}) = \left((1 - \sigma(a^\tau))\pi(G^\tau) \right) \cdot P + (1 - \sigma(a^\tau)) \cdot (1 - \pi(G^\tau)) \cdot (y - \omega(a) - \eta + k + V_G(H^\tau)) \quad (2)$$

When Hamas accepts an offer, it plays a commitment game with the Israeli government, in which Hamas chooses whether or not to enforce calm and control over the territory using their influence power (at cost c , which could be political efforts or a force on the ground). On the other hand, the Israeli government chooses whether or not to honour the offered concessions. full stage game beside this commitment subgame is better described in Fig. 1.




Fig.1 Interaction stage game

In this game, the Israeli responsive actions (offensive or defensive) could be analysed using the following equation:

$$\frac{\partial \sigma(a)}{\partial a} [W - (1 - \pi(G))(x - Y(a) - k - G + V_I)] = (1 - \sigma(a))(1 - \pi(G)Y(a)) \quad (3)$$

Equation (3) implies a definition of optimal level of responsive actions (a^*). The left-side of the equation characterizes the marginal benefit in terms of increasing the Israeli government probability of winning the conflict as the efforts increases. On the right-side, however, there are the marginal costs of these efforts in terms of resources devoted to this purpose. On the other hand, Hamas responsive actions (offensive or defensive) could be analysed using the following equation:

$$\frac{d\pi}{dg} (1 - \sigma)(P - \varepsilon) - \frac{\partial \sigma}{\partial a^*} \frac{\partial a^*}{\partial g} (\pi P + (1 - \pi)\varepsilon) = v' \quad (4)$$

The expected outcome of Hamas can be influenced by the amount of resources utilized in the actions in three dimensions. The first dimension, $(\frac{d\pi}{dg} (1 - \sigma)(P - \varepsilon) > 0)$, means there is a direct impact of increasing the resources on the probability of defeating the Israeli government. The second dimension, $(-\frac{\partial \sigma}{\partial a^*} \frac{\partial a^*}{\partial g} (\pi P + (1 - \pi)\varepsilon) < 0)$, means that as the resources of Hamas increases, the level of countermeasure efforts of Israeli government also increases, which could mean an increase in the probability of Hamas being defeated. The third dimension $-v' < 0$ denotes the occasional costs of utilising scarce resources in actions. Equation (2) can explain how Hamas could behave based on different resources and levels of attacks. Consequently, at an interior solution, g^* is growing in P and R . This formulation will enable us to determine the level of responsive actions Hamas choose.

The expected outcome of Hamas when engaging in violence (responsive actions) is:

$$out_G(\text{actions}) = \sum_{j=0}^{\infty} [(1 - \sigma)(1 - \pi)]^j [(1 - \sigma)\pi P + v(R - G)] = \frac{(1 - \sigma)\pi P + v(R - G)}{\sigma + (1 - \sigma)\pi} \quad (5)$$

If $k < out_G(\text{actions})$, then Hamas will not accept the offer. In this case, the total level of violence would be G , which indicates that the Israeli government's expected outcome as follows:

$$Out_I(k) = \sum_{j=0}^{\infty} [(1 - \sigma)(1 - \pi)]^j [(1 - \sigma)(1 - \pi)(x - \gamma - G) + \sigma W] = \frac{(1 - \sigma)(1 - \pi)(x - \gamma - G) + \sigma W}{\sigma + (1 - \sigma)\pi} \quad (6)$$

The Israeli government's expected outcome is given as follows:

$$Out_I(\hat{k}) = \frac{(1 - \sigma)(1 - \pi)(x - \gamma - \hat{k}) + \sigma W}{\sigma + (1 - \sigma)\pi} \quad (7)$$

Based on parameter values, both resulting utilities can arise in equilibrium. The main characteristics of the equilibria in this game are presented in the following proposition. To summarize this result, there are two different equilibrium paths that can be realized for this game considering the two players have a cooperation during in the commitment subgame. These two paths are shown as follows:

1. No Deal: when concessions are offered, leading to a level of responsive actions
2. Making a deal: when concessions is offered, leading to a state of calm in the area.

3 MODEL APPLICATION

The model has shown high applicability in resembling the ongoing conflict between Hamas and Israel. Many examples could be drawn starting from the Gaza war in 2008-2009, also known as operation cast lead, Gaza war of 2012 (operation pillar of defence), and Gaza war of 2014 (operation protective edge). A recent example is presented in this study, in which the Gaza war of May, 2021 also known as Operation Guardian of the Walls is analysed.

3.1 Confrontation Background

The fighting that began on May 10th was sparked by a rocket attack on Jerusalem by Hamas in response to clashes earlier in the holy city and other tensions in the area, most notably the Sheikh Jarrah crisis. Hamas called the ensuing conflict the "Sword of Jerusalem Battle". Whereas, the IDF responded by launching Operation "Guardian of the Walls", which ended 11 days later, on May 21, with a unilateral ceasefire. Israel stopped launching airstrikes and Hamas stopped firing rockets and mortar shells.

3.2 Analysis using game theoretic approach

The Gaza war 2021 had witnessed massive diplomatic efforts to put an end to the conflict. The efforts resulted in several attempts to ceasefire. a game theoretic approach to analyse the negotiation process to ceasefire during Gaza war 2021 between Hamas and Israel is demonstrated. the options that both sides had and the strategies they chose to maximise their outcome were explored. The analysis addresses the level of violence in which each side engaged, the duration of the conflict and the terms of settlement.

3.3 Response levels

Israel and Hamas agreed to cease hostilities from 20 May [15-16]. A ceasefire deal ending 11 days of fighting. Both sides claimed victory in the conflict [17-18]. The truce tentatively concluded the fourth war between Israel and the Islamist militant group since 2008 [19]. Israeli Reports indicated Thirteen people were killed, 114 injuries directly related to rocket attacks, and another 198 indirectly related to rocket attacks [20-22]. The UN and Human Rights Watch reported that 260 Palestinians had been killed, half of them (129) civilians including 66 children and 40 women [23-25]. The deaths of some 243 were reportedly killed by Israeli Defence Forces. The Gazan Health Ministry stated 1,948 individuals were wounded, of whom 610 were children, and 400 women [23][25]. According to a report by the Intelligence and Terrorism Information Centre, which has ties to the IDF, 48% of the Palestinians killed in Gaza were militants. The report noted varying figures of Palestinians killed in Gaza ranging between 240 and 260 and analysed the deaths of 234 Palestinians in the Gaza Strip [26].

As it could be concluded, both sides choose to play the commitment subgame entailing accepting a level of concessions by a Palestinian faction knowing that Israel are committed to deliver the offered concessions. Based on equation (3), the Israeli government intensified its actions as the probability of winning the round increases, choosing a level of action = $(1 - \sigma(a))(1 - \pi(G)Y(a))$. On the other side, Hamas's choses a level of responsive action based on equation (4) using its maximum capacity of actions against Israel. Hamas used a variety of rockets and mortars indicating an increase of their resources. Maintaining such level of responsive actions comes with high cost on both sides. Costs include resources for

maintaining these actions, and the effect of these actions on the ground and the number of casualties.

3.4 Conflict Duration

The probability of a conflict to be continued for next round is given by $(1 - \sigma)(1 - \pi)$.

Thus, the estimated duration of a conflict can be given as follows:

$$Duration = \sum_{j=0}^{\infty} [(1 - \sigma)(1 - \pi)]^j = \frac{1}{\sigma + (1 - \sigma)\pi} \quad (8)$$

Even though both σ and π were relatively large during the beginning of this war, the duration was shorter than any other before. This is because both parties were not expecting this continuation of the war since there were early indication of diplomatic effort to stop it. In fact, there were ceasefire proposals since the first day of the conflict, in which it had Israel rejection and Hamas's acceptance. Given the previous history of Hamas $V_g(H)$, they are not in favour of continuing the conflict, but rather reaching a level of outcome as reached before, and therefore they chose to continue using a level of actions as in equation (4). Israel in return upgraded their responsive actions to it maximum to target everything that could influence Hamas's decision to accept an immediate ceasefire. For 11 days, both parties used a maximum level of responsive actions causing an unprecedented magnitude of the destruction in area.

3.5 Settlement Terms

The model also provides insights into the terms of settlements between the Israeli government and Hamas. As explained earlier, Hamas will consider striking a deal if $k \geq out_G(actions)$. Knowing Hamas preferences, the negotiation process is very difficult since the level of concessions Israel is willing to offer is lower than acceptable for Hamas. Assume that Israeli government is willing to offer the minimal level of concessions that could enable solving the commitment subgame, then this level would be worth:

$$Out_I(\hat{k}) = \frac{(1 - \sigma)(1 - \pi)(x - \gamma - \hat{k}) + \sigma W}{\sigma + (1 - \sigma)\pi} \quad (9)$$

The level of concessions can be influenced by probability of one side winning the conflict. As when the probability of Israeli government to win the conflict increases, Hamas can be more flexible to accept this level of concessions. This implies that the more likely for Hamas to lose a conflict, the more appealing it is to make a deal and accept an offer. This explains the fact that by the end of the conflict Hamas accepted somehow the same level of concessions made by the first week of the conflict. Studying the conditions of both sides for a ceasefire, we can briefly show some of what they demand. Israel made small list of demands included no violence against Israel neither by firing rockets nor any other activities from Gaza guaranteed by Egypt (the mediator for the ceasefire agreement). While Hamas required the permit to transfer food and medical supplies furnished by the United Nations and Physicians for Human Rights, aid workers, and journalists into the Gaza Strip. Furthermore, Hamas insisted in ending the Sheikh Jarrah crisis, which shown the Israeli high court suspends its rule in its case. Obviously, this time Hamas received a higher level of concessions since the Israeli government can tolerate some level of G and γ . The continuation of the conflict would decrease the outcome $(x - \gamma - G)$ of the Israeli government. It is worth mentioning that this level of concessions required Hamas a higher cost considering the effects of the escalation on the area and the high number actualities.

4 CONCLUSION

This work presents a game theoretic approach to analyse a negotiation process between Hamas and the Israeli government. Ever since Hamas took control over Gaza Strip in 2007, the area has been witnessing frequent violent events affecting people living in and around Gaza Strip. During the recent years with some diplomatic efforts, Hamas and Israel came to realize a better way of dealing with each other through a negotiation process. Even though the two parties are not directly communicating, they were able to find a solution. We explained a game theoretic approach that models the scenarios of alternative choices they both can adopt to maximize their outcome. Considering the responsive actions from both sides and the cost of these actions, parties can choose different strategies to handle the situation. The model explains the phenomena that even though Israel considers Hamas as terrorist organization, yet it allows some facilitations that enable Hamas to control Gaza Strip. Moreover, even though Hamas considers Israel as an occupier and an enemy, it does not allow any militant activates against Israel from Gaza when an agreement is reached. The presented study describes a stage game that include a commitment subgame in which players can rely on history-dependent information to reach communicatively efficient equilibrium. The model shows that solving the commitment game leads to two paths: violent path when (No deal) is made, and calm path when a (deal) is made. Based on the history of the conflict, both Israel and Hamas have adopted different strategies lead to those different paths. Recently, it could be easily noticed that Israel and Hamas are tending to establish an understanding about keeping the area in calm. It is unfortunate that this understanding has come with expensive cost since it is realized after putting the area through four wars caused the area a massive amount of destruction. Studying the proposed model and adopting different strategies could lead to different results, yet one of the results include a peaceful path that could benefit both sides.

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Conciliation: Culture Making Byproduct

Life Long Learning - Tangible/Intangible Skills Training - Mutual Care Understanding

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Abstract

Reclaiming public space at Oakland's Arroyo Public Park, a nexus of crime and illegal activities. A coalition of neighbors invited local performing artists to help animate city agencies, inspire repair of the amphitheater and create daytime performances in the summer, mostly by children. It gave voice to and represented many people. Reclaiming space for community was the impetus, structured curriculum activities were means. Safe public space and learning were two inseparable goals.

Conciliation learning through specific responses, example: *Crisis Of Perseverance* acute among children and youth lacking role models or witnessing success through perseverance. Artists of all types are the embodiment of achievable mastery and completion. Taking place on redefined historic 1940 passenger-cargo/military ship for public peacetime use and as a cultural space.

Mixt generations after and outside school programs: *Children and Architecture* project's intention was to integrate children's internal wisdom of playing with learning about the world of architecture (environment and co-habitability) as starting point was an intergenerational setting: 5-12 olds + parents and volunteers, twice weekly from 1989 to 1995 at the Museum of Children's Art in Oakland, California.

Concluding Examples Public celebration and engagements as inadvertent *conciliations* if prepared for before hand.

Biographical sketch:

Slobodan Dan Paich native of former Yugoslavia was born 1945. He lived in England from 1967 to 1985. Slobodan taught the History of Art and Ideas, Design and Art Studio from 1969 through 1985 at various institutions in London, including North-East London Polytechnic, Thames Polytechnic and Richmond College-American University in London. Between 1986 to 1992, he taught at the University of California at Berkeley. With a number of scholars, artists, and community leaders, he founded the Artship Foundation in 1992, and has been its Executive Director ever since. He also served as a board member of the Society of Founders of the International Peace University in Berlin/Vienna from 1996 to 2002, where he lectured annually and chaired its Committee on Arts and Culture.

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CONTROLLING THE MENACE OF HIGH-TECH WEAPONS: A NEW DIRECTION FOR ARMS CONTROL

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Abstract

This paper describes the risks posed by the advent of software-based weaponry (SBW) and the novel challenges it raises for existing arms control architectures. It highlights the fundamental mismatch between the dynamic, persistent character of SBW advancement and the static, intermittent nature of prevailing arms control practices, and argues that a new arms control model is needed in order to keep pace with the rapidly evolving SBW threat. It introduces a preliminary sketch of a modernized arms control approach that better accounts for the realities of contemporary arms development.

Keywords: *arms control, arms race, high-tech weapons, emerging technologies*

I. Introduction

Development of a new generation of software-based weapons (SBW) is accelerating in the course of an intensifying international arms race, unrestrained by existing arms control arrangements. Advanced nations are systematically adapting breakthroughs in software-controlled microelectronics to embed machine intelligence in a broad range of weapons. The software-intensive nature of these weapons systems allows them to be modified as quickly as improved software becomes available, enabling not just basic weapon performance improvements, but the provision of entirely new capabilities, such as networked cooperative operation and autonomous functioning.

The unique characteristics of SBW threaten to destabilize strategic dynamics between advanced military nations, heightening the risk of runaway escalation scenarios, inadvertent conflict provocation and third-party hacking. While regulatory containment of the Pandora's Box of high-tech arms racing is desperately needed, prevailing arms control frameworks are ill-suited to the task. The lumbering arms control processes of today developed in response to previous generations of primarily hardware-based weapon systems with static capabilities limited by physical characteristics. These weapons took considerable time to develop, deploy and subsequently modify, allowing the parties to conclude arms control agreements at wide intervals, with confidence that they would have sufficient time to gauge and manage future risk. The protean character of modern SBW creates a fundamental challenge for the static, slow-moving nature of existing arms control frameworks and practices.

We argue that the old paradigm simply cannot keep pace with rapidly evolving SBW threats and that a new arms control model is needed – one that is modernized to account for the contemporary and future realities of SBW. We introduce a preliminary sketch of a new regulatory framework for weapon capabilities for which i) software is intrinsic to weapon functioning; and ii) this software is readily modifiable. These criteria cover a range of kinetic, electro-magnetic and purely digital weapons categories and, given the current high-tech trend, will likely come to cover most sub-nuclear weaponry in the future. Our proposed framework is substantively tailored to address contemporary risks and challenges, and structurally designed to remedy recurrent problems which have plagued arms control efforts to date.

II. SBW Risks

SBW technology is being deployed in a wide variety of military systems in ground, naval, airborne, orbital, and cyber weapons systems. Software is a critical component of modern military systems enabling surveillance, targeting and engagement of enemy forces. It provides the “intelligence” that greatly amplifies the power of modern weaponry. We briefly highlight current SBW development in space, autonomous and cyber weapons. In each of these categories, dangerous arms racing is under way in the absence of effective arms control.

i. Space Weapons

With the launch of the Sputnik satellite in 1957, military planners immediately grasped the potential for exploitation of satellite technology. Any nation mastering this technology could greatly expand its surveillance, communications and weapons delivery capabilities on a global scale. No part of the world would be out of reach of orbital platforms circling the

planet. As the U.S. and Soviet Union raced ahead in developing and deploying military reconnaissance and communications satellites, the ominous possibility of putting nuclear bombs in orbit led to the 1967 Outer Space Treaty (OST) banning nuclear weapons in space.

The OST ban, however, was limited to nuclear weapons and weapons of mass destruction. Weapons intended to attack orbital assets were not prohibited by the treaty, and this has become an active field of development and deployment. Advances in microelectronics and computing power have enabled a variety of ground-based and space-based offensive weapons designed to disable or destroy satellites. Without software-enabled systems for tracking, targeting and engaging satellites, this weaponry would be infeasible. The cataloging of the array of space weapons technology under development is beyond the scope of this paper, but it should be noted that there is a broad range of projects, all of which are complex, software-intensive, highly classified, and costly.¹ These can be roughly grouped as follows:

- Ground-based
 - o Missile anti-satellite (ASAT) capabilities
 - o Directed energy ASATs
 - o Tracking and targeting facilities
 - o Command and control facilities
 - o Launch and recovery complexes
- Space-based
 - o Recoverable vehicles (space planes)
 - o Satellite ASATs (kinetic, electromagnetic, directed energy)
 - o Orbital reconnaissance
 - o Anti-satellite countermeasures (Anti-ASATs)

A primary global security risk posed by space weapons, particularly ASATs, is that of conflict escalation to nuclear war. Because reconnaissance, early warning and military communications satellites are essential components of a nation's nuclear deterrent capability, the destruction or substantial degradation of these facilities could be viewed as a precursor to a nuclear attack and could lead to a nuclear exchange, especially if there were an imbalance in the anti-satellite capabilities of the adversary powers.²

Beyond the escalatory threat, there is additional cause for concern based in physics. As orbital space becomes increasingly populated by satellites, there is a danger of a cascade of destruction resulting from the accidental or deliberate breakup of one or more satellites. The so-called Kessler Syndrome is the possible large-scale destruction of many satellites in the same orbital region resulting from the snowballing propagation of debris from multiple collisions. Although scientists assign a low probability to this outcome based on the predicted rate of accidental collisions, warfare involving the deliberate destruction of large numbers of satellites could significantly increase the odds of such a catastrophe.³ The resulting loss of numerous civilian communications, weather and global positioning satellites could cause significant disruption to the world economy.

ii. Autonomous Weapons

The industrial revolution introduced the war machine as a major factor in armed conflict. By the mid-20th century, tanks, aircraft, submarines, and warships had become the decisive weapons of conventional war, but they were all directly operated by human occupants. The efficacy of these weapons was limited by the physical stamina, skill and motivation of the personnel controlling them. Today's unmanned combat vehicles will out-perform human operators in basic tasks requiring speed, accuracy and endurance.⁴ Pilotless fighter jets can sustain high-G turns that would render a human pilot unconscious.⁵ Robotic warships can reliably patrol vast areas, immune to fatigue.⁶ The obvious advantages offered by computer control of mobile weapons have led to numerous substantial development programs in all major militaries. Examples include the following:

- Uran-9 combat vehicle (Russia)
- Skyborg unmanned combat aircraft (U.S. Air Force)
- Sea Hunter anti-submarine ship (U.S. Navy)
- X37 space plane (U.S. Space Command)

It is important to note that the capabilities of software-based robotic systems improve steadily as their software is updated and augmented, without requiring hardware changes. This novel characteristic poses serious challenges for arms control efforts because there is no visible evidence of a software-based weapon's altered characteristics. Moreover, almost any remotely operated robotic weapon system can be modified to become partially or fully autonomous with the addition of appropriate software and computing components, again without any visible alteration.

The issue of fully autonomous weapons is a crucial one for the preservation of world peace. Historically, humans have been responsible for acts of war. From the highest commander to the lowest rank of soldier, individual decisions have been linked to the resulting consequences. Although the fog of war often obscures this responsibility, it has been a fundamental assumption of politics and law. With the appearance of war machines that can independently decide when to kill, there is an epochal change in the nature of warfare. It may be argued that if humans remain in control of the engagement authority (decision to attack) of an automated weapon, then accountability can easily be preserved. Unfortunately, there is a powerful evolutionary force operating against this cautionary principle.

In the 1950s, the American military strategist John Boyd formulated a general theory of armed conflict based on a cyclic pattern called the OODA loop (Observe-Orient-Decide-Act). The key insight of this theory is that the combatant who can execute this loop faster than an adversary has an advantage because the adversary's reactions will lag the current state of the conflict, leading to incorrect actions. According to Boyd, speed of decision-making is the key to victory:

“The ability to operate at a faster tempo or rhythm than an adversary enables one to fold the adversary back inside himself so that he can neither appreciate

nor keep up with what is going on. He will become disoriented and confused.”⁷

This theory has been widely adopted and is reflected in the weapons development practices of all advanced nations. The application of OODA loop theory to combat involving autonomous weapons leads to the conclusion that the autonomous system should execute the loop at maximum speed, and this includes the “decision” step part of the loop. Thus, an autonomous weapons system requiring the delay of human approval for target engagement will be inferior to an adversary system that makes this decision automatically. Absent global conventions limiting the autonomy of lethal weaponry, there will be a steady trend toward granting engagement authority to such weapons.

If autonomous weapons are granted full engagement authority, two major problems arise: i) the danger of escalation and ii) the difficulty of assigning responsibility for inappropriate weapons use. Escalation danger arises from the interconnection of multiple autonomous systems acting in concert with lightning speed. The higher up the ladder of decision-making authority the automated systems climb, the greater the escalation risk, culminating in the realization of a nuclear doomsday machine. At every stage it will be argued that competitive advantage is gained by giving the automated systems more authority, but this trend will steadily raise the risk and magnitude of a dangerous runaway escalation in which events outpace the ability of leaders to halt hostilities.

The issue of accountability for the accidental, unplanned or inappropriate operation of autonomous weapons concerns the diffused responsibility for the creation and deployment of such systems. If the weapon independently decides to destroy a target or kill individuals, where does the responsibility lie? It can be argued that all persons in the chain from the weapon designer to the battlefield personnel deploying the weapon are partially accountable. Although automated weapons can make decisions at computer speed, their ability to decide in ambiguous circumstances is limited by the logic of their software. Thus, the burden of dealing with an ethically problematic battlefield situation shifts from a front-line soldier to the software developer writing the code controlling the autonomous weapon. It is difficult to imagine how software could deal adequately with hostage situations, misidentification of friendly forces or commingled hostile and civilian personnel. The presence of machine intelligence does not obviate moral quandaries.

iii. Cyber Weapons

Unlike the software-empowered weapons discussed above, cyber weapons are pure software, with no physical embodiment. Thus, they are invisible, deliverable almost instantly, and capable of replicating and spreading rapidly and extensively. Cyber weapons owe their potency to the increasing reliance on interconnected computers by all sectors of society. Any computer system, military or civilian, is a potential target for a cyber weapon. Cyber weapons operate by inserting manipulative or destructive code (malware) into an enemy computer system. This is usually done by exploiting weaknesses in widely installed commercial operating systems or by otherwise circumventing system security protections. Once inside a target system, the cyber weapon can strike immediately or lie dormant,

awaiting remote or timed activation. Harmful effects of cyber weapons can include theft of information, erasure of data, halting of systems, and destruction of physical facilities controlled by the target software. The malware can be programmed to spread beyond the immediate target to attack other accessible targets.

Because the development of software weapons does not require costly resources or specialized facilities, unscrupulous independent computer hackers develop malware tools for sale in a black market for computer “exploits” that enable malware to penetrate target computer systems. The security agencies of nation states compete to purchase these software tools to add to their cyber weapon arsenals,⁸ but criminal elements can also obtain access to malware through purchase or theft of cyber weapon code. Thus, cyber weapons pose a dual threat to peace: cyber-attacks conducted by governments and similar attacks carried out by criminals.

The ease of transmission of software makes the development of malware a hazardous undertaking for nation states because it is difficult to secure arsenals of cyber-weapons. In 2017,

Wikileaks began to publish a stolen archive of NSA malware tools called Vault 7. Soon afterward, a series of ransomware attacks utilizing these tools occurred.⁹ The contents of Vault 7 included a component called “Marble Framework” which enabled the masking of NSA cyber-weapons to conceal their source, possibly by leaving misleading traces indicating of foreign origin. The inability of nation states to reliably secure cyber-weapons is a serious concern and an important reason to restrain development of such weaponry.

Beyond the threat that cyber-weapons pose to civilian infrastructure is the escalation danger resulting from cyberattacks on military facilities. Because the nuclear forces of major powers rely on computerized warning and command and control facilities, a cyberattack on these systems could precipitate a nuclear exchange. Indeed, a statement in the U.S. 2018 Nuclear Posture Review explicitly acknowledges this possibility.

“the president will have an expanding range of limited and graduated [nuclear] options to credibly deter Russian nuclear or non-nuclear strategic attacks, which could now include attacks against U.S. NC3 [Nuclear Command, Control, and Communications], in space and cyberspace”¹⁰

Despite the evident dangers of cyber weapon development, the U.S. is pressing ahead with military investments in cyber-warfare.¹¹ The newly established U.S. Cyber Command includes offensive capabilities in its operational scope.¹² Russia, China and other advanced nations are proceeding with similar military cyber-weaponry efforts.¹³

Because the development and deployment of cyber-weapons is entirely unregulated by arms control, these weapons are an increasing threat to global peace, both from a military conflict perspective and because of endangerment of civilian infrastructure. Thousands of factories, power plants, water supplies, hospitals, and communications networks can be damaged or disrupted by military or criminal cyber-attacks. Thus, applying effective arms control to cyber-weaponry is a matter of high importance.

III. SBW Challenges for Arms Control

The disruptive characteristics of present SBW development – speed of modification, secrecy of design, functional anomalies, hacking susceptibility, displacement of human control, and escalation potential – raise serious challenges for arms control. Pivotal questions include:

- ▶ How can SBW arms racing be restrained?
- ▶ How can SBW arms control compliance be verified?
- ▶ How can SBW arms control compliance be enforced?
- ▶ How can non-combatants be protected from potential consequences of SBW?
- ▶ How can human control be assured?

The recognition that the prevailing approach to major power arms control is ill-suited to address these challenges is already becoming evident. German Foreign Minister, Heiko Maas, called on global leaders to “rethink” arms control in light of the technological advancements of weapons capabilities, organizing several conferences on this topic.¹⁴ Still, the formulation of actual solutions remains in a stage of infancy.

One route considered has been the subsumption of autonomous SBW under the existing Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW). In 2013, states parties to the CCW agreed on a mandate for lethal autonomous weapons systems (LAWS) “to discuss the questions related to emerging technologies in the areas of lethal autonomous weapons systems in the context of the objectives and purposes of the [CCW].”¹⁵ A series of meetings of a Governmental Group of Experts (GGE) have taken place, though, at present, this group is still exploring “possible recommendations on options related to emerging technologies in the area of LAWS...”¹⁶

A coalition of non-governmental organizations, including Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International, under the banner of the Campaign to Stop Killer Robots has advanced a proposal for a preemptive ban on LAWS. The idea for such a convention has the backing of the Holy See and some 30 nations, including China, which supports banning the use of LAWS.¹⁷ Both the CCW’s GGE and the ban campaign, however, fail to account for the range of SBW. A specific ban on LAWS neglects the emerging gamut of artificial intelligence-facilitated and software-enhanced weapons capabilities falling below the capability threshold of full autonomy, not to mention those capability sets in the cyber realm.

Apart from China, the major players in the SBW arms race, including the U.S., Russia, United Kingdom, and Israel, oppose a ban on LAWS. While evincing little interest in contemplation of broader SBW arms control, the U.S. and Russia favor a “basic rules of the road” approach in the context of cyber warfare.¹⁸ At the 2021 Geneva Summit, the U.S. and Russia set forth basic interests in which the other side should not infringe without an expected response and agreed to further talks.¹⁹ Other efforts, such as the Tallinn Manual attempting to bring cyberattacks into a law of war framework, advance a norms-based approach of best practices for the use of cyber weapons. This manner of proceeding fails to provide for binding regulation in the cybersphere, while ignoring the issues and risks posed by SBW more broadly.

We contend that these fragmentary proposals are insufficient to control the risks of SBW and to stem wasteful arms racing in their development and deployment. None of the proposed

initiatives addresses the fundamental mismatch between the dynamic, persistent character of the SBW threat and the static and intermittent nature of historical arms control practices.

IV. Sketch of a New Direction for Arms Control

We contend that a new arms control model requires i) new substantive regulations tailored to the practical threats and realities of contemporary SBW; and ii) new structural means of enforcing these regulations in a manner that is sufficiently adaptive to keep pace with constant technological advancement and sufficiently impactful to ensure compliance. We base this new regime on the legal foundation of the Geneva Conventions and the Nuremberg Principles, noting the precedent of liability and effective punishment set by the Nuremberg Trials and the International Military Tribunal for the Far East.

i. Functional Parameters

The new model we are preliminarily sketching would be effectuated by an international, legally binding treaty providing for the regulation of the following weapon types classified as SBW:

1. weapons for which software is intrinsic to functioning; and
2. for which this software is modifiable.

