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Cyberwarfare: In Desperate Need of a Doctrine

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Abstract

In the last few decades, the world has seen a rapid development of IT technology, especially in the field of digital communications where information can now be efficiently removed, distributed, and retrieved in a split second. However, such progress has been accompanied by alarming threats and concerns. The states, as well as non-state actors, have mastered different ways of using technological advancements in threatening ways to obtain confidential information or damage life and infrastructure. This paper examines various cases of cyberattacks, current measures taken by the international community to ensure cyberwarfare prevention, and aspects of an effective doctrine of cyberwarfare whose development and standardization at the international level is necessary today. Accordingly, a proposal was made on what should be included in the doctrine of cyberwarfare with an emphasis on the need to methodically reshape the traditional approach to this issue, to better understand the role that cyberwarfare could play on the battlefield of hybrid wars in the future.

Keywords: cyberwarfare doctrine, international security, cyberterrorism, cyberattacks, cyberwar, hybrid war

Introduction

Globalization is taking its course rapidly in the present time making human conditions more comfortable. Aspects of normal life such as information, transportation, healthcare, and education have improved immensely. However, one of the most striking development has been in the field of information technology with advancements in distribution, use, and gathering information. Military technologies are becoming more digitalized with weapon systems being integrated into computer software, making them susceptible to cyberattacks which if occurs at a large scale can trigger a cyberwar. Unlike features of regular warfare, cyberspace threats are not subjected to physical limits of air, water, and land. The tools required for cyberwarfare¹ is significantly cheaper than uranium isotopes required for nuclear bombs, and it opens a whole new virtual battlefield in which a new kind of limited wars could be successfully fought.

As the world is becoming more digitalized, and governments becoming more integrated and interconnected through cyberspace, the risk of information technologies being susceptible to cyberattacks will only increase. Today, cyberattacks have expanded beyond traditional targets (government and military) into private and public technologies such as email, credit card details, online accounts, etc. It is evident that cyberattacks are unpredictable and can be carried out in any sector of the state, and are very difficult to be successfully identified and prevented. Cyber technologies have a huge role to play in digitalized military, political, social, economic, and environment-related conflicts. However, due to the high risk of misuse and the lack of defined doctrine of cyberwarfare, it is necessary to investigate cases of cyberattacks that justify the necessary reasons for the urgent need for such a doctrine, and the role the U.S. plays in its development. This study aims to address the following research questions: Is it possible to establish a cyberwarfare doctrine anytime soon and what are the alternatives?

The following sections will explore existing literature on cyberwarfare, relevant case studies, the methodological elaboration of the framework of analysis, as well as possible and existing cyberwarfare threats concerning their impacts on the military, economic, social, political, and environmental sectors. This paper weighs into the already suggested resolutions for the ever-growing threat of cyberwar and will also provide new solutions that fit in the narrative that has already been proposed.

Theoretical Concerns & Conceptual Solutions in a Search for a Doctrine

There have been several attempts to define cyberwarfare. The United States Airforce defines cyberwarfare as the protection of information and computer networks through acts of offensive and defensive strategies in cyberspace with acts of denial of a rival's capability to do the same (McKenzie, 2017). Janczewski and Colarik (2008) consider information [cyber] warfare a former counterpart term for cyber terrorism and is defined as the planned attacks by a nation and their envoys against information, computer programs, systems, and data that will result in the defeat of their enemies (p. 15). Cyberterrorism causes fear and harm to anyone present in the locality whereas information warfare is waged on specific targets (Janczewski & Colarik, 2008). They further elaborate that there is a pragmatic difference between the two terms with regards to respective strategies and targets (p. 15). Nonetheless, cyberwarfare today shows a combination of cyberterrorism, information warfare, and cyber-crime, which brings it closer to the concept of hybrid warfare. Thus, with the emergence of new types of warfare and a 'broader' approach to this matter within the international security studies [ISS], it has become evident that these definitions require revision.

¹ A variant of compound spelling of the words: *cyberwarfare*, *cyberwar*, *cyberattacks*, cyberspace, is based on the definitions of John B. Sheldon [Professor of space security and cybersecurity, School of Advanced Air and Space Studies, Maxwell Air Force Base, Ala., U.S.], <https://www.britannica.com/>.

Colarik and Janczewski (2012) attempt to identify the premises that might become a prerequisite of cyber doctrine. They noted that present states are incapable of handling cyberspace conflicts due to the absence of a true systems approach and necessary resources, suggesting a development of a national strategy for cyberwarfare in alignment with civilian infrastructure and military objectives (Colarik & Janczewski, 2012, p. 33).

Cyberwar is closely linked to the nuclear threat and nuclear deterrence. It gives a new dimension to traditional analysis of the economic, social, political, and military sectors. A combination of nuclear weapons and cyberwar can lead to undesirable and unanticipated hybrid warfare (Cimbala, 2017). In the security crises, cyberwarfare presents a challenge due to the “power law randomness” in which things occur outside of the normal distribution of the conventional factors of war (Bibighaus, 2019, p. 41).² Cyber and information warfare is regarded as a type of asymmetric warfare taking place in cyberspace and will be adverse for democracies due to the presence of political, legal, and conventional counterbalances. As explained by Naim (2017),

The reason why this new conflict is asymmetrical is because liberal democracies are at a distinct disadvantage when waging cyber wars against authoritarian regimes and illiberal democracies. The disadvantage is not technological. The United States is the world’s undisputed leader in the information technologies needed to wage cyber wars. Instead, its competitive disadvantage stems for the fact that its authoritarian rivals do not have the legal, institutional, and political constraints or the checks and balances of a democracy. (p. 1)

Cyberspace has become a competitive domain. The United States Air Force has expressed great concerns regarding the potential of cyberwars. Lt. Col. Mark Reith (2016) identifies a long-term challenge based on the absence of fully consolidated air, space, and cyberspace operations (p. 83). A reason for this long-term challenge is the struggle of the United States to fully grasp the potential of cyber operations as a national policy instrument and to integrate it into the national security framework (Sanchez, Lin, & Korunka, 2019, p. 15).

Thus, existing scholarly works express concerns and dilemmas revolving around the concept of cyberwarfare and its destructive potential in non-traditional warfare. Most of these articles are written and published by military organizations such as the USAF, with a focus on the military sector and a traditional view of international security studies. What they mostly cite as the biggest shortcoming is the lack of an analytical framework for safety and prevention and doctrine on cyberwarfare.

For a better understanding of cyberwarfare and as a prerequisite to conceptualize the content of future doctrine, an assessment of cyberwarfare must first be made from the ‘wider’ perspective of international security studies.

Wideners’ perspective on cyberwarfare. The study of international security has transitioned from the traditional [narrow] approach to a more modern [wider] approach. During the Cold War, interstate warfare and nuclear escalation directed international security studies to focus on nuclear deterrence. Toward the end, and after, the Cold War, the new *wider* approach included threats that are beyond purely military actions and it is associated with the post-positivist theories of international relations.

The separation of ISS into traditional and modern approaches is a vital part of the framework of analysis used in this research which is based on the one presented in *A New*

² Power law randomness, shown in the graph, is not distributed along the normal curve, but is randomly dispersed [to understand difference in randomness in context of cyberwar and regular warfare, see Bibighaus (2015, pp. 40-41)].

Framework for Analysis by Buzan, Wæver, and De Wilde (1998). Its purpose is to contribute to a better understanding of cyberwarfare by clearer conceptualization and separation of the analytical categories which are not present in most of the contemporary analyzes of this issue and still have not been formally incorporated into the ISS methodology. The actors in the international security studies and their interaction are classified within five levels: *international systems, subsystems, units, subunits, individual*. These actors within different sectors—*military, political, economic, societal* [social], and *environmental*, are establishing different types of interactions. The framework helps in a better understanding of what the actors and sectors are as well as the types of their interactions. Also, the significance of such a framework of analysis is to identify the respective trends and the solutions to various types of international security problems.

With no traditional/physical limitations, cyberattacks are an unpredictable threat, capable of creating viruses and malware that can convert, reproduce, and manipulate in complete anonymity. The recent shift in international security studies toward asymmetric and hybrid warfares was largely due to the emergence of cyberspace, suggesting the need from a *wider*—non-traditional perspective in studying the co-related issues.

Cases of Cyberattacks

Information and cyber technologies have been increasingly exposed to daily attacks. The risk of governments' digital systems being exposed to cyberattacks with the potential to destroy even large physical infrastructures will be explored in this section on a few examples of cyberattacks that have occurred in the last two decades.

The possibility of cyberwarfare turned into reality in 2007, when various cyberattacks were launched against Estonia. Estonia like most of the European states incorporated new information technologies, enforcing a highly-integrated e-government infrastructure. However, in April 2007, Estonia's internet information systems were attacked by a series of distributed denial of services (DDoS) by anonymous and politically motivated hackers. As a result of the attack, the Estonian government websites and other commercial websites experienced a loss of service. Online banking and DNS (domain name systems) were one of the vital targets of these attacks (Ottis, n.d.). Private emails and public websites were also targeted, forcing the Estonian government to isolate itself from the world until the attacks ceased, freezing almost all cyber-related aspects of economic, political, and social life. Estonia labeled these attacks as acts of cyber-terrorism but if these attacks had been prolonged for more than three weeks it would have had warlike consequences. With damages costing approximately more than a million dollars for just one bank called Hansabank in Estonia, the country also saw various lootings and conflicts between civilians and the police causing mayhem in the capital city of Tallinn (Ottis, n.d.). Prolonged conflict in the society and cyberattacks could have done more damage since the cyberattacks were unmatched in terms of size and variety for a small country like Estonia.

Another turning point for understanding the concept of cyberwarfare occurred a year later in a cyber-attack on Georgia where its information and communication infrastructure was shut down. The target of cyberattacks was banks, news agencies, and government websites, which resembled cyberattacks on Estonia. Georgia has shown an inability to provide adequate information to the public regarding the crisis, which created fear and disruption in the country. Cases such as Estonia and Georgia have shown that cyberattacks can manipulate and control the most important assets of democratic countries such as government information infrastructure, as well as create tension and obstruction in almost all sectors of the state.