The regulatory scope of this treaty and liabilities contained therein would extend to the following:

1. nation state governments and their armed forces responsible for the deployment of SBW;
2. private sector entities responsible for the manufacture of SBW; and
3. individuals directly or indirectly responsible for the use of SBW.

ii. Substantive Provisions

This new model would include, inter alia, the following substantive regulations:

1. *Ban all forms of indiscriminate anti-personnel SBW.* Any automated weapon designed to target and injure or kill individuals irrespective of their combatant status would be prohibited. Examples of such weapons would be intelligent drone swarms or loitering munitions programmed to recognize human targets.
2. *Criminalize all SBW attacks on civilian infrastructure.* Use of cyberweapons designed to disrupt, damage, or destroy civil infrastructure, such as power plants, water supplies, hospitals, transportation, or emergency services would be banned and their use (and planned use) would provide for criminal liability.
3. *Ban strategically destabilizing SBW.* All types of anti-satellite weapons, which greatly increase the danger of nuclear war, would be prohibited. Other destabilizing strategic systems, such as automated launch-on-warning retaliatory systems, would also be tightly restricted or banned.
4. *Ban autonomous engagement mode for anti-personnel SBW.* Weapons designed to independently decide when to kill or injure individuals would be

banned. Independent decision is defined as the ability of a weapon to strike without direct human authorization.

5. *Prohibit trade in commercial software security exploits.* The sale or purchase of software methods for defeating computer security for destructive purposes would be banned. This prohibition would apply to all entities engaged in such commerce: national, corporate, or individual.
6. *Restrict automated escalation in SBW battle management systems.* The escalation of hostilities under software control, independent of human management, would be prohibited. In addition, a circuit-breaker function would be required in all automated battle management systems to prevent erroneous runaway escalation.
7. *Prohibit improper modification of regulated SBW.* Because software is easily modified, it would be prohibited to deliberately modify an SBW system to make it non-compliant with relevant restrictions.
8. *Require kill-switch function in all autonomous combat systems.* To prevent accidental or deliberate undesired operation of an autonomous SBW system, all such systems must incorporate a “kill-switch” permitting immediate remote deactivation of the autonomous mode.

iii. Structural Framework

The above enumerated provisions, though more comprehensive, are not so different from what might be included within an existing arms control regime. Our envisioned structural framework is what constitutes the novelty of our model and endows it with capacity to keep pace with modern weapons development.

We propose establishment of an independent, regulatory institution – an International Arms Control Agency for Software-Based Weaponry (IACA) – with robust competencies for treaty compliance verification and enforcement. The IACA would preside over a registration protocol requiring SBW possessors to register functional SBW software specifications for IACA certification of compliance with treaty regulations. Recertification would be required upon modification, ensuring continual compliance even as technology progresses. The IACA would have authority to mandate periodic and random inspections and would have sophisticated verification capabilities, such as satellite surveillance, at its disposal.

The IACA would also enforce compliance. It would have an adjudicatory body, investigating both Agency-identified violations and claims of violation made by treaty parties. This body would have the authority, subject to appeal, to issue binding decisions and proscribe remedies and sanctions, including enjoining deployment and international sale of SBW found to be in violation of treaty regulations.

It would also have the power to recommend individual political and military leaders, as well as private sector manufacturers, to relevant treaty-external bodies, such as the International Criminal Court, for investigation in such cases where SBW use transgresses treaty provisions in a manner violative of international criminal law. The treaty might also propose a novel

strict liability provision for specific instances of grave violation, such as preemptive use of SBW to initiate a large-scale attack on civilian infrastructure, or gross negligence, such as permission of SBW capabilities to be hacked leading to large-scale disruption to civilian infrastructure.

In this way, the IACA would both verify and enforce enduring compliance, as well as facilitate trust-building transparency. To ensure objectivity, membership of the adjudicatory body would be regularly rotated and staffing of technical experts investigating possible violations would be comprised of individuals from a variety of nations, including the one under investigation. IACA decisions would also be subject to appeal considered by an appellate body.

V. Conclusion

SBW present a clear and present danger to world peace. Because the current arms control paradigm cannot effectively address the novel characteristics of SBW, a new paradigm is needed to accommodate the dynamic challenge of SBW evolution. An independent global regulatory entity should be established to implement a modernized arms control framework tailored to the contemporary and future realities of SBW. Such regulation should be a continuous process that is responsive to the evolution of SBW technology. In this paper, we have endeavored to introduce a preliminary sketch for such a model, which we hope will stimulate much-needed new discussion on this critical issue.

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Encircling Transnational Peace through Khaita – Joyful Dances

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ABSTRACT

This article investigates how Khaita- Joyful Dances promote an understanding of peace from a transnational and Buddhist perspective. Khaita dances have been created by the Buddhist Dzogchen master Namkhai Norbu as a practice of presence and collaboration, promoting an inner attitude of peace spreading from the individual to the group. Peace is hereby understood as a multi-faceted, intra- as well as interpersonal, dynamic state perceived and experienced not only by the intellectual mind but also through the body and subtle energies.

This article is structured in three parts. First, I will explore peace theory in the context of Khaita. Second, I will illustrate the peace understanding promoted by the Tibetan artists through examples from the Khaita songs. The Tibetan song lyrics thereby express the wish for unification amongst Tibetans and the desire for (world) peace. Third, I will investigate the principles of accessible participation, equality as well as collaboration as parameters for peace experiences through examples from the Khaita practice sessions as well as Khaita Kordros, circle dances. The circle dances thereby offer an easy, non-hierarchical immersion in a diverse group of dancers and require presence and self-observation.

KEYWORDS: transnational peace, peace theory, circle dance, Tibetan dance, Buddhism

“How can we have peace if we don’t have peace in ourselves?”
(Namkhai Norbu)

1 Introduction

The official Khaita – Joyful Dances (short: Khaita) website states: “Since 2011, Khaita Joyful Dances have spread all over the World to share joy with all its citizens, to share values of respect, solidarity and peace.” (International Atiyoga Foundation, 2021e) And further: “People from all over the World danc[e] together to promote a message of peace and tolerance.” (ibid.)

Khaita is a translocal and transcultural dance practice founded in 2011 by the Tibetan Buddhist scholar and Dzogchen Master Namkhai Norbu¹. The Tibetan word “Khaita” translates as “melody of the space” or also “harmony in space” (Norbu, 2018: 93). Khaita consists of approximately 240 dances that have been created under Namkhai Norbu’s supervision in collaboration with his students of the International Dzogchen Community. The International Dzogchen Community consists of thousands of people interested in Namkhai Norbu’s Dzogchen teachings in over forty countries. Due to the internationality of the Dzogchen community, Khaita can be considered a translocal and transcultural phenomenon that draws on specific elements of Tibetan culture. Khaita practices, meaning dedicated sessions of singing and dancing, have become an integral part of the daily activities of Namkhai Norbu’s students.

Because of its translocality and -culturality, Khaita is often associated with a peace practice. For this reason, Alkis Raftis, the president of the International Dance Council, claims that “Khaita dances totally embody the spirit and ideas of UNESCO and the UN by bringing together people from all over the world. People who, thanks to dancing, promote peace, harmony, and understanding.” (Raftis in International Atiyoga Foundation, 2021)

Raftis asserts Khaita as a peace practice for two reasons: First, he emphasizes Khaita dancers’ harmonious collaboration across cultures and nations, partaking in peace promotion as “citizens of the world” (Raftis in Granger, 2016: 17). Second, he states that Khaita offers an answer to non-peaceful circumstances:

This world in the present situation in which we have so many problems with terrorism, with lack of respect for human rights, with illiteracy, with discrimination, with the economic crisis and so many other ills, it is important to get away from all of this and present an answer to it. You [Khaita practitioners] are an answer to that. (ibid.)

Thereby, he refers to both Khaita’s attempt to promote the study of Tibetan language and preservation of cultural elements and the joyful dance practice that proposes a diversion from everyday problems. Raftis further praises the theory behind the Khaita dances, combining the physical practice with an embeddedness in a broader cultural context. By this, he refers not only to the dance movements of Khaita but also highlights the meaning of the song lyrics.

Khaita started with Namkhai Norbu searching for songs by Tibetan artists on YouTube and selecting them according to their melody and lyrical meaning. The Tibetan was then

¹ Namkhai Norbu (1938-2018) is considered a great Tibetan scholar and master of the ancient Dzogchen Atiyoga teaching. Atiyoga, which translates from Sanskrit as “total perfection”, is “the natural condition of each of us and if recognized naturally it leads to compassionate and nonviolent lives” (International Dzogchen Community, 2021). Namkhai Norbu first came to Europe in the 1960s to teach Tibetan and Mongolian Languages and Literatures at the University of Naples and soon after, on the request of numerous people, started giving Dzogchen teachings to a group of Italians. Eventually he founded the International Dzogchen Community. Until his death, Namkhai Norbu travelled around the world to teach. To find out more about Namkhai Norbu and his legacy see: <https://dzogchen.net/>

transcribed and translated into English and the songs were grouped into three Khaita collections². Namkhai Norbu further commented many of the songs, drawing on his expertise as a Tibetan culture and language scholar as well as a Buddhist master. As I will show, many Khaita songs include an explicit message of peace.

Furthermore, the Khaita dances, in particular the circle dances, or 'Kordros', function as methods for experiencing peace. At least this is what Namkhai Norbu intended them to be: practices to observe oneself, be present and relaxed in the given circumstances and develop inner peace that may then spread to the group of dancers. Thereby, three parameters become relevant, namely the accessible participation in the circle dances, the equality and non-hierarchy of all dancers that is encouraged by the circle formation as well as the choreographic request of collaboration and cooperation.

What has become clear so far is that Khaita is promoted explicitly as a peace practice by its own channels and has also gained official recognition as such by the International Dance Council. It has further been stated that the Khaita songs are carriers of peace messages as well as that Khaita circle dances help to promote peace experiences. However, it remains unanswered so far how this is done. In this article, I therefore want to discover if and how the Khaita practice promotes peace. How does it foster harmonious collaboration? In how far do the circle dances function as tools for peace experiences? How do the song lyrics support the argument of peace promotion?

In the first part of my paper, I will theorize peace. Thereby, I will follow the approach of many peaces, assuming that there is not a singular definition for peace. I will in particular focus on Wolfgang Dietrich's transrational³ peace perspective as well as Namkhai Norbu's peace concept of 'evolution'. With these two theories in mind, I will then proceed to the second section of this article and focus on Khaita's peace lyrics as presented in the songs. Thereby, two groups of peace songs will become apparent, the first one focusing on Buddhist viewpoints and the second revolving around the call for Tibetans' unification and collaboration despite differences. In the third part of this article, I will then explore the Khaita practice and describe exemplary circle choreographies to illustrate how Khaita dances promote peace.

2 Peace Concepts

Peace has a multitude of meanings. There is not a single definition that summarizes all its connotations. It is relational and contextual. Padmendra Singh Rawat's summary gives an insight into its numerous understandings, depending on perspective and situation:

A child gets peace in the arms of his/her mother. A partner gets peace of life when his/her hand is held by his/her who works along all the difficulties of life with him/her. A homeless gets peace under a shelter. A beggar gets peace with the piece of bread. The fire of hunger gets peace with food. Love gets peace in the heart of someone. An old aged gets peace in the words of respect. A relation gets peace with the pillars of trust and understanding. And at last, a soul gets peace when meets in the eternity. (Rawat in Valdez, 2014: 89)

Besides these different concepts of peace that depended on perspective, peace is also an institutionalized term. The European Commission, for example, understands peace as

² The Khaita App (see: khaita.com) provides a clear overview of all the dances and their systematic divisions into the three collections of *Message from Tibet* (T), *Barsam* (B), and *Mekhor* (M). (International Atiyoga Foundation, 2021d) In the following, I will provide the abbreviated group name as well as the numeric indication in the footnotes when referring to Khaita songs that correspond to the system used in the Khaita App.

³ As I will explain, transrational peaces combine concepts of transpersonality and -rationality.

security and nonviolence. Its mission, as stated on the website, is “to reduce their [countries’] vulnerability and build their resilience and political stability” by supporting the establishments of democracies, civil administration, separation of powers as well as preventing and fighting violence (European Commission).

Peace definitions differ widely across various cultures, history and perspectives⁴. Besides peace as mental concepts, peace is often experienced as something corporeal or spiritual, which makes a description in words particularly challenging. This suggests that there are as many definitions of peace as there are individuals, or, as Ivan Illich states, “each person’s peace is as distinct as each people’s poetry” (Illich in Facci, 2017: 37).

Arguing that there is more than one peace understanding and criticizing singular peace perspectives that exclude other viewpoints, Wolfgang Dietrich questions the use of ‘peace’ in its singular form⁵. He proposes a theory of multiple ‘peaces’ or peace families. They are equally valid and become relevant in specific circumstances, depending on time, place, culture and individual perception. His peace families are called energetic, moral, modern, postmodern and transrational peaces.

The classification of these five peace families does not attempt to be complete but provides insights into the different interpretations of peace from cultural and historical perspectives while not denying other peace understandings. The peace understanding I will follow corresponds to Dietrich’s transrational peace perspective.

2.1 Transrational Peaces

Transrational peaces combine the concepts of transpersonality and transrationality to allow for individual and non-comparable experiences of peace. They understand peace as something that “everybody can only experience for herself/himself, the harmony that is only true, just, or secure if it is also really felt” (Dietrich, 2012: 255). As such, transrational peaces reach beyond the limits of a singular person and give space to peace experiences as incommunicable thoughts, feelings, sensations and intuitions. (Facci, 2017: 97)

Transrational peaces do not negate or compete with other peace understandings but integrate their elements in a pluralistic approach. Paula Ditzel Facci states:

It [a transrational perspective] embraces the achievements of the interpretations of peace throughout history and culture (energetic, moral, modern, and postmodern) and twists them, emphasizing relationality and balance. Thus, transrationality integrates the transcendental experience from the energetic approach, in the moments of spirituality, intentionality, and interconnectedness of everything, conforming the aesthetics of peaces. Truth, justice, and security are integrated in their referential, deflated of their absolute claim to an ultimate norm. (ibid.: 101)

As such, transrational peaces transgress the limits of modernity and postmodernity and recombine elements of the other peace families. Rationality, the main determinant for modern peaces, is not denied. Yet transrational peace understandings unfold components beyond rational thinking in favor of a more holistic approach. Spiritual experiences and natural opposites, as common for energetic peaces, are validated but are not seen as the ultimate or singular truths. Incommunicable feelings, thoughts and sensations are recognized. In contrast to the proposal of moral peace understandings, transrational peace perspectives do neither regard God nor institutionalized peace contracts as the normative rule givers for peace. However, they do not deny their relevance for individual experiences of peace. They follow

⁴ For an overview, see Wolfgang Dietrich’s *Interpretations of Peace in History and Culture* (2012).

⁵ Johann Galtung, often referred to as the ‘father’ of peace studies, famously defines peace as either negative or positive. ‘Positive’ peace, on the one hand, is thereby understood as the presence of desirable states, both on an individual as well as a societal level, and includes concepts of harmony, justice, equity etc. (Valdez, 2014: 89) ‘Negative’ peace, on the other hand, refers to the absence of war or violent conflict. (ibid.)

postmodern peace perspectives in their approach of treating multiplicity and plurality of meaning and experiences distinctly and respectfully.

What results in a transrational peace perspective is a synthesis of the other peace families. It recognizes and integrates all earlier understandings of peace, yet neutralizes their universalistic claims and focusses on small, 'unspectacular', individual peace experiences. (Dietrich, 2011: 13)

Transrational peaces are contextual and relational. As such and with their claims of inclusivity, they do not fall into the trap of colonial thinking or discriminate against other peace understandings. Peace becomes a dynamic, intra- as well as interpersonal continuum that does not have a perfected or finished state. It is a relational and highly contextualized experience that may be perceived differently by each person.

The starting point for transrational peaces is the individual perception of peace, which means that "human beings' relations among themselves and to their whole *Mitwelt* [(social) environment] are at the center of interest for this kind of peace research" (Dietrich, 2012: 267). As I will show in the following, this corresponds to Namkhai Norbu's peace concept of 'evolution' that also departs from the individual.

2.2 Namkhai Norbu's 'Evolution'

Khaita is the result of the dedicated work of Namkhai Norbu. Until his death in 2018, he continuously highlighted his intention of bringing together people, foster their collaboration and thus contribute to peace in the world through the means of Khaita. Thereby, his underlying peace concept is called 'evolution'. In many conferences, books and meetings Namkhai presented this concept that, according to him, has the potentiality to evoke and foster sustainable peace.

Two principles are important for evolution, thus peace: Self-observation and presence. Presence can thereby be considered a prerequisite for self-observation, since without awareness for one's present circumstances, self-observation cannot happen. As I will show, these principles are emphasized in the Khaita practice.

Just like in a transrational peace perspective, the concept of 'evolution' highlights the importance of starting peace from oneself. This stands in contrast to 'revolution' where others or the outside are seen as something that needs to be changed:

[H]ow can we have peace in this world when everyone is limited and will not open up a little, always thinking of 'me', 'we', etc. Political parties are the same, countries are the same. If we need peace, we need evolution and evolution must develop in the condition of the individual, not revolution. We always have the idea that we want to change someone. This is called revolution, but it doesn't work and it has no benefit. (N. Norbu, 2013: 2)

In contrast to seeking revolution, Namkhai Norbu advocates evolution. Thereby, present self-observation starting from the individual may lead to (world) peace. He illustrates this with the example of counting:

Just as in counting to a million one must begin counting at the number one, so to benefit society, one must begin by working on oneself. Each individual must truly take responsibility for him or herself, and this can only be done by working to increase one's awareness, to become more fully conscious, more the master of oneself. Change on a small scale can bring about change on a wider scale. (C. N. Norbu, 2000: 164-165)

Namkhai Norbu's goal is to offer his students tools for self-observation so that they might discover something about themselves and the world around them:

When we observe ourselves, we can discover how many limitations we have, how these limitations create many problems, and we can free ourselves from those problems. We no longer go behind or

believe in our inventions and become free from all these limitations. [...] The final goal is that we observe and discover that limitation is not good and in that way we are conditioned by it. (Namkhai Norbu in Granger, 2016: 17)

Khaita, he argues, thereby serves as a joyful practice of self-observation. When dancing, one has to focus on the present moment. Amongst other things, dancers must integrate bodily coordination, music, the space around as well as other dancers. This leaves little space for distracting thoughts. Things from the past or future projections lose their relevance, as the present moment requires full attention. Dancers can further observe their thoughts and emotions while dancing, noting, for example, when they feel stressed or relaxed, when they compare themselves to others or when they cooperate with them while dancing.

2.3 Buddhist Peace Understandings

Namkhai Norbu was a Buddhist Dzogchen⁶ master. As such, his understanding of peace and his concrete instructions for its achievement that revolve around the parameters of presence and self-observation align with Buddhist thought. Though not calling it evolution, the spiritual leader of Tibetans and Buddhism, the 14th Dalai Lama, promotes the same peace principles as Namkhai Norbu: “Without inner peace, without inner calm, it is difficult to have lasting peace.” (The Fourteenth Dalai Lama, 2006: 59) Peace is seen as something manifesting in the individual which then spreads to the world. As a point of departure, one must observe oneself and foster a compassionate, kind and loving heart to reach peace. “Through internal change, [...] peace [can be] brought to society. Self-examination is most important, and thus the Buddhist theory of self-responsibility is useful as it entails self-examination and self-control in consideration of both one’s own and others’ interests”, states the Dalai Lama (The Fourteenth Dalai Lama, 2006: 36).

Tibetans are predominately Buddhist. Because of the Khaita lyrics, the peace understanding of Tibetans Buddhists is of particular relevance for my research. Khaita songs are sung by Tibetan artists in Tibetan and mostly talk about topics relevant for Tibetans. Peace is thereby a reoccurring topic of the lyrics.

After having clarified transrational peace understandings, connected them to Namkhai Norbu’s concept of evolution and embedded it in the context of Buddhist peace perspective, I will now proceed with the analysis of Khaita as a peace practice. I will thereby start with an investigation of the Khaita lyrics as carriers of peace messages and then focus on the dance practice and circle dance choreographies.

3 Khaita Lyrics: Messages of Peace

There are many Khaita songs that explicitly talk about peace. Khaita songs are performed by Tibetan artists in Tibetan and focus on issues particular to Tibetan culture and experiences. They can be found on YouTube as well as on the Khaita App. With regard to Khaita’s peace message, a mixture of Buddhist peace concepts, most of all the path of nonviolence⁷, and calls for the unifications of Tibetans can be observed in the Khaita lyrics.

⁶ In *Visionary Encounters*, Dzogchen is described the following: “Dzogchen, a Tibetan word that means ‘total perfection’ or ‘absolute completeness’ is the name of a spiritual teaching found in both the Bön and the Ancient Buddhist traditions of Tibet, where it is considered the highest path of realization, due to its direct and clear presentation of the nature of mind as the source of all phenomena of existence and to its special methods for accomplishing its potentiality” (Clemente, 2016: 1)

⁷ Buddhism is generally understood as a universalistic religion of peace, compassion and nonviolence. For more insight into Buddhist peace perspectives, see Karma Lekshe Tsomo’s “Shi Wa: A Vajrayana Perspective” (2011).

The Khaita song corpus consists of 3 collections, *Message from Tibet*, *Mekhor* and *Barsam* in which numerous songs explicitly address peace. For the purposes of this article, I will concentrate on *Message from Tibet* only⁸.

In the following, I use exemplary songs to illustrate the peace concept promoted in Khaita lyrics. Thereby, I group the songs according to whether they, first, speak about peace from a Buddhist viewpoint or, second, address the unification and collaboration of Tibetans as a way to peace.

3.1 Buddhist Peace Lyrics

The first group of peace lyrics that can be found in *Message from Tibet* explicitly expresses the wish of Tibetans for (world) peace. The songs thereby promote the Buddhist values and behavior of nonviolence and the desire for all sentient beings, including animals, to be happy.

For instance, in “Dzamlung Zhide”⁹, which translates as “World Peace”, the lyrics sung by three Tibetan women say:

The light of love and kindness radiates everywhere, sustaining everything with its heat. Wishing fortune and prosperity for all beings, we perform these songs and these dances. The white immaculate khatag¹⁰ held in our hands becomes the white dove of peace. Standing on the summit of the globe [the region of Tibet is the highest in the world], on the top of our round world, we make a prayer of auspiciousness: may there be peace and happiness throughout the world, may all beings be happy! (International Atiyoga Foundation, 2021c)

The song can be interpreted as a prayer, wishing happiness and peace for all beings. At the same time, it follows the peace concepts as promoted by Buddhism: Peace starts from the individual – here represented by the collective ‘we’ –, which then has the potential to spread to others.

In “Dzamlung Zhide”, peace, the desire to spread it and the wish for people to be happy concretely manifests through the performance of singing and dancing (“we perform these songs and these dances” (ibid.)). Peace is thereby represented as actively evoked through singing and dancing.

Using songs and dances as symbols for auspiciousness and happiness is a common motif in the Khaita songs. In “Kampai Tashi Nyima”¹¹ / “Auspicious day for the Khampas”¹², for example, the singers repeatedly say: “An auspicious sun has risen, today an auspicious sun has risen. Today, let’s happily perform a circle dance! Remembering our intentions as we circle, today let’s sing an auspicious song!” (International Atiyoga Foundation, 2021f) Though not stated explicitly in this song, the intention that should be kept during singing and dancing is implied as good, wishing happiness and peace for all beings.

A similar prayer for peace can be found in “Changphud Ngapa”¹³, translated as “The Fivefold Offering of Choicest Chang”¹⁴:

I make the fifth offering of chang to the entire world, may the people of the world obtain the glory of peace! I make the fifth offering of chang to the entire world, may the people of the world obtain the glory of peace! May the people of the world obtain the glory of peace! (International Atiyoga Foundation, 2021a)

⁸ As the chronologically first Khaita compilation, consisting of 108 songs, *Message from Tibet* is representative of the entire collection of songs and provides good insights into the topics and atmospheres of all Khaita songs.

⁹ T3.8

¹⁰ Khatag is a Tibetan white silk scarf used, for example, in welcome ceremonies.

¹¹ T9.10

¹² ‘Khampa’ is a person from the Kham region in Tibet.

¹³ T8.7

¹⁴ Chang is a Tibetan alcoholic beverage made from barley or rice.

In this case, not songs and dances are used as a symbol for offering peace but chang, traditional Tibetan beer. Toasting together hence functions as a symbolic peace offering. Peace hereby again starts from the individual spreading to others. Following Namkhai Norbu's concept of evolution, the person must thereby be in a peaceful state themselves to make their wish effective and beneficial.

In addition to these examples of explicit prayers for peace, some Khaita songs specifically address the Tibetan way of peace (politics) that corresponds to Buddhist views. In "Meypoi Zijid"¹⁵ / "The Grandeur of our Ancestors", the singer Tsewang Lhamo, for example, states that "nonviolence and peace are the shared hope of the Tibetans" (International Atiyoga Foundation, 2021h). Similarly, in "Dongmar Bodba"¹⁶ / "Ruddy-faced Tibetans", the lyrics claim that "the sacred, nonviolent Dharma"¹⁷ is the path to tread" (International Atiyoga Foundation, 2021b).

Thus, Buddhism, with its principle of nonviolence, is used as a prescriptive path for Tibetans in the Khaita songs. The Tibetan artists connect themselves with the image that all Tibetans practice Buddhism, hence orienting their lives along the teachings of the Dharma. Considering that Khaita is practiced mostly within the context of a Buddhist community, this is of particular relevance. Furthermore, the reoccurring description of peace concretely experienced while singing and dancing is an important indication for Khaita circle dances.

3.2 Tibetans, Unite!

The second group of peace songs in *Message from Tibet* revolve around the call for the unification of Tibetans. This means that both Tibetans from the three different regions¹⁸ and Tibetans living abroad in various countries are asked to collaborate and unite their forces in peaceful ways.

"Thundrilgyi Rangdra"¹⁹, which translates as "The Sound of Unity", serves as an excellent example for this. The first stanza of the lyrics, with the other two following in a similar style, says:

Tibetans, unite, unite! Thinking of the sadness on the faces of your fathers.
Tibetans, unite, unite! Tibetans from Amdo, Kham and Central Tibet unite! Tibetans from Amdo, Kham and Central Tibet unite, unite! Unite, unite! Thinking of your mothers' tears, Tibetans, unite, unite! Tibetans of the Land of Snow, unite! We are children of the same parents. We are the heirs of one people. The ruddy-faced Tibetans! (International Atiyoga Foundation, 2021l)

The song refers to Tibetan's shared history and ancestors. As such, similarities between Tibetans from the three regions rather than their differences are highlighted. It is claimed that Tibetan people, regardless from which area, have the same sadness and fears, hopes and aspirations and must unite to preserve their cultural heritage.

In a commentary to this song, Namkhai Norbu stated that "if I could, I would make an anthem out of this song" (N. Norbu, 2017: 74). For him, "Thundrilgyi Rangdra" is a perfect example of people unifying and collaborating, focusing on common goals rather than on distinguishing features (ibid.).

Songs such as "Rangwang"²⁰ / "Freedom" further emphasize the performers' wish for Tibetans to unite: "Freedom is the basis of happiness and joy. Therefore, brothers and sisters of the Three Regions of Tibet, let's agree to combine our forces together tightly, and

¹⁵ T6.5

¹⁶ T4.1

¹⁷ Dharma means Buddhist teachings.

¹⁸ The three different regions of Tibet are Kham, Amdo and Central Tibet (or U-Tsang).

¹⁹ T2.7

²⁰ T5.2

collaborate with those who foster progress. This is my hope.” (International Atiyoga Foundation, 2021i)

Similarly, the male singer Trinley Gyatso asks Tibetans to unite in “Yarkul”²¹ / “Request to all”:

Tibetans! Brothers and sisters of the Land of Snow, brothers and sisters, if we care about our people, let’s stay united! Let’s stay united! Let’s stay united! Let’s stay united! If we don’t loosen our hold on the iron mountain of fraternal unity, this is our happiness, ruddy-faced people²²! [...] Send[] auspicious messages of peace into the wind. (International Atiyoga Foundation, 2021m)

Happiness and hopes for a future in freedom are thereby projected onto the unification of Tibetans.

Even though these songs specifically talk about Tibetans and often implicitly refer to the conflictual (political) situation with China²³, they can be understood symbolically for all people, cultures and nations. During the Khaita practice, it is thus encouraged not to regard the songs and their meaning as foreign to one’s own culture but understand them as examples for people of all cultural and ethnic backgrounds. After all, if people from different places in the world focused more on what unites them rather than what separates them, there would be less (political) conflicts. As such, peace experiences can be generated.

Therefore, I argue that if Khaita dancers are aware of the symbolic meaning of the Khaita songs, the intention and strive for peace is clarified, emphasized and reinforced. When maintaining this awareness and inner attitude during the singing and dancing as well as collaborating with other dancers, Khaita may thus become a concrete method and practice for the experience and promotion of peace.

After having investigated Khaita songs according to their peace messages, I will now focus on the Khaita dance practice. Thereby, I concentrate on circle dances since they bear most potential for experiences of peace.