The potential asymmetric nature of cyberwarfare was prompted in 2010 when the Stuxnet computer worm specifically designed to target military infrastructure was uncovered. Stuxnet

is highly complex with the ability to mask itself and its actions making it almost undetectable. Its devastating potential has been unquestioned since its unveiling, following the devastating consequences it created/could have created at Iran's Bushehr nuclear power plant [a slowdown or acceleration of gas centrifuges]. The creation of Stuxnet in itself demonstrates the feasibility of creating digital weapons in this highly integrated technological age, aimed at destroying government and military infrastructure. The malicious computer worm was found concealed inside data banks of nuclear power plants, industries, and traffic control systems worldwide with more than 60,000 computers affected in countries like Iran, India, South Korea, Malaysia, Azerbaijan, the United States, the United Kingdom, Finland, Germany, and Australia (Farwell & Rohozinski, 2011). Stuxnet had the unique capability to pass as a legitimate software inside of the computer, therefore, making it undetectable. The worm penetrates inside a computer system and takes control over remote systems by using *zero-day vulnerabilities* (which is the flaw in a software that is unrevealed to the party responsible for fixing the flaws). Once entering the system, Stuxnet begins to speed up or slow down power generation, which might lead to catastrophic consequences (Colarik & Janczewski, 2012).

Another example of dangerous computer malware that targeted information databases is the Flame virus detected in 2012. There is a reasonable doubt that it was created by the same people who created Stuxnet because it looks like its hybrid [twenty times its size]. Its features suggest that the malware was created to generate intelligence from sources like emails, instant messages, and documents. Similarly to Stuxnet, Flame had been detected in 2012 by MAHER – Center of Iranian National CERT [Kaspersky Lab, and CrySyS Lab], and the linked with mass data loss Iran had faced during that time (Zetter, 2012). This incident shows the potential of cyber weapons in the areas of covert intelligence and covert operations.

In May 2020, more than 10 major cyberattacks have been recorded by the Center for Strategic and International Studies. One of those was launched on Norway's state investment fund known as Norfund, stealing \$10 million (Cluley, 2020). Likewise, Japan's Defense Ministry is currently investigating the cyberattacks possibly perpetrated by a group of Chinese hackers against Mitsubishi Electric which has compromised information on new missile designs, government organizations, and partners (Kyodo, 2020). Recently, the Australian government also gave the announcement of a sophisticated state hack conducted through a series of cyberattacks on "government, industry, political organisations, education, health, essential service providers and operators of other critical infrastructure" ("Australia Cyber Attacks," 2020). The Australian government has classified the series of attacks as a state hack due to its broad scale of targets. The Australian PM Morrison stated that not many state actors can perpetrate such attacks ("Australia Cyber Attacks," 2020).

These examples of cyberattacks confirm the versatility and variations of attacks that can be perpetrated by anonymous hackers with no states to point fingers at. Additionally, they demonstrate a wide range of targets and the ability of cyberattacks to violate international law and jeopardize international security.

The Mounting Threat of Cyberwarfare

The United States is considered potentially the biggest target of cyberattacks, due to its dependence on digital infrastructure, but also the biggest perpetrator of cyberattacks on other state and non-state actors. Argument underlining the U.S. as a threat to the cybersecurity of other countries remains plausible for two reasons: First, the United States has one of the most advanced technologies, and there are reasonable grounds to believe that the United States, together with Israel, was responsible for creating Stuxnet and Flame to slow down the Iranian nuclear project and gain access to confidential government information (Farwell & Rohozinski, 2011). Second, The United States could launch attacks on states characterized as *rogue states*

[as in the case of Iran] to maintain its hegemonic status (Cimbala, 2017). Cyberspace offers the United States the ability to overcome the legal restrictions of international law, the security constraints of nation-state borders, the agility and efficiency of strategic operations, and advantages of anonymity/secretcy.

Cyber-attacks can disrupt and affect all sectors of the state. To understand them correctly in the broader strategic perspective, it is necessary to classify cyberattacks and outline the consequences individually by sectors.

The development of the military sector has historically followed and sometimes conditioned the development of the political, economic, and social sectors. This development has been marked by the advancement of military technology from ancient times to the present day when military technology has reached an unprecedented level of development. Military weapons are now being digitized and automated for greater efficiency and convenience. It is already clear that cyberwarfare and digitized military technology can be a key factor in winning a hybrid war. Military control systems are vulnerable to cyberattacks that can turn missiles, nuclear bombs, and unmanned aerial vehicles of one state even against its population and civilian infrastructure.

Modern Cyber technologies have the potential to act on the political sector of the state through the hacking of government databases that could leak hundreds of valuable, confidential information. Thus, for example, Russia's foreign policy motive now involves a new combination of intelligence operations, corruption, propaganda, and cyberattacks, which will require a new kind of strategic response (Baev, 2017, p. 1). A CNN article (Collier, 2019) points out that American hackers have discovered that ballot papers used in the United States are susceptible to cyberattacks. This directly addresses the suspicion of possible Russian interference in the 2016 U.S. presidential election. Today, states use cyber technologies as a means to achieve their goals in secret as in the case of covert operations, or anonymously through cyberattacks. Such acts are a complete violation of the sovereignty of other states and can undermine international cooperation, creating insecurity and a lack of trust between nation-states. This, in turn, could lead to changes in national security policies and political reforms that could change the character of the now liberal-oriented international society.

Economic infrastructure is currently the most affected by hackers. Cyberattacks, directly and indirectly, target national banks, personal bank accounts, and digital networks of private companies, resulting in huge losses. According to a survey done by Cybint, "64% of companies have experienced web-based attacks. 62% experienced phishing & social engineering attacks. 59% of companies experienced malicious code and botnets and 51% experienced denial of service attacks" (Milkovich, 2020). It has also been discovered that "4.1 billion records have been exposed due to data breach/hacking in the first half of 2019" (Sobers, 2020). In 2017 the annual Cybercrime Report estimated that "cyber attacks will cost the world \$6 trillion annually by 2021, up from \$3 trillion in 2015" (Cybercrime Report, 2017). Thus, it is to be expected that cyberattacks in the near future will be able to paralyze the entire state and its most important institutions by freezing all transactions and plundering the national economy.

Cyberattacks have a huge impact on many aspects of social life. Almost all tasks of daily life, such as banking, healthcare, transportation, and communication are controlled by digital technologies. As this infrastructure is highly integrated into the cyber domain, it has become easy for states and individual actors to disrupt and paralyze social life. In cyberwar there is the possibility of creating social chaos by large-scale identity theft, shutting down digital networks and electrical grids, breaking into digital infrastructures of transport and medical institutions, etc.

As noted by Bada and Nurse (2019, p. 2.)

The social impact of a cyber-attack refers to aspects such as the social disruption caused to people's daily lives, and widespread issues such as anxiety or loss of confidence in cyber or technology. Psychological impact can be informed by social impact, and can include more personal aspects such as an individual's anxiety, worry, anger, outrage, depression and so on,

which can, in turn, affect the stability of the social order of the state resulting in social protests and violence.

The environmental sector has become increasingly important recently with the constant escalation of the environmental crisis. Cyberattacks targeting industrial control systems and wastewater treatment plants could cause catastrophic spills, waste discharges, and toxic emissions into the air, affecting human lives and local/global biodiversity. The perpetrators of cyberwarfare, to achieve their primary objectives, could try to disrupt the stability of the state by targeting the environmental sector, which, in a very short, time can undermine regional and international stability.

Creating a Cyberwarfare Doctrine

Doctrine is defined as a code of belief or a set of principles governing policies in a state (Colarik & Janczewski, 2012). In the present time, there is no such doctrine that governs *jus ad bellum* and *jus in bello* of cyberwarfare. Unlike conventional warfare, cyberwarfare has no set limits, it is more versatile, processes greater mobility, and can inflict damages on all the sectors with the same magnitude as conventional warfare. The possibility of a hybrid war that includes cyberwarfare requires the establishment of a cyberwarfare doctrine that is necessary for a strategic understanding of a possible future global crisis. The purpose of the doctrine will be to examine existing cases, to create principles for a common understanding that will provide the necessary guidance for resolutions and how to approach this issue. The cyberwarfare doctrine will need to change its approach, compared to existing approaches to organizing, communicating, and defending against threats.

Currently, there are a few existing approaches to organizing, communicating, and defending against cyberthreats. Commander Thomas Parker and Col. Warren Parker article (2019) on cyberwarfare published in the proceedings of the U.S. Naval Institute, stands out. They assert that a cyberwarfare doctrine already exists in the form of Marine Corps Doctrinal Publication 1, *Warfighting*. *Warfighting* is a 115-page document which talks about the nature, theories, preparation, and the conduct of wars. There, it is stated that:

Three aspects of *Warfighting* are especially relevant to cyberwarfare: the inseparable nature of offensive and defensive operations, maneuver warfare as a means to create and exploit adversary gaps and vulnerabilities, and a combined-arms approach to leave the adversary in a no-win situation. (Parker & Parker, 2019)

Likewise, an assessment of the National Doctrine and Organization for Cybersecurity and Cyberwarfare has identified that cyberwarfare was included in the military planning and organization in 33 states. The responsibility of cyber in the military doctrine ranged from surveillance and exploration to critical target information operations (Jabbour & Devendorf, 2017, p. 83).

There have been attempts to discuss the capabilities and threats of cyberwarfare by both China and Russia. In the Russian Federation in an updated military doctrine of 2010 (Russian Federation, 2010) the attributes of modern military conflict and the prospects of the early use of information warfare [to achieve military objectives without using military force], were

discussed. However, the revised doctrine of 2016 clearly shows a shift from an offensive to a defensive approach, highlighting strategic deterrence and conflict prevention towards information warfare (Jabbour & Devendorf, 2017). Similarly, the Chinese People's Liberation Army (PLA) saw information warfare to be an asset to use against the asymmetric advantage in kinetic capabilities the U.S. possesses (Jabbour & Devendorf, 2017, p. 83).

Political aspects. The fundamental document of a state is its constitution. The state's constitution represents a set of principles, beliefs, and collective values that govern the entire nation. The constitution has the power and ability to unite people, giving them a sense of belonging to a particular community in a particular territory. The constitution of the state is subject to possible amendments, to align with the constantly changing values and principles of social and political systems. It is, therefore, possible and necessary for cybersecurity clauses to be reflected in the state constitution. But if the cyberwarfare doctrine was to be created separately it should reflect the principles of unity and aims of promoting peace enshrined in every constitution (Colarik & Janczewski, 2012).

The Russian and Chinese revisions can be considered as an attempt to creating more cyber-inclusive doctrines. The inclusion of cyber and information warfare as possible assets that can be used as both offensive and defensive strategies make these countries one step closer to establishing a cyberwarfare doctrine. One significant piece of document that symbolizes China's transition towards a cyberwarfare doctrine is the 2004 white paper on National Defense in which China acknowledges the use of 'informationalization' and the use of cyberwarfare during the early stages of conflict (State Council of the People's Republic of China, 2004).

A way to initiate a cyberwarfare doctrine among other states would be to create a convention on cyberwarfare, similarly to the Geneva Conventions of 1864 and 1949 which discussed important issues of the international humanitarian law in armed conflicts, such as the effective treatment of injured soldiers, prisoners of war, medical personnel and civilians (ICRC, 1949). Likewise, the convention on cyberwarfare should be implemented with the participation of all countries willing to promote peace in cyberspace and establish agreements on the restriction of certain cyberspace capabilities. The cyberwarfare doctrine developed in this way would provide states with a set of rules and principles based on which states and other actors could function in the domain of cyberspace.

Legal aspects. The cyberwarfare doctrine should also include legal incentives to provide strict guidelines for states and individuals to act in cyberspace, introducing measures for certain behaviors in this domain to discourage individuals from engaging in cybercrime and cyberattacks. There is a need to follow principles of *Stare Decisis* in which judges and legal actors are bounded on looking into criterion put forward in previous verdicts offered by the court regarding a situation (Colarik & Janczewski &, 2012). Due to the very nature of cyberspace and cyberattacks, legal procedures are required to be consistent for a better understanding of legal imperatives. The future doctrine of cyberwarfare may, however, be subject to change and new precedents, but states should carefully consider the possible consequences of the changes to avoid confusion and inconsistency. International law governing all nation-states should specifically include clauses that provide remedies and ramifications in cases of cyberattacks. However, it is very difficult to attribute acts of cyberattack to the state because state actors refrain from acting through their state bodies and instead tend to carry out attacks using anonymous non-state actors or individuals such as during the Estonia cyberattacks where only one person was convicted.

The law of war asserts that an act of aggression must be attributed to carrying on counterattacks. However, cyberattacks face a very huge attribution due to the anonymity factor. The international community has widely blamed Russia for perpetrating the cyberattacks in

Estonia, yet only one hacker was convicted for the attacks, and the main perpetrators still lurk behind the shadow of anonymity. This makes it difficult for the international community to attribute such crimes since there is a high possibility of guiding cyberattacks through third-party computer systems (Graham, 2010). To fill these gaps, it has become necessary for private firms, international bodies/organizations to invest in the technological development of software and computer programs that can help detect the origin of malicious cyberattacks. For example, Erns & Young, a multinational professional services firm, has organized cybersecurity incident exercises that would train employees to effectively respond to cybersecurity threats and attacks (van Kessel, 2018). Likewise, the U.S. Department of Health and Sciences also conducted cyberattack drills in which the participants were put in a mock cyberattack in which hackers attempted to steal a health plan's third-party vendor (McGee, 2015). Funding and encouraging these types of drills and exercises would be beneficial not only for private companies but also for state departments and institutions.

Military aspects. Reflecting on cyberwarfare in the spirit of traditional war theorists such as Sun Tzu and Clausewitz it can be noticed that the nature of cyberwar is very much in line with Sun Tzu's theory, as his approach coincides with limited war, speed, deception, knowing yourself and your enemy, bloodless victory, avoiding what is powerful, attacking what is weak, and so on. Also, following Clausewitz's ideas, it is necessary to recognize the means to win cyberwarfare and the point at which cyber-attacks turn into acts of cyberwar. According to Clausewitz, the cumulating point of victory is achieved when one party reaches maximum advantage over the military and political positions of the opponent. At this point, all that is left to the defeated side is to try to maintain the defense and hope for the terms of the conflict resolution proposal. In Clausewitzian's words, victory in the cybernate would be possible if one of the actors in the conflict realized that it had been defeated and agreed to the terms of the other party. In the case of cyberwar, in the current circumstances, it is very difficult to identify the 'other side', which further complicates the determination of the culmination point of victory. Therefore, it is necessary to discuss the advancement of technology and fusing cyberspace across military branches that will help more successful identification of belligerents and implementation of political and legal measures at the international level.

To defend the state from modern military threats, it is necessary to develop a cybernetic doctrine. Colarik and Janczewski (2012) stressed that a cyberwarfare doctrine should be divided into three doctrines namely, a fundamental doctrine that discusses the nature of war and the role of the military in this war, the environmental doctrine that concretizes computer networks and information technologies concerning air, land and naval military operations, and organizational doctrine that will look after the adjustment and organization of already present structures of the military in accordance to what the situation requires (p. 36). According to the U.S. Naval Institute:

Cyber warfare is not fundamentally different from the expeditionary operations central to Navy and Marine Corps missions. This type of warfare has reached a point of maturity that demands a doctrine to support resourcing decisions, technology development road maps, and, most important, human capital investments. (Parker & Parker, 2019, p. 1).

What the above characterization of cyberwarfare does not consider is the complexity of cyberwarfare that suggests the necessity of looking at cyber threats and possible cyberwarfare from a non-traditional perspective.

Social, economic, and environmental aspects. The cyberwar doctrine that is yet to be created must not only be related to the military sector but all other sectors of social, economic,

political life, including the environmental sector. Therefore, the scope of cyber doctrine must be formed taking into account a wider view of international security studies due to the asymmetric and hybrid nature of modern warfare. The following sections will examine the different aspects of doctrine that might emerge concerning all the five sectors, together with solutions on possible resolution and prevention of cyberwarfare/ cyberattacks.

The solutions across social, economic, and environmental sectors are to some extent similar and rely on careful monitoring of the flow of digital information and the education of citizens on the risks related to cyber technologies and the principles of cybersecurity. Cyber authentication must be encouraged and regularly updated to ensure data security. These precautions seem to apply only to individuals, but if launched on a large scale, they can help in efforts to strengthen the security of computer and information systems at the international level.

Conclusion

Due to the highly integrated nature of cyberspace, it seems that assessing the threat of cyberattacks is impossible to narrow down to only one level or one sector of analysis. Both state and non-state actors can gain access to vital information and data, or carry out a cyber-attack, and most of the time the ‘unidentified’ perpetrators interact across all levels and within all sectors of the state. To assess the degree of risk of such interactions, the gradation of the threat would still traditionally go from top to bottom, with the international level and the military sector as the most important for international peace and security. However, in the near future, the impact of cyberattacks/warfare is expected to have a spillover effect in all other sectors, affecting all segments of life, and, as a consequence, impairing the rights and freedoms.

Accessing the cases of cyberattacks and the existing literature on the concept of cyberwarfare, the impression is that the threat of cyberwar is only a possibility. However, the world is already experiencing countless cyberattacks that threaten governments, civilians, military structures, and the environment. As the analysis of this study suggests a cyberwarfare doctrine must be formed as a threat to cybersecurity, and security in general within all sectors of the state increases every day. For now, its development is only in the initial stage. The doctrine, if established, should be reflected through documents regulating different sectors such as the constitution, international law, military doctrines, and public awareness, to provide clear guidelines in which the state and the international community can seek an effective response to a possible cyber crisis.

The analysis of the previous scholarly work, case studies, and the present indicators shows that most states are still in the process of accepting cyberwarfare as a possible and upcoming inevitable threat. The states’ actions to combat cyberattacks are slowly evolving, and attempts are already being made to create a doctrine that will guide them on how to combat cyberattacks and prevent them from escalating into full-scale war. The severity of such escalations is given through examples of various cases from the recent past. Unfortunately, an increasing frequency is to be expected,

This study attempted to present aspects of conceptualizing the doctrine of cyberwarfare, from the perspective of each sector of the state, which is vital for understanding the true nature and threats associated with cyberattacks. In the end, again it should be pointed out that there is an urgent need for the doctrine of cyberwarfare due to the growing threat posed by cyberattacks, further intensified by the current crisis.

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The Responsibility to Protect Doctrine - A Humanitarian Intervention Mechanism

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Abstract

The primary objective of the Responsibility to Protect doctrine (R2P) is to never allow the international community to stand aside in the wake of industrial scale human atrocities and to forbid sovereignty to take precedence over gross human rights violations, such as genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity. Originally conceptualized in the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty's 2001 report, it outlined a robust framework for humanitarian intervention. The R2P was officially established as a doctrine at the UN World Summit by Heads of State and Government in 2005. It is regarded as a noble global political commitment due to the very fact that it reinforces the responsibility of heads of state and government to protect civilian populations. After its adoption, it began to take shape and evolve to eventually be mired with complexities and inconsistency.

The original version of R2P outlined specifically three separate responsibilities: the responsibility to prevent, react, and rebuild. Within this report, it was asserted that all three preconditions must be present in order to successfully and legitimately intervene and thereby protect a population from mass humanitarian crises. It succinctly outlines four crimes which would merit implementation of R2P while at the same time reaffirming the state's responsibility to protect their civilian population and the international community's responsibility to protect them in the event the state is unwilling or unable to do so. The paper will argue that R2P, while a noble concept, is undermined in its ability to consistently and effectively protect civilian populations from serious international crimes. This is primarily due to the fact that the R2P has been held hostage by the UN Security Council, the body that holds the express right to invoke pillar three (timely and decisive response), due to divergent geopolitical interests, thereby rendering the doctrine ineffective in its applicability. Within this context, the paper will use the UNSC resolutions on invoking R2P in Libya and failing to do so in the case of Syria, in support of the above premise.

Controversy in Applying R2P with Respect to Syria and Libya

A comparison of the mass humanitarian crisis in Libya and in Syria explains how the applicability of R2P has been inconsistent and at the same time why it has been held hostage by the UN Security Council.

With the outbreak and worsening of the Syrian civil war in 2012, the international community was reminded of the situation which had unfolded in Libya in 2011, and had contemplated the consequences of invoking R2P. However, due to the mixed apprehensions of having invoked a regime change in Libya, which eventually brought about the demise of Gadhafi, and mindful of the fact that the UNSC was a divided entity, left Syria without decisive help. During the ensuing deliberations in the Security Council on Syria, Moscow and Beijing were explicitly against regime change and cautioned the West invoking R2P as a way to securing national interests. Specifically, Vitaly Churkin, the Russian ambassador to the UN, questioned US and NATO motives in the debate leading to the February 2012 veto (Carpenter, 2013, p. 9). Despite the substantial number of innocent lives lost, the breaking point for the international community seemed to have been the use of chemical weapons against the innocent civilian population. It should be noted that even as the crisis intensified, Russia and China

vetoed three successive SC resolutions to put into motion the R2P in Syria. Moreover, the use of chemical weapons is internationally illegal and is listed under both war crimes and crimes against humanity, two specific crimes prohibited in the R2P doctrine (Garwood-Gowers, 2013).