4 Khaita Kordros: Experiencing Peace

I propose that Khaita Kordros²⁴, meaning circle dances, can be used as effective tools for the promotion of transrational peace experiences. For this argumentation, I rely on three parameters: accessible participation, equality and collaboration. I will demonstrate these principles with dance examples from the Khaita collections as well as experiences from my field research in the sites of the International Dzogchen Community²⁵:

Accessible participation, equality and collaboration connect to Namkhai Norbu’s peace concept of ‘evolution’. All three of them foster as well as require each dancer to observe themselves, focus one’s attention and stay present. Following the idea of evolution,

²¹ T10.4

²² Because of their reddish skin color, Tibetans often use ‘ruddy-faced people’ to refer to Tibetans.

²³ I do not wish to express a political opinion about the situation of the Autonomous Region of Tibet within the People’s Republic of China. I am aware that the conflictual past that, amongst others, caused the 14th Dalai Lama to flee Tibet in 1956 is still subject of political discussions today. Here, I solely describe and interpret the Khaita lyrics by Tibetan artists.

²⁴ ‘Kordro’ is Tibetan and means circle dance. On the official Khaita website the following explanation of Khaita Kordros is given: “KORDROS (KOR = CIRCLE + DRO = DANCE) are simple circle dances, mostly inspired by modern popular dances coming from different region[s] of Himalayan area. These dances have their own character, movement and style. We study them and bring to Khaita Joyful Dances paying respect to the ancient rich culture of celebrating life together.” (International Atiyoga Foundation, 2021e)

²⁵ As part of my field research, I spent several weeks in the places of the International Dzogchen Community - in Dzamling Gar, Spain as well as Merigar, Italy - to observe and participate in the Khaita activities, including daily practice sessions, performances and courses.

peace can manifest as a result of the Khaita practice when it is danced with awareness. Furthermore, individual peace experiences, as recognized from a transrational peace perspective, may arise due to feelings of collectivity, empathy and joy arising while dancing.

Khaita is not always danced in circles. There are numerous choreographies that require formations of lines and some that have no specific formation at all. However, I will focus on Khaita circle dance choreographies here as a means of peace promotion. Thereby, I align with the current state of research that agrees on the numerous benefits of circle dances, one of them the potential experience of peace.

4.1 Circle (Dances)

A 'circle' is not only a geometrical shape but also a popular symbol. It is often used across disciplines - religion, psychology, art etc. - and carries linguistic connotations such as 'life cycle' or 'vicious circle'. It is generally used to represent totality and completeness, with no beginning and end, and as such is associated with perfection and eternity. A circle is characterized by harmony arising from its perfectly round shape, without curves or edges. (Karampoula & Panhofer, 2018: 28)

With reference to dance, circle dances are among the oldest forms of dance²⁶. They have been used to build and stabilize relationships, typically during rituals, festivities, and ceremonies across different cultures and traditions. Circle dance formations are special because they cannot be formed alone. At least three people are needed to form a circle. Provided the space, an unlimited number of people can join the circle. This highlights the circle as a symbol of collaboration and unity, with an unlimited potential of quantitative members.

Scholars from various disciplines have investigated circle dances (see Borges da Costa & Cox, 2016; Borges Da Costa, 2012; Nowicka, 2016; Karampoula & Panhofer, 2018; Shannon, 2019). What their findings have in common is that circle dances in their various forms have the potential to overcome isolation, promote feelings of interconnectedness, strengthen communities and enhance general well-being²⁷.

Anahātā Iradah, for example, who conducts research on Dances of Universal Peace, sees circle dances as an answer to people's desire for connection: "We long to connect. [...] We long to get enough distance from our problems and responsibilities that we can see them through an expanded lens of interconnectedness [...]" (Iradaha, 2016: 178)

Because of this quality, circle dances are often used intentionally and effectively in societies to build and stabilize communities. Phuntsog Wangmo illustrates this by naming three concrete purposes of circle dances in Tibetan culture: first, the fostering union of people from different villages and towns; second, the welcoming of new members to the community such as people from young generations and third, the passing on of cultural knowledge. (Phuntsog in Shang Shung Institute. School of Tibetan Medicine, 2021: 32:40) All of these three aspects assert circle dances as integral means of cultural community building²⁸.

²⁶ Archeologist Yosef Garfinkel, for example, provides evidence that people have danced in circles since prehistoric times. (Garfinkel, 2018: 284)

²⁷ From a therapeutic perspective, Anna Borges da Costa and Diana Cox have found that circle dances have the potential to improve quality of life. They argue that they enhance general well-being and have positive influences on lifestyle and health aspects (Borges, Cox: 205). Amongst others, they address aspects of emotional and physical health states, self-esteem, spiritual experiences, resilience, empathy, relaxation, mood swings and cultural as well as social engagements. Elena Karampoula and Heidrun Pandorfer (2018) further provide an overview of the use of circle dances in different medical studies, in particular noting health improvements for people suffering from dementia and other cognitive impairments.

²⁸ See also Eva Nowicka's research (2016) on Siberian Circle Dances that connects with Victor Turner's concept of 'communitas'.

Hence, researchers from different disciplines agree that circle dances have the potentiality to improve physical and emotional states, establish and reinforce connections between dancers, help to overcome feelings of isolation and foster collaboration amongst the dancers. As such, they also bear the potential for the rise of peace experiences that start from the individual and, through cooperation, may spread to the group.

4.2 Accessible Participation

“Khaita Joyful Dances are open to all! Anyone who is interested, or even simply curious, can learn it!”, it states on the Khaita website (International Atiyoga Foundation, 2021e). The Khaita community, as mentioned in the introduction, mainly consists of students of Namkhai Norbu. However, all people are welcome to join the practice, even if they might never have heard of Namkhai Norbu and Dzogchen or are unfamiliar with Tibetan culture and Buddhism.

Khaita is a translocal and transcultural dance practice that is open to all people regardless of ethnic or cultural background, religion, age, gender or previous dance experience. Therefore, Khaita dance circles usually consist of diverse people. What they share is at least the wish of dancing together.

In my field research in the places of the International Dzogchen Community, I observed that there are several dedicated Khaita dancers who join the daily practice sessions of two hours regularly, some even every day. As a consequence, they master the choreographies and movements well. Hence, they often serve as reference point for others to follow during the dances. Some people join the practice only occasionally which means that they are confident with some but not many dances (as mentioned earlier, Khaita consists of 240 dances). Regularly, there are also ‘newcomers’ to Khaita. They are welcomed to the practice and invited to dance. Even though they might feel overwhelmed with the unfamiliarity of the movements, the people and the space, they become equal members of the practice as soon as they enter the dancing circle. This is a consequence of the circle formation, since all members are equal in a circle.

4.3 Equality

There is no hierarchy in a circle. Each dancer has the same relevance in a circle, as a harmonized circle only consists of equal members. Each dancer is observable and can simultaneously observe everyone else.

Usually, Khaita choreographies are organized in way so that dancers face inside the circle towards the center. Some circle dances, “Phayul Amdo”²⁹ or “Phayul Markham”³⁰, for example, also have parts where dancers face outside the circle. This is often challenging for people who are less familiar with the choreography as it is more difficult for them to follow others.

Through their choreographic structure, many Khaita choreographies emphasize the aspect of looking at each other during the dance. Presence is required: if one is not aware of the others and the space around, it is likely that the circle formation will not be kept or that movements do not correspond with the group or the music.

The choreography of “Riwo Chak”³¹ (International Atiyoga Foundation, 2021j), for example, plays with different body orientations within the circle. In the introductory phrase, dancers face each other. When the singer’s voice can be heard, the dancers turn their body towards the circle and move two steps clockwise along the circle. They then quickly change

²⁹ M1.4.08

³⁰ B5.02

³¹ M1.4.06

their body alignment back to the center of the circle and perform two taps with the right leg. Facing towards the center allows them to see not only the person in front of them but everyone in the circle. With four steps, the dancers then move to the inside, to the center of the circle, reducing the distance between them. Hereby, it is necessary to look at each other as otherwise the circle formation of the smaller, inside circle would not work. With a basic step³², dancers then raise both arms towards their heads with slightly bent elbows and bring them down again with another basic step. They then retreat to the original circle formation, change their body orientation towards the circle and move clockwise along the circle. They then once more quickly change their body towards the center and back again towards the circle. The movement phrases then repeat until the end of the dance.

Without looking at each other and being aware of an equal distance between the dancers, the choreography of “Riwo Chak” cannot be successfully executed. Everyone is responsible for keeping the formation. With only one dancer being out of place, the circle loses its form. As such, each dancer is equally important in Khaita circle dances. This implies agency and requires of self-observation.

4.3.1 The Role of Instructors

Equality within circle dances does neglect the fact that knowledgeable dancers are needed to guide dancers with less experience or newcomers through the choreographies. There are certified Khaita instructors³³ who, together with other expert dancers, fulfill this role. Instructors are thereby responsible for guiding the practice sessions and serving as reference points during the dances. ‘Newcomers’ and less experienced Khaita dancers are encouraged to look at the instructors and imitate their movements³⁴.

Thus, expert dancers and instructors are necessary to make the dances successful³⁵ and easily accessible for everyone. Collaboratively, by uniting different capacities, Khaita choreographies work. While instructors may be more experienced and as a result more coordinated in their movements, they are positioned equally in the circle to someone who joins the practice for the first time. Newcomers are part of the group as soon as they enter the Khaita circle.

4.4 Collaboration

Keeping a circle formation while dancing, especially without holding hands, is challenging. It requires attention to one’s own placing in relation to the group. Without being aware of where one is located in space and where the other dancers are respectively to oneself, a circle

³² The most fundamental step of Khaita is called ‘basic step’ and consists of a combination of simple weight transfers with constant energy investment and elastic and swinging modulation. The right foot thereby steps behind the body, which leads to a transfer of weight to the left leg, before the right foot steps forward in front of the dancer and slightly kicks up towards the head on the fourth count of the movement, shifting the weight back to the left leg. The upper body is relaxed and the arms follow the movement, meaning that the right arm swings in front of the body and the left arm swings behind the body when the right foot steps back, creating a diagonality similar to walking. When the right leg performs the kick, the left arm is in front of the body. The movement happens more or less in place and is rather fast paced.

³³ In 2016, Namkhai Norbu authorized around 60 instructors to teach Khaita after candidates successfully passed an exam.

³⁴ Instructors usually put a bracelet of five-colored-ribbons around their right hand that functions as an indication for dancers to follow them and also highlights the movements of the right hand. Like this, instructors are easily recognizable for newcomers and less experienced dancers, even in big circles with many dancers.

³⁵ When referring to ‘successful dances’ I do not mean to imply that dances cannot be successful, in the sense of beneficial, joyful etc., if some movements are not executed correctly. Here, I solely refer to the choreographic intention of the dances that is met when the steps and movements of all dancers are coordinated and precise.

formation will not be successful. This again connects to the principles of collaboration, self-observation and presence that Namkhai Norbu emphasizes in his teaching.

Dancing together in a unified circle means that the focus of the dances lies on the group and not the individual. Self-expression thereby fades into the background of collectivity. The group becomes more important than the individual. This fosters feelings of togetherness, compassion and cooperation.

Khaita choreographies often structurally require collaboration between dancers. An example for the principle of collaboration in Khaita circle dances, or Kordros, is “Sa Kyidpo Jig”³⁶. “Sa Kyidpo Jig” (International Atiyoga Foundation, 2021k) is a simple circle dance from the Tibetan region of Amdo. In repeated phrases, dancers thereby stretch their arms in front and behind of their bodies at the height of their shoulders and move with simple steps of weight shifts clockwise along the circle. The left arm is stretched towards the dancer in front and the right arm towards the dancer behind. The upper body is oriented towards the left side of the body, towards the dancers in front. Hands between the person dancing in front and behind might slightly touch but it is not required. When all dancers execute this movement precisely, meaning that their arms are stretched well and align with the hands of the other dancers in front and behind (this is challenging when dancers are of different heights), it looks as if an additional circular line in the formation of a circle is drawn between the dancers. This represents unity, completeness and totality.



Screenshot from “Sa Kyidpo Jig”(International Atiyoga Foundation, 2021k)

“Sa Kyidpo Jig” demonstrates well how very simple movements (stretching the arms in front and behind oneself) can create a powerful image of unity when all dancers collaborate. It is not possible to have the same effect alone or just with two people.

Further examples that illustrate the principle of cooperation in Khaita is the formation of collaborative mudras³⁷. “Machen Gangir”³⁸ (International Atiyoga Foundation, 2021g), for instance, starts and ends as a circle dance but in the meantime requires a formation in two lines with two people in the front and the others aligning behind them. In the dance, there is a repeated mudra that symbolizes the mountain, the Anyemachen Mountain in Tibet³⁹. The mudra is thereby formed with a partner: The dancers from the two lines walk towards each

³⁶ M2.6.01

³⁷ Mudras are symbolic hand gestures that represent specific meanings. They are common in various Asian dance styles and often require precise practice to master.

³⁸ M2.4.05

³⁹ Namkhai Norbu comments the following about the Anyemachen Mountain: “In East Tibet the most important mountain is Anyemachen. Anyemachen is also the seat of the guardian Anyemachen, we have rites, prayers, many things. Anyemachen is considered a very important sacred place. It is also a very high mountain and not only high, but also very large. Recently the American researchers announced that Anyemachen is higher than Everest, they recognised now. So, it is a fantastic mountain in east Tibet, near Amdo and Golog, in this part.” (see commentary International Atiyoga Foundation, 2021g)

other to the center and raise the respective arm that is closer to the partner. Dancers positioned in the right line hence raise their right arms, dancers from the left line their left arm in the direction of their heads and towards the partner. The elbow is stretched, the fingers point upwards. The fingertips of the two dancers touch, creating a triangular shape with their arms. This represents the mountain.



Mountain mudra from “Machen Gangir”(International Atiyoga Foundation, 2021g)

Similar to the simplicity of the movements in “Sa Kyidpo Jig”, the movements that each dancer executes to form the mountain mudra in “Machen Gangir” are easy. However, they only become effective in collaboration with another dancers. Self-observation and presence are required: If one dancer is not positioned correctly in space, raises their arm too high, too low or in an incorrect direction or is not in the correct timing of the music, the mudra will not work and lose its effect. Only when dancers are attentive and precise in their movement execution, the image of the mountain is created.

5 Conclusion

I suggest that Khaita can be regarded as a peace practice because of the following four arguments: First of all, it brings together people from various cultural and ethnic backgrounds. As such, Khaita’s translocality and transculturality represents collaboration beyond differences. This can be considered a fundamental peace element.

Second, there is a precise peace theory behind Khaita. Embedded in a broader Buddhist context, Namkhai Norbu calls it ‘evolution’ which aligns with transrational peace perspectives. Peace is thereby considered as starting from the individual, requiring self-observation and presence.

Third, the Khaita lyrics performed by Tibetan artists spread a message of peace that follows the Buddhist path of nonviolence, the wish for all sentient beings to be happy and calls for the unification of people. Keeping this intention during Khaita singing and dancing has to potential to emphasize and reinforce the promotion of peace.

Fourth, Khaita circle dances, Kordros, promote principles of self-observation, presence and collaboration. The choreographies thereby structurally require focus on the given circumstances and the collaboration with other dancers. Furthermore, regardless of experience, Khaita dancers are equal and depended on each other when dancing in circle formations. As such, Khaita Kordros may enable peace experiences.

In this article, I provided an overview of Khaita as a peace practice and its underlying peace theory. With examples from songs and dances, I illustrated the principles of self-

observation, presence, collaboration that lead to peace experiences starting from the individual. Transrational peace theory and Buddhist peace concepts have thereby guided my peace understanding.

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Game Theory and Dealing with Water Conflicts

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Abstract

In the last century, water conflicts have increased in many parts of the world for reasons such as a strong desire for rapid development and poor governance. The impact of these conflicts on various sectors of society such as economic, political and legal subsystems has led researchers to focus on providing solutions and practical methods to deal with water conflicts. Game theory is one of the most common methods used by researchers to manage water conflicts and water allocation in shared and transboundary river basins. Despite the special place of game theory in reductionist sciences, the application of this theory to dealing with conflicts in complex water systems faces challenges. Whereas, the critique of the effectiveness of the game theory method in water conflict management has been neglected. Accordingly, the purpose of this study is to investigate and analyze the capacity to apply the game theory to deal with water conflicts. In order to achieve this purpose, while using library resources, the basics of game theory and the capacity to apply it in the management of water conflicts are analyzed. The results reveal that following the theory of rational choice and rationalism in the game theory method has led to ignore many dimensions and factors affecting the water conflict formation and the way to deal with complex water conflicts.

Keywords: Water Conflicts, Game Theory, Peacebuilding, Shared and Transboundary River Basins

Global Citizenship Education (GCED) in The Digital Era: The Unexpected Tool for Peacebuilding

How 21st-century fluencies can shape sustainable global peace?

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ABSTRACT

If education is unanimously recognized as a powerful and impactful tool for social advancement, its use in global affairs as a major component has not yet been fully acknowledged. The current world state, with multiplying challenges amidst a global crisis - caused by the fallouts of an unmanageable pandemic - exposed the limits of multilateralism, undermining international cohesion already struggling over geopolitical rivalries and bursting territorial conflicts.

Growing gaps between citizens and governing bodies are threatening the very essence of democracy, the quintessence of people representation, the act of being a citizen. If such struggles arise even within states' borders, needless to say, building a global citizenship feeling of belonging may prove difficult, requiring exceptional efforts and a strong driver, such as education, leaning on an innovative approach.

Peacebuilding through education to global citizenship is one of the pillars of the United Nations 2030 Agenda. In this regard this work is directly relevant to the Sustainable Development Goal 4.7 (Education for sustainable development and global citizenship, and the promotion of a culture of peace and non-violence), an indicator building a basis for decision-making and institutional frameworks, reflecting on citizen political involvement on a local/global level, leaning on the tryptic pattern of foundation/adaptation/integration.

GCED could be one of the strongest peace advancement tools to think globally and act locally, by integrating emotional intelligence, creating a common shared value, tackling climate change and gender equity, as women are often in the frontline of rising challenges. This work will investigate and analyze the paradigms of GCED in peacebuilding using a cross-national analysis within the framework of digital humanities and peace studies research fields.

KEYWORDS: peace, education, peacebuilding, digital citizenship, emotional intelligence, critical thinking, global security, 21st century skills, peacetechnology, innovation, empowerment

1 GCED IN PEACEBUILDING: THE CONCEPTUALIZATION OF A DEBATED YET UNIVERSAL NOTION

Territory, citizenship, and identity, these three historical forces for all their distinctiveness tended to be intertwined, the idea of citizenship took on meanings associated with state membership and nationalism, becoming a major force in shaping loyalties and identities in political communities. This conception is today challenged and overhauled by the increasing number of people exercising rights over borders. Trade and commerce “succeeded” in building a complex interstate interdependence as developed by Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye in the 1970s, but these economic agreements did not manage to facilitate intercultural dialogue or promote peace, and somehow global governance was expected to keep pace. While there is much room for improvement regarding fair global political representation, unsurprisingly, democracy is still striving in many parts of the world.

Intergovernmental cooperation is struggling over interests and conflicts in a relatively broad scope of action. If pluralities and identities need to be protected as much as possible, education has always been a gateway between citizenship and global citizenship. GCED (Global Citizenship Education), in that regard, is not a call to elude cultural specificities but rather embrace and understand them, honing skills that will allow every citizen to be part of “collective considerations” mobilizing “multiple intelligences”, asserting everyone’s rights and freedom, contributing to various forms of international solidarity, openness, and interest in global issues, in view of building a sustainable and peaceful future (for everyone) making every view count, and empowering those voices, especially the voiceless, often on the frontline of crisis and conflicts.

This set of global competencies need teaching and learning methods aligned with global challenges, this includes not only “technical skills” but also socio-emotional competencies. They are meant to provide and secure environments not only in times of conflict but lay the ground for peace as well. Peace is not only the absence of violence as we will explore in this paper. Indeed, security and peace are often conflated. As an academic discipline, the interest in Peace studies started several decades ago, but gained significant prominence in the past decade. Peace education and GCED in the digital context are even more recent topics of studies with a substantially growing interest since 2019, sparked by the UNESCO 2019 Forum on Education for Sustainable Development (ESD) and GCED.

During the UN’s mass public survey called *My World*, within the framework of the Millennial Goals, people voted on issues concerning gender equality, climate change, and many other global challenges. Unanimously, every part of the world designated education as paramount, confirming the universal character of education as a shared value and a rallying point for building the common good, GCED being transdisciplinary by nature. But can we really assume today that education is fully supported and valued as an agent of change and advancement? Is education up to the 21st century pressing challenges? Does it answer and wholly address deficiencies preventing the construction of a peaceful environment? Are citizens empowered for taking in hand these matters locally and globally? And how can GCED positively influence a multilevel and multidimensional approach to peacebuilding?

Many still consider “Global Citizenship” as an oxymoron with the association of two opposite notions, one deeply rooted and one uprooted. As a highly debated term, Global citizenship has gained considerable depth in theory with ideas such as cosmopolitan democracy and civil society but needs yet to establish a political ground in practice to be duly

efficient. It remains resilient as an aspiration yet is still highly uncertain about its materiality. GCED is a very wide-ranging concept that includes a plethora of notions from education to sustainable development to institutional and civic representation. If the concept is not novel it is facing horizontal and vertical inequalities where divides tend to be exacerbated, enforcing the need for a differentiated approach.

The UNESCO Progress Update Report on “The Futures of Education” describes the state of education today as “not fully satisfactory”. Indeed, so far education has not held up to its promise to become an equalizer. The 2020 report of the International Commission on the Futures of Education titled “Education in a post-COVID World: Nine ideas for public action” states that “governments and citizens alike should be encouraged to demand strong responses in public education. The report also recommends that “curricula should be increasingly integrated and based on themes and problems that allow us to learn to live in peace with our common humanity and our common planet”. Although military force and security enforcement can be quick and responsive tools in major crises, they have been proved insufficient. Sustainable institutions and rules of law are fundamental for peacebuilding, education being its supporting pillar for social advancement.

There lies the relevance of teaching 21st-century skills (or 21st-century fluencies), competencies we need beyond school borders, “soft skills” that mutually benefit open environments where education ecosystems thrive, enabling youth to acquire fluencies and skills that are not merely “academic”. Learning communities, learning networks, and even mobilizing families and private spheres, creating infinite cooperation and collaboration possibilities, under the logic of co-development and co-agency.

In setting out the foundations for this paper, the relevance of technological skills, despite their ubiquitous aspects, will be considered in regard to their impact in the digital era or the information era. Digital citizenship being a segment of GCED for peacebuilding purposes, the latter comprises indeed a plurality of paradigms that we will explore henceforward.

1.1 Fostering Global Citizenry

The motto of UNESCO is “Building peace in the minds of men and women.” UNESCO seeks to build a culture of peace through peaceful approaches, with education as a transversal principle to all the SDGs (Sustainable Development Goals). However, education is usually based on performance and academic achievements, and sometimes even considered as being out of touch with the reality of pressing challenges, its quality has been increasingly questioned. Education today is the missing link, making “closing the literacy gap” the first imperative step, by extension, to prepare young generations to develop an understanding of global challenges, to become tomorrow’s leaders, peacemakers and simply acting citizens.

If all countries around the globe are sovereign in their decision-making processes and political social contracts, GCED aims are not necessarily to be differentiated from the notion of “citizenship”, they can share common grounds, and this probably is the most significant and efficient way to “think globally and act locally”. GCED does aspire to “empower learners of all ages to assume active roles, (...) in building more peaceful, tolerant, inclusive and secure societies”. Embedding these actions in educational curricula from an early age allows young people to familiarize themselves with fair representation activities and build an understanding of social justice, facilitating the integration of cognitive, socio-emotional, and behavioral components in the educational experience. Enabling such an active position in the

learning process is a significant first step towards the achievement of Target 4.7 of the SDGs, that is to say, “ensuring that all learners are provided with the knowledge and skills to promote sustainable development”, among others, through education for “sustainable development and sustainable lifestyles, human rights, gender equality, promotion of a culture of peace and non-violence, (...) and appreciation of cultural diversity.

Fostering such an ambitious vision will not only enable personal fulfillment but will also facilitate the co-construction of formal and informal networks through extended mobility, project-based learning, and digitally-enabled collaboration, fostering directly or indirectly a holistic approach to problem-solving, intercultural dialogue, and mutual understanding. Initiatives such as eTwinning and Erasmus+ do provide spaces for building convergences for the fulfillment of common visions with a shared strategy, allowing youth, not only to take an active part in reflecting on how to create safe spaces for dialogue, peacebuilding, democracy, and human rights action, but also to construct and emerge meaningful and structured ways through creativity, art culture and awareness.

1.2 Peace as a Universal Concept in Education

Education is tied to the very notion of development, with GCED being its major component for enhancing the skills to prepare for a very uncertain future, a future where citizens should be playing the role they were always meant to play, through direct and representative forms of democracy.

Fair access to education is certainly one of the most significant forms of social equity, offsetting persistent divides and gaps. The facts are these: education is acknowledged as a powerful tool but is still striving to be established as a “game-changer”. That being said, in the 2020 Human Report development titled: “The Next Frontier: Human development and the Anthropocene”, published by *The United Nations Development Programme*, the word “education” appears 301 times, which only emphasizes the call for asserting education and conceding its virtue as a unifying factor in the Global Actor-Network.

The peace and reconciliation education part of GCED is a very far-reaching area that offers everything from teaching peer mediation and conflict resolution skills, a curriculum about diversity and advocacy against poverty, as well as civic education. Cheryl Duckworth explains that as the field is developing scholar-practitioners still debate over its origins “as old as Confucius and as young as the United Nations”. GCED and peace education have in common an inherently multi-disciplinary dimension, making the relevance of peace studies in the 21st century more up to date than ever, an indispensable first step in the life of every citizen towards cooperative internationalism. The work of Maria Montessori (see Montessori Pedagogy), in this regard, deserves credit. She stressed the importance of “the implicit and explicit” parts of every child (and adult’s) education, and also acknowledged the values of global citizenship, personal responsibility, and respect for diversity, considering these “every bit as crucial as math, language or science learning”.

The interactions between peace education and GCED are numerous and as multiple as the challenges the global society is trying to solve. Whether related to cognitive, affective, or behavioral domains, the two fields share a common interest in building a culture of sustainability, peace, and the common good, extended by the information era, making these two notions evolving and scalable, and consequently hard to institutionalize, but at the same time relevant and easy to grasp.

GCED is relevant in conflict resolution, conflict prevention, and conflict reconstruction, yet it does require a set of skills for educators and a stable quality educational system to support processes such as intercultural dialogue and critical thinking, especially in the digital age where social boundaries can be blurred. It requires a positive dialogue setting, within a framework where the values of equity and diversity are already integrated, providing a “safe and peaceful space” to reflect upon peacebuilding, not as an abstract notion, but as a shared responsibility. This directly refers to the concept further developed by Johann Galtung, known as “positive peace”. That is to create peace-friendly environment, through structural and institutional reforms, to produce a ripple effect, to activate means of peace and advocacy, and not to only maintain a precarious status quo of “non-violence”.

2 CITIZENSHIP 4.0: FROM ACTIVISM TO SLACKTIVISM

The internet and social media have brought new forms of empowerment that are deeply reshuffling relations between citizens and states, with significant impacts on global and local levels, as the Arab Springs demonstrated. ICT (Information Communication Technology) tools have also emerged as instruments to support more effective humanitarian response and improve peacekeeping, as many refugees depend on apps such as *YouTube*, *Facebook*, and *WhatsApp* as their only source of information.

According to a 2017 Intercultural Trends Survey of the Anna Lindh Foundation, online and social media are the second most trusted sources of information, behind television, for young people, in the Southern Mediterranean. So social media and other forms of cyber-enabled communication do facilitate new openings for civic participation and engagement, but also remain spaces for disinformation, hate speech, propaganda, and cyber-bullying. These negative manifestations are harmful to democracies and fuel mistrust in institutions of governance around the world. If the temptation of avoiding these expression spaces for the reasons stated above is too strong, we should not, in any case, leave the field free for such practices. It is necessary to take over the public eye and orient policies towards digitally enabled youth actions. It is a legitimate question to ask, can social media be a space for positive social action and change?

“Slacktivism”, a combination of the word “slacker” and “activism” has increasingly been used to refer to action through social media, with varying degrees of commitment, and this is often the criticism received. If it is not the school’s duty to assign causes, it is the role of the educational system to equip students with skills and knowledge to educate politically aware citizens.

It is imperative to study and analyze the role of social media for (and with) students and decode the consequences and ramifications behind one single mouse click and attempt to explore commitment and activism beyond that. Jennifer Casa-Todd refers to a very compelling example when explaining the difference between activism and slacktivism, quoting a sign declaration on social media saying: « A 👍 (like) is not an action. A signature is. Sign this student petition! ». Today, technology and social media can help students develop a voice and become actively involved in causes about which they care and are passionate about, an extension of their commitment which makes GCED an important feature of the student’s development, as summarized by the Framework for citizenship Education in the Canadian World Curricula (Figure 1).




Figure 1 Citizenship Education Framework- Copyright Queen's Printer for Ontario 2018

2.1 Youth Engagement and Advocacy

Young people accounted for 33% of the global population in 2020, making them the largest demographic across the globe. Although youth participation in peacebuilding is widely discussed, there are very few examples of practical action.

On December 9, 2015 the United Nations Security Council unanimously adopted a historic resolution that recognizes the “important role young people play in the prevention and resolution of conflict”. Resolution 2250 created the framework for nations to engage and empower youth as workers of peace through five pillars: ●Participation ●Protection, ●Prevention ●Partnerships ●Disengagement and reintegration in “war to peace” and “post conflict reconstruction”. These pillars can all integrate GCED and fully embed soft skills learning, often implicit, not to say underrated in comparison with “academic” knowledge.

In the light of these elements and what we have considered so far, the empowerment and inclusion of youth is capital. Membership of young people through sponsorship, mentoring and positive role-modeling can vastly contribute to building a global tradition of peacemakers, given the high potential of youth as a diverse active political group, which is still not fully integrated. It is imperative to break the glass ceiling that leads to high profile national or international assemblies where youth-related subjects are discussed without a single representative of youth leadership organizations, the same goes for women and many other under-represented groups.

GCED can be a useful approach to tackle these issues, through various prisms, fostering vocations and interest in governance and representation. There are oceans of drawbacks in

this domain. When debating over social media, we can depict the advantageous potential for intensifying voices of influencers. Klear platform has drawn a ranking list on the “Top 10 Social Media Peace Influencers” revealing that the Peace community is made up of 69% Women, mostly from the United States (13.6%) and the United Kingdom. Clearly, social media plays a role in making these voices heard beyond their communities making them “lobbyists” and “ambassadors” for peace.

2.2 Lobbying for Peace: Citizen Diplomacy

GCED is based on the capacity and trust that every citizen has a part to play in the peacebuilding process. And it is this belief that should motivate the empowerment of learners, based on the idea that every global citizen has the right, even the responsibility, to engage across cultures and create shared understanding, through meaningful person-to-person interactions. In other words, act as a “citizen diplomat”. This does not necessarily involve spectacular actions, the latter being nevertheless important to advance causes, but strong actions can mutually benefit from what Catherine Neveu refers to as “ordinariness” or “ordinary citizenship”, where it is “normal” to perform what some might call “small and ordinary activities”. This perception takes credit for encouraging everyone to “do their part”, making it accessible to initiate a sustainable ecological and societal transition, especially in the field of education where allocated resources are sometimes very scarce or difficult to mobilize, due to ever increasing pressure.

The concept of global citizenship first emerged in the 4th Century BCE among the Greek Cynics, who coined the term “cosmopolitan” – meaning citizen of the world. This vision of a shared and accepted common commitment for the future, global justice, and global cooperation is still slow moving and requires backing and innovation in the field of policymaking. With the rise of populism and isolationism, it is today more necessary than ever to acknowledge the moving nature of our world and the global which need to be urgently dealt with.

The term “lobbyist” has a negative bias but should be given a positive connotation when rooting for the common good. There is still a perpetual struggle to implement values of inclusion and tolerance due to the vacillation of political agendas. Hence the work of researchers, political influencers, and the presence of citizens in policymaking are imperative. Pragmatism and bureaucracy should go hand in hand with a human-centric vision of social advancement. Time for reflection is overdue, as the urgency of the situation must be brought forefront.

This calls for the necessity to ascertain the key feature of youth leadership in order to spread extensively the “bandwagoning” of peace, through a peace-oriented mindset. Not only in conflictual situations, but also in peaceful contexts. Leaders and practitioners must also pre-emptively work to ensure that the targets of “peacebuilding” become durable objectives, not simply temporary reactions to violence.

3 DIGITAL LITERACY: PEACE, ETHICS, AND ADVOCACY IN THE INFORMATION AGE

In the continuum of the human-centric approach of GCED, in peace building and policymaking, it is essential to tackle “Digital Literacy”. If the digital divide and tech-illiteracy need to be addressed, there is another component that requires focus, which is

Digital Citizenship Education (DCE) as a catalyst of digital and social competencies of GCED. According to the European Reference Framework of Competences for Democratic Culture, DCE is “the empowerment (...) through education or the acquisition of competencies for learning and active participation in a digital society” ensuring users “to exercise and defend their democratic rights and responsibilities online, promoting and protecting human rights, democracy and the rule of law in the cyberspace”. This set of skills includes locating and consuming digital content as well as creating and communicating digital content.

The case of digital literacy is the embodiment of the urgent need for harmonization of the implicit part of the educational curriculum with the explicit one, developing creative, relational, and critical thinking skills, illustrating the need to widely educate, regardless of any socioeconomic or generational considerations. There is indeed a common idea that young people master ICT tools, but they are rather more active in terms of population ratio and are prime example tech consumers, as we will see, making social media routine, use, and practices, in terms of liability and security, a complex but necessary issue to address.

However, in a world characterized by deep inequities and power differences, the principle of “Universal Responsibility” would not have much practical meaning if not coupled with a principle of “Common but Differentiated Responsibility (CBDR), meaning to “bring substantive equality in a framework for justice, to foster cooperation (...), and to provide incentives (...) to implement (...) obligations”, a concept usually applied to states in international law but that would be very interesting to explore in this regard. Universal responsibility, in this context, refers to the moral dimension of a global ethic that can be shared by all humans”.

Differentiated responsibility refers to the “capacity to respond,” depending on our actual capacity to do so. Thus, although we may all be equally obliged to respond ethically to meet the challenges we face, our actual capacity to respond depends on the powers and resources one has at hand. With increased freedom, knowledge, and power comes increased responsibility to promote the common good. This responsibility is also valid for digitally-enabled countries, designed for the promotion of art, science, education, and culture, preserving the legacy of humankind essential for building the foundation of a balanced creative, cognitive, emotional, aesthetic, and social development of children and youth. While much progress has been made since the year 2000 on access to primary education, significant challenges remain for the implementation of 21st-century fluencies. Yet, universal access to primary education has not yet been achieved for low-income countries – whose primary enrolment rate stood at 73% in 2016 – and an estimated 750 million adults are still illiterate, a situation only aggravated by the pandemic, obstructing even further development perspectives, and even causing a great backwards surge in terms of the advances made so far.

Youth school disengagement is sadly enough a rising phenomenon, in which we can observe young people seeking other forms of “inspiration”, comprised of a variety of diverse paths. Nevertheless, some managed to express their commitment against climate change, as an example, with the “Fridays for Future” movement led by Greta Thunberg. The Global Education Monitoring 2019 report notes that formal education may not be playing its full role in peace education. It also noted the importance of non-formal and informal education in helping people to become critical media consumers and to foster respect for diversity. Likewise, the report highlights the scarcity of adult work-related education and training in low and middle-income countries, in a context in which labor markets are undergoing rapid


and significant transformations, triggered by technological developments and climate change, this calls for structural reforms to align educational strategic planning, in the era of fake news, deep fakes and sharp power.

3.1 Critical thinking in the Sharp Power Era

The global Big Data market was estimated to be more than \$111 billion in 2020 with a total volume of data expected to reach an average increase of 530% by 2025, according to the European Commission. In that data is said to be the new oil, this new resource will exacerbate multi-level conflicts, with a wider spectrum of actors. Whether it is in Antarctica, in cyberspace, or in outer space, conflicts over resources and territories will persist in the “Zero-Sum Game” international patterns. The conquest of space opens new horizons for collaboration as well as conflict. So how can we ensure that data economy and new technologies are oriented towards peacebuilding, social progress, human dignity, and the protection of the planet? How can they contribute to achieving SDGs? A starting place to answer this would be genuine civil society inclusion, not only consultation processes but also full civil participation, empowering voices that matter. It is no secret that the voices of “influencers” resonate louder than some politicians. Citizens need in fact to have a say on this data mining, as they are the target audience. Open data certainly enables innovation, but citizens should be able to play a more active role.

Young people, for example, are no longer content with merely receiving official information from authorities and mainstream media; they expect to play a role in producing and sharing it with large audiences. This is a powerful steppingstone to trigger intergenerational dialogue and bridge skills for a productive two-way conversation. The educational ecosystem has the advantage of providing space to reflect on the diversity of actors in our societies, on the condition of having the appropriate framework in terms of allocated financial and human resources.

It is essential to highlight the importance of e-literacy or (digital literacy) as a 21st-century fluency, part of DCE, especially in protecting against vulnerabilities such as organized crime, violent extremism, cyberbullying, etc. Promoting safety initiatives such as Safer Internet International Awareness Day, in addition to multiple UNESCO-driven programs, is crucial in disseminating the culture of freedom and independence in mainstream media. Peacetech (use of technology for peacebuilding purposes) plays a major role in civic participation, with a significant and growing number of initiatives proving that technology can be leverage in tackling pressing challenges. Given the global proportion of youth using the internet (Figure 2), there is much to reflect on as far as the skills we should be addressing in education planning are concerned. These initiatives underscore the fundamental constraints that deserve attention from international actors, as well as pushing to create a more inclusive “information society”, and evolving into a dynamic hub for participation, in which youth are paradoxically excluded from in most official processes.



3.2 Empowering Voices that Matter

The demands for reformed and renewed educational mechanisms are a reality and a necessity, strengthened by the need for vibrant and active networks. As early as 2015, Ms. Irina Bokova former Director-General for UNESCO declared in the “Rethinking Education: Towards a Common Good” report, that education should be “moving beyond literacy and numeracy, to focus on learning environments on new approaches to learning for greater justice, social equality and global solidarity”. Indeed, in theory, the universal character of education should matter even more in an era where the world-village notion is a reality. Despite resounding schisms and social upheavals, education to global citizenship carry shared moral values but also flexible mechanisms allowing the attainment of global security, weaving the idea of a unity beyond all forms of divides, empowering citizens, and supporting outstanding trans-border initiatives, ventured by inspired young people.

This is specifically what François Taddei characterizes as the “ability to cooperate and stand for moral values”. One of the key components of this human feature is language and the ability to exchange information, a capacity reinforced by digital progress. This conception is even more meaningful with the advent of deep fakes, advanced use of AI, and sharp power as a growing trivial international means of destabilization. We are losing ground and we need to make cyberspace a peaceful space as well, by equipping learners with 21st-century skills.

We need to hold everyone accountable by developing ethics and empathy in regard to knowledge prescription and learning mechanisms. This falls directly within the framework of *phronesis*, the ethics of action, and *Praxis*, social action, two of the pillars of learning models along with *episteme* (knowledge), and *techne* (craft). Usually, *Praxis* and *phronesis* are ranked last, regarded as secondary in comparison with knowledge and this is probably stemming from the over-appreciation of “hyper-specialization”, especially significant in higher education, that tends to overshadow soft skills.

The plurality and diversity of resounding voices is a rich resource that should be at the foundation of a worldwide reflection. Despite growing and radical forms of nationalism and centrism these values should be at the core of our social projects. It can only be achieved on a global level if the proper institutions, modes of governance and networks are empowered within states, supported by a significant regional integration, ensuing consolidated global development. We need to aim for the “How to achieve the ultimate form of “*who can I empower?*” in the Digital Age rather than the “*what can I say?*”.

Nolens volens, it is safe to say that education to soft skills (or 21st-century fluencies) as depicted in this work, is in direct association with addressing these issues, through a “Whole Education” perspective leaning on “transformative competencies” addressing the rising needs for innovation, responsibility, and awareness, creating new value, reconciliating tensions, solving dilemmas, and taking responsibility.

4 CREATING A CULTURE OF COMMON GOOD FOR PEACEBUILDING

Former UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan said that “Education is, quite simply, peace-building by another name”. If there is a common consensus over this idea, the challenge has

always been and still is, addressing objectively deeply rooted structural causes of conflicts emanating from historical injustices, marginalization, and corruption. Education imparts knowledge, skills, values, and attitudes that are important for the social, economic, and political development of any country, ensuring social justice, fair access to resources, and reducing divides. Even if it sounds like a cumbersome and hilly path we need to start somewhere, GCED is a good start, acting at the core of our societies, in one of the most significant social advancements of our time, which is education. Eventually, it might be the most cost-effective and the easiest way to distill peace in our societies, providing fundamental human rights and human dignity. It is all about creating a shared vision of what the priorities are and how to address them with concrete actions.

Addressing social injustices allows citizens to climb up the Maslow Pyramid individually and collectively. The persistent digital divide, as an example, is undermining the potential digital dividend for youth amongst many segments of the young people, especially young women and those living in the countryside, who remain excluded. The 2020 World Development Report by the World Bank observes “that there are persistent digital divides in terms of gender, geography, age, and income”. More than half of the world population still lacks access to the Internet and the majority are in low-income countries. It is the poorest households that are systematically excluded, and women are most frequently left behind.

4.1 Global Competence Education: 21st Century Soft Skills for a Soft Power

We have seen so far that the convening power of GCED for peacebuilding purposes dwells in its ability to unify and facilitate processes at any stage of conflict.

Oxfam’s Guide for Teachers depicts GCED as a framework to “equip learners for critical and active engagement with the challenges and opportunities of life, in a fast-changing and interdependent world”, developing the knowledge and understanding, skills, values, and attitudes that learners need to “participate fully in a globalized society and economy and to secure a more just, secure, and sustainable world than the one they have inherited”. The two main poles here, if we consider this definition, are, first the set of soft skills required for building the socio-cultural capacity, the second being the edification of awareness and the empowerment of citizens through social justice. A virtuous circle that can harness accountability through the tryptic: learning, thinking, and acting.

Promoting democratic and civic institutions for learners, through participation in kids’ parliaments and city councils, should be much more generalized, allowing understanding and transparency. This also underlines the very importance of starting the development of soft skills through GCED curricula at an early age, nurturing peace, and harnessing the transformative power of education, to build and educate citizens to be ready to face the complexity of the world, a world where the monopoly over information and knowledge goes far beyond the educational system. This might be the orientation school systems need, with the encouragement of student participation and the support of student-driven learning practices, as was highlighted at the Conference of the Asia Society.

The achievement of such an ambitious plan demands strong conflict-sensitive policies of reform in view of including education in security issues, beyond patching deeply rooted problems with cosmetic measures. Furthermore, there is a need for addressing issues related to marginalization and social exclusion, which if not resolved could result in the reverse effect, making education the creator of social divides instead of playing its role in closing

gaps. A multidimensional and inclusive reform would allow educators to benefit from spaces, tools, and budgets, as well as national, regional, and international partnerships, supporting transversal cooperation, with possibilities of best practice exchanges, with simplified protocols to avoid the overlapping of administrative tasks. Whether the debate over the digitalization of education is as passionate as were other variables in the history of education (since the debate over the obligation of education itself faced hurdles) it would be much more beneficial to consider what would be the best way to make the most of digital environments, in an ethical, universal manner, to free teachers from some constraints, and to open up the sectors of the learning process. Approaches such as Flipped Learning have explored such routes, by leaning on a wide range of resources, having been tailored with an impressive level of precision thanks to AI. This approach certainly leads to some healthy and constructive debates in democratic societies, as well as creating great opportunities.

4.2 Open Data, Open minds: Emotional Intelligence and Artificial Intelligence

Whole Education mentioned earlier is an approach that believes in the importance of well-being in the learning process. While viewing humans as the center of sustainable development, the right to a healthy environment does stress that it is only possible if there is harmony with environment and nature. These Third-Generation human rights, updated by United Nations Conference on Environment and Development in 1992, are sometimes called “Solidarity Rights” because they more explicitly express the need for all citizens, not only states, to fulfill their fraternal duties, to provide effective defense and promote human rights for all. Seen from this perspective, there is a direct relationship between a holistic view of human rights and the principle of universal responsibility.

Indeed, with the rapid growth of machine learning and AI, the best asset of human beings is empathy and the capacity to care. To achieve global competency development technology is a game-changer, but it is not a miracle solution. Educators play a more important role in the uptake of socio-emotional learning (SEL), leaning on transformative pedagogy (the educator can teach about sociocultural issues to raise awareness of social ills through high levels of reflection, focusing on equity and diversity). This could be achieved by the means of what Dr. Fernando Reimers calls “Empowering Teaching for Participatory Citizenship”.

In education, we often talk about IQ (Intellectual Quotient), but we very seldom discuss the prominent purpose of EQ (Emotional Quotient). Travis Bradberry qualifies EQ as the best predictor ratio commanding 53% when compared to 33 other “workplace skills”. This means taking this direction is not deflecting from educational purposes but answering the demands considerably for 21st century most sought-after skills. This requires capacity building among youth as well as educators, changing the mindset and allowing ethical innovation, by including diverse approaches not only in research and academia but also in policymaking, by encouraging cross-cultural and inventive leadership.

Civil hackathons for example demonstrated an interesting potential for governments to open access to data and launch co-developed and creative actions. The Canadian Open Data Experience (CODE) in 2014 succeeded in attracting widespread participation encouraging government departments to contribute, showing that “Open Government is about greater openness and accountability, strengthening democracy, and driving innovation and economic opportunities”, an event witnessed by a long list of observing countries, giving an international scope to the event, driving in a snowball effect the possibility of multiplying and reallocating this action, the format being itself an open-source.

Civic tech and peacetechnology could be relevant concepts for making art and culture accessible, connecting classrooms, activating perspectives, and taking into practice, giving a positive vision of openness, sharing and building a participatory culture without ignoring the excesses and deficiencies of our digital era to apprehend what Gianluigi Fioriglio calls the “Dictatorship of the Algorithms”.

AI is a complicated toolkit that is hard to utilize effectively and objectively in ambiguous situations like peacebuilding. As peacebuilders, we need to give careful thought to all the challenges it brings into our work: resource requirements, ethical data collection, transparency, and trust. Raising awareness about ethics, obstacles, and challenges of the digital era is essential as a 21st-century fluency.

5 CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

To achieve sustainable peace, we need to comprehend the incentives behind war and direct the collective endeavors towards building mutual understanding and a transnational continuum of actions. If this idea might sound worn out by repetition it is time to move to action and take measures beyond the theoretical scope, by questioning the traditional line of hierarchies when building peace through education, the only war we should be leading is the one against poverty, illiteracy, and social injustice. “Education is the key” as Nelson Mandela said. Education cannot do it all, but it is a safe and reliable place to start.

Encouraging interdisciplinarity and breaking the silos of restrictive approaches through GCED, and education in general as a major peacebuilding pillar, is crucial. Decision-makers need to consider that it is equally relevant to address building peace and promote equity and inclusion, at the risk of widening existing gaps, this latter should be the focus of strategic planning in education so as to harness the values of social justice and human dignity, laying the grounds for GCED, resulting in active and responsible citizenship.

The digital era has not yet revealed its full expectations and is standing on thin edges surrounded by very blurred boundaries. The development of open data and AI should be accompanied by one of the most significant skills of the future, which is trust-building. Blockchain and AI in peacetechnology should encourage transnational cooperation in this area for the rights and duties of citizens, building the premises of human-centric and peace-oriented, global governance, shaking up the stagnation of traditional credentialing, establishing renewed social contracts, and flexible work cultures. The vivid criticism addressed to international organizations should not over-shadow the massive amount of their work in advancing research and innovation and collective reflection. Political participation on all levels should be everyone’s prerogative with structured, anticipatory, and participatory patterns, new open mindsets, and modes of education governance, more receptive to change, adaptive and innovative, targeting long-term sustainable results, leveraging existing resources.

Global citizenship, despite being a collective and large-scale concept is not expected to be a uniform block. The preservation of freedom, plurality, and diversity are the fundamentals of peace preservation, peace reinforcement, and peace sustainability. Michael Steiner, former Special Representative of the United Nations Secretary-General in Kosovo stated rightly in 2002, that “peacebuilding does not require (..) to create clones of western society. But it requires us to work to change bad habits”.

From growing anti-trade sentiments, through the impact of climate change, and cyber-threats in a hyper-connected world, most of the security threats of the 21st century will require greater cooperation across borders and collective action from governments, private sectors, non-state actors but above all civil society.

Implementing a strong GCED policy for peacebuilding purposes implies leaning on solid yet open institutions and global governing bodies, with appropriate technical capacity, setting shared goals with differentiated protocols towards building a common good, with international organizations acting as a catalyst for peace efforts, in view of rethinking multilateralism with consensus, rules, and membership. Making this organization effective requires the inclusion of civil society, citizens being the core unit of global citizenship, answering consequently the need for a stronger convergence of individual and collective efforts.

Covid-19 pandemic unhinged numerous existing operative patterns, especially in education, proving a compelling example of the necessity of local actions and thinking global. The fact that millions of young people are seeking other forms of commitment outside the educational circle, to advocate for peace and sustainability, is an encouraging sign of the necessity to bring global questions to schools and should at the same time activate signs regarding the relevance of these issues in education strategic planning for GCED purposes.

The subject of this paper is comprehensive and can take a number of forms and leads. As a Ph.D. candidate, I wish to explore even further the role of GCED in peacebuilding and global governance and come up with tangible material in the field of policymaking. Let us keep in mind that peace is a shared responsibility, and that education is a precious but fragile asset, that can easily be undermined in times of crisis, and thus should never be taken for granted. Maria Montessori said in 1949 in one of her most impactful works, simply titled “Education and Peace”, a sentence worth reflecting upon: “Preventing conflicts is the work of politics; establishing peace is the work of education.”

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Improving social capital, a solution to manage water conflicts

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Abstract

Water systems are categorized as coupled human-natural systems. It is argued that extreme events are primarily associated with the natural component of the system, while conflicts are considered as part of the human component of the water systems. Since the system is coupled, both human and natural components interact with each other. For instance, extreme events such as droughts can trigger conflict among societies. What needs to be noted here is that such disturbances in both systems are, to some extent, inevitable. However, by using the proper mechanisms and leverages, they can be alleviated. Enhancing social capital among stakeholders is one of those leverages to reduce the conflicts' likelihood or at least intensity. Social capital reflects people's collective level of awareness on the issues, their reciprocal relationships, and public participation. In other words, social capital captures three concepts of "Public Justice," "Public Cohesion," and "Public Participation." This paper aims to descriptively analyze the effect of social capital in social conflicts in the context of water systems. The results of this study indicated that social capital is effective in alleviating water conflicts, but requires large and long-term investments. Therefore, it can be used to alleviate conflicts to reduce vulnerability, and achieve development.

Keywords: Social capital, Water systems, Conflict, Vulnerability

Introduction

Water systems are categorized as coupled human-natural systems (Liu et al. 2007). Two characteristics of water systems are the emergence of emergent and evolutionary behaviors (Islam and Repella 2015). Given these behaviors, these systems cannot be predicted given current information and knowledge. In addition to these issues, it is necessary to pay adequate consideration to climate change as an effective element on water systems. Taking into account the above, it is understandable that water systems are constantly changing and therefore, communities must be aware of issues like conflicts in water systems and take action to address them.

Water systems and Extreme events

water systems consist of three sub-systems: natural (hydrological), socio-economic, legal and administrative subsystems (Loucks and Van Beek 2017). The global climate system, with its interconnected processes and feedbacks, has affected all elements of the hydrologic cycle and imposed many changes to the hydrologic subsystem. Because the different components of water systems interact with each other as well, changes in the hydrologic subsystem will also lead to changes in other subsystems. extreme events are natural and common phenomena in water systems; However, climate change has altered the frequency and seriousness of these events; And it will have effects such as long-time droughts or more severe floods, all of which will adversely affect other subsystems. These factors sometimes lead to conflict

because of their relation to the human component of water systems. Therefore, an approach to conflict reduction is required.

Social capital and water systems

Social capital reflects people's collective level of awareness on the issues, their reciprocal relationships, and public participation. In other words, social capital captures three concepts of "Public Justice," "Public Cohesion," and "Public Participation." Therefore, it can be acknowledged that social capital plays an important and effective role in shaping the adaptive capacity of societies and consequently reducing conflicts (Pelling and High 2005). One of the functions of social capital is self-organization. Self-organization indicates the emergence of global behavior patterns (macro level) due to local interactions (micro level) (Atkinson et al. 2017). In other words, self-organization in social interactions refers to a specific issue that facilitates collective action. At the level of aquatic systems, these interactions take place through social networks and connections that take place between different actors. This feature indicates that most of the management and policy interventions imposed on these systems from the outside are not very successful and to influence these systems, it is necessary to try to influence the relations and interactions between the internal components of this system. In other words, it facilitated the self-organizing processes in these systems.

Now, to deal with extreme water events, such as floods or droughts, self-organization in response to these events is done in order to reduce vulnerability and it refers to interactions between people that have not been coordinated before, but at the time of the event, the events occur in order to reduce the damage and speed up the repair process. Therefore, it may be considered as an appropriate alternative to governmental and governmental interventions (Adger 2010). However, what opens the door to such interactions is social capital. For this reason, collective actions can result in the reduction of conflicts caused by extreme events.

Conclusion

In light of the above, one of the key approaches to dealing with water systems (in addition to examining and applying alternative solutions) is to reduce conflict. Given that climate change has also disrupted the regime to some extent, reducing water conflicts and consequently reducing social vulnerability has become increasingly important. One way to recognize conflicts is to increase social capital. Increasing social capital requires investment, one of the solutions of which is to increase awareness and education about the concept of social capital, such as promoting and increasing the social network. Accordingly, social capital is one of the influential components of water conflicts that it is necessary to pay close attention to it in adopting approaches and decisions to deal with water systems.

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Making the Soft Power Hard: Nepal's Internal Ability in Safeguarding National Interest

-Pitambar Bhandari

Soft power is an important instrument of foreign policy and a tool in safeguarding national interests. Under various regimes after the advent of democracy in 1950, Nepal has experienced a turbulent effect of international influence on technology, governance capability, policy transfer, labor migration and climatic affairs. In these contexts, traditional diplomatic effort based on persuasive bargaining requires an interest based practice which is complicated for the countries like Nepal where military power and economy are considered to be public goods rather than strategic base for the expansion of domestic policy making the other countries follow.

Nepal creates an exemplary image in coping with the internal and external threats even during the major political transitions in 1950, 1990 and 2006. In all these power sharing mechanisms, the immunity that galvanized internal forces with minimum experience of indirect influence from the neighbouring countries shows that soft power values in Nepal became the major component for managing internal tensions and mitigating external interests. At one hand, the sources of soft power rests on ancient value system and on the other, Nepal celebrates new political system confronting the values earlier regime survived on. Political crisis before 2015 and the natural disaster after it plunged Nepal into a serious threat. During the time of crisis it is need and the value that functions compared to the interest. This paper posits a central question that how soft power became a variant during the war to peace transition from 2006 to the period of implementation of constitution stipulated in 2015 with the result of a stable government. The first part of the paper explores the dimensions of soft power in Nepal- both perceived and practiced- after *Jana Aandolan II*. The effectiveness of soft power in maintaining the geostrategic importance through a constant coupling of soft power diplomacy adopted and endorsed in Nepal by the external powers and Nepal's own soft power standpoint will be analyzed in the second part of the paper. The last section of the paper analyzes the challenges for effective implementation of soft power diplomacy in meeting the national interest.

Key words: Soft power, geo-strategic importance, national interest

Reflections on Preliminary Fieldwork: The Militarisation of Public Space in Srinagar and its Impact on Rhythms of Everyday Life.

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This project focuses on the conflict in Indian administered Jammu and Kashmir (J&K). This conflict is characterised by the militarised occupation of the region and resistance for self-determination by indigenous populations. In 2019, there were over 500,000 military and police force stationed in the state of J&K and over the years the forces have become a permanent fixture of the day-to-day life of people in the region. The use of civilian infrastructure by the military apparatus to control the rhythms of everyday life has evolved to its current form as an integral aspect of the conflict itself.

This paper is focused on two interrelated aspects i.e., the impact of militarisation, magnified by Covid-19 pandemic on the fieldwork itself and its relationship to the larger impact of militarisation on everyday life in Srinagar. The methodology is inspired by rhythmanalysis which focuses on space of interaction. The rhythmanalysis is in two parts, it explores the rhythms as viewed and investigated by the researcher as opposed to the rhythms of everyday life for research participants. The aim here is to contextualise the questions of ethics and positionality as a researcher, conducting fieldwork during covid 19, in a militarised conflict region.

Key Words: Military; Public Space; Rhythmanalysis; Resistance, Critical Architecture

RETHINKING SECURITY: AN ANALYTICAL STUDY TO EXPLORE THE CORRELATION BETWEEN MILITARY EXPENDITURE AND HUMAN SECURITY IN ARMS IMPORTING (DEVELOPING) STATES

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ABSTRACT

The following research seeks to identify a correlation between increasing military expenditure and the simultaneous changes observed in the levels of human security in arms importing states under the world military order. Identification of such trends is needed because leaders use the narrow understanding of security in terms of military strength to justify the higher global military expenditure. However, it is also understood that growing military expenditure increases insecurity amongst states. This paradox excludes consideration of other factors that impact human lives and need to be secured. The research uses case studies analyzed with quantitative data and analysis to determine any correlation between the two variables - military expenditure and human security. It is found that in arms importing states, there is generally an inverse proportionality, causing a negative correlation between military expenditure and human security. Therefore, higher military expenditure causes a drop in human security in importing states due to various structural factors of the global arms hierarchy. This illustrates a need to rethink the understanding of security to include other factors of human security: economic, political, personal, community, health, food, and environmental security for a holistic security approach to human lives in contemporary security studies.

KEYWORDS: arms control, security studies, military expenditure, international order, global arms trade, human security, humanitarianism, neo-imperialism, militarism, world military order

1 INTRODUCTION

After the end of the Cold War, the world rejoiced in the anticipation of prolonged global peace. Despite progress in negotiation about disarmament, development and arms control during the cold war [1], military expenditure has gradually increased after the end of the Cold War. 2019 saw the highest annual increase in collective global military expenditure (3.6% higher than in 2018) in a decade [2]. Governments have remained dedicated to military expenditure and arms trade even amidst the COVID-19 crisis. 2020 saw the highest rise in military burden as a share of gross domestic product (GDP) even while the global GDP shrank due to the global pandemic [3]. This prioritization of arms and military capability has raised questions about the strategy, investments and structures put in place by global leaders for the prioritization and facilitation of human security.