Nonetheless, there was one complication contiguous to this use of chemical weapons, due to the uncertainty surrounding who was committing such crimes (Garwood-Gowers, 2013). Specifically, in April 2013, the United States and Britain insisted that the situation regarding chemical weapons be further investigated (*BBC*: “Syria profile,” 2013). Russia, in an attempt to legitimize the Assad regime, maneuvered to establish negotiations with Assad in order to remove chemical weapons from the country. This strategy of establishing negotiations was actually an effort to exhaust all other options before contemplating military intervention. Other efforts in the form of economic sanctions had been initiated by the United Nations, Arab League, and European Union, but did not have the necessary impact to deescalate the violence within Syria (Williams, Ulbrick, & Worboys, 2012). Moreover, it should be stated that after a possible unilateral military action on behalf of the United States, Britain, and France were put on hold due to the impending negotiations, it emerged that the destruction of chemical weapons had missed a number of deadlines laid out in the agreement (Nichols, 2014). Although the Assad regime had crossed the ‘red line’ set by President Obama which would justify in triggering an intervention, the presence of 26,000 jihadists operating in Syria complicated such an endeavor (Obama, 2013). Scholars argue that had the UNSC intervened at the onset of the crisis, this would have been less costly in both financial aspects, as well as the number of lives saved. However, along with this same reasoning, it can be argued delaying decisive humanitarian intervention in Syria will only complicate the situation even more (Boot & Kirkpatrick, 2014).

It should be contemplated as to why R2P was invoked in Libya but not in Syria, and also whether or not an intervention in Syria was even plausible as the situation proved to be dire. It is argued that the “regional impact of an intervention” in Syria would be worse than it had been in Libya due to the strong support that the Assad regime enjoyed. As a result of the diplomatic ties shared with Hezbollah, Iraq, Iran, Russia, and China, a military intervention in Syria was considered to be costly and would have negative implications for the region (Carpenter, 2013). While, the Assad regime enjoys some regional support and in particular two UNSC veto wielding powers, the Gaddafi regime of Libya, lacked such a support. Furthermore, trade relations between Syria, Russia and China, were also important factors in considering the UNSC’s possible decision on invoking a no-fly zone in Syria. It was found that China is highly invested in Syrian oil, and had bought “Syrian oil assets” for two billion dollars in 2008 (Carew, 2008). Beijing also relies on a healthy Syrian economy due to the fact that, China was a leading trade partner with Syria in 2011, with exports “totaling more than \$2.4 billion” (Carpenter, 2013, p. 9). Ultimately, China’s concern is the power vacuum that would be created following the demise of Assad. Additionally, as it had been mentioned, Russia had established trade and military relations with Syria since the Cold War. With this being said, it can be argued that Russian and Chinese national interests greatly hinder their ability to objectively make a decision on moral grounds to intervene in Syria.

One other reason for not having invoked R2P in Syria is the lack of so called ‘success’ regarding the military intervention in Libya. The necessity to invoke R2P in Libya was initially met with resolve, specifically from the West. The prevailing conviction was that the doctrine

would be instrumental in protecting the civilian population, however, “much of the optimism that surrounded R2P in the immediate aftermath of Resolution 1973 now appears to have been naive and misplaced” (Garwood-Gowers, 2013, p. 610). It should be said that while R2P was successful in protecting the civilian population in Libya, there were mixed feelings with regard to the swiftness with which the regime change had taken place. With the discontent felt from the aftermath of the regime change in Libya, it can be argued that the restraint within the UNSC was even more augmented in invoking the third pillar of R2P. Specifically, Russia and China were adamant to a regime change in Syria. The vetoes of successive three UNSC resolutions can be translated as a lack of willingness to protect the Syrian population. Russia and China are arguably more concerned with their national interests rather than holding Assad accountable for Syria’s crimes. US Secretary of State, Hillary Clinton surmised that “it is quite distressing to see two permanent members of the Security Council using their veto while people are being murdered” (Clinton, 2012).

By following to the letter and spirit of the UN Charter and obtaining UNSC’s authorization before intervening or invoking R2P, the West had missed the unique opportunity to intervene in Syria, due to the fact that the situation grew more complicated and thus more costly. Therefore, it should be asked whether a military intervention in Syria could still be initiated. Two things should be borne in mind when analyzing this. First, by R2P standards, an intervention to protect the Syrian population after all other diplomatic options have been clearly exhausted, is necessary regardless of geopolitical factors. Therefore, the only other factor to consider is how to carry out this military intervention. One option is for the West to undertake a unilateral humanitarian intervention, as it has been done in the past. If this were to be carried out, then it can be argued that the West, countries such as France, United States and United Kingdom, could gain the support of Saudi Arabia, Qatar and Turkey for funding. This argument can be backed by the fact that, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and Turkey have already backed the Syrian opposition and have been seen providing weapons to the rebel forces. However, what is problematic about this measure is that the intervention would have to be carried out without a UNSC authorization and as a result, the legitimacy of a regime change would raise further concern for any unilateral interventions in the future. If another mass humanitarian crisis occurred, this regime change carried out without the express consent of the UNSC, would possibly hinder support for another humanitarian intervention in the future. Similarly, the unilateral intervention carried out in Iraq in 2003, the United States was strongly criticized. It is crucial that major powers maintain a certain degree of legitimacy within the international community. Kenneth Roth from Human Rights Watch asserts that “as a consequence of the use of humanitarian justification in relation to Iraq, ‘it will be more difficult next time for us to call on military action when we need it to save potentially hundreds of thousands of lives’” (Bellamy & Wheeler, 2011, p. 520). Furthermore, this intervention had cost the United States dearly, given the huge financial cost, the amount of time spent overseeing the security of the nation, and the number of military lives lost. For example, in 2004, the United States spent around \$18.4 billion dollars dedicated to “development spending to Iraq” (Bellamy & Wheeler, 2011, p. 518). Therefore, the consequences of undertaking a unilateral intervention are a matter of deep concern.

The second option for carrying out military intervention is if the parameters of the R2P were to be modified to the extent that the P5 would no longer have the ability to curtail it, thereby allowing the West to garner the necessary support to invoke R2P’s pillar three.

However, changing the decision making mechanism within the UNSC thereby allowing a more effective R2P, is not a plausible solution due to the fact that realism asserts that countries will never sacrifice power for humanitarian purposes. Moral obligations will only become of primary importance if it serves the interests of the state, and as a result the attainment of power would be secondary in their considerations (Morgenthau, 2005). Therefore, even though forfeiting veto powers within the UNSC for the purpose of implementing humanitarian decisions pertaining to R2P only to design a more efficient system, it is highly unlikely that it will gain ground in future R2P endeavors. Undoubtedly, the situation in Syria does merit a military intervention. It has been made abundantly clear that the Assad regime has not only caused the deaths of tens of thousands innocent civilians but has also deployed chemical weapons, a blatant violation of the “1992 Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons” (“Joint UN-OPCW mission,” 2014). The UN reported that “over 100,000 people” have been killed due to the crisis (“Those guilty of chemical,” 2013). By sponsoring negotiations with the Syrian government, Russia has attempted to carry out the criteria of R2P’s pillar one and two. President Putin engaged Damascus into negotiations leading to the elimination of its chemical arsenal. This agreement, which was also a ‘face saving’ for President Obama, was backed by UNSC resolution 2118, which called for the destruction of chemical weapons within Syria. However, it should be said that, the Assad regime missed a number of deadlines specified in the agreement (OPCW, 2013). Nonetheless, this agreement was ‘welcomed’ in the sense that the situation on the ground had shaped in a way that became more complex. The presence of numerous jihadists groups and the deteriorating state of the opposition caused a dilemma among the Western powers. The worsening of the situation leading to the total collapse of the state would pose an even bigger threat for the international community as a whole (Blanchard & Sharp, 2013).

Due to the mixed response from the aftermath of the Libyan crisis and UNSC resolution 1973, heads of state no longer deemed it plausible that an intervention or regime change would yield the desired outcome. At the same time, R2P’s pillar two, which invokes diplomatic sanctions, often results in causing much suffering to the civilian population rather than the regime and its cronies. Nonetheless, it is believed that if pillar three were to be a credible threat, than a head of state would be more inclined to respond to pillar two’s enforcement, due to the fact that a harsher threat in the form of a plausible regime change would be inevitable (Garwood-Gowers, 2013).

Conclusion

Ultimately, in a realist world order, international issues are recognizably complex and unpredictable. With this in mind, certain revisions should be made to the R2P doctrine to make it meaningful and more effective. These amendments could be based on the initial ICISS report of 2001, which was sadly enough watered down in its final outcome. Firstly, by negating the veto powers of the P5 in decisions specifically related to humanitarian intervention and implementation exclusively within the confines of R2P, would be most pertinent in forging a consensus on what morally needs to be done. Secondly, the different aspects of R2P: prevention, react and rebuild, should also be addressed. The ‘rebuild’ aspect should stand out as utmost importance due to the very fact that it prevents the possibility for a mass humanitarian

crisis to reoccur within that state. Lastly, there needs to be more consistency and coherence surrounding implementation of R2P. The international community should resolutely demonstrate that there are no exceptions made. With more than 150,000 deaths since the uprising flared up in 2011, 10,000 children killed, and with 2.5 million refugees, the situation in Syria is horrendous. In December 2013, the UN Commission of inquiry on Syria in their report established that the Assad government is responsible for war crimes. Navi Pillay, the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, called UN member states to refer the report to the International Criminal Court (ICC). Sadly enough, not only the question of military intervention is held hostage in the UNSC, even referring the crimes committed to the ICC would be blocked in the UNSC by Russia and China. It is glaringly evident that Russia and China are pursuing their national interests in Syria. Moreover, along the same lines Russia and China argued that the intervention in Libya and the ousting of Gaddafi was a factor of national interests and not purely humanitarian for the West. Consequently, R2P's ultimate ineffectiveness is derived from the structure of the UNSC as well as the doctrine's third pillar. Due to the fact that pillar three entail military intervention, Russia and China are hesitant on adopting any resolution which has the possibility of ousting a head of state. Furthermore, because R2P requires authorization by all members of the P5, it is unlikely, after the experience of the regime change in Libya, that military interventions in the name of R2P will be invoked. There appears to be a general acceptance of merely applying pillars one and two of R2P, however, this is not enough to reinforce the responsibility of a state committing crimes when it is unwilling (Garwood-Gowers, 2013). Certainly, all three pillars are essential, however, in the absence of a threat for possible intervention; it will remain a soft doctrine, and inevitably become mundane in a complex world. Additionally, it should be reminded that the UNSC and its P5 were established in an international climate very different from today. There are multiple major powers outside the P5 which could be considered for membership. Ultimately, a reform of the UNSC is not only necessary but overdue and consequently could render R2P more effective. While there are many complexities surrounding each mass humanitarian crisis, it should be said that allowing hundreds of thousands of civilians to die is unacceptable and should be intolerable to the international community. As the human tragedy continues with unabated violence, Syria did merit an intervention under R2P's contentious third pillar.