The primary issue with security studies is the understanding of security in terms of military power alone [4]. Alongside the doubling of the global military expenditure since the end of the cold war, international transfers of major weapons have shown a steady increase since the beginning of the 21st century [5, p. 4]. The flow of arms has historically been able to decide the global hierarchical power structure [4, pp. 38-39]. Scholars identify this hierarchy based on the flow of arms as ‘world military order’ [6][7]. Therefore, major arms manufacturers – primarily western states - enjoy the top position in the world military order, part producers remain in the middle, while the non-producers – primarily underdeveloped or developing nations - remain at the bottom of the international structure [4, p. 47].

While military expenditure grows, human security goals like climate change goals and Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) suffer immensely in their achievability for the lack of investment. The COVID-19 pandemic and increasing civil wars and conflicts throughout the world have brought to the forefront the lack of prioritization of human security needs. This paper will explore and analyze the correlation between military expenditure – using the total estimated amount of government spending on military and the share of government spending used on military affairs - and human security – using human rights scores (HRS) and human development index (HDI) – with use of case studies.

The paper is going to discuss its results in section 2. Section 3 will comprise discussions that will encompass a literature review and conceptual analysis, along with case studies of Rwanda, Ukraine and Venezuela and exceptional cases of the United States of America (USA) and South Sudan. The methodology used for the paper will briefly be discussed in section 4 of the paper before the paper concludes with recommendations in section 5.

2 RESULTS

The case studies were conducted to analyze the correlation between high military expenditure and human security in arms importer states through a quantitative lens while drawing parallels in the datasets and the empirical events. The key findings of this study can be summarized in the following points:

- A negative correlation between military expenditure and human security in arms importing countries.
- Reiteration of the importance placed on military strength and growth by governments.
- Prioritization of military expenditure and growth even amidst a crisis, instead of diverting resources towards improving factors that impact human lives.
- A minor trend of prioritization of the military that is shared by a manufacturing state – the USA – in special circumstances (the 9/11 attacks).

- Absence of the same trend in arms importing state – example, South Sudan under exceptional circumstances.

The importance of military strength and growth in the understanding of security.

The analysis reiterated the importance given to military capacity and growth in quantitative terms of growing military expenditure. This is seen in the growing trends of rising military expenditure even while the governments are dealing with an economic crisis, civil wars and conflicts as observed in the case studies of Rwanda, Ukraine, and Venezuela. This is primarily because of the importance given to military capability for the maintenance of territorial integrity. This prioritization of military capability and military expenditure amidst crisis and decreasing human security is increasingly detrimental to the human security in the importing states that are already chasing development and improving the lives of citizens. A similar trend of militarism is seen when observing the COVID-19 crisis - when despite the pandemic causing a healthcare crisis globally, governments continued to invest economic resources to military expenditure [8].

Negative Correlation between military expenditure and human security in arms importing states.

The findings of this study reflect a relative negative correlation, illustrating inverse proportionality, between military expenditure and human security in arms importing states. This typically means that when governments of states belonging to the importing category in the world military order choose to prioritize investments in military expenditure for arms acquisition, training, etc., there is a simultaneous decline in the human security levels in the country. Increasing military expenditure is not the cause of such a drop in human security, but the correlation illustrates that such inverse proportionality could be hindering substantial improvements in their domestic human security dimensions.

However, the correlation between military expenditure and human security does not hold in the case studies of the USA and that of South Sudan because the USA is a manufacturing state, and as a global pioneer and supplier of arms technology, stands to benefit from a military-based understanding of security. South Sudan faced exceptional circumstances as an importer state and the youngest independent state in the world. Governments possess limited resources to spend. When they prioritize military capability, they are essentially trading human security measures off.

3 DISCUSSION

3.1 Literature Review

Military growth has been a concern for global security. COVID-19 brought to light the disproportionate expenditure on military affairs by states, and the shortfall of investment in human security infrastructure, such as healthcare [8]. The biggest factor to rationalizing and justifying military expenditure has been the realist understanding of security, primarily in terms of arms acquisition [9, p. 233][10][11]. Such militarism has resulted in the understanding of arms as instruments of national security [12][13]. The counterargument has generally been a conversation about the correlation between economic growth and military expenditure. Several studies claim that higher military expenditure has a negative or no impact on the economic growth and development of a country [14]. Limited arguments claim that under certain conditions, like in the presence of threats, military expenditure can drive growth [15]. When analyzed with a framework accounting for the adverse impacts of hostility and the presence of high levels of corruption and rent-seeking in the circumstances,

Aizenman and Glick (2006) conclude that high military expenditure can drive economic growth for certain states [15]. Despite laying out further possible extensions regarding the analysis, there is an absence of considerations of the impact of the same on human security and the rights of individuals.

Other studies record the relationship between high military expenditure and human rights. Park (1987) attempts to examine the general tendencies of human rights concerning different social, cultural, and political characteristics [16]. He concludes that military expenditure and human rights share a negative relation. Similarly, Davenport (1995) seeks to analyze the effect of the military's influence in a state on the levels of political repression [17]. According to his findings, higher military influence in a state's political system generally results in higher military spending and military control in states hamper human rights [18][19]. Therefore, it was concluded by Davenport (1995) that higher levels of military expenditure, as part of the total government expenditure, results in a rise in political restrictions [17]. However, in another study, Davenport found no significant relations between high military expenditure and human rights when controlling for economic development [20]. The relationship differed in the same study when democracy, coercive capacity, dependency, and lagged repression were considered as additional factors.

The defining problem of the understanding of security is rooted in militarism. Firstly, the understanding of security is extremely limited in scope - being limited to state security. Secondly, military strength and power are understood to be at the centre of such security. This understanding gives rise to the problem of an arms race, making it a vicious cycle of militarism and security [4]. The arms trade is an integral and central part of international affairs with a direct bearing on state security [9, p. 233]. This arms race harms the prospects of global peace, trust, and cooperation. This is backed by historical evidence of wars being preceded by arms races which resemble the contemporary growing military and nuclear capabilities of states. The literature on the arms race causing insecurity and trust deficit is abundant [21][22].

Arms and military weapons have been the cause for the loss of millions of lives in the past, both military and civilian. However, in contemporary politics, following realism, we continue to view security in terms of the military [9, p. 233][10]. There was a period of caution after the end of the Cold War, but we have returned to deterrence-based militarism [9, p. 233]. However, some studies prove that arms acquisition by states also contributes to amplification in domestic political violence [9, pp. 234-235][23][17][24].

There is a need for an understanding of the effects of militarism from a humanitarian perspective. At the same time, there are limited contemporary studies on militarism. Therefore, the paper intends to contribute a resurrection of the study of militarism from a human security lens.

3.2 Conceptual Analysis

The paper conducts its analysis based on 3 central concepts: Military expenditure, Human Security, the World military Order and Arms Importing states.

3.2.1 *Military Expenditure*

Military expenditure is the measure of economic resources devoted to military activities by individual countries. Therefore, it can be used as an effective tool for measuring the prioritization of military and non-military expenditure by states. The biggest challenge to gathering data and measuring military expenditure is the lack of standardization of data being processed by different states [25, p. 270]. Despite the obstacles, the Stockholm International

Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) has been able to gather and report on the military expenditure of states since 1949. SIPRI data on military expenditure includes capital spending on armed forces, defence organizations of the nations, paramilitary forces, and military space activities [26]. They also do accept the limitation of gathering such data and that it generally is an underestimate of the real levels of military expenditure –due to different understandings of what activities do and do not constitute military expenditure [26]. The understanding of human security is much more complicated than the understanding of military expenditure since it is a qualitative concept.

3.2.2 *Human Security – A Working definition for a work in progress*

The definition of human security is contested. Amitav Acharya (2001) discusses the different understandings of the term ‘human security’ [27]. The idea of human security tries to direct the understanding of security to be about individuals and communities instead of states. Therefore, it involves human rights as well as human development [28]. Human security was popularized as an idea in the international sphere with the United Nations Development Programme’s (UNDP) 1994 Human Development report [29]. The report included seven core areas of security: economic, environmental, food, health, personal, community, and political security [29 pp. 22-33] [28, pp. 182-183][30]. The study will use this broader understanding of human security as defined in the UNDP Human Development Report of 1994 using a threat-based approach as illustrated in Table 1.

Table 1: Components of Human Security threats under UNDP definition of Human Security [31, p. 7]

Type of Security	Examples of Main Threats
Economic Security	Persistent poverty, unemployment
Food Security	Hunger, famine
Health security	Deadly infectious diseases, unsafe food, malnutrition, lack of access to basic healthcare
Environmental security	Environmental degradation, resource depletion, natural disasters, pollution
Personal security	Physical violence, crime, terrorism, domestic violence, child labour
Community security	Inter-ethnic, religious and other identity-based tensions
Political security	Political repression, human rights abuses

There is a sense of interconnectedness and fluidity between the threats and responses when addressing the different sources of insecurity to guarantee human security [31]. Therefore, policymaking cannot be done in isolation for tackling individual issues of human insecurity but needs to approach all aspects of human security simultaneously.

3.2.3 *World Military Order and Arms Importing states*

The technological capability of states decides the direction of the flow of arms trades globally. It is also recognized that this spread of technology remains uneven and equal, giving an advantage to some states over others [4, p. 37]. The unequal distribution and manufacturing capability of arms facilitate the creation of a hierarchy between states - the ‘World Military Order’ - depending on their role in the global arms trade [6][7][4][32]. This hierarchy splits the world into three categories of states:

- **Producer or exporter states:** These states are the ones that can produce the entire range of weapons domestically and rely on little or no import of military technology from other states [4]. They are at the top of the world military hierarchy.
- **Part producer states:** These are states that have a significant capability and infrastructure to manufacture arms, unlike the non-producing importer states, but fail to

match the range and quality of arms produced by the primary producers. These lie in the middle [4, pp. 47-49].

- Non-producer and importer states: These states have little to no arms manufacturing or production capability and consists primarily of states that attained independence after the second world war [4, pp. 47-49]. These lie at the bottom of the hierarchy.

This paper is going to use arms importing states to determine the negative effects of high military expenditure on human security in the states that most need the prioritization of economic development and human security.

3.3 Case Studies

3.3.1 Case Study: Rwanda during The Rwandan Genocide

The case study of Rwanda is an intentional analysis to test trends and correlations between military expenditure and human security change during a domestic crisis - the Rwandan Genocide. Racial differences and ethnic tensions played a major role in the genocide.

In the 1990s, Rwanda was one of the most densely populated countries in Africa, with about 85% of the population belonging to the Hutu community, and the rest being part of the Tutsi community and a small number of Twa [33]. As a colony, Rwanda saw the ruling Belgians favouring the minority Tutsi community, leading to tension and violence even before independence. In 1959, a Hutu revolution already forced over 300,000 Tutsis to flee the country, making them an even smaller minority [33]. The Hutus forced the Tutsi monarch of Rwanda into exile. Rwanda attained independence in 1962, and after years of violence, military groups made Major General Juvenal Habyarimana – a moderate Hutu – the sole leader of Rwanda in 1973 [33].

In 1990, Rwandese Patriotic Forces (RPF), consisting primarily of Tutsi refugees, invaded Rwanda from Uganda. Habyarimana accused Tutsi residents of being loyal to the RPF and carried out mass arrests and killings [33]. The government's military spending increased - from 110 million USD in 1990 to 125 million USD in 1992. During the same time, the human rights score dropped, reflecting the use of force and violence. A peace accord was signed between Habyarimana and the RPF in 1993, but it did little to stop the violence [34]. In 1994, Habyarimana's plane was shot down and it set off the genocide that took place in 1994. Despite a drop in government expenditure at that time, the government still prioritized spending on the military. The share of government spending on the military increased from 17.80% in 1992 to 21.40% in 1994. Human Rights Score (HRS) in Rwanda was also the worst in 1994 – from -2.19033 in 1992 to -2.6136 in 1994. Within 100 days of the killing of Habyarimana, around 800,000 Tutsis and moderate Hutus were killed, and the Hutu militia fled to Zaire, with about 2 million Hutu refugees [35]. This caused more military action and interventions in Zaire. This caused a rise in the share of government spending on the military until 1996 before it started decreasing. United Nations (UN) appointed international tribunal started charging and sentencing those responsible for the genocide and a new President then took charge in Rwanda.

The violence inside Rwanda started fading despite political issues in the country. Between 1996 and 2004 - Rwanda carried out military intervention in Zaire (1996), a change in President (2000), voting to establish 'Gacaca' courts for ordinary Rwandans to judge their peers for the 1994 genocide cases (2001), a new flag and national anthem for unity was adopted (2001), Rwandan withdrawal from Zaire (2002), voters backing a draft resolution banning the incitement of ethnic hatred (2003) and the first presidential elections since the genocide [35]. This period also saw a decrease in military expenditure in value and as a share

of government expenditure, from 99 million USD and 23.70% of government expenditure in 1996 to 68 million USD and 9.70% of government expenditure in 2004. The same period saw marginal improvement in HRS and HDI – an increase from -2.46805 HRS and 0.12 HDI (1995) in 1996 to -1.05807 HRS and 0.22 HDI (2005) in 2004.

Table 2: Military Expenditure (Source: SIPRI), Share of Government spending on military (Source: SIPRI), human rights score (Source: Our World in Data), and human development index (Source: Our World in Data) in Rwanda (1990-2004)

Year	Military Expenditure (in USD millions)	% of Government spending on military	Human Rights Score (HRS) – Scale - 3.8 to 5.4	Human Development Index (HDI) – Scale 0-1
1990	110	-	-2.10974	0.13
1992	125	17.80%	-2.19033	-
1994	41.3	21.40%	-2.6136	-
1996	99	23.70%	-2.46805	0.12 (1995)
1998	100	23.10%	-2.22696	-
2000	86.8	16.30%	-1.70984	0.18
2002	83.7	12.70%	-1.42851	-
2004	68	9.70%	-1.05807	0.22 (2005)

The case study shows that Military Expenditure and Human Security are negatively correlated in the case of Rwanda - where an increase in military expenditure resulted in a decrease in human security and a decrease in military expenditure reflected a rise in human security. The trends of the rise and fall in the indexes of military expenditure and human security for Rwanda between the years 1990 and 2004 are illustrated in Table 2. The factors of human security directly affected in the case study of Rwanda are – community security, personal security and political security due to the targeting of a specific community causing a loss in lives through political power and backing of the government. Rwanda is a developing nation and an arms importer. Limited resources of the government were being spent primarily in growing the military capabilities of the states while the state was seeing human rights violations, community conflicts, etc.

3.3.2 Case Study: Venezuela

Democracy was on a decline in Venezuela in the 1990s when the then Colonel Chavez attempted two coups on the then President Perez amidst an economic crisis. Hugo Chavez then became President in 1998 [36]. The data on the share of government spending is missing in the case of Venezuela due to a lack of transparency. The trends of increases and decreases in the indexes for military expenditure and human security for Venezuela between the years 2000 and 2017 are illustrated in Table 3.

Table 3: Military Expenditure (Source: SIPRI), Share of Government spending on military (Source: SIPRI), human rights score (Source: Our World in Data), and human development index (Source: Our World in Data) in Venezuela (2000-2017)

Year	Military Expenditure (in USD millions)	% of Government spending on military	Human Rights Score (HRS) – Scale - 3.8 to 5.4	Human Development Index (HDI) – Scale 0-1
2000	15.5	-	-1.03214	0.47
2002	11.5	-	-1.1871	-
2004	15.9	-	-1.12914	0.5 (2005)
2006	34.4	-	-1.14226	-
2008	34.6	-	-1.03488	0.55 (2007)
2010	18	-	-0.87796	0.56

2012	25.1	-	-0.90614	-
2014	17.9	-	-0.97435	0.56 (2015)
2016	7.3	-	-1.22921	-
2017	8.7	-	-1.43452	-

Hugo Chavez came to power with the motive to reduce corruption in the domestic institutions, make a more equal society and make the country more autonomous [37]. These policies led to the ‘Bolivarian Revolution’ that began in 2010. In 2001, Chavez used the enabling act to pass laws aimed at redistributing land and wealth, attracting growing concerns about him trying to concentrate economic and political power [36]. Similar socialist policies emerged in 2005. The same year, new media regulations came into effect which enabled a crackdown on any criticism of public figures by the media. The parliament was dominated by parties that were loyal to President Chavez as the opposition boycotted the election [36]. Such policies and intent are reflected in the drop in the HRS of Venezuela from -1.03214 in 2000 to -1.14226 in 2006. 2006 also saw a marginal rise in military expenditure in the country – from 15.9 million USD in 2004 to 34.4 million USD in 2006. This was due to the beginning of closer relations with Russia and distancing from US arms supplies [36][38]. This period saw some improvements in the HDI because, in the short term, the new policies were bridging inequality and improving the lives of its citizens. Further measures implemented by the Chavez government included nationalization of telecommunications (2007), failed attempts to increase government control of the central bank (2007), signing of oil and gas cooperation accord with Russia (2008), joint exercises with Russia (2008) and abolishing of term limits for elected officials (2009). However, the economic crisis of 2008 also hit the country hard and kickstarted economic problems. In 2009, the Venezuelan government also took greater control of the banks in the country [39]. This is now recognized as the Venezuelan banking crisis of 2009-10 [40]. The bolivar currency was devalued in 2010 after the economy shrank by 5.8% in the last quarter of 2009 [36]. Despite the crisis, the government kept extending price controls on more basic goods to fight inflation [36]. There was a major drop in the military expenditure by the government – from 34.6 million USD in 2008 to 18 million USD in 2010 - due to smaller spending power, but the HRS and HDI in the country improved from -1.03488 HRS in 2008 to -0.87796 HRS in 2010 and 0.55 HDI in 2007 to 0.56 HDI in 2010, due to the increased price controls and greater accessibility causing short-term benefits. However, there was a rise in military expenditure by 2012 with the government military spending increasing to 25.1 million USD in 2012 while the HRS fell from -0.87796 in 2010 to -0.90614 in 2012.

President Chavez died in 2013 and Nicolas Maduro was elected president while the opposition contested the results. 2014 onwards, there was incredible damage to the economy of Venezuela. There was also a rise in the suppression of opposition and critics. The Government also announced cuts in public spending as Venezuelan oil prices reached a four-year low [36][41]. In 2015, the opposition coalition won a two-thirds supermajority in parliamentary elections [42]. In 2016, Venezuela saw mass protests for removing President Maduro from office for the economic crisis [43]. This then was followed by the election of a contested constitutional assembly in 2017 [36]. The results of the Presidential election held in 2018 were contested by the opposition as President Maduro won the elections [44]. 2018 saw massive harm to human rights with centralized control and suppression of decent [45]. In the same year, the UN announced that around 2 million Venezuelans fled from Venezuela starting from 2014, to avoid the ongoing economic crisis, which gave rise to a refugee crisis [46]. The above developments correspond with the human rights score in Venezuela dropping to -1.43452 in 2017 from 0.97435 in 2014. Military Expenditure dropped due to the worsening economy from 17.9 million USD in 2014 to 7.3 million USD in 2016 but saw a

rise to 8.7 million USD amidst a worsening economic crisis in 2017. Data about military expenditure is not available for Venezuela post-2017 due to a crackdown on agencies.

The Venezuelan case study is complicated due to the aspects of a major economic crisis, centralization of power and suppression of dissent. However, the general trend shows the prioritization and increase of military expenditure whenever possible, despite, and even while promulgating, reduction of human rights and freedom. This shows an impact on the economic security, human rights (political security), food security and health security of individuals in the country. There was also an impact on the personal (physical) security of the protesters. The HDI reflects minimal change even over a long time – increasing by less than 0.1 points over 15 years – due to the concentration on the military over human security.

3.3.3 Case Study: Ukraine

Ukraine declared independence in 1991 while the Soviet Union collapsed [47]. Presidential elections were held in 1994. In 1995, Ukraine adopted a new democratic constitution, and its local currency was introduced [47][48].

In 2002, the General elections resulted in a hung parliament and there were allegations of election fraud. The Ukrainian government announced its decision to launch a formal bid to join the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) [49]. There was a rise in military expenditure from 1042 million USD in 2000 to 1133 million USD in 2002 with a drop in HRS from -0.28012 in 2000 to -0.30265 in 2002. In 2004, the opposition leader Viktor Yushchenko launched mass protests over election results - the ‘Orange Revolution’ [50]. The elections were annulled by the Supreme Court and in 2005, Viktor Yushchenko became the president. The Global financial crisis hit Ukraine due to a fall in the demand for steel – the country’s main exports. The value of the Ukrainian currency declined marginally [47][51]. This is reflected in the Military expenditure, which saw the only decrease between 2008 and 2010, dropping from 2149 million USD in 2008 to 1967 million USD in 2010 although the share of government spending towards military expenditure remained the same (marking the consistent prioritization of military expenditure). In 2010, the previous president – Viktor Yanukovich – returned to power after the Presidential elections and the Parliament voted to abandon the aspiration to join NATO [47][49][52]. The ‘Maidan Revolution’ began in 2013 with mass protests against the decision to not sign an association agreement with the EU. Russian pressure was blamed for this decision [53]. Security forces killed over 77 protesters and the President flee to Russia. The opposition took over the government [47][54][55]. There is a marginal decrease in the human rights score for Ukraine between 2010 and 2016 – from -0.27944 in 2010 to -1.22003 in 2016. Despite the domestic turmoil, military expenditure continued to rise – from 1967 million USD in 2010 to 3507 million USD in 2016. This period encapsulates the protests, the elections, the Russian annexation of Crimea, another election with Petro Poroshenko winning presidential elections on a pro-Western agenda, Russian troops entering eastern Ukraine and the European Union brokering a ceasefire at talks in Belarus [47].

Table 4: Military Expenditure (Source: SIPRI), Share of Government spending on military (Source: SIPRI), human rights score (Source: Our World in Data), and human development index (Source: Our World in Data) in Ukraine (2000-2016)

Year	Military Expenditure (in USD millions)	% of Government spending on military	Human Rights Score (HRS) – Scale: -3.8 to 5.4	Human Development Index (HDI) – Scale: 0-1
2000	1042	6.10%	-0.28012	0.48
2002	1133	5.40%	-0.30265	-
2004	1495	4.90%	-0.29914	0.52 (2005)

2006	1808	4.30%	-0.14625	-
2008	2149	3.90%	-0.26558	0.54 (2007)
2010	1967	3.90%	-0.27944	0.54
2012	2000	3.30%	-0.53768	-
2014	2812	5.00%	-1.09345	0.56 (2015)
2016	3507	7.80%	-1.22003	-

The economy saw fragile growth in 2016. In 2017, Ukraine signed an Association Agreement with the EU to boost its economic and political ties with the EU. Since then, Ukraine has had another general election, won by Television comedian Volodymyr Zelensky and Ukraine has been looking for ways to gain a major economic boost to stimulate industrial revival [47][56][57][58]. Despite the turmoil in domestic situations – economic and political – there was a greater military expenditure. There is a trend of a constant rise in military expenditure (apart from the slowdown caused by the 2008 economic crisis) and a parallel fall in HRS for Ukraine between 2000 and 2016.

The trends of the rise and fall in the indexes of military expenditure and human security for Ukraine between 2000 and 2016 can be observed in Table 4. The aspects of human security impacted in the case of Ukraine were political security, economic security, food security and health security. As a newly independent country, Ukraine had a growing economy, which was minutely hampered by the 2008 crisis. This meant that the quality of life of people in the country was constantly improving minimally. This potentially prevented a dip in the HDI. However, the improvement in the HDI is also not marginal – an improvement of less than 0.1 in over 15 years.

3.3.4 Brief Study: South Sudan – An importing state not following the observed trend

South Sudan is one of the states to gain independence and sovereignty most recently – in 2011. It is an importing state, but being a new state and domestic instability impacts its correlation between military expenditure and HRS. With South Sudan as an exception, this paper will illustrate the drop in military expenditure with a parallel drop in human security.

Table 5: Military Expenditure (Source: SIPRI), Share of Government spending on military (Source: SIPRI), human rights score (Source: Our World in Data), and human development index (Source: Our World in Data) in South Sudan (2011-2017)

Year	Military Expenditure (in USD millions)	% of Government spending on military	Human Rights Score (HRS) – Scale: -3.8 to 5.4	Human Development Index (HDI) – Scale: 0-1
2011	1269	29.00%	-1.82468	-
2012	811	27.70%	-1.93981	-
2013	806	25.90%	-2.25709	-
2014	1051	23.70%	-2.47033	-
2015	844	25.60%	-2.55078	-
2016	246	9.00%	-2.58939	-
2017	106	6.20%	-2.59248	-

Soon after gaining independence in 2011, a civil war started in the new country in 2013 after President Salva Kiir Mayardit announced that he had prevented a coup attempt led by the then Vice-President Riek Machar [59]. This armed civil war fueled domestic instability and gave rise to killings of civilians from both sides, obstruction of humanitarian access and millions of citizens facing food shortages in absence of appropriate healthcare [60]. There was a peace agreement in mid-2015, which only lasted for about a year before the

conflict was refuelled [61]. In 2018, the leaders of the two sides signed a power-sharing agreement to end the domestic conflict and try to form a transitional government.

After independence, South Sudan stood to gain greatly from the control of the oil reserves of Sudan. However, the control of the pipelines remained with Sudan and the tensions with Sudan were high immediately after independence. Despite the oil wealth, the economic situation of South Sudan was among the worst in the world, and it was recognized as one of the least developed countries in the world. The constant violations of human security through the different aspects of economic, food, health insecurity, political, as well as, personal insecurity resulted in deterioration of human security in the region as represented in Table 5. The domestic instability and harsh economic conditions caused a simultaneous drop in military expenditure, as well as, human security. Another way to analyze this case study is the possible importance of human security for development. The hypothesis that human security could be a prerequisite for development or that human security can fuel development and growth in states is one beyond the scope of this paper. However, the case study of South Sudan does demonstrate how the relationship between military expenditure and human security does not always abide by an inverse proportionality.

3.3.5 Brief Study: USA – Arms Exporting State

The United States of America (US) as arms manufacturing western state enjoys a developed economy and high human security while enjoying great influence in the international community [62].

As manufacturers and producers of new arms and military technology, standards for securitization are set by manufacturers. This makes them the primary producers and exporters of arms, through which they gain massive economic and political benefits and can fuel the same into their domestic human security needs, while also being the largest spenders on military capabilities in the world [4, pp. 47-48][63]. Despite the pleasant conditions for the country, the US saw a rise in military expenditure with a parallel drop in HRS between 2002 and 2006. This could be related to the ‘war on terror,’ declared in 2001 [64]. This war on terror meant increased involvement of US troops in foreign territories and interventions with a crackdown on perceived domestic threats causing a drop in HRS in that time [65][66][67].

Table 6: Military Expenditure (Source: SIPRI), Share of Government spending on military (Source: SIPRI), human rights score (Source: Our World in Data), and human development index (Source: Our World in Data) in the United States of America (2000-2016)

Year	Military Expenditure (in USD millions)	% of Government spending on military	Human Rights Score (HRS) – Scale: -3.8 to 5.4	Human Development Index (HDI) – Scale: 0-1
2000	466759	-	1.16208	0.72
2002	528337	10.30%	0.54656	-
2004	655407	12.00%	-0.08974	0.74 (2005)
2006	695474	12.00%	-0.1423	-
2008	765973	12.00%	-0.00318	0.75 (2007)
2010	849867	12.30%	0.0906	0.77
2012	793157	12.00%	0.1763	-
2014	687112	10.40%	0.3772	0.78 (2015)
2016	669448	9.60%	0.25628	-

The trends of changes in the indexes of military expenditure and human security for the USA between 2000 and 2016 can be observed in Table 6. Although the US does not follow the inverse correlation between military expenditure and human security domestically, there is scope for further research on the military expenditure in the US and a drop in human

security in other countries due to intervention, arms supply, or military collaborations. However, an in-depth analysis of this correlation is beyond the scope of this paper and could be a possible research focus for an extended paper.

4 METHODOLOGY

4.1 Methodology for the case study analysis

It is important to highlight that correlation does not equal causation. Therefore, the paper does not conclude that high military expenditure state ‘causes’ a drop in human security but seeks to identify a possible trend that human security reflects with respect to military expenditure. The paper performs an analysis of two indexes – one is quantitative (military expenditure) and the other is qualitative (human security). This is done via the collation of quantitative data tables for each index and parallel analysis of empirical events in the same period. This is for a broader understanding of the numbers and trends observed on the dataset by understanding how they reflect on empirical events.

A desk-based methodology has been used to carry out empirical and data-based analysis using case studies of specific countries to follow the trends of military expenditure and human security for each country. The primary research for this study is the compilation and creation of datasets for the states in the time periods chosen for each. The secondary research used is for theoretical and conceptual analysis of the literature on military expenditure and human security, and the gathering of empirical reports and academic articles for the different events that have taken place in a certain time in each country.