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**Preparedness and readiness for aggressive actions in complexity theory:
An empirical example using the influence of ASEAN on companies in
Myanmar**

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Abstract

This work gives a short overview of complexity theory on the basis of interacting agents, as far as relevant for the issue of peace and war. All humans form groups at many interlocking levels, and those groups are always in conflict with each other. Those groups can be described as Complex Adaptive Systems and limited forms of interactions are sufficient to give a descriptive of offensive and defensive interactions between the groups. Those conflicts can be benevolent and an incentive to do better for everybody or very destructive. Preparation for attacks follows a general pattern that is described here for companies considering to export. Because of the fractal nature of those groups the model should be relevant for other groups with other (not peaceful) intentions, including countries, terrorist organizations and other groups. It is hoped that awareness of seeing a group (state, political group, terrorist group) going through those preparatory stages can serve as a warning flag, because the model describes the mobilization of all resources inside the whole group.

Keywords: ASEAN, Complexity Theory, Export readiness model, Preparation for War

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1. Introduction to Complexity Theory

This paper discusses how groups of agents that form emergent systems (like people in a state) can be described using complexity theory. Conflicts between those groups are analyzed in this framework. At the state or semi-state level, heavily armed conflicts with many victims are commonly called wars, and their absence, peace. Existence of conflicts can be shown to arise unavoidably from the existence of interaction between the agents of those systems and considerations of thermodynamics, but their intensity can be controlled by sensible actions from sufficiently aware agents.

Complexity theory describes systems far from equilibrium, usually called complex adaptive systems (CAS). The theory can be applied to any group of agents, from families, friends, cities, religious entities, terrorist organizations, to countries and associations between states. The theory is also applicable to cells forming living creatures, certain mechanical systems, and other systems. The theory has had its roots in physics, thermodynamics far from equilibrium, and in evolutionary biology, in how those systems adapt and try to prolong their existence. An admitted weakness of the theory is that it is mostly descriptive, although, when the interactions are sufficiently precisely specified, simulations, and therefore predictions, are possible.

An observation in complexity theory is that systems theory is applicable at many levels (from a fractal system). Biological systems often consist of a fixed variety of cells much smaller than the total number of cells in the organisms. Those systems of cells have an internal organization, which means that it is not necessary to describe the actions of every cell to understand the overall behavior. That in its turn means that the information content is lower than when the cells would operate randomly and independently. Lower information implies lower entropy (Shannon, 1948). As we know that entropy only can increase in a closed system, this means that these systems cannot be closed, that at their boundaries materials, energy and information is exchanged with their environment, and only (a part of) the environment and the system itself can be considered a closed system. A system that is closed off from the environment and is not exchanging anything with it is commonly called “dead”. Usually parts of dead systems break apart, unless physically protected, and are then re-used by other systems. Systems stay “alive”, existing, as long there are certain ways to resist the damage that can result from interactions with other systems. While this description is easily seen as applicable to biology, complexity theory posits it is valid for all systems far from equilibrium that exists for sufficiently long time scales, typically on a scale that is much longer than the interactions with the environment and the speed of incoming and outgoing materials, information, and energy.

It is not always true that each of the various agents that form a system need the same type of materials or energy or information to stay alive as the others. Multicellular organisms probably arose from a mutual parasitic “collaboration” in which each variety provided something that the other types could not provide. While such collaboration is possible, it is also possible sometimes for a system to find sufficient resources in the neighborhood, or to attack other systems and get them, or to get into an ecosystem in which each species of system provides something to the other species (to talk in biological terms).

The overall behavior of a system depends on the interactions between the agents and the overall threats and resources from the environment. At the very least, interactions are repulsive at very short distances (otherwise the system collapses) and attractive at large distances (otherwise the system loses members at its edges). Such an interaction explains immediately as an emergent consequence the size of cities, as people need a certain minimum distance (about the size of a house) and the maximum distance is determined by maximum meaningful interactions for work, entertainment, etc. (Krugman, 1996). In the last centuries city sizes tend to expand as technological innovations in transport and other (also digital) communication increase the maximum workable distance.

Interactions between agents can also depend on the behavior of the agents. A simple beautiful example is the murmuration (flight pattern) of a flock of starlings (Flight of the Starlings, n.d.) The large group of thousands of birds shows emergent behavior, there is no central leader. Each bird follows only three simple rules: separation, avoid getting too close to neighbors; alignment, steer towards the average heading of the other birds close by; and cohesion, steer towards the average position of its neighbors if far enough from that (long range attraction). Here again the interplay of repulsion and attraction causes unexpected emergent behavior. The similar expansion and movement of cities is not visible because of the time scale is hundreds of years instead of seconds as with the bird flock (and in modern times, city planning and similar influences disturb the pattern of the wriggling movement of cities from expansion of new neighborhoods and loss of old decaying neighborhoods).

An alternative mathematical formulation for the actions of the starlings is to use a utility function. In this case the utility function depends on three variables, separation, alignment, and cohesion. Utility functions are very similar for each individual bird. At any moment the bird will carry out the action for the set of variables with the highest utility. The utility function is like a landscape with mountains and valleys and is often called (in a two-dimensional analogue) a fitness landscape.

After this short sketch of the concepts of Complexity Theory, the next section sketches an application to human societies.

2. A simplified sketch of sociology.

In the first section it was argued that systems behavior depends on the interaction between the agents and the influx and outstream of materials, energy and information. We specialize now to people as the individual agents. It is not useful here to go to deeper units like parts of the brain, although the same description here actually holds. The first author, in collaboration with M. Rhoades and Bill McKelvey, has argued that a large part of business science can be derived in this framework with people as the simplest agents by positing very simple interactions between the agents (c). The influences on agent behavior that were discussed in that work were (reframed slightly) 1) need for resources 2) need for space (repulsive force) 3) higher needs on the Maslow scale yield to lower needs 4) intentionality (agents have goals and work towards them; emergent behavior can also mimic this) 5) agents can (and will) learn, i.e. modify behavior under the influence of experiences) and 6) Agents do not have perfect knowledge. (Valid) information decreases with increasing distance (physical distance and blocked or unavailable information), similar to the starlings who only look at their neighborhood. In that

work it is argued that those postulates are enough to understand emergent conditions inside a system of people.

Besides specifying the possible interactions, it is necessary to assume that in human societies agents can be part of more than one system. As an example, an agent (person) can be part of a family, a company, a sports club, an inhabitant of a city and a citizen of a country. The same agent will have different utility functions associated with each system, which might lead to contradictory preferred actions. For instance, one action might be preferred for family and another one for company. In general, there will be an overall function that depends on the values of each utility function, and an associated overall fitness landscape, which resolves those conflicts (the psychological mechanism here is cognitive dissonance).

The previous framework is sufficient to contain emergent behaviors that are well-known from business science like resistance to change, the principal agent problem, turnover, and cognitive dissonance. All those descriptions come from an agent having contradictory utility functions as members of different systems. Klieb et al. (2014) also discusses behaviors that are not resulting from the membership of one agent in more than one system.

For a discussion of war versus peace and the defense of a CAS against outside threats, the “edge of chaos” plays an important role. When long range attractive forces that “pull the agents inwards” are too weak, the system will lose coherence and fall apart. When those forces are too strong, the system collapses. The state in-between, metaphorically called the edge of chaos, is optimal in maintaining system integrity. (The relationship with chaos in a mathematical sense and Lyapunov coefficients is a point of research and unclear).

In order to describe conflicts of any size, from the most innocent difference of opinion to devastating war, it is necessary to include the hierarchical structure of all CAS with human agents. In a fundamental approach this is an emergent characteristic resulting from the interaction between the agents. In this article, it is just postulated as an observed fact. It was noticed before that agents can be members of various CAS. However, roles of agents in different hierarchies can be different in different CAS. Powerful leaders of a country can be less powerful than their spouses inside their family CAS and have limited power on the boards of the school CAS of their children. The science of family businesses studies the consequences of the overlap between family, business and

Phenomenologically, many characteristics of CAS display power laws. Size of companies is well-known fact and also openness to export display power-law like characteristics (Giovanni et al., 2010). Power laws with a specific exponent are said to follow Zipf’s law, after the frequency distribution of words in natural languages.

CAS systems are fractal: the same structures repeat themselves on different scales. This paper will use this to extrapolate established behavior in one type of system to other systems at a different scale.

3. War and Peace in CAS systems

As generally CAS systems are competing for similar resources, there are always conflicts between systems. In that sense there is no difference between war and peace in a CAS description. War is a term applied to the most serious conflicts, with many victims but rare, as

opposed to frequent soccer matches in a small village. The mechanisms are the same. Indeed, deaths from wars display also a power law distribution (Chatterjee and Chakrabarti, 2017). Events like World Wars I and II, the Mongol conquests, and other events with many victims are rare, while events with a few victims occur frequently.

With the fitness function resembling a mountainous landscape, it is possible that a blockage to higher utility disappears and suddenly a higher utility function becomes possible for one of the players. This can make it very tempting and advantageous for a player to start offensive actions. In biology this is called “punctuated equilibrium”. Collapse of one system will lead to a complete rearrangement, which can lead to many fatalities in biology (dinosaurs) or people (collapse of the power of a country).

One of the postulates of the system is that agents influence each other. A war might be started by a leader whose utility function influences that action, but the larger CAS system still will need to react and to participate in the war-like behavior. This paper will give some details about a study about how companies increase their export readiness when new markets come available after a new phase in the ASEAN trade union. As systems are fractal (each level similar to lower levels) the same model can be used for how countries prepare for war.

4. Trade unions and defense pacts

The theory of CAS systems predicts that as the long-range interactions grow in distance, those systems would rearrange themselves, so that over the area of influence also power laws become visible. Those rearrangements could in aggressive ways be from wars or its equivalence in capitalism, acquisitions of firms by other firms, and in a more peaceful way the formation of trade unions and defense pacts or “buying” better players from poor soccer clubs by richer ones. It has been noticed that the expansion of the Mongolian empire under Djenghish Khan was contingent of the use of the horse, the unification of China under one empire coincided with more contacts between the original states, the decline of English nobility who governed independently many counties came around with better transportation, etc. Over time the fractal structure is preserved, but shifts in between happen. Such shifts are not only a legal formalistic issue. People start to feel in time that they belong to the larger system. A happy side effect is that the chance for deadly interactions decreases because those usually occur between systems that have less interactions and therefore are not seen as peers.

South-East Asia was an example of an area where middle-size entities did not exist. On one hand there was global powerhouse China, on the other hand the different countries that got established after the retreat of English and French colonialism. While interactions between nations used to be rarer than in the West, because of lagging industrial transportation and other infrastructure, this has increased in modern times, a midsize union would be a fair postdiction. In South-East Asia this has been the ASEAN trade union.


5. Export readiness in Myanmar

We report here on a model for export readiness of companies in Myanmar, and its empirical validation among Myanmar companies. The value of this work is not only that it describes this particular issue quite well. It can also be applied to any offensive preparation between a CAS

systems, including preparations for war. The work was done for an unpublished MBA thesis at Webster University Thailand by the second author, Yee Yee Khaing.

ASEAN liberated its trade between the countries by the end of 2015. Companies saw possibilities for new markets and started to prepare for those markets. The liberation can be seen as the final result of an interplay of the interests of leaders, voters, companies and other stakeholders who were each forming their own CAS. The liberation is expected to decrease the chances for wars between the members and to cause a shift to more peaceful interactions like trade and increased travel, tourism and other interactions.

The model is as follows:



The model has been drawn for the CAS system of companies. The organizational factors consist of human resources, financial support, business strategy and commitment of the decision maker(s). Human resources are the key element of a firm to be able to expand their business. A company requires personnel with expertise in specific role of productions lines, international experience, knowledge of exporting, knowledge of international rules and regulations. They can prepare upper management to have the motivation and commitment to go international. If so, management will fund and allocate resources to a suitable segment of the company. The top decision maker will eventually have to sign off. Usually the initiative in companies starts from the top.

The same model applies to countries preparing for intense conflicts like war. Target market considerations are in a such a CAS model a positive utility function for the aggressive country, where costs (financial, casualties...) are estimated to be lower than advantages. (It is our opinion that this calculation is often overly optimistic on advantages and underestimating costs). In modern times with sufficient sources of information it has become impossible for any leader, even dictators, to start a war without sufficient cooperation and participation of a considerable part of its citizens. The model shows how the full company needs to participate in getting ready for exporting. Product considerations are the advantages the vanquished are promised. Leaders need to motivate the population; those are the motivational factors.

In a nearly complete census among companies with export potential in Myanmar (N=65, Myanmar is not a very industrialized state), this model was found to hold nicely. 17 companies were already exporting, of the 48 non-exporting companies, 14 thought that they were not

likely at all to start exporting, 18 considered it slightly likely, 13 considered it moderately likely, and 2 very likely. A considerable part of the companies wants to use new openings. More companies are willing to export but estimate the likeliness low. Organizational Commitment and Knowledge was found in a factor analysis as one factor from three questions about personnel committed to exporting, knowledgeable, and culture of the target country and the same three about management. Also, organizational resources formed one factor, from questions about sufficient finances, qualified personnel or consultants, collaboration with suppliers and compliance issues. Further one factor was necessary change in production processes, organizational processes and all necessary changes. Further one factor for a working system for quality control, capacity to manufacture products and variety of products and handling of the products. All those questions have corresponding ones for war preparations. Not a corresponding question is about products adaptable to overseas markets and new labeling; the correspondence is to install new governmental procedures in the conquered region. A factor coming from two questions on difficulty of selling in the foreign market and advertising is in a conquered region also about getting to accept the new regime. The three questions about preparedness of managers, of personnel, and of owners yielded also one factor and are equivalent to the stakeholders in an attacking country. Readiness for selling products, dealing with target market and able to export yielded one factor and is similar to readiness in an attacker. Expectations also have a direct translation with questions about the likeliness that company will grow considerably, will have higher profits, and will become easier. Questions on strategy were about fitting in the marketing strategy, about having too many competitors and about diversification. They have obvious counterparts. Five motivational factors on taking risks, thinking your company has unique strengths, less bothersome regulations in export, being part of a trade union and lower prices have also similar counterparts. Regression analysis generally yielded very satisfactory results with relatively high R² values. Here we only report on the analysis for preparedness, as obvious important for war and peace situations as well. R² was 0.493, and the only significant independent was Organizational Commitment and Knowledge.

Obviously, it is possible that in other situations significant factors can be others. Nevertheless, the overall model seems to be fairly completely.

6. Conclusions

This work gave a short overview of complexity theory on the basis of interacting agents, as far was relevant for the issue of peace and war. The work supported the quip attributed to G. Clemenceau: “La paix, c’est la guerre poursuivie par d’autres moyens”, peace is war pursued by other means (Clemenceau, n.d., as cited in Margadant (1964)). All humans form groups at many interlocking levels, and those groups are always in conflict with each other. Those conflicts can be benevolent and an incentive to do better for everybody or very destructive. Preparation for attacks follows a general pattern that is described here for companies considering to export. Because of the fractal nature of those groups the model should be relevant for other groups with other (not peaceful) intentions. It is hoped that awareness of seeing a group (state, political group, terrorist group) going through those preparation stages can serve as a warning flag, because the model describes the mobilization of the whole group.

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Covert Operations: Means or Ends?

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Abstract

Since the Cold War, covert operations have been one of the most important instruments of foreign policy. This has become even more evident after 9/11, suggesting the indispensable role of the secret intelligence that continues to this date. However, not everything remains secret in covert operations. In recent years, there has been an expansion of covert operations, often conducted in less secrecy and with increased congressional oversight. This study presents a selected history of covert operations and explores all aspects of the definition of covert operations. The main analysis focuses on re-assessing democratic debates in the context of such operations, as well as their impact on the transformation of the concept of war. The aim is to shed light on the nature of covert operations and to provide a framework for analysis by answering the questions of whether covert operations are still covert, and whether they should continue to be understood only as a means of achieving foreign policy objectives.

Keywords: covert operations, plausible deniability, democracy, secret intelligence, international security

Introduction

Covert operation, as it might sound, is an unconventional approach covered in layers of secrecy and ambiguities. Although it might be thought that this way of war/warfare emerges with the end of the Cold War, there are indicators that it is not the case. These types of operations have been expanding since the creation of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) in the mid-20th century, but their origin can be traced much further back in time. It was with the advent of technology and globalization, which are characterized by free movements of human capital, goods, and services, that the origin of such operations has become blurred. In fact, it has largely been used as a foreign policy instrument by policymakers, most apparently in the U.S., to achieve their policy objectives, both at home and abroad. However, what this globalized world also brings about is the ever-changing complex threat environment. As such, covert action now encompasses a broad range of activities apart from the traditional intelligence gathering such as diplomatic or military operations, which are now difficult to be pinpointed in time and space, with no written or digital evidence confirming their existence. Therefore, there is a consensus that assumes that covertness allows states to intervene in other states' internal affairs and still plausibly deny such involvements. In the contemporary period, however, such deniability is largely in doubt.

It has been argued that covert operations today are more of 'open' secrets and overt than its traditionally perceived anonymities, which has spurred up the debate of how democratic or undemocratic such operations can be. Therefore, it is important to ask: with the changing nature of the political climate since the end of the Cold War, are covert operations still covert? If so, should covert operations be means or ends? This study aims to call for the need to re-define contemporary covert operations, re-access the democracy debate it reflects upon, explore how all these drive the questions of whether it should be used as means or ends, and assess its implications to the transformation of the concept of war.

Before doing so, it is necessary to understand what constitutes covert operations. That is, what exactly are covert operations? Thus, the following sections seek to provide an account of the evolution of its definition and a literature overview on what has been done in this field of research. It will also identify key actors, sectors, levels, threats, and resolutions, and use case studies to test the argument that covert operations are 'open' secrets. Finally, inferences will be drawn in the context of the transformation of the concept of war.

Literature Overview

Although there is an oversized body of literature on covert operations, no consensus has been reached on the definition of the term itself. Many scholars and governmental organizations have made contributions, but not all of them seem to account for the contemporary nature of the covert operation, which is becoming less secret than it was before. The definition is critical because what is regarded as covert operations determines what constitutes such an act and gives a clue on how states justify it. According to the Section 503(e) of the National Security Act of 1947, covert action is "an activity or activities of the United States Government to influence political, economic, or military conditions abroad, where it is intended that the role of the United States Government will not be apparent or acknowledged publicly" (National Security Act [NSA], 1947, p. 80). The U.S. government may conduct any covert operations that affect all sectors (i.e. political, economic, military, and societal sectors) of targeted countries, suggesting that any covert attempts on domestic politics are unjustifiable. Shortly after, former U.S. President Harry Truman's National Security Council Paper 10/2 defined covert operations as "all activities which are conducted or sponsored by [the] Government against hostile foreign states or groups or in support of friendly foreign states or groups but which are so planned and

executed that any U.S. Government responsibility for them is not evident to unauthorized persons and that if covered the U.S. Government can plausibly disclaim any responsibility for them” (National Security Council, 1948, para. 5). Although these activities can be conducted in an attempt to achieve national interest and specific foreign policy objectives, the U.S. law prohibits any intelligence attempts, most famously the use of propaganda through the media, for example, that are intended to influence a country’s domestic environment: “political processes, public opinion, policies, or media” (Executive Order No. 12333, 2014).

The Intelligence Accountability Act defines covert action as “operations in foreign countries, other than activities intended solely for obtaining necessary intelligence” (Johnson, 1989, p. 83). As such, it is important to understand that covert operations are not all about offensive ‘secret’ wars. They encompass a wide range of activities which include propaganda, political activity, economic activities, coup, paramilitary operations, secret participation in combat, renditions (i.e. the practice of sending a foreign criminal or terrorist suspect covertly to be interrogated in a country with less rigorous regulations for the humane treatment of prisoners) and most significantly assassination (Rosenbach & Peritz, 2009).

A most recent approach attempts to take this further by identifying a key element of covert operations. The U.S. Department of Defense defines covert operations as “an operation that is so planned and executed as to conceal the identity of or permit plausible denial by the sponsor” (Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2020, p. 53). This definition identifies one of the most distinguishing factors of covert operations—‘plausible deniability’. It is a term coined by the CIA during the Kennedy administration to describe the withholding of information by the senior officials to protect them from repercussions if illegal or unpopular activities by the CIA became public knowledge. In simple terms, it is the ability of an actor/actors, whether carried out by individuals, groups, organizations, or agencies, to deny any involvement in the conduct of such operations. Deniability can occur at both international and domestic level, where the former allows a state to disclaim involvement and the latter allow senior officials to deny involvement (Treverton, 1987). The plausible deniability is what marks the principal difference between covert and overt actions. If an action can ostensibly be denied, either by the lack of traits to make any operation demonstrable or provide proof of any actions, it is considered to be covert.