For the study, this paper used case studies of three different arms importing states. These three states are Rwanda (during the Rwandan genocide), Ukraine and Venezuela. These case studies were followed by a brief study of South Sudan as an example of an importing state that fails to observe the same trends as other importing states. The study of South Sudan is followed by a brief study of the United States of America (USA) as an arms manufacturing and exporting state that does not follow the trend of inverse proportionality due to the benefits it reaps from the higher global military expenditure. However, an exceptional crisis like 9/11 has represented a similar short-term trend in that case as well. No state from the part-producing, middle category of states is used as a case study in the paper due to their trends tending to be like those of the importing or exporting states, or having a massive range of mixed nature of states within the category.

4.2 Measuring Military Expenditure

For the quantitative data on military expenditure, SIPRI - one of the most reliable sources of data on military expenditure and arms transfers is used. This is because of the three-tier sourcing of the data: 1) primary sources from official data from government publications and responses to questionnaires; 2) secondary sources that quote the primary data and; 3) additional secondary sources [26]. SIPRI’s understanding of military expenditure includes all capital and current expenditure that states undertake on – armed forces & peacekeeping forces, defence ministry & other agencies dedicated to defence projects, paramilitary forces – when judged to be trained and equipped for military operations, and military space activities [26]. Two measures are used for the quantification of military expenditure – the total value of military expenditure in million US Dollars (denoted as million USD or million \$ throughout the paper) and the share of government expenditure that was spent on military purposes illustrated as a percentage (%) of government spending. The valuation of military expenditure in million USD is constant at 2018 USD prices and

exchange rates after having adjusted for inflation to ensure adjustments that allow comparison over longer periods of time. The data collected is yearly data for countries from around the globe from 1988-2019 for both, the total valuation as well as government expenditure on military spending.

The two measures are used for gauging the changing trends in military expenditure to account for government spending power and economic circumstances. Therefore, a drop in military expenditure might be a result of economic shrinkage. The prioritization of the military can be observed using the share of government expenditure in that case. Such a trend would mean that despite the economic crunch, the government prioritized military expenditure and devoted fewer resources to its citizen's immediate concerns - observed through the indexes for human security.

4.3 Measuring Human security

Human security encompasses various factors impacting human lives across the world. These factors, as further elaborated in the conceptual analysis are economic security, personal security, political security, health security, food security, community security and environmental security. For this study, two different indexes were used – HRS and HDI.

4.3.1 Human Rights Score (HRS)

Human rights include various aspects of human security since they intend to guarantee basic human liberties and basic security. However, it is understood that human rights are a qualitative index. Therefore, the measurement of a qualitative phenomenon like human rights, which is a global norm in contemporary international politics, poses several problems. Measurement of human rights involves inherent problems in collecting such data and information [68] [9, p. 236]. The best way to minimize biases in a study would be to use and combine data from multiple sources. Therefore, this study uses the human rights score available on Our world in data-based at Oxford University, which is a compilation of human rights scores constructed using an econometric model with data from nine different sources [69][70]. Human rights scores recording by Our World in Data is a measure of the protection of the physical integrity of individuals. This includes a measure of how a government protects its citizens' physical integrity, taking into account torture, government killing, political imprisonment, extrajudicial executions, mass killings and disappearances [69]. The values for the recorded human rights score range from -3.8 to about 5.4 and higher scores indicate better upholding of human rights by the government for its people. The data included yearly scored for countries from around the globe from 1946-2017.

4.3.2 Human Development Index (HDI)

The measures for the HDI for this study have been taken from Our World in Data as well. The source for this compilation of the data is the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). The Human Development Index aims to take a more holistic approach towards human lives and tries to measure the average achievement in key dimensions of human development – a long and healthy life, being knowledgeable & gaining an education and having a decent standard of living [71]. The index includes data for countries from around the globe in 5-year intervals from 1980-2017. The scale for HDI is 0-1. Higher scores on that scale represent a better status of human development. HDI provides a great measure that encompasses factors of education, healthy life and standard of living, that impact human

security and such inclusiveness makes it an appropriate index to be used alongside human rights to gain a holistic understanding of human security in a certain state at a certain time.

5 CONCLUSION

This paper aimed to analyze the correlation between the variables of military expenditure and human security in arms importing states. The variables of military expenditure and human security are quantified with the use of 2 measuring indexes for each variable. The correlation is analyzed by using case studies of different states in different periods of time to observe and compare the rise and fall in the indexes to read trends. Based on a quantitative analysis with empirical academic literature and media reports of events, it illustrates an inverse proportionality between human security and military expenditure in importing states. An inverse proportionality means that a rise in military expenditure observes a drop in human security, and a decrease in military expenditure observes a rise in the levels of human security of a state.

The results indicate a need for in-depth inquiry into the causal links for the correlations between human security and military expenditure and a possible need to redefine the understanding of ‘security’ in international relations. With the rise in the global acceptance of the norms of humanitarianism, there is a need for leaders to expand the understanding of security from militarism to humanitarianism. Such an understanding can use the UNDP’s threat-based approach to human security for policymaking to expand the scope of security to include economic, political, personal, community, food, health, and environmental security.

A major problem is that massive military expenditure in a world of limited resources means that a large chunk of the pie will be allocated to accelerating the probability of war and a smaller chunk will be dedicated to directly fighting the troubles that ail humans. There needs to be a revival of dialogue on disarmament for diversification of resource allocation from the military to meeting the goals of human security and development. Such dialogue made ample progress during the cold war, when the Soviet Union tried to attain consensus on mutual disarmament in equal proportions for trust-building and redirecting the freed-up resources to newly independent developing countries to aid their development process [1]. Although the efforts in the UN failed, technological advancements provide greater opportunities today. The progress made by the international community in the cold war years can be leveraged to use the existing structures for furthering possible disinvestment and repurposing of resources towards human security globally. Even little proportions of the global military expenditure can achieve several international goals if repurposed. For example, it is estimated that quality universal primary and secondary education for all – Sustainable Development Goal (SDG) 4 – can be achieved with investment amount barely exceeding 3 per cent of global annual military spending; eliminating extreme poverty and hunger globally – SDG 1 and 2 – would amount to only 13 per cent of the annual global military spending [72]; and reinvesting 5 per cent of the global annual military expenditure would exceed the initial estimated costs for climate change adaptation in developing countries – SDG 13. The UN Secretary General’s Agenda for Disarmament – Securing our Global Future also emphasizes the need to rethink the disproportionate growing military expenditure globally by engaging in more active international diplomacy and cooperation. Rethinking security in broader terms to include human needs globally beyond military capabilities can catapult human security needs into substantial progress into a more peaceful, equal, and cooperative world for all.

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Study On The Situation Between France And The South China Sea From The Perspective Of Balance Of Power Theory

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ABSTRACT

With the rise of China and the escalation of tension between China and the United States, European countries led by Britain, France and Germany pay increasing attention to the regional situation in the Asia-Pacific (now known as "Indo-Pacific"). Among them, the South China Sea (SCS) is one of the main areas disputed by China, the United States, Southeast Asian countries and some European countries. Western countries are worried that the rise of China's military power will break the stability of the situation in SCS and alter the balance of power among major powers. Therefore, they tried to balance China's rise through alliance. In France's Indo-Pacific strategy, France aims to build a regional order with the alliance of France, India and Australia as the core, and regularly carry out military exercises targeting SCS with the United States, Japan and Southeast Asian countries. This paper aims to study the activities and motivation of France in the South China Sea, and put the situation in SCS under the perspective of Balance of Power Theory, focusing on China, America and France. It will be argued that great powers are carefully maintaining the balance of military power in SCS, and it is highly possible that this trend would still last in the middle and long term, particularly via military deployment and strategic alliances.

KEYWORDS: South China Sea, France, China, Balance of Power theory, Indo-Pacific.

1 INTRODUCTION

“Balance of power” is one of the most important theories in realism school, and has been discussed by scholars for centuries. By observing the war between Athens and Sparta, Thucydides came to the conclusion that building an effective power balance could both result in the outbreak of war or the prevention of war[1]. According to Morgenthau[2], “balance of power” refers to a relatively stable distribution of power between state actors on the international stage. Integrating the views of various scholars, “balance of power” can be defined as a temporary steady state between countries through alliance and confrontation, which aims to prevent the emergence of any superpower. “Balance of power” have some core assumptions: the international system is anarchy, thus states continuously struggle for power with each other to guarantee their own survival, “balance of power” is not a goal of states but rather is a final product of power competition; the main component of state power is military power; state always seeks to strengthen themselves, thus they tend to alliance with other states to resist rising states together that pose a threat to existing hegemony.

“Balance of power” theory can be applied to analyze the current South China Sea situation. According to Kaplan’s model[3], a balance of power system is supposed to have at least five major powers to maintain enough flexibility and complexity. SCS fulfils this criteria for providing an arena between America, China, Southeast Asian countries and some European countries. For western countries, China’s rise is a threat to American hegemony and existing power balance. Thus, the US, UK, France, Germany strengthened their military alliance with Southeast Asian countries (particularly the Philippines, Vietnam, Malaysia, Indonesia, Brunei), Japan, India and Australia. The security of SCS is crucial to the global situation, since the world's major powers are involved. Any country's expansionary behaviour may lead to the outbreak of war. Therefore, it is very important to maintain the balance of power in SCS, at least not to let a single country destroy the balance in a short time.

2 DISCUSSION

2.1 New trends of France in the South China Sea in recent years

In order to cope with the trend of "rising in the East and falling in the west" of global strength and China's challenge to the Asia Pacific order, France proposed "pivot to Asia" in 2012[4]. With the establishment of the "strategic partnership" between France and Vietnam in 2013 and the signing of the defense cooperation agreement between France and the Philippines in 2016, France has changed from its previous neutral attitude to officially uniting Southeast Asian countries to oppose China's proposition in the South China Sea[5].

France's actions in the South China Sea mainly include joint cruises, sale of military weapons, participation in military exercises and strategic alliances. In 2013, Southeast Asia received a total of 2682 billion euros of European weapons. Among them, Vietnam ordered French Exocet anti-ship missiles, while the Philippines imported French armed light helicopters[6]. In 2015, the French naval task force sailed through Paracel Islands and Spratly Islands. France said they had fully exercised the freedom of navigation permitted by international law[7]. In May 2017, France conducted its first joint military exercise with the navies of the United States, Britain and Japan to restrict China's freedom of navigation in SCS[8]. In 2019, during the Shangri La Dialogue, the French defense minister mentioned that France has been trying to build a military alliance with India and Australia. At the same time, Malaysia is an important partner of France in Southeast Asia, and France will actively

cooperate more closely with ADMM plus. In September 2020, Britain, France and Germany submitted a diplomatic letter to the United Nations, emphasizing that China's "historic rights" of the South China Sea are inconsistent with international law and the provisions of the United Nations Convention on the law of the sea (UNCLOS). In February 2021, France sent a nuclear attack submarine and naval support ship across the SCS and planned another transit with an amphibious attack ship and frigate as part of its annual Jeanne D'arc mission.

As can be seen from the above activities, France's activities in the South China Sea are becoming increasingly frequent, from the initial alliance and arms assistance to the subsequent direct intervention of military forces, which presents a situation of pressing China's military in SCS step by step. The following will analyze the main reasons for the increased frequency of France's involvement in the South China Sea.

2.2 Analysis on the motivation of the increasing trend of France's involvement in the South China Sea

A. Historical reasons

One of the reasons why France has spent substantial arms in the South China Sea is that France has lost its past islands in SCS. Therefore, France wants to maintain a certain sense of existence in SCS even if it is nearly impossible to recapture them.

On April 13, 1930, the French gunboat "Malicieuse" occupied the Spratly Islands (de La Tempete) and nearby reef islands[9]. On July 25, 1933, France formally announced the annexation of Spratly Islands, which is the starting point for France to advocate sovereignty over Spratly Islands. From 1933 to 1939, France occupied nine Spratly Islands. In July 1938, the French occupied Paracel Islands in the course of China's comprehensive resistance against Japan[10]. After the victory of anti-Japanese war, according to the Cairo Declaration and the Potsdam Proclamation, in 1946 November to December, China took back the Paracel Islands and Spratly Islands occupied by Japanese militarism and resumed their exercise of sovereignty.

Vietnam now believes that when France left Indochina in 1945, it had abandoned the sovereignty of two islands, and as a former colony of France, Vietnam had the right to inherit the islands after independence. However, France does not admit that it has lost all the SCS islands, which may be one of the reasons why France is still involved in the SCS nowadays. The French Ministry of Foreign Affairs announced in September 1953 that ships in Spratly Islands belonged to France, rather than Vietnam. In addition, in 1938, the Paracel Islands occupied by France was under the jurisdiction of Thua Thien Province of Vietnam. However, France did not draw any official maps showing that Spratly Islands belonged to the French ruled Vietnam. Therefore, according to international law, the sovereignty of Spratly Islands had not been transferred from France to Vietnam. Apart from that, France holds on the view that China occupied the islands controlled by Vietnam by force in 1974, which violated international law. Therefore, France also believes that China has problems in the legitimacy of occupying SCS Islands, which has become a reason for France to confront China in SCS in the 21st century.

B. International situation

As a traditional western ally of the United States, France's political policy towards Asian affairs basically follows American steps, although its position is usually not as tough as that of the US. In 2009, US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton first proposed "rebalancing Asia-

Pacific", and in 2012, France also proposed "pivot to Asia"; In 2017, the Trump administration put forward the "Indo-Pacific strategy", showing the ambition of the United States to expand its alliance. Then, in 2019, France also introduced its own "Indo-Pacific strategy", which not only follows the eastward movement of the U.S. strategy, but also aims to protect its own economic interests and overseas regions. On the one hand, France could guarantee its security by jointly resisting the rising China with the United States. On the other hand, intervening in SCS affairs also plays a role in demonstrating the power of great power and declaring France's core dominant position in the EU.

In the final analysis, there are three considerations why France chose to adapt to the global situation: from the perspective of realistic politics, France strives not to be excluded in the wave of global power turning to Asia, and then integrates India and the Pacific into its global strategy; From the perspective of economic development, France should seek to master the leading power and voice in the formulation and game of new global trade rules, and lead the construction and development of economic order; From the normative level, France urges emerging countries represented by China to abide by the so-called "international norms" by strengthening dialogue and diplomacy with "democratic countries".

C. Strategic considerations

According to <France and security in the Indo-Pacific> issued by the French Ministry of defense in 2019 [11], France attaches importance to the Indo Pacific region for the main purposes of safeguarding economic interests, deploying military forces and protecting overseas regions. The Indo Pacific region has France's exclusive economic zone of nearly 9 million square kilometers. In 2018, France's exports to the India Pacific region accounted for 34% of France's exports outside the EU. In the South China Sea, militarization has exacerbated tensions. Considering that one-third of world trade is transferred through this strategic region, France believes that maintaining security and stability in the South China Sea is crucial to protect its trade from being affected. Therefore, at the Shangri La summit, the French defense minister repeatedly stressed the need to maintain the "rules-based international order" and "freedom of navigation", and stressed the need to safeguard the international maritime law in the South China Sea.

France has five overseas regions (ROM), namely Guadeloupe and Martinique in the Caribbean, French Guiana in South America, Mayotte and Reunion in the Indian Ocean[12]. In addition, France has several overseas entities. These islands and overseas territories also provide a large number of military bases. Almost all overseas provinces and entities have military bases of varying sizes to house military personnel and equipment. The Indian Ocean islands of Reunion and Mayotte have two frigates (equipped with integral helicopters), a multi-mission ship, two patrol ships (including a polar patrol ship) and two tactical transport aircraft. The Pacific islands of French Polynesia and New Caledonia have three frigates (equipped with integrated helicopters), two multi mission ships, three patrol ships, five maritime reconnaissance aircraft, four tactical transport aircraft and five helicopters[13]. It is worth noting that these military equipments can be dispatched by France to areas requiring military exercises or navigation missions. For example, Vendemiaire, which used to dock in New Caledonia, was sent to the Philippines in 2018 to carry out defense cooperation in the South China Sea; In 2019, it voyaged to the Taiwan Strait for FONOP (freedom of navigation operation) activities.

Therefore, France has shifted its national strategy from the "Asia Pacific region" to the "Indo Pacific region", the main purposes pointing to SCS are: 1. Follow the shift of the strategic

focus of the United States, to obtain security guarantee from the United States by actively helping to balance China's military forces in SCS; 2. Increase allies, especially India, Australia, and New Zealand, strengthen military cooperation with Southeast Asian countries, and thus strengthen naval forces in SCS through military exercises, weapon assistance and other means; 3. Reaffirms the importance that France attaches to its overseas territories in the Indian Ocean and the Pacific Ocean in order to mobilize naval equipment to SCS when necessary.

2.3 Analysis on the situation in the South China Sea between France, The United States and China from the perspective of “Balance of Power Theory”

At present, the western countries led by the United States are aware of the rise of China's naval power in the South China Sea, and China's stance has become increasingly tough. Therefore, the United States has formed alliance with European countries and Southeast Asian countries to strengthen military deployment in SCS to balance China's power. While cooperating with the United States, France is also looking for allies in the Indian Pacific region to ensure its own security, safeguarding interests and highlighting the strength of major power.

As the largest country in the South China Sea, China has the largest Navy and weapons. According to the US Department of defense, China has the largest Navy in the Indo-Pacific region, with at least 300 ships, as well as many submarines, amphibious ships, patrol boats and special ships, and dozens of attack submarines. In 2019, China's Marine Corps program expanded from 10000 to 30000 soldiers. China Coast Guard (CCG) is another powerful force, the largest coast guard in the South China Sea and the world. Beijing has made sufficient military preparations for the disputed islands. In 2016, Beijing deployed HQ-9 missile defense company on Woody island and landed J-10 and J-11 fighters there for several times; In April 2018, Liaoning aircraft carrier participated in SCS live fire drill as part of at least 40 surface ships; In 2019, an anti-ship ballistic missile (ASBM) test was conducted near the disputed Spratly Islands[14].

In contrast, the continental United States is far away from SCS, and its military projection power is relatively inferior. However, the United States is increasing the frequency of military activities in the South China Sea in recent years. U.S. military activities in SCS can be divided into six categories: declarative action, existential action, military reconnaissance and intelligence collection activities, training and exercises, battlefield construction, operational concept verification and deterrence action[15]. In the past 12 years, the exposure frequency of "freedom of navigation" and "crossing the Taiwan Strait" done by the United States is increasing year by year; In 2018, the US has more than 30 sorties of B-52 bombers cruising the South China Sea; In 2019, the US Navy has three aircraft carriers to the South China Sea; On average, the US military has 3 warships and 2-4 reconnaissance aircraft operating in SCS area[16].

In order to strengthen military power to balance China, in 2017, the United States restarted the "US-Japan-India-Australia quadruple security dialogue" (the Quad), raised joint boycotting China's influence in SCS to the strategic level, and regularly held foreign minister talks and military exercises.

France has also played a role in implementing a hard balance with China. First of all, France has continuously expanded its military strength in SCS after its focus has shifted to Asia.

Since 2014, French military deployment in Asia has expanded eastward to the South China Sea; In 2017, France arranged at least 5 ships sailing through Spratly Islands. In 2017 and 2018, France used its annual Jeanne d'Arc naval exercise to cross SCS for defending "freedom of navigation".

Secondly, France has formed extensive alliances with the United States, Britain and Indo Pacific countries to form a military camp to balance China. In 2014 and 2016, French frigate Vendémiaire conducted joint exercises with American frigates; In 2017, the United States, Japan, France and Britain held the first quadripartite military exercise, including amphibious landing and helicopter delivery. France successively determined the "strategic partnership" with Indonesia, Singapore and Vietnam in 2011, 2012 and 2013, held anti-submarine exercises with Malaysia in the South China Sea in 2016, and signed a formal defense cooperation agreement with the Philippines in the same year[17]. Since 2014, France and Japan have held two plus two meetings of foreign and defense ministers every year and signed the 2018 acquisition and cross service agreement (ACSA) to support interoperability and mutual support services between the two armies. In 2020, France, India and Australia held their first tripartite dialogue. This alliance could not only launch trilateral naval exercises in the Indian Ocean (or even cooperate with Vietnam and other countries in SCS), but also speed up their contacts in the fields of national defense manufacturing, national defense technology and intelligence sharing. This mechanism may cooperate with the ASEAN Regional Forum in the future, including the extension of Indo-Pacific powers such as South Korea, Vietnam and New Zealand[18].

From the perspective of subjective intention, China's military action aims to claim sovereignty over the disputed SCS islands and defend China's sea domination; The US action aims to defend the so-called "freedom of navigation" and suppress China's intention to expand power in SCS through military deployment; France's action aims to help the United States declare freedom of navigation, support Southeast Asian countries compete against China's sovereignty in SCS, and unite India and Australia to enhance their power projection. In terms of their existing characteristics, China has the strongest military strength in the South China Sea, with a large number of permanent troops and offensive weapons; SCS is not the main battlefield of the United States, but the US maintains high frequency existential actions and ensures a certain combat capability in SCS; For France, its military focus is still in Europe, so France has only sent a small amount of military equipment to SCS, but France has shown a trend of increasingly extensive alliance, from certain Southeast Asian countries to major countries with common interests in the Indo Pacific region, and there is a trend to treat China's existence in SCS from a soft balance dominated by diplomacy to a hard balance dominated by military.

3 METHODOLOGY

This article is a combination of empirical method and interpretation method. As for empirical method, official documents from French ministry of defense (for example, France's Indo-Pacific strategy) are frequently used to analyze France's military presence in South China Sea; in terms of interpretation method, the situation in the South China Sea (particularly the military presence of China, America and France) has been explained from the perspective of Balance of Power Theory.

4 CONCLUSION

This paper applies the balance of power theory of realism school to the situation in the South China Sea, and analyzes the current situation and motivation of France's involvement in SCS. From France's military deployment in SCS, the complexity of participating countries and the importance of maintaining the balance of disputing powers can be seen. This paper first introduces the balance of power theory, then reviews the military actions of France in SCS in recent years, analyzes its motivation, and finally interprets the power distribution in SCS from the perspective of balance of power theory (focusing on China, the United States and France).

In the medium and long term, it is highly possible that the major disputing countries will continue to carefully maintain the balance of power in SCS, neither making their opponents strong nor seizing islands and reefs by force, so as to avoid the outbreak of large-scale military conflict. However, the momentum of China's rise can not be resisted by western countries. As the world's second largest economy, China has extensive trade relations with all countries in the Western camp. For the purpose of maintaining economic interests, European countries will not risk to completely standing on the opposite side of China. In the future, China's voice in SCS will probably be further enhanced. The author believes that, disputed islands in SCS are more likely to be resolved through diplomatic methods rather than military means.

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CONFLICT OF INTEREST: Because the author is Chinese, it is inevitable that the positions and idioms on sensitive topics of this paper may be different from western countries. This paper has tried to objectively state the facts and remove the influence of ideological factors on the analysis process to the greatest extent. In addition, the main body of this paper paraphrased some other literatures, especially the deployment of military forces in the South China Sea. Please understand as there might be similar parts.

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Tending To The Devastating Wounds Of Nigerian Girls And Women

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ABSTRACT

In 2018, one thousand, one hundred people were murdered across six states of north-west Nigeria, in 2019, two thousand two hundred people and between January and June 2020, one thousand, six hundred people were killed. In addition, more than 200,000 have been internally displaced [Strife 2021].

These are what we read daily; and further alarming are that the attacks and abductions seem to be more targeted at educational institutions of all levels in recent times, particularly across north-western Nigeria. For example, the abduction of at least 20 college students and two staff from Greenfield University Kaduna in April 2021. In February 2021, gunmen seized 279 girls from a school in Zamfara state and the abduction of 200 students by some reports; from a school in Tegna, Niger state. In early July 2021, more than 100 students were also abducted from Bethel Baptist High School, Damishi, Kaduna.

While these attacks are not restricted to girls and women alone, this report aims to explore what the effects and related trauma of this seemingly intractable violent conflict on girls and women in Nigeria are and answer how we can curb the continuous occurrences.

We reflect with women activists across the country, on ways to address the violence, and support the healing and rehabilitation. The paper also outlines fifteen major recommendations in response to the key question of how to support recovery and the part everyone can play to halt the menace.

KEYWORDS: Girls, Women, Violence, Nigeria, Abduction, Kidnapping, Rehabilitation, North-West Nigeria, Effects, Healing.

1 INTRODUCTION

No doubt distressing experiences are part of life. From major incidents like the decade of the great depression of the industrialised world or the Spanish flu of 1918 where at least 50,000 million died, humans seem to have grown in resilience and adapting to difficulties on a large scale-especially when these incidents are not human made. The most recent example being the novel corona virus which hit every sector of the world in unprecedented proportions and has made us rethink life as we know it.

Stories of incredible feats of human beings continue to fuel the narrative of how resilient the human spirit is. In fields of sport, arts and even entertainment, we continue to see records set and broken, innovation and new heights reached. From Grammy awards to Olympic medals, we marvel at what humans can do with the right training and nurturing environments. These are the more pleasant stories.

There is the flip side of this which is when humans experience trauma because of negative experiences and how we deal with trauma. According to the American Psychological Association (APA), “Trauma is an emotional response to a terrible event like an accident, rape or natural disaster” [American Psychological Association].

Trauma is said to be of three main types: Acute, Chronic, or Complex. Each type is characterised by the length of time the incident happens for.

Accordingly:

“Acute trauma results from a single incident, Chronic trauma is repeated and prolonged such as domestic violence or abuse and Complex trauma is exposure to varied and multiple traumatic events, often of an invasive, interpersonal nature,” [Missouri’s Early Care and Education Connections].

Our bodies have five responses that are programmed to respond when we are in traumatic circumstances. They are fight, flight, freeze, flop, and friend. When in danger, these responses try to keep us safe automatically. [Psychoeducation: Trauma 5 Fs of Trauma Response]. It is therefore expected that victims of traumatic experiences go through a range of emotions that are destabilising and have long term effects.

This paper aims to look specifically at the effects of traumatic experiences that girls and women in northern Nigeria face; and what strategies we can take to tend to the devastating and long-term wounds that the current situation is creating.

We want to ask ourselves how the continued abductions in Nigeria have affected the abductees and how do we go about addressing the aftereffects of their ordeals which remain with them even when or if released?

How do we support families who lose their loved ones in such instances? What are we “breeding” for generations now and those to come?

2 CONTEXT

As of 2020, the great nation of Nigeria was 206,139, 587 strong; according to the World Bank [World Bank 2020] with a gender disaggregation of 101, 669, 150 being female and 104, 469, 637, male. Nigeria is the most populated African, and black nation in the world.

This West African powerhouse is additionally abundantly endowed with natural resources. For example, Nigeria is the tenth largest oil producer in the world, has the largest natural gas reserves in Africa in addition to mineral resources like coal, bauxite, gold, tin, iron ore, limestone, niobium, lead, and zinc. Agriculture and tourism are underutilised sectors and the potential to live up to the name “Giant of Africa” is ever present, however over the past two decades the living conditions and general environment in the country have deteriorated rapidly.

There is a wide variety of issues that can be spotlighted, not least of which include high levels of corruption, outdated and/or unavailable infrastructure, high rates of inflation and in 2020, a ranking of 161 out of 187 in the Human Development Index, a Gender Development Index of 0.881 and 46.4% of the Population in multidimensional poverty [United Nations Development Programme 2020].

The data starts to tell the story and it is a sad one. Things that Nigerians never thought would happen or happen again (after the 1967 – 1970 civil war) have re-emerged in the daily lives of Nigerians. Crime rates are soaring, and people are so desperate that they now resort to stealing food that is being cooked off the fire and making away with it.

“Political instability, citizen alienation, terrorism and violence define the Nigerian crime scene. Nigeria has recently been included among the countries with the least peace in the world, according to the Global Peace Index” [Statista 2021].

Of particular concern is the growing level of abductions and violence specifically targeted at girls and women and the overall lack of wellbeing among Nigerian citizens. From the infamous 2014 Boko Haram kidnappings of more than 270 girls in Chibok, north-eastern Borno state, with some still in captivity and abductions still ongoing in Borno state, to the ever-increasing instances of armed banditry across north-west Nigeria, we have reached a critical stage where girls and women are in a constant state of fear and unease.

For example, since 2020, more than 1,000 girls, women, boys and men have been abducted in various locations in Kaduna including Federal College of Forestry Mechanisation, Greenfield University, Bethel Secondary School, numerous communities across at least seven Local Government Areas, churches, colleges, hospitals and many unreported cases. School attendance rates have declined drastically and all primary and secondary schools in Kaduna state were temporarily shut down in August 2021 due to the deteriorating security situation. Kaduna has been worst hit among the other north-west and north-central states most affected by mass and individual abductions. With the DW reporter’s name redacted for security reasons, this short narrative tells of a community member who witnessed and became a victim himself:

“Alhaji Dan Juma began to relate the attack — during which his son, his brother and other 13 people had been murdered. “They came around 2:30 a.m. They killed my son and my brother and took (another) brother,” Juma told me in the Hausa language through a translator. “I pray for the government officials to protect the interest of the people, for God’s sake,” Juma pleaded. Gunmen killed Juma a day after I spoke with him. They had contacted him demanding ransom money to secure the release of his abducted brother.

After collecting 5 million naira (€11,000, \$13,123) from him, they then killed him and the brother he was trying to rescue.

Juma's death is similar to what many Nigerians in the north go through. But such stories barely make it in the news,” [Deutsche Welle 2021].

This describes one story and today there are thousands of similar stories. In addition, attention has not been given to the gender specific effects of these abductions on the abductees.

The world-famous Chibok girls have been the ones who have gotten the most chances to tell some of their stories, due to the notoriety of the incident and time that has passed; and some simply cannot. It is much too traumatic and the potential for re-traumatisation is an ever-present reality. In Kaduna state for instance, as of 29 September 2021, we are still very much in the throes of the bombardment by kidnappers and the publicised attempts of the armed forces and police, so no one is even thinking yet of the effects on the girls, women and the community as a whole, how much more what concrete actions need to be taken to start to address both short and long-term effects. This very complex and difficult situation has also hampered effective data collection related to women/men ratios of victims as data is sometimes scarce or even unreliable; and follow up on any rehabilitation efforts. This causes an enormous gap in being able to truly assess, find support for and implement holistic rehabilitation, mental health and psychosocial support to victims. There is also the devastating effect on families; both those who have been able to get their wards back and those whose wards have been killed in the course of their abductions- in most cases in the most humiliating and disrespectful ways [Al Jazeera 2021].

3 TRAUMA TESTIMONIALS

“The APA states that Hostage and kidnap survivors can experience stress reactions including denial, impaired memory, shock, numbness, anxiety, guilt, depression, anger, and a sense of helplessness,” [American Psychological Association 2013].

Such survivors can feel relief on being freed but being able to adjust “back to real life” can be just as hard as when one was in captivity. When survivors are released, they can feel a whole range of emotions that result in major adjustment difficulties.

Survivors may experience “survivors’ guilt” which is when they feel underserving of having survived over others who did not, and some common reactions include, denial, impaired memory, decreased concentration, being overcautious and aware, confusion, shock, numbness, anxiety, guilt, depression, anger, a sense of helplessness, withdrawal and avoidance of family, friends, and activities.

Even more complicated psychological effects can emerge like the “Stockholm Syndrome” which is a condition where survivors develop a bond with their captors or feel guilty for feeling that bond, and experience grief if their captors are harmed.

The effects of abductions on girls and women cannot be minimised. Additional problems of stigma, economic difficulties which may have come about because of ransom money paid or general destabilisation of the family, ill health, and poor well-being of the family also as a result of the abduction are all factors that additionally play a significant role in the effect of abductions on abductees. Many communities tend to see survivors as outcasts and in some cases even as traitors (especially when linked to terrorism and such abductees come back with children or even a “repentant” husband). The weight of being an abductee is enormous and only with proper medical attention, connecting with loved ones, talking about or relating their experiences, and being in a safe and secure environment can they even begin to experience some relief and potential healing from their ordeals. Our trauma testimonials will focus on two cases.

Noami Adamu’s story is intriguing. She was one of the Chibok girls abducted in 2014. And she managed to keep a diary throughout her ideal. She spent three years in captivity. “Senior Boko Haram militants were constantly trying to get Naomi to marry one of their fighters. They believed seeing her get married would help convince the younger girls to follow her lead. Every time she refused, she would be beaten brutally and threatened with death,” [Jones, M. 2021].

Her story is definitely worth reading. But for the sake of scope, we are focusing the emphasis here on what happened after she was released along with 81 other girls. Naomi reports that every time new reports of abductions are in the news, she cannot sleep; and when she heard about the Zamfara abductions she didn't want them to go through what she and her peers went through. She says she still gets scared whenever she hears gunshots - even if they're from the military. Naomi is rebuilding her life. She is now happily married and expecting her first child as at the time the report was published. Her story is ongoing as she faces whatever her new life brings her including dealing with the complexities of being an ex-abductee. More than 100 of the Chibok girls are still missing. How does Naomi feel when she thinks of those left behind? How will she approach the care of her own child and the potential paranoia that will come as the child grows up? How will she cope with loss as life goes on? Many questions are staring us in the face that we cannot answer right now.

In Kaduna, some abducted students are seeking alternative educational opportunities overseas as they do not see Nigeria and particularly Kaduna state as an option anymore because they are not safe. With very scarce information about abductees and the barring of journalists

speaking with them to avoid re-traumatisation as probably for security reasons, we are only able to access bits and glimpses of the state of minds of these rescued abductees. 19-year-old Kauna Daniel from one of the Kaduna colleges wants to leave, even though she currently has no passport or money to fund her education abroad but is extremely frightened on top of it all.

“I don’t want to go anywhere again,” her voice rang out angrily over the phone. She said she hasn’t been able to sleep since she was released from captivity in May because of trauma and an eye problem. The trauma we are passing through is getting out of hand and it is even now that everything is getting worse,” she said, adding almost as if she is pleading that “it is better for me to stay at home.” [Asadu C. September 2021] If that’s not confusion and disorientation, I do not know what is.

We do not have in-depth testimonials because we do not have access to them and for this to happen within a culture that mental health disorders and problems are considered shameful and are stigmatised, it is no surprise that we cannot hear more in order to help more. One thing is for sure, no good comes out of such an ordeal as an abduction or kidnapping and the effects for everyone are destabilising and distressing.

4 THE VOICES OF ACTIVISTS

This chapter documents the reflections of activists on the issues of violence against women and specifically issues of abductions and kidnappings. This question was posed to them: “With the increase of violence against women and abductions particularly of girls and women in Nigeria, what solutions would you proffer to start to heal these girls and women from these traumatising incidents and how can we prevent their continual recurrence?”

Activist One: Geo-Political Zone-North Central

Having contacted victims and survivals of GBV, I know what victims of violence can suffer such as sexual and reproductive health consequences, including forced and unwanted pregnancies, unsafe abortions, traumatic fistula, sexually transmitted infections including HIV, and even death.

Possible solutions here are to make provision of **Safe Centers** for GBV survivals. Here the victim stays there for about 2 months and during this period they should be preoccupied with different activities that will develop their minds. Such activities will help contribute and increase safety, hygiene and comfort among the survivors.

This is where they will be empowered on various views. Empowerment and autonomy of women and the improvement of their political, social, economic and health status is a highly important end in itself. In addition, it is essential for the achievement of sustainable development. Involving them in **skills acquisition** activities will help ease them from being traumatised.

The self-esteem of these survivors needs to burst out (**high self-esteem**). The fear of inferiority should have to be cleared from their minds. They need to see themselves as one who can do better than the other, to be courageous and understands and recognises their high self-esteem. They should also be encouraged in **participation** in activities that promote the ending of GBV, such as 16 days of Activism (Orange Day). With their active involvement they will be healed from the trauma.

In conclusion, the most powerful approach in ending violence against women is making sure perpetrators are brought to book, if possible, naming and shaming of perpetrators should be implemented. This single activity will send a message out there to people who wish to continue with violence against women. In Benue we are working closely with NGO and CSO implementing partners to see if we can achieve this target by 2022.

Activist Two: Geo-Political Zone-North Central

To heal victims of this menace, government and relevant organisations have to take seriously the setting up and equipping of rehabilitation centres to provide succor to women.

To prevent recurrence of these incidents, government should clamp down on the elements involved in these activities. After which they should make the penalties for kidnapping more stringent in order to ward off intending kidnappers.

Activist Three: Geo-Political Zone-North East

From my experience over the years, one of the major ways that women and girls can be protected from rights violations and its consequences is through sensitisation, and engaging the community gate keepers. Many people don't even have a clue what their rights are. So, when we start to sensitise communities on human rights which should be protected, it goes a long way. Also, when we engage men in accountability practices, sensitising them on their roles as upholders of the rights of women and girls, it would help. We also need to work through community gatekeepers/leaders and religious leaders. All these are prevention strategies. Then when rights are violated, there must be channels of reporting which protect women, referral pathways so to speak. Women should be linked with functional legal and psychosocial services. Women should also have safe spaces to speak, to heal and dialogue with other women. There should also be skills acquisition schemes, livelihood, or economic capacity building, for women and adolescent girls.

Activist Four: Geo-Political Zone-North West

In recent years, Nigeria has been plagued with so much crime and terrorism. The height of this is the incessant abductions happening around the country. Women and girls are not free from these abductions, one might even say they are higher risk as they experience different levels of trauma as a result.

Some of the traumas these girls and women experience include; sexual harassment, rape and assault. Some of the victims abducted by Boko Haram have been indoctrinated into the terrorists' group and forced to participate in their terrorist activities.

Thankfully, some of these girls and women are rescued or released after a while, however the damage has been done and upon their return they are confronted with a different kind of challenge; reintegrating into society after experiencing days, weeks, months and even years of unspeakable agonising trauma. At this point, they need the help of all-family, friends, society and even the government-to heal and to return to normalcy, if possible.

These survivors have gone through something so profound, most of them live with the scars-physical, psychological, and mental. Hence, they need the help of loved ones, their community and the government to heal and reintegrate back into society and live life with the highest level of normalcy attainable for them. The first step to be taken is to have them undergo a thorough medical examination to check for internal and external injuries as well as STDs. This can be provided by Sexual Assault and Referral Centers (SARC), or otherwise by public hospitals at no cost to the survivors. Having covered their physical wellness, then there is a need to also take care of their mental and psychological well-being; this can be in form of therapy sessions with a professional therapist or a psychiatrist. Talking to a professional is only 50% of the work, they also need to talk to loved ones about their experiences.

Talking to loved ones may prove difficult if not impossible especially for those who have been away from their families for years. The Chibok girls, who were abducted in 2014 as kids are now adults, haven't been gone for 7 years, and this means some of them have already forgotten what their families look like and one thing is sure for all of them, interacting and trusting their families and loved ones again will take time and work. Work on both sides; the families and the survivors, but mostly their families, as they have to remind the survivors that they are now home, and safe.

Some of the work needed is engaging them in activities that keeps them busy and away from isolation and provides them opportunities to learn new skills as well as re-learn day-to-day interaction. Another most crucial path to healing for survivors is reassuring them of their

safety and justice what for what has been done to them, this is only achievable by bringing perpetrators to justice and intensifying security measures across the country. To prevent the continual occurrence of these traumatising incidents, perpetrators must be held accountable for their actions, and should be brought to justice.

Activist Five: Geo-Political Zone-North West

People should be allowed to tell their story and you should listen without judging them because that's how you build trust and make them to have a safe place to tell their story as nobody likes to be attacked which doesn't give room for healing. Listening to their story makes you to know how to respond and preserve their sanity. Safe spaces must be provided to assure them that they are safe from their perpetrators and that they are safe with you.

You shouldn't select the victims and treat them in a discriminatory manner, leaving this one and picking another. Healing should be approached in uniformity, and this builds more confidence in them knowing they are not the first neither the last, so it doesn't start and end with me. In as much as we encourage healing, we should also render justice to them. We must make sure that there is implementation and enforcement of the necessary laws. Another thing is confidentiality when people need healing, we should be able to keep their confidentiality intact in the sense that when they tell their stories, we should allow them heal first before we share the stories so by the time we want to share it with other people they are already healing and back to the society.

Activist Six: Geo-Political Zone-South East

To prevent violence against women and girls, it's necessary that law enforcement officers should rise to their responsibilities and the government should stop playing politics with the safety and well-being of women and girls, the citizens at large and ensure that perpetrators are fished out and adequate punishment served (irrespective of social status of perpetrator or victim) to serve as a deterrent to others abusers. Women and girls should be encouraged to stand up for one another, to speak with one voice over the failure of the government to protect them, and punish offenders. There is also a need to teach self-defense skills to women. In order to help them heal, we should end stigmatisation of victims and provide psychosocial support.

Activist Seven: Geo-Political Zone-South West

While we must admit the difficulty to forget the experiences of violence by survivor, trying to help them forget bad experiences is important because someone who has been a victim of violence definitely has been in an environment where s/he feels so lost and is not accepted. So, I believe that if such a person is placed in a community where s/he feels loved and accepted, that way it can be the beginning of the healing process.

We can also encourage them by booking counseling sessions for them where they can have one-on-one interactions with therapists who are specialists in some of these areas to help them express themselves (express their grief) freely without condemnation. These sessions have to be consistent as a process and constant engagement with the therapist, will help them to renew their mind.

Because Sexual and Gender Based Violence can have physical, psychological, and financial effects (trauma) on the survivor, as we take care of the psychological part, we should encourage them to invest in their interests, talents, skills, and build them up such that they are

able to see themselves as useful to the society because we've been able to help them through their physical and financial trauma.

To stop these from reoccurring, the government needs to play a major role. The insecurity situation is worrisome, and the security agencies need to be well empowered to face the challenges posed by it. Schools should be well protected from kidnapping. An average girl should be able to defend herself by including taekwondo in our sexual and reproductive health rights curriculum. I feel that the government has a major role to play and invest in the budget for security.

5 CONCLUSION

This paper has highlighted one of the very important and overwhelming problems Nigeria, especially northern Nigeria is facing today. This is done using the lens of trauma and we questioning ourselves on how we can tend to the effects of trauma that girls and women face daily. We also glanced very briefly into some testimonials that give us little information but even that is showing us very clearly that things are in a bad shape and will only get worse over the short and long term.

We wanted to share a glimpse of the scope of the problem in such a richly endowed nation and highlight the irony of how now even striving for education is now a deadly endeavour, especially for girls and women. We posed a question to women activists to hear their views on possible solutions to start to heal girl and women abductees from these traumatising incidents, and how to prevent their continual recurrence.

Considering all the conversations and reflections, the following recommendations emerge commonly:

1. The problem must be acknowledged, its importance and effects must be recognised to be on the level of a pandemic by all stakeholders especially the government and security agencies.
2. Government must acknowledge and invest all resources to uphold the sanctity of human life, security and human rights of every citizen of Nigeria.
3. We cannot allow this issue to become a political issue – as it relates to the well-being of those who literally care for the nation and its people.
4. All resources must be mobilised to prioritise and enforce the safety and security of Nigerians and particularly of girls and women.
5. Survivors must have access to rehabilitative and support resources including legal, health, empowerment, psychosocial and mental health services in addition to the provision of safe spaces.
6. Experts, community, and civil society groups should be engaged as active partners and provided with resources to support the state's efforts in responding to the needs of survivors.
7. Families and communities need to be sensitized and encouraged to provide support to survivors.
8. Reflecting on and localising good practices of addressing the problem of abductions and kidnapping should be undertaken by all stakeholders systematically.
9. Root problems that are factors feeding into the increase of abductions should be analysed and proposed solutions to transform these environments discussed in a consultative manner and implemented.
10. Self defence and rights education should be mainstreamed into school curricula.
11. Work closely with gatekeepers, religious leaders, and influencers to raise awareness and encourage action against abductions.
12. Promote the dignity of survivors and encourage them to tell their stories when the risk of re-traumatisation is low.
13. Stringent laws and policies must be put in place as deterrents for those considering or involved in abductions or kidnappings.
14. Perpetrators must face the full wrath of the law when caught and should be named and shamed.
15. Holistic programming should be provided to survivors and patience must guide the application of any services or process to support them.

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The American Perception of the Palestine-Israel Conflict

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ABSTRACT

The Palestine-Israel conflict is probably one of the most pressing problems in the Middle East. Moreover, the United States has been involved in this conflict since the 1970s. Therefore, the present research aims to learn more about the American perception of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. It was conducted using a survey that addressed Americans from different backgrounds, focusing on four variables: the American government's position, solutions, the Israeli settlements, and Jerusalem. The research suggests a correlation between political party and the American perception of the conflict. It appears that Republicans seem to be against the withdrawal of the Israeli settlements, and they believe that the US government is not biased toward Israel. Nevertheless, Democrats tend to believe that the US government is biased in favor of Israel, and they support withdrawing the Israeli settlements. Moreover, there might be another correlation between the American perception and the source of information they use to learn about the conflict. Most of the surveyed Americans, whatever their resource of information that they use to learn about the conflict is, tend to believe that the US is biased in favor of Israel. It is crucial to know about the American perception when approaching to a solution to the conflict as the US is a mediator in this conflict, and a powerful country in the world. Especially because it has a permanent membership in the UN council.

KEYWORDS: American Perception, Palestine-Israel Conflict, Jerusalem, Israeli settlements.

INTRODUCTION

The Palestinian-Israeli conflict appears to be one of the most pressing political cases around the world (Chapman & Benson, 2015). This conflict can be defined as a fight between two people on the same territories (Ben-Ze'ev & Yvroux, 2018). Palestinian people were part of the Ottoman empire (Foster & Klein, 2015). At that time, noticeable numbers of Jewish people were immigrating to Palestine (Barnai & Barnay, 1992). After the Ottoman empire collapsed, Palestine was under the legation of Britain, which helped Israelis to establish their country in 1948 (Kochavi, 2003). Thus, 80% of Palestinians who were living in what is now called Israel had to escape to other parts of Palestine and to other countries (Gabriel & Sabatello, 1986). The conflict started to be over the territories, but it escalated to be a more complex conflict. The issues impending a final solution are Jerusalem, Israeli settlements, borders, Palestinian refugees and the Palestinian state, which are awaiting issues of the final phase of the Palestine-Israel negotiations that started in 199. These five issues have never been solved yet. However, many peace treaties have been tried to reach to an approach toward a final and applicable solution that both Palestinians and Israelis would accept (Osiewicz, 2013). At least one of them has always refused all the attempts to solve the problem (Talib & Mwango, 2017). The United States is one of the countries that has a long history with this conflict (Curtiss, McArthur & Stauffer, 1998). In early 1970's, the US played part in this conflict by mediating between Palestinians and Israelis (Swisher, 2018). For decades, Palestinians have seen the US to be biased in favor of Israel (Moughrabi, 1986). In addition, the American public has for years displayed pro-Israel sympathy (Odeh, 2014). As the media plays a role in politics (Caballero, 2010), the American perception of the Palestinian- Israeli conflict might have been changed recently. The abundance of information presented in social media and the access to multiple sources of information can give people a wider vision about this conflict. In fact, it is important to know what Americans believe about this conflict because the American people choose their government administration, which mediate between Palestinians and Israelis (Moughrabi, 1986). Some politicians could use their discourses around this issue to gain favor with certain groups of voters. Moreover, the US supports Israel by sending them \$146 billion in bilateral assistance (USA Today, 2021). Importantly, the US is a permanent member of the security council of the United Nations. It has the right to use the veto to prevent any resolution that other countries in the security council are voting for (Hosli & Dörfler, 2019). As a result, the American government is playing a crucial role in this conflict, as it is a mediator and pro-Israel at the same time. The mediator should take middle ground in the conflict in order to convince both parties of a solution. Palestinians need to feel that they are approached in the same way Israelis are to agree on a final solution. Otherwise, they would accept peace agreements that would not truly solve the conflict, and further violence will just continue. While a democratic government is a representer of its people, since in this case the government is elected by its people, the Palestinian- Israeli conflict might be not a deterrent factor for Americans when they vote for their government. However, it is still valuable to explore how beliefs about American policy might correlate with other factors. The following research aims to explore correlations between what American people believe and demographic features. For example, does the political party play role in what Americans believe about this conflict? Consequently, would it be different to Palestinians depending on the ruling party? Is there any correlation between the American perception of this conflict and where they receive information about the conflict from?

The objective of this research paper is to find out what Americans might believe about this conflict, especially in four factors, Israeli settlements, the security of Israel, Jerusalem, solutions to the conflict, and the American government position to this conflict. Nonetheless, this research is an exploratory study, and the results are a start point for more sophisticated studies. In addition, this paper is structured as following: the second section presents the methodology of the study. The third section describes the results and a discussion of the results. The final section describes the conclusions of the study.

METHODOLOGY

The following study was conducted using primarily Likert scale survey. An online questionnaire was designed with 15 questions on four characteristics of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict focusing on the Israeli settlements, Jerusalem, solutions to the conflict, and the American government position. Lickert-style questions in the form of a rating scale comprised the test (Wimmer and Dominick, 2011). The questionnaire was administered through the Google Drive platform between June and July 2021. The total number of participants were 59, 27 men, 29 women and three people who do not prefer to say their gender.

RESULTS

Below are the results of the research. Table 1 shows the demographic data of the surveyed people.


Table 1. Descriptive Statistics (N=59)

Variable	%
Sex	
Male	45.8
Female	49.2
Prefer don't say	5.1
Political Party	
Democrat	57.6
Republican	15.3
Other	27.1
Race	
African American	3.4
White American	84.7
Asian	3.4
Latino	1.4
Middle Eastern	1.7
prefer not to say	1.7
other	3.7
Level of Education	

High school diploma	5.1
Undergraduate Degree	22
MA/ MA equivalent graduate degree	52.5
Doctorate	11.9
prefer not to say	1.7
other	6.8
Religion	
Protestant	44.1
Catholic	13.6
Jewish	0
Muslim	0
Prefer not to say	5.1
Secular/non-religious	32.2
Other	5
Age	
20-39	49.2
40-59	20.3
60+	30.5
Geographical location	
Southeast	32.2
Northeast	23.7
West	10.2
Midwest	28.8
prefer not to say	1.7
other	3.4


According to the survey, 84.5% of people who completed the survey know about the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. In addition, 45.8% of them know about the conflict through personal experience and/or research, while 37.7% of them are relying on media including TV and newspapers to learn about this conflict. However, when they were asked about the solutions to this conflict, 55.9% have heard about the one-state solution, while 86.4% of them have heard about the two-state solution. Moreover, while 37.3% of them consider the American government to be part of the solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, 33.9% of them believe the opposite. Although 79.6% of them think that the US government is biased in favor of Israel, 50.8% of them appear to believe that Biden's administration is not taking actions in this conflict. Moreover, 44.1% of them believe that peace in the middle east will come when Palestinians have a state of their own on the occupied territories. 54.3% of them believe that the two-state solution is the only applicable solution to this conflict, whereas 67.8% of them think that the one-state solution is not applicable in this conflict. 62.8% of them believe that Israeli people have no right to settle in the occupied territories. 64.4% of them think that Israel has no right to build settlements in the West Bank. Nevertheless, only 49.2 think that Israel must withdraw its settlements from the West Bank. 17% of them believe that a Palestinian state would be a threat to the security of Israel,

45.7% believe that a Palestinian would not affect the security of Israel. Finally, 49.1% of them want Jerusalem to be part of both states. In addition, 55.9% refuse Jerusalem to be under the control of only Israel.



According to the chart above, 54.3% the surveyed Democrats believe that Israel must withdraw its settlements from the occupied territories, while no surveyed Republican believes that Israel might have to do that. Comparing the results of the question about withdrawing the Israeli settlements with the question about the two-state solution, 44.4% of Republicans support the two-state solution. It might be confusing that no surveyed Republican supported the idea of withdrawing the Israeli settlements from the occupied territories, while some of them supported setting a Palestinian state. The reason/s for these contradict results could be because of misunderstanding the questions, or maybe they support the idea of establishing a Palestinian state if it is not located where it is now. On the other hand, 66.7% of those who are not affiliated in any political party tend to support the Israeli settlements withdrawal. In addition, 91.4% of the surveyed democrats believe that the American government is biased in favor of Israel, so do other people who are not affiliated in any political party with a percentage of 86.7%. Nevertheless, 22.2% of Republicans believe that the American government is biased toward Israel. In addition, 73.3% of not affiliated, surveyed people support the idea of dividing Jerusalem to be part of Palestinian and Israeli states. On the other hand, 44.4% of the surveyed Republicans agreed on this idea, while only 40% of Democrats support the idea. It seems that Republicans and Democrats have the same point of view about dividing Jerusalem. However, only 5% of Democrats agreed on Jerusalem's being fully under the control of the Israeli state. As a result, Democrats seem to agree on another approach when it comes to Jerusalem, which could be internationalization the city.

The American Perception on Three Variables Correlated with the Source of Information



According to the chart above, it seems that in the academic atmosphere Americans tend to believe in the idea of withdrawing the Israeli settlements. It could mean that in academic spaces, they are less likely to get misinformation and are more likely to be given historical information rather than a more politically driven media source. 60.7% of Americans who gained their knowledge about this conflict from an educational institution, or another source of information supports the Palestinians' right of having their own country without Israeli settlements. Nonetheless, only 30% of them supported the two-state solution, while no one supported the one state solution. On the other hand, 57.1% of Americans who accumulated their knowledge through personal experience or research support the two-state solution, but they do not agree with withdrawing the Israeli settlements from the occupied territories. The applicable solution to these people is not clear, and the data seems to contradict itself. However, these contradictions could shed light on American understandings and beliefs about this conflict. It could be that they did not understand the questions well, or that they believe in establishing a country for Palestinians on a different land.

All the surveyed Americans, wherever they receive their information about the conflict from, tend to believe that the US government is biased. Although the American media is politically driven (Caballero, 2010), 73.9% of those who rely on media think that the US government is biased in favor of Israel. Therefore, since most of the surveyed Americans believe that their government is biased in favor of Israel, this could be an indication on how the American government is functioning when guiding parties to this conflict to reach to a solution. Thus, both Palestinians and Israelis should be reached in the same way, which makes it fair for both of them in order to agree on a permanent and trustworthy solution.

CONCLUSION

Taking the American perception into consideration while choosing a mediator, Palestinians will be more successful in approaching a solution to this conflict. The goal of any mediation in this conflict should be to find a solution that will be agreed on from both Israel and Palestine, but in order to do that, Palestinians need to feel that they are approached in the same way Israelis are. For that, an exploratory study was conducted to find the American perception of the Palestine-Israel conflict using a survey that was focusing on four variables: the American government position, solutions to this conflict, Israeli settlements, and Jerusalem. Knowing what Americans

believe about this conflict would help the Palestinian government to take reliable actions toward approaching a solution to this conflict while also gaining fair treatment in this process. It might also help the Palestinian government whether to consider the American government as a mediator between them and the Israeli government. Moreover, it could help Palestinians in finding a way to address the American government depending on the ruling party. As there might be a correlation between the source of information Americans use to educate themselves about the conflict and what they believe, knowing that would help Palestinians to rebuttal the American version of the story by showing what the truth could be. Most of the surveyed Americans believe that the government is biased in favor of Israel. Thus, there should be a use of this piece of information by Palestinians when addressing American people or the American government.

This study has found correlation between the political party and how Americans approach the solutions to the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. However, further studies have to be done in order to find if there is a causation between the Americans' beliefs and political parties. Moreover, there have to be further studies to make progress in making peace in the Middle East relying on how to address the American government, according to the findings in this research and further ones. As the survey was conducted during two months, the findings might not be as confidential as they should be.

FUNDING

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CONFLICT OF INTEREST

This research was conducted and written by a Palestinian author, a sort of bias toward the Palestinian people might be found in asking the questions and/or interpreting the results.

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APPENDIX A

SURVEY: THE AMERICAN PERCEPTION ON THE PALESTINE-ISRAEL CONFLICT

***Required**

1. Sex *

- ☐ Female
- ☐ Male
- ☐ Prefer not to say

2. Political party *

- ☐ Democrat
- ☐ Republican
- ☐ Prefer not to say
- ☐ Other: _____

3. Race *

- ☐ White American
- ☐ African
- ☐ Native American
- ☐ Asian
- ☐ Latino
- ☐ Native Hawaiian/ other Pacific Islander
- ☐
- ☐
- ☐

Middle Eastern

prefer not to say

☐ Other: _____

4. Level of education *

☐ High school diploma

☐ Undergraduate Degree

☐ MA/ MA equivalent graduate degree

☐ Doctorate

☐ prefer not to say

☐ Other: _____

5. Religion *

☐ Protestant

☐ Catholic

☐ Jewish

☐ Muslim

☐ Baptist

Prefer not to say

☐ Secular/non-religious

☐ Other: _____

6. Age *

☐ 20-39

☐ 40-59

- ☐ 60+
- ☐ prefer not to say

7. Geographical location *

- ☐ Southeast
- ☐ Northeast
- ☐ West Coast
- ☐ Southwest
- ☐ Midwest
- ☐ prefer not to say
- ☐ Other _____

8. On a scale from 1-5, how much do you know about the Palestine-Israel conflict?

	1	2	3	4	5	
I do not know anything about it very well	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	I know about it

9. Where have you learned about the Palestine-Israel conflict from? *

- ☐ School
- ☐ University
- ☐ TV
- ☐ Newspapers
- ☐ Personal research
- ☐ Personal experience
- ☐
- ☐

Media
Other

10. Which of the following solutions to the Palestine-Israel conflict have you heard of?

- ☐ one-state solution
☐ Two-statesolution
☐ none of them
☐ Other: _____

On a scale from 1-5, how much do you agree with the following statements?