Nevertheless, the above definitions still do not take into account the transformation of covert operations brought about by the changing nature of political climate and a more complex threat environment. Previous definitions do not recognize the fact that covert operations are now experiencing increased transparency and decreased secrecy, and the changing motivation for such operations is brought about by the major global transitions in the post-Cold War. In light of the perceived shortcomings of existing definitions, scholars have begun to improve the understanding of covert operations. Cormac et al. (2016) defined covert action “as intervention in the internal affairs of another state or non-state actor in a plausibly deniable manner [...] that involved a broad spectrum of activity ranging from the dissemination of unattributable propaganda on the one hand, to more kinetic special operations on the other” (p. 14). This definition recognized the expanding scope of the intelligence community and the covert operation. Most significantly, Cormac and Aldrich (2018) question the relevancy of plausible deniability. They highlighted that the greatly improved electronic proliferation and media communication, brings about by the ever-increasing dilemmas in the contemporary war, challenges the very nature of secrecy of covertness. This created what is known as the grey zone, blurring boundaries between overt and covert, public and private, and even truth and fiction (Cormac & Aldrich, 2018). Multiple failures in the history of covert operations both traditionally—Bay of Pigs in 1961 and large-scale paramilitary operations in Laos, Angola, and Afghanistan, and most recently—Kremlin’s Crimea Annexation in 2014, and the 2016 U.S. presidential election meddling, indicate that plausibility of covert operation lays thin and

its deniability rang hollow. Consequently, in opposition to plausible deniability, Cormac and Aldrich (2018) introduced the concept of *implausible deniability* (p. 479) as a more explanatory factor of contemporary operations. They argued that although the actor(s), in most cases, denied involvement, the plausible denials remain questionable. This is because any covert operations at some point face varying degrees of exposures, often due to the technological improvement in media communication and its multi-dimensional nature. Increased validity of implausible deniability is also linked to the growth of private military companies and actors, and the emergence of special forces, thereby, creating a much visible grey space between secrecy and transparency (Cormac & Aldrich, 2018). Furthermore, they believed that covert operations run on the spectrum of plausibility and implausibility and the only constant is non-acknowledgment (p. 493). That is, covert operations today equate plausibility with acknowledging, meaning plausible non-acknowledgment allows the actor(s) involved to deny involvement.

With the emergence of implausible deniability, there is a relentless egress of dialogue on the implications of covert operations in the debate on democracy. Forsythe (1992) suggests that covert operations in its very nature violate democratic ideals. The U.S. conducts its covert action towards the foreign government to protect the liberal order, yet it “was replacing a government with considerable claim to democratic credentials with a distinctly authoritarian one [and sometimes brutal dictator]” (Forsythe, 1992, p. 387). Radsan (2009) highlights that as transparency is the conceptual component of the principle of democracy, the secrecy of the covert operation is itself the violation of this very principle of transparency that democracy allows. Robarge (2011) claims that the U.S. has used covert operations “mainly to undermine democracy, support pro-Western autocrats, and protect U.S. economic [and political] interests” in the target state or region (Robarge, 2011, para. 1). In sum, despite the successes and significance of these studies, contemporary covert operations suffer constant doubt on its validity and whether or not they can be considered integral constituents of a democratic society as they evolve to become more overt.

Case Study Analysis

The study follows a new framework of analysis introduced by Buzan et al (1998) that includes the distinction of two approaches within international security studies (ISS) –traditional [‘narrow’] and non-traditional [‘wide’]; the traditional and non-traditional actors and their interaction within different levels—*international systems*, *international subsystems*, *units*, *subunits* and *individual*, and different sectors—*military*, *political*, *economic*, *societal*, and *environmental* (pp. 2–8). Three cases are chosen to validate the argument of this study: Two from the Cold War period for comparison purposes – The removal of Prime Minister Mohammed Mosaddegh in Iran [Operation Ajax], the removal of President Salvatore Allende in Chile [Project FUBELT], and one of the most recent covert operations and the main case study – the assassination of ISIS leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi in Northern Syria [Operation Kayla Mueller].

Operation Ajax. In 1951 Mohammed was democratically elected as Prime Minister of Iran by a majority in the parliament. Early that year, he advocated the nationalization of domestic oil industries, which angered the United Kingdom that had its Anglo-Iranian Oil Company (AIOC) established in Iran. Although the UK sought help from the former U.S. President Truman, he refused the pressure to use its military might to resolve the problem. It was not until former U.S. president Eisenhower took over in 1953 that much-anticipated support was given. The U.S. validates its aids with Soviet interest and communist threat, even though this was not a plausible reason since the real threat was on the U.K economic interests alone. Overwhelmed by such ideology, the two countries, with the involvement of their secret

services, planned and executed a covert “Operation Ajax” to overthrow Mossadegh’s government which combined the use of propaganda and force, both military and economic (Uram, 2005).

Project FUBELT. The anti-Allende operations in Chile took place in the early 1970s. Chile at that time was one of the most democratic and politically stable countries in Latin America. After being democratically elected, Salvador Allende took over the office in 1970. President Allende was a strong leftist and the first Marxist president to be elected in a liberal democracy, and that worries the U.S which then begins to perceive the country under his regime as a communist threat. In addition to that, there was also a prediction of Soviet maneuver in the region which gradually lead the U.S. to take up actions (Lilley & Downes, 2008). The U.S. covert operations rely heavily on propaganda and financial support to the opposing candidate, Eduardo Nicanor Frei Montalva, which gradually lead to the use of a coup, thereby killing Allende in 1973.

Operation Kayla Mueller. The U.S covert operations have a long history against Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi and the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIS). The earliest motivations in the formation of ISIS is believed to have taken place during the Iraq War in Camp Bucca, where he worked together with future ISIS fighters. After leaving prison, he joined one of the al-Qaeda affiliates, gradually rose to leadership. Under his leadership, the group carried out multiple large-scale operations. Following the death of Osama bin Laden, ISIS offensives intensified across Iraq. In response, the U.S. launched economic sanctions against al-Qaeda leaders under Section 1(b) of Executive Order 13224 (2001) and announced a massive financial reward to Iraqi, in return for their information and intelligence support in locating Baghdadi (Law, 2019). After the expansion of ISIS to Syria, the U.S. “focused [extensively] on rebuilding security forces to defeat ISIS – facing pressure from Iran, new security issues in Syria, and growing pressure from Turkey as Iraqi and U.S. forces broke up the ISIS Caliphate” (Cordesman & Hwang, 2020, p. 45). But it never really developed a clear strategic plan to deal with the extremism. With the rising threats posed by its expansion, the U.S. gradually led a coalition, establishing Combined Joint Task Force – Operation Inherent Resolve (CJTF-OIR). The operation was initially launched for prominent support for local allies in Iraq and Syria in fighting civil wars and against the Islamic extremist. Multiple airstrikes have been conducted by the campaign, with the help of the local Kurdish population. The operations have significantly weakened ISIS's advance and helped the Kurds recaptured its territory from ISIS’s control (Law, 2019). The operations extended throughout 2015, significantly weakening the power of ISIS in the region. By 2019, the group has almost entirely lost its ground against the operation. It was not until later this year that Baghdadi was successfully located. Operation Kayla Mueller took place on October 26, killing al-Baghdadi in Northern Syria. Earlier that week, President Trump was notified of the location of al-Baghdadi from the Department of Defense whose information is shared by the intelligence of the CIA. The operation took approximately two hours according to President Trump and involves several U.S. special operation forces (SOFs) including a squadron of Delta Force (Cohen, 2019). It has also been said that some forces originated from areas inside Iraq. The operation ended ‘successfully’ when Baghdadi donned a suicide vest and blew himself up along with his 3 children. This case study was chosen as the main case study because of its significance and controversy, where the operation itself was not considered as a covert operation by many, or even not intended to be deniable at all. this is because President Trump later publicly announced the death of al-Baghdadi while recognizing the state’s involvement in the operations. The covert operations are conducted mostly by state actors, governmental and non-governmental organizations. They encompass all sectors, especially the social and political, where the threats are perceived as such without clear evidence—layers of secrecy and ambiguities that are wrapped around the covert operations suggest that this is usually the case. With the increased engagement of various

states, secret services, SOFs, and non-state actors the international, unit, and subunit levels can be identified as the levels of analysis most relevant to this study. While the U.S. position will be viewed through a realist paradigm (traditional), its motivations can be interpreted using a constructivist approach (non-traditional).

Comparison. The case of Operation Ajax, Project FUBELT, and Operation Kayla Mueller are chosen for a reason. All cases are held by the U.S. to be its success story. The first two belong to the Cold War period and include the U.S. covert operations against traditional actors—the states, while the last case is the most recent one received with much anticipation and ambiguities, and includes operations [more or less cover] against a non-state actor. This also indicates that the decades after the end of the Cold War were a period characterized not only by a transition in the political climate but also in the rise of different kinds of non-traditional actors such as terrorists and other non-state actors. The link between these three cases illustrates the transition from previously ‘quite’ covert operations with a varying degree of deniability to an era of ‘overt’ covert operations. These covert operations were conducted by the state actors [the U.S. and UK], their government agencies [CIA and MI6], and in the case of Operation Kayla Mueller, the special operation forces [SOFs]. Perhaps the latter is one of the most important reasons why covert operations are becoming overt.

In three cases, the U.S. clearly declared its ambition to remove its targets, Mosaddegh, Allende, and Baghdadi. As aforementioned, to be clarified as covert, an operation is to be aligned with either of the two basic criteria: *non-apparent* and *non-acknowledgment*. The involvement of the intelligence community was not-apparent or publicly acknowledged. Nevertheless, it can then be substantiated that although the operations were clandestine, the intention and their outcomes were highly ‘visible’.

Despite the public denial of operations in Project FUBELT, in Operation Kayla Mueller, President Trump did not deny the operation at all. Note that, although covert operations in Iran and Chile were triggered by economic or political transformations, Operation Kayla Mueller has less to do with any ‘traditional-actor’ related model, with the operation itself turning from covert to overt. In Operation Ajax and Project FUBELT, the CIA was directly involved in the conduct, while in Operation Kayla Mueller CIA only in evidence gathering of the location of Baghdadi.