1. The United States is part of the solution to the conflict between Israel and Palestine *

1 2 3 4 5

Strongly disagree ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ Strongly agree

2. The U.S. administration is biased towards Israel *

1 2 3 4 5

Strongly disagree ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ Strongly agree

3. The U.S. administration is biased towards Palestine *

1 2 3 4 5

Strongly disagree ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ Strongly agree

4. The Biden administration is active in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. *

1 2 3 4 5

☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐

Strongly disagree

Strongly agree

5. Peace in the Middle East will come when Palestinian people have a state of their own on the occupied territories. *

1 2 3 4 5

Strongly disagree

☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐

Strongly agree

6. The two-state solution is the only applicable solution to this conflict. *

1 2 3 4 5

Strongly disagree

☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐

Strongly agree

7. The one-state solution is the only applicable one to this conflict. *

1 2 3 4 5

Strongly disagree

☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐

Strongly agree

8. Israeli people have the right to settle in the occupied territories. *

1 2 3 4 5

Strongly disagree

☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐

Strongly agree

9. Israel has the right to build settlements in the West Bank. *

1 2 3 4 5

☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐

Strongly disagree

Strongly agree

10. Israel must withdraw its settlements from the West Bank. *

1 2 3 4 5

Strongly disagree

☐☐☐☐☐

Strongly agree

11. A Palestinian state on the occupied territories would be a threat to the security of Israel. *

1 2 3 4 5

Strongly disagree

☐☐☐☐☐

Strongly agree

12. Jerusalem must fully be under the control of Israeli government. *

1 2 3 4 5


Strongly disagree

Strongly agree

APPENDIX B RESPONSES ORGANIZED BY CHARTS

Sex


60 responses



- Female
- Male
- Prefer not to say

Political party

60 responses




- Democrat
- Republican
- Prefer not to say
- prefer not to say
- American
- Independent, non-affiliated
- Independent
- depends on the policies

▲ 1/2 ▼

Race

60 responses




- White American
- African American
- Native American
- Asian
- Latino
- Native Hawaiian/ other Pacific Islander
- Middle Eastern
- prefer not to say

▲ 1/2 ▼

Level of education


60 responses



- High school diploma
- Undergraduate Degree
- MA/ MA equivalent graduate degree
- Doctorate
- prefer not to say
- Cpa
- JD
- Some college

Religion

60 responses




- Protestant
- Catholic
- Jewish
- Muslim
- Baptist
- Prefer not to say
- Secular/non-religious
- Christian

▲ 1/3 ▼

Age


60 responses



- 20-39
- 40-59
- 60+
- prefer not to say


Geographical location

60 responses




On a scale from 1-5, how much do you know about the Palestine-Israel conflict?

59 responses




Where have you learned about the Palestine-Israel conflict from?

60 responses




Which of the following solutions to the Palestine-Israel conflict have you heard of?

60 responses




1. The United States is part of the solution to the conflict between Israel and Palestine

60 responses




2. The U.S. administration is biased towards Israel

60 responses




3. The Biden administration is active in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

60 responses




4. Peace in the Middle East will come when Palestinian people have a state of their own on the occupied territories.

60 responses




5. The two-state solution is the only applicable solution to this conflict.

60 responses




6. The one-state solution is the only applicable one to this conflict.

60 responses




7. Israeli people have the right to settle in the occupied territories.

60 responses




8. Israel has the right to build settlements in the West Bank.

60 responses




9. Israel must withdraw its settlements from the West Bank.

60 responses




10. A Palestinian state on the occupied territories would be a threat to the security of Israel.

60 responses




11. Jerusalem must fully be under the control of Israeli government.

60 responses



12. Jerusalem must be a part of both states.

60 responses



Theory of Institutional Peace and Peacebuilding in transboundary river basins

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ABSTRACT

Social developments have led to prompt the significance of concentrating on peace and the factors influencing it throughout history. In order to analyze this concept, various theories have been proposed in the field of international relations and peace and conflict studies. Institutional peace theory is one of the prominent theories that emphasizes the role of international institutions to achieve meaningful change and cooperation among governments at the international level. Most researchers in the field of environmental challenges in general and water challenges in particular have also based liberal institutionalism in their research at the international level. Attention to the role of institutions in dealing with water conflicts and peacebuilding in transboundary river basins has led to the need to analyze the theory of institutional peace in the management of water conflicts. Accordingly, the purpose of the present study is to analyze the capacity of institutional peace theory in dealing with water conflicts in transboundary river basins. With this goal in view, while using library resources, the effectiveness of institutional peace theory in the management of water conflicts is analyzed. Based on the analyses, it can be acknowledged that despite the positive effect of water institutions in relieving water conflicts in some river basins, there are significant criticisms of this theory.

KEYWORDS: Water Conflicts, Institutional Peace, Transboundary river basins, Institutionalism

UNAMID: A Path Towards Hybrid Peacekeeping?

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ABSTRACT

In 2007, the United Nations - African Union Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID) was established as the first joint peacekeeping operation (PKO) of the United Nations (UN), with the African Union (AU) in Darfur, Sudan, which became known as the first hybrid PKO, bringing together two of the largest international organizations and taking over AMIS (African Union Mission in Sudan).

In this paper, we want to understand the purpose of this bilateral relationship, since this hybrid operation opened a window of opportunity for future operations to adopt this typology. Firstly, the responsibility of managing certain conflicts is distributed among other regional organizations, giving them more autonomy and responsibility. Secondly, the “burden” – human and financial – of the UN is somehow eased.

To this end, we will gather and process the data relating to the strengths and weaknesses of this PKO typology, with the help of a SWOT analysis, to find clues and bring evidence to light that demonstrate the possibility of this model being replicated in future situations, while respecting the due differences inherent to each mission and each country and region.

We concluded that the hybridization of more PKOs could be a reality, albeit dependent on a greater investment by regional organizations in adapting to UN procedures, namely through diverse types of training. In addition, it will always be necessary a prior and careful analysis regarding the implementation of a PKO of this typology, with a concrete and clear definition of the roles of each organization.

KEYWORDS: hybrid peacekeeping; United Nations; peacekeeping operations; UNAMID; African Union.

1 INTRODUCTION

Bearing in mind that a Peacekeeping Operation (PKO) with a hybrid format was held for the first time with the implementation of the United Nations - African Union Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID), in which two of the largest international organizations joined, it is our intention, in the first instance, to understand the purpose of this bilateral relationship based on this particular case.

Next, with the end of UNAMID, it seems to us that a research and treatment, although in an exploratory way, of the strengths and weaknesses of this PKO typology, with the help of a SWOT analysis, may raise clues and to find evidence that demonstrates the possibility of this model being replicated in future situations, respecting the appropriate differences inherent to each mission and each country and region.

In this sense, for the present paper, we posed the following starting question: **it would be possible to replicate, in the future, the implementation of a PKO between the UN and the AU, *mutatis mutandis*, taking into account the experience of UNAMID?**

For our investigation, we outline the following objectives: i) to understand the nature of the conflict in Darfur, which led to the implementation of UNAMID; ii) to understand the reasons that led to the creation of a hybrid PKO; iii) to analyze the successes, failures, opportunities and challenges to this typology of PKO, based on UNAMID.

We will start our article with a chapter dedicated to the nature of the conflict in Darfur, where we will seek to geographically characterize the country and the region and understand the reasons that led to the conflict that led the Security Council (SC) to take the decision to implement UNAMID. In a second phase, we will try to analyze the existing history between the UN and the AU, with regard to the situation in Darfur, in order to understand the work developed between both organizations that culminated in the implementation of a hybrid operation, with shared leadership.

Finally, we intend to examine the results that, so far, can be verified, of this operation, to understand if this model can be replicated in the future or if it will be a unique event, not desirable in the near future.

2 CONFLICT NATURE

As we will see further on, the nature of the conflict that emerged in the Darfur area, on one of the strands, is intimately linked with the geographic characteristics of the country and, specifically, of the region. Therefore, it is important to briefly characterize Sudan and the Darfur region, for a better understanding of the conflict itself.

In this sense, according to the official UN website, Sudan is located in northeast Africa, with a total area of 1,882,000 km², being the third largest African country in terms of territory, with an estimated 34 million people to live in the country. It borders seven countries, Egypt and Libya to the North, Ethiopia and South Sudan to the South, the Central African Republic (CAR) and Chad to the West and Eritrea to the East, where it is also bathed by the Red Sea (about 885km). The Nile River crosses the territory from North to South, passing through the center of the country.

It should also be noted that 97% of the population is Muslim, with Arab culture being dominant in the country, despite the fact that in Darfur the majority of the population is of Central African origin, of different ethnicities and religions [1][2].

With specific regard to Darfur, it occupies the region located in the Northwest of Sudan, which borders Libya, Chad and CAR, with a land area of around 440,000 km² and a population of approximately 7.4 million of inhabitants. The region's soil is mostly arid, especially in the North, although in the center of the region stands out the *Marrah* mountain

range, which, due to its altitude, has a favorable climate for the development of agriculture and livestock, as well as the creation of water sources, due to the constant rain fall.

Sudan (corresponding to the actual South Sudan and Sudan) proclaims its independence in 1956, after a period of Anglo-Egyptian rule, which had occurred since the end of the 19th century, causing natural, social and political changes, especially in the Darfur region, as Salih [3] argues, since:

- i) It gave rise to new alliances based on the ethnic origin of political parties;
- ii) A strong competition for resources began – sources of water and pastures – due to the exponential increase in population and livestock, accompanied by constant droughts;
- iii) The control of political power, which resided in the hands of the *Umma* party, began to be frequently contested by regional movements.

Since its independence, the country has been plagued by conflicts. The first one dates back a year before independence, in 1955, which lasted until 1972 [1]. The fact that the region is controlled by an elite based in the capital, the absence of a national self-identification and the differences between African and Arab culture [2] were also at the origin of the outbreak of successive conflicts. Despite these difficulties that Sudan, as a country, was going through, the Darfur region was frankly less developed compared to the east of the country, at various levels [2][4][5].

Following the above, Young, Osman, Aklilu, & Dale [4] report that Darfur “was governed by commissioners who neglected the basic needs of the population and only corresponded to the interests of the central government”. This was also the case with deputies from the capital, who represented Darfurian interests in the National Assembly, but who “had little or no concern for the region [4] with a clear negligence strategy in relation to Darfur [5][6].

This policy of marginalization dragged on for several decades, as can be seen in Table 1, in which we see that the distribution of wealth in Sudan was disproportional, with Darfur being, by far, the poorest region, despite having marked a growth from the 1960s to the 1980s, although not significant.

Table 1 Wealth Distribution [4]

Region	Income 1967/68	Income 1982/83
Khartoum	236	283
Middle (including the Blue Nile	183	201
Eastern (including Port Sudan and Kassala)	180	195
Kordofan (including South Kordofan)	153	164
Nothern Region	124	130
Darfur	98	102
Standard Deviation	44.5	57

Alongside the adoption of these policies by the central government, according to Etefa [5], ethnic conflicts in Darfur began to escalate into violence in the 1980s, “culminating with rebel attacks on the government in 2003”, albeit there was a history of disputes in the region over the “rights of land and water tenure between farmers and pastors”. It should be noted that there was a clear dispute over resources, since farmers were already on the land and pastors (nomads) constantly invaded the land of the former, thus creating a natural dispute between them. Danielová [2] states that the main conflicts were between Arabs and non-Arabs.

During a second civil war that started in 1985, and accused of oppressing the country's non-Arab people, in 2003, the Sudanese government is confronted with the rebellion of two armed groups – Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) and the Sudan Liberation Movement/Army (SLM/A) -, made up mainly of rebels from non-Arab communities [7], to

which the Government responded with the creation of the *Janjaweed* Arab militia and the Sudanese Armed Forces.

In view of the ongoing conflicts, a mission in Sudan, called African Union Mission in Sud (AMIS), was established by the AU in 2004 after the US Government declared that the conflict in Darfur evidenced the existence of genocide and that the responsibility to resolve the issue should be imputed to the AU. Later it would be proved that AMIS had neither the means nor the resources to resolve the conflict [8].

For this reason, in March 2005, the United Nations Mission in the Sudan (UNMIS) is implemented to support AMIS, namely in the establishment of a peace agreement between the parties involved in the conflict. On 9 July 2011, the UNMIS was replaced by the United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS).

In the words of Totten [9], he declares that the causes of the genocide witnessed in Darfur were complex, but that they would be based on five factors: “i) extreme drought and desertification; ii) Arab supremacy; iii) authoritarianism; iv) the deprivation of rights of black Africans in the hands of the Sudanese Government; v) a growing bellicosity in the region (within Sudan, Darfur and beyond the borders)”.

Still in 2005, the second civil war would end with the signing of the peace agreement – designated as a *Comprehensive Peace Agreement* – between the Government of Sudan and the Sudan People's Liberation Movement, a movement composed of Sudanese forces from the south of the country, which would later become what is now South Sudan.

However, this peace agreement did not end the conflict that had broken out in the country in 2003, as it, in turn, fueled the conflict in Darfur in various ways, through the “recruitment of Darfur militias to combat in the South, the increased militarization of Darfur and the use of resources in the region and respective marginalization of it” [4].

In May 2006, a peace agreement was signed between the SLM/A and the Government of Sudan – the Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA) -, after two years of negotiations, and in 2010 the SLM/A, once again, broke links with the Government, joining if the remaining rebel groups [10].

As we will see in the next chapter, given the gravity of the conflict, which brought tragedy and suffering to hundreds of thousands of people, including peacekeepers, the UN was forced to establish, together with the AU, the UNAMID, in what would be the first hybrid PKO, on 31 July 2007, through SC Resolution 1769 and which would later formally replace AMIS, on 31 December 2007.

We realized, after the analysis carried out, that the conflict in Darfur has in its genesis three distinct vectors that have been prolonged over the last decades:

i) Politics: there is political marginalization on the part of the central government, which has dragged on for decades, preventing this region from developing and creating a feeling of revolt against the governing elites;

ii) Ethnic: there is a dispute between Arabs and non-Arabs. The Arab faction finds itself in the Sudanese power elites, concentrating power within themselves and the darfurians do not feel represented by them;

iii) Economic: in a region where resources are scarce and droughts are abundant, the constant struggle between farmers (sedentary) and pastors (nomads) to obtain sources of water and arable land, destabilizes the region and leaves many in poverty extreme.

In fact, it is difficult to find a solution to a conflict with this multiplicity of factors, but Salih [3] adds that this will only be possible when the “Sudanese governing elite recognizes that Sudan cannot be governed by one government alone, located in Khartoum”, thus giving voice to the other actors of the regional movements.

3 THE CREATION AND THE MANDATE OF UNAMID

It is at a meeting of the Peace and Security Council (PSC), an AU body, dated January 12, 2006, during the presence of AMIS in Sudanese territory, that the motto is given to a UN-AU partnership, within the scope of a PKO. Thus, it is recognized by the PSC that, given the scenario of the conflict in Darfur, AMIS would be severely limited in financial and logistical terms, although it has "significantly contributed to the protection of the civilian population and to the development of security and humanitarian conditions" (paragraph two – PSC 45th Meeting Communication, PSC/PR/Comm.(XLV)).

In paragraph 5 of the same Communication, the PSC declares "the support (...) for a transition of AMIS to a UN operation, within a framework of partnership between the AU and the UN". In turn, and according to the Security Council Report [11], the Special Representative of the SG – Jan Pronk - and the AU Mediator for the crisis in Darfur – Salim Salim - reported on January 13, 2006 to the SC that the SG and the Chairperson of the AU Commission (CAUC) - Alpha Konaré - would have addressed the need to involve peacekeepers in the Darfur region, but that "any attempt to simply replace AMIS completely with a UN presence" could find strong opposition from the Government of Sudan.

It is also mentioned that the AU would be prepared to increase the organization's presence in Darfur, "possibly through the deployment of UN peacekeepers in a configuration to be determined", but which, as we know, would become the UNAMID, the first hybrid UN operation.

We consider a hybrid operation to be a "joint operation, in a particular area of responsibility, conducted by forces from different organizations under common command and control, with the purpose of achieving a common goal or purpose, with each force maintaining its organizational identity during the operation" [12].

The conflict in Darfur deteriorated with each passing day, witnessing serious violations of human rights, the use of force against civilians and elements belonging to the AMIS mission, without its resources being sufficient to contain the conflict. The SG Report, November 8, 2006 (S/2006/870), describes the violent scene in Darfur, reiterating that the UN would continue to support the AU mission, but that this would not increase the operation's ability to expand to other locations. That is, this support from the UN only served so that the mission would not end immediately.

In view of these facts, during the month of November, several meetings were held with the presence of the SG, with a view to implementing an PKO involving the AU. Thus, on November 10, it is proposed the implementation of a hybrid PKO, involving the AU and the UN, with the following general lines:

- i) Leadership of a joint AU-UN special representative;
- ii) A substantial involvement of the UN, with regard to the command and control of the PKO;
- iii) UN financing and logistics, on a sustained basis;
- iv) Human resources similar to UNMIS;
- v) PKO based on a robust Protection of Civilians (POC) component and DPA implementation support [13].

Even before the year ended, on December 19, the SC President (S/PRST/2006/55), by decision of the Council, affirmed that the establishment of a hybrid operation in Darfur would be a decision to be taken immediately, given that "the structures and systems of command and control would be provided by the UN". However, some fundamental aspects for the implementation of the PKO were not detailed, such as the mandate, dimension, duration and cost of the PKO.

During 2007, the activity of both the SC and the SG with regard to Darfur and the promotion of the implementation of UNAMID was significant. For example, on June 5, 2007, the SG and the CAUC prepared a report (S/2007/307/Rev) which contained, in its sixth chapter, a possible mandate for the hybrid PKO which, on June 22, would be approved by the PSC (79th Meeting Communication, PSC/PR/Comm.(LXXIX), accelerating the mission implementation process.

The following month, in July, the first drafts would begin to be prepared with concrete details of the mission, including attributing the designation of UNAMID. These drafts already reported the duration of the mission, the number of peacekeepers to be sent from each component, the main tasks to be carried out, a reduction in the number of personnel employed in UNMIS and the approximate cost of 2.5 billion euros [14].

Thus, on July 31, 2007, through the SC Resolution 1769 (S/RES/1769), the implementation of UNAMID is formally decided, for an initial period of 12 months, in accordance with paragraph 1, establishing, as mentioned, that “thus as soon as possible and not before December 31, 2007, UNAMID (...) will assume the authority of AMIS” (paragraph 5, letter c).

They also determined that the mandate of the PKO would be the one contained in paragraphs 54 and 55 of the report prepared on June 5, 2007, by the SG and the CAUC - already discussed by us. In this sense, UNAMID would be mandated, generically, to:

- i) Monitor and verify the implementation of peace agreements;
- ii) Support the political process;
- iii) Contribute to the promotion of human rights and the rule of law;
- iv) Monitor and report on situations involving other bordering countries, especially Chad or CAR;
- v) Monitor the existence of weapons, complying with the terms of the provisions of the peace agreements;
- vi) Acting on Chapter VII of the Charter, take the necessary measures to support the execution of the DPA, acting against possible armed attacks and protecting civilians, without jeopardizing the responsibility of the host State.

During the “negotiation” of this hybrid PKO, we were able to perceive that there was always some reluctance on the part of the AU to hand over, in full, the powers of mission management to the UN. This is verifiable when defending the motto of AMIS as African solutions to African problems [11][15] or that the presence of only African militaries in UNAMID would be ideal for mission success [16].

Despite this ambition, several countries across the planet would contribute with troops, police and civilians to UNAMID. However, it should be taken into account that African representation was agreed in the “Senior Leadership of UNAMID, in the staff recruitment process, and in the way of selecting the contributions of the military and police” [17].

We also emphasize, from the analysis carried out, that the establishment of this partnership is due, above all, to an absence of support - financial, logistical and human -, which the AU, through AMIS, showed to deal with the conflict in Darfur, which is why the UN was eventually called to intervene, although it was already present in Sudan.

As we have already mentioned, there was a tendency for some African States, through the AU, to seek to assume a leading role on the international stage, showing that the organization would be able to resolve the conflicts existing on your continent. Therefore, it did not seem to us that there was a clear “will” to establish this PKO on the part of the AU, but there was a “need”, because otherwise the conflict would deteriorate due to the insufficiency and ineffectiveness of AMIS.

4 UNAMID: SUCCESSES, CHALLENGES AND PERSPECTIVES

Considering the POC robust mandate, a greater number of peacekeepers in the field, more adequate funding and an appropriate logistical capacity, the implementation of UNAMID, according to Aguilar & Marquezi [18], was “more proactive and successful”, given that it has increased the level of security in the region and facilitated access to humanitarian assistance.

Nevertheless, the same authors state that, with regard to the resolution of the conflict itself, it is crucial that all parties involved respect the DPA. Also, as a result of the panoply of rebel movements that do not intend to collaborate, it is difficult to mitigate the conflict.

However, this view was not shared, for example, by the International Refugee Rights Initiative (IRRI) which argued that “eight years after deployment, conflict in Darfur not only continues but appears to be on the increase” [19] or by the High-Level Independent Panel on United Nations Peace Operations (HIPPO) which noted, in paragraph 25, that UNAMID was “a mere shadow of its original purpose” [20].

Right from the start of the PKO, there were some challenges linked to the operational capacity of UNAMID, as the Government of Sudan “required that the mission be predominantly African, with only some contributions from China and Pakistan” and imposed some constraints on the execution of the mandate, such as prohibiting night patrols, curfew in some areas or delaying the issuance of entry visas into the country and the entry of military equipment [15][18].

IRRI [19], on the other hand, highlighted the “huge political and logistical challenges” that UNAMID faced from the beginning, which included the inability to put the peacekeepers on the ground, constant attacks on the mission and poor Government collaboration. Government involvement is crucial to the execution of a robust POC mandate, as peacekeepers hardly have the means to ensure full compliance with the mandate, depending on armed actors such as the government to do so [21].

There was a clear division in the Council; while some members strongly criticize the Sudanese Government, demonstrating successive acts of human rights violations, other members – such as China and Russia - believed that “Sudan is working hard to promote stability in the country” [19].

However, this hybrid nature immediately allowed the Government of Sudan, which had always been reticent about placing UN forces in its territory, to authorize the implementation of this PKO, with a distinctly African identity, while without the AU as a partner, the mission would hardly be established [22].

For Mickler [15], UNAMID “reflects the importance and legitimacy of African leadership in regional governance, the material and political constraints faced by the AU and the benefits of shared responsibility”. These factors, together with the motivation of some African states to resolve their own issues, create a “political space” for this organization to assert itself.

It can be said that operations of a hybrid nature place greater responsibility for conflict resolution on countries in the region of the same. According to Bashua [22], the “involvement of a regional organization in a PKO gives the organization a feeling of ownership of the solution to the problem”, creating a feeling of obligation to resolve the conflict between its member states, as well as a feeling of solidarity [23]. In addition, the one author argues that “countries may be more inclined to contribute to a hybrid operation because they tend to have more control over the mandate and policies” [22], compared to an exclusive UN PKO.

On the path of Bashua, Prinsloo & van Niekerk [23] found that UNAMID can be seen as a success story, as “it allowed the AU to work on an equal footing with the international community to face a range of threats to human security and international peace and security”.

With regard to the execution of the PKO, IRRI identified a set of positive indicators arising from the implementation of UNAMID, namely: i) the possibility of adequately protecting civilians; ii) the production of reports, serving as a channel to “pressure” the international community to find solutions for the resolution of the conflict; iii) the transmission of messages to promote peace, information and education, throughout, for example, holding workshops with local communities (i.e. community-based labour intensive projects [24]); iv) support the delivery of humanitarian assistance.

However, one [25] emphasizes that the mandate, by including the POC component, submits peacekeepers to a herculean task, given that they were facing about “5 million civilians (...) [in a region] approximately the size of France”.

In line with the IRRI indicators, some state that “the protection of civilians has clearly improved compared to AMIS”, even though “it was not possible to guarantee an adequate level of security” [15] and that, specifically with regard to conflict resolution and the establishment of a peace agreement between the Government and the rebels, UNAMID does not seem to be successful.

Regarding POC, Spandler [26] is not so optimistic, since he argues that the PKO had some success regarding the humanitarian situation and the resolution of problems related to internally displaced persons, but not regarding the component of POC, as Müller [27] analyzes in an article. Spandler also points out a set of obstacles to achieving the mandate, namely the lack of human and financial resources, management and command/control of the problems and the aforementioned opposition from the Government. In this sense, “the lack of dialogue and a coherent strategy, including the interpretation of the mandate and the incompatibility of some procedures between the UN and the AU” [26], marked some challenges of this type of PKO.

Prinsloo & van Niekerk [17] designed a table in which they verify whether a specified condition – existing or not in PKOs carried out in support/partnership with other organizations - would have contributed to the success of UNAMID, from the perspective of the UN. The conclusion is that it is only with regard to the relationship with the Government of Sudan that benefits can be reaped, since it rejected, from the beginning, the implementation of a PKO led exclusively by the UN.

Bashua [22], highlights some challenges triggered by UNAMID, such as the difficulty of understanding when a shared leadership or different interpretations of the mandate, reflected in different decision-making, contribute to creating fractures between organizations that can be explored by the parties involved in the conflict. Hence, “communication, constant exchange of information, commitment and coordinated decision-making” are factors to be taken into account when developing an PKO with this typology.

The author ends up concluding that it is unlikely that SC will take the decision to implement another hybrid PKO, and that it should continue to support certain PKOs carried out by regional organizations, but without establishing a formal partnership (i.e. African Union Mission in Somalia), despite to consider that the involvement of international organizations in peacekeeping matters is a trend for the future [22].

Having identified the strengths and weaknesses of this type of operation, as well as the challenges and perspectives for the future, we proceed with the following SWOT analysis, from the UN's point of view, as proposed in the introduction to this paper. In this sense, as strengths we point out the ease of obtaining support from the local government, which, as we have seen, would not be possible in Sudan if it were not for an operation of this type. A hybrid PKO promotes a sense of responsibility on the part of the regional

organization and, consequently, of the member countries, which seek to solve their (region) problems with their solutions, creating bonds of solidarity among themselves.

In terms of weaknesses, we found that the communication between the UN-AU would not be in harmony, reflecting the difficulty of interpreting the mandate, ending up taking divergent measures (means and objectives), which end up confusing the peacekeepers and bringing into it causes the success of the mission itself.

Not only is there little experience in the execution of hybrid PKOs, the AU itself does not have the peacekeeping experience that the UN has and the fact is that, although the AU participates in the mission, the UN is financially responsible for all the expenses of the mission, not seeing any advantage in this aspect.

Strenghts	Weaknesses	Opportunities	Threats
•Local Government support •Accountability of the regional organization and member countries •Increased felling of solidarity between countries in the same region	•Difficulty in strategic communication •Difficulty in implementing mandates •Different means and objectives •Lack of experience •Financial and material charges	•Shaping organizations within the scope of the PKOs avoiding to "overload" the UN •Adapt peacekeeping practices to cultures, taking advantage of the knowledge of regional organizations •Strengthen the role of regional organizations	•Ineffectiveness of the PKO - waste of time, human, material and financial resources •International organization compromise to Governments interests •Balance UN / regional organization

Figure 1: SWOT Analysis

Hybrid operations can constitute opportunities for the UN because it allows this organization to pass on the experience and know-how in this matter so that international organizations can start to develop more PKOs, autonomously, not "overloading" the UN role and assuming their responsibilities in the region itself.

Furthermore, by incorporating a regional organization into an PKO, it can give a unique identity to the mission. As an example of UNAMID, the presence of an African identity can result in the approximation between citizens and peacekeepers, for sharing similar cultures, for taking advantage of the knowledge that the organization itself has of the region where the conflict occurs and to reinforce its role as actors in the international system, in a legitimate way (by the UN).

As threats, we believe that it is possible, in an eventual "repetition" of a hybrid PKO, to start the entire implementation process and, after a few months, realize that the synergies between the UN and a certain organization are not functional, resulting in a waste of time, as well as material, financial and human resources, even if the mandate is readapted afterwards.

On the other hand, there may be a risk of the regional organization giving in to pressures carried out by the Government where the PKO is established, since the Government may even be in charge of that regional organization that is carrying out the PKO. We can also foresee that the tendency of an imbalance of powers may be registered, with the regional

organization wanting to assume a role that goes beyond its spectrum of competences of the mission in question, to the detriment of the UN.

5 FINAL CONSIDERATIONS

With this work, it became clear that the Darfur region is a region that, over several decades, has been marked by several violent and complex conflicts. However, the conflict that culminates with the implementation of UNAMID, as we have seen, is based on three vectors of a different nature – in part, these vectors already existed in previous conflicts -, which are of a political, ethnic and economic nature.

To face this conflict, the AU wanted to assume, with the establishment of AMIS, a leading role, establishing its position as an African regional organization, claiming that African problems are solved with African solutions. However, it quickly became clear that this would be sufficient, given the escalation of violence in the conflict, which increasingly threatened international peace and security, due, for example, to the high number of displaced people fleeing to neighboring countries such as Chad or CAR.

In this context, it became necessary for the international community to intervene in the darfurian conflict, under the aegis of the UN, implementing UNAMID and fully absorbing AMIS on December 31, 2007. As we have seen, this was not an easy process. The UN begins by encountering resistance from the Government of Sudan, which was perennially against the total replacement of AMIS by a UN PKO. In addition, the AU itself wanted a prominent role and an PKO with an African identity. Nevertheless, UNAMID was effectively put on the ground, but always with great reluctance on the part of the Sudanese Government.

It is in this aspect, in our view, that this AU-UN partnership turns out to be most fruitful, since if there were no shared leadership, most likely the UN would never be able to put a significant device in Darfur, at least with the consent of the Government.

Naturally, this typology of PKO, even for being the first time it was established, has its flaws, namely lack of communication between organizations, different views on how to achieve certain goals or different readings and interpretations of the mandate, but it can also constitute an opportunity for regional organizations to see their role strengthened as an actor, contributing to international security and peace which, after all, is the ultimate goal of all organizations.

In fact, each conflict has a unique nature and vicissitudes, so putting the possibility of replicating this model will always be an open question. A careful analysis of the conflict in question will always have to be made, to understand the advantages and disadvantages, using past experiences and to understand, above all, whether global security would benefit from this partnership. We can, in a way, advance that the hybridization of more operations may be a reality, but regional organizations may have to go through, for example, training and formation within the scope of UN procedures - never losing their organizational identity -, with the intent of the perceptions to be equal with regard to the means to reach certain ends.

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