The link between these three cases illustrates the transition from previously ‘quite’ covert operations such as Operation Ajax and Project FUBELT, with a varying degree of deniability, to ‘overt’ covert operations as in the case of Operation Kayla Mueller. The former two operations satisfied the above characteristics of non-apparent [somehow] and non-acknowledgment, enabling the government to plausibly deny involvement, while Operation Kayla Mueller does not qualify for such covertness. The operations of the Delta Forces and the involvement of the Department of Defense was apparent and acknowledged. In fact, it could even be argued that it was never intended to be deniable. It was carried out in precision-like fashion and professionalism of U.S. Special Forces, demonstrating the power of their role at the international level.

Theoretically, overt operations can be defined as “activities that are openly acknowledged by, or are readily attributable to, [...] including those designated to acquire information through legal and open means without concealment through the use of observation, elicitation, or from knowledgeable human sources” (Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2020, p. 164). From the initial intelligence gathering, either human or digital, to the conduct of Operation Kayla Mueller itself, the operation took place with much public awareness, both locally and in the target regions. In alignment with the definition, it was done in an ‘open’ manner without ‘concealment’. Even if the progress of the operation was not known as it was taking place, later press releases clarify the process, though with many ambiguities. Therefore,

it is clear that with its lack of the central characteristics to qualify for covertness and its alignment with the definition of overt operations, Operation Kayla Mueller is an overt operation.

In sum, the difference between Operation Ajax and Project FUBELT, and Operation Kayla Mueller can be summarized as follow:

- Targets: State actors in Operation Ajax and Project FUBELT, but additional non-state actor participation in Operation Kayla Mueller [Political Sector].
- Plausible Deniability: Public denial in Operation Ajax and Project FUBELT, but public acknowledgment in Operation Kayla Mueller [Political Sector].
- Apparency and Acknowledgement: Non-apparent and non-acknowledged involvement of the intelligence community in Operation Ajax and Project FUBELT, but publicized involvement in Operation Kayla Mueller [Political and Social Sector].

The contemporary multipolar environment indicates a major transition that is taking place within the political and social sectors. It has not only affected the types of actors involved but also the nature of these operations. One of the reasons for the overt turn in covert operations is the result of the significant transformation in the social sector, specifically the ever-growing public participation and inclusion in politics. This transition has also intensified international cooperation, which is apparent with Operation Kayla Mueller that involved combined efforts of Turkish, Iraqi, and non-interference of Syrian and Russian forces. These transformations within the political and social sectors together characterize the contemporary nature of the newly emerging overt operation.

The shift to overt operation is triggered for several reasons. The weakness of international rules, norms, and standards is among the reasons. At the international level, oversights in the conceptualization of determinants of covert operations, most significantly the erosion of plausible deniability, has led to the gray zone of covert operations—blurring the difference between secrecy and transparency. At the state level, countries also suffer a painful ideological dilemma, trying to adhere to liberal democratic ideals which often seems to conflict with their security concerns. Consequently, the decision made in the field of intelligence often reflects this interaction between the estimate of threat and the prevailing values of democracy. Apart from weakness in the normative arena, the effect of media technology increases the risk of exposure to any covert operations. The primary rationale behind conducting such operations is secrecy and thereby fulfilling the promise of plausibility deniability. Exposure, either internal leaks from the government itself or the intelligence agencies or external leaks from the foreign or targeted government, has created a level of openness in covert operations (Joseph & Poznansky, 2018). As a result, the operations often trigger public attention. Without a high level of secrecy of such operations, their overtness requires public legitimacy both domestically and internationally, to prevent unpopular responses in the aftermath of the operation. Lastly and most importantly, the publicization of covert operations acts as a strategic power projection capability. It is a testament to the American commitment to its international responsibilities as a marker of an ethical significance that amplifies the overt operations as a critical milestone in the U.S. fights against jihadist extremism.

Identifying Overtness in a Covert Operation

Covert operations, in the contemporary context, are more of an open secret than traditionally perceived clandestine actions. States should be able to plausibly deny not only the conduct of the operation itself but also its accountability. Oversight on the plausible deniability as an

integral factor erodes the very nature of such operation: secrecy. For instance, in the case of Bay of Pigs, former U.S. President Kennedy publicly acknowledged the existence of the operation although the country's involvement was denied (Best, 1996). This indicates the secret part of plausible deniability or covert operations as a whole, is not fully comprehended as such. It also raises the question of how secret should an operation be? To this date, there is still no consensus to what extent the operation should be exposed or remained secret even after its official declassification.

This brings the discussion to the doubt about the secrecy of covert operations. How secret it should be? Looking at the wording of the definition of covert operation as “an operation that is so planned and executed as to conceal the identity of or permit plausible denial by the sponsor” (Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2020, p. 53), and “...will not be apparent or acknowledged publicly” (NSA, 1947, p. 80), many ambiguities about the deniability and secrecy arise that makes the covert operation controversial in itself. By ‘sponsor’ and ‘not be apparent and acknowledged publicly’ who exactly is implied? Thus, the validity of plausible deniability is largely in doubt, which blurs the division between long-term and short-term objectives of the conduct of such action, which appears to protect the sponsor rather than denying it all along.

Theoretically, covert operations are considered to be carried out by the state actors—governmental organizations, and/or the non-state actors which means that sponsors are identified within units and subunits level. However, the level of secrecy and acknowledgment of the conduct are mutually conditioned. The fact that an act should “not be apparent or acknowledged publicly” (NSA, 1947, p. 80) conveys the impression that as long as the involvement of the sponsor(s) is denied, an operation constitutes a covert operation. Some scholars might argue that “this seems too idealistic and binary, for sponsorship can be apparent but not acknowledged” (Cormac & Aldrich, 2018, p. 480), nonetheless, it should be noted that Section 503(e) of the National Security Act (1947) alludes the fact that it is a covert operation if the role of its sponsor is either not apparent or not acknowledge. Thereby, as long as the sponsor of operation denies/can deny its involvement, the operation is qualified as covert.

Concerning all cases from the benchmark group, the U.S. had declared its ambition to remove the main targets, Mosaddegh, Allende, and Baghdadi. The involvement of the intelligence community was also apparent through the CIA's prior operations. How can it be substantiated that the operation itself is covert? Based on purely political/rhetorical denial? It could, therefore, be argued that acknowledgment as the key criterion is under question, as in the instances when the U.S. publicly claims the replacement of Mosaddegh with Shah in Iran, Allende with Eduardo in Chile, and when Trump announced worldwide that Baghdadi killed himself with a suicide vest in Northern Syria.

While operations in Chile were publicly denied by the U.S, Operation Kayla Mueller proved the lack of secrecy as President Trump did not deny the operations at all. Namely, the reason for the openness of covert operations is the exponential growth in the influence and scope of the media and journalism which directly broadcasted and influenced the course of the War on Terror. The scope of their and influence has increased to the extent that they are now more willing and confident to ask hard questions related to secret operations and actions of the government. This drives the leak of information that makes “covert operations hardly [a] secret to the target populations [...] If the lead does not come from Washington, the affairs will eventually come out elsewhere” (Treverton, 1987, p. 1013). For example, aid to Contras in Nicaragua become publicly known through the popular press, including the foreign press. More violent exposures follow when a series of articles by Ramparts magazine exposed a major portion of the CIA Staff's covert action empire (Rudgers, 2000), influenced not only the general public but also the government. As a result, The U.S. Congress started funding those ‘overt’ media institutions and in 1983, President Regan created the National Endowment for

Democracy (NED) to promote democracy worldwide (Best, 1996). This response to uphold the press not only transfer much needed funding but also transfer covert action functions to those overt institutions (i.e. NED). All these indicators point to the fact that the layers of secrecy surrounding covert operations have been constantly removed since the Cold War, and especially after its end, to the extent that in the 'New World Order' being secret, even being an action, depends on a dead letter on paper, or rather on the political rhetoric in the ether of the world's media.

The threat to democracy. Before accessing how democratic (or undemocratic) are covert operations, it is crucial to identify democratic values. From a constructivist point of view, democracy is what it is thought to be. It can be freedom of speech, right to vote, right to life, liberty and property, etc. However, in the context of covert operations, these are of less relevance. Democracy, in this context, is simply binding to the liberal norms of freedom. It includes the right to be free from arbitrary power by other states which implies that democracies or similar governments should be free from external intervention [i.e. non-interference], practice non-violent resolutions [i.e. negotiations and compromise], and allow transparency. The covert operations, as witnessed in our case studies, are violent and related to human and civil rights violations by the rebel forces (e.g. Contras) backed by the U.S. However, in the examined case studies, high-intensity conduct, massive casualties, and large-scale war were not witnessed. If covert operations are to be seen through its outcome one gets the impression they are not undemocratic.

Despite such arguments, the liberal prospects of non-violent resolution are about co-operation through negotiations or compromises. Therefore, any threat or use of force against (possible) political opposition would be undemocratic. Besides, even if covert operations are making an overt turn, one could claim that although transparency is an important element of democracy, there is certainly room for secrecy. In fact, “government could not function if everyone took part in every decision, and [therefore,] it could not function without some secrets” (Goodman, 1998, p. 41). The fact that covert operations are kept secret should not make them completely undemocratic. Accordingly, recognition of the decision of the U.S. to conduct covert operations should be indispensable in assessing whether or not it is democratic. Although the U.S. used threats of communism, and today of terrorism, as a justification for its action, what motivated the operations is target states' undemocratic policy reforms and their status as non or partial democracies. Nevertheless, what the U.S. did is acting covertly and replacing it with a distinctively authoritarian regime that had pernicious effects on the target country. Thus, if being (partial) democracy is the concern, the new regime should be at least more democratic or fully democratic rather than authoritarian or dictatorship.

Lastly, covert operations in its very nature violate the principle of sovereignty and non-intervention. Although consensus eventually arises that if a country is to protect its national interest and fulfills its international responsibilities, covert operations could be considered as a valid choice, spying and covert operations are regarded by many as ‘dirty policies’. Even if it is an ‘open’ secret, the operation itself constitutes meddling in the target state's internal affairs without its consent. In the case of ISIS, since the beginning of the fights against the group, the U.S. has been utilizing the local population and is indirectly involved in the region's politics, as a means to its fight against jihad extremists.

Puzzle Answered

To answer the question of whether covert operations are means or ends, one must first answer why covert operations are so important to the United States, even if today they are to a lesser extent or not covert at all?

This transition to overt operations has been part of the recent transformation of the concept of war. At the international and the state level, the U.S. acted on its perceived security threats, fearing the spread of communism, and today of international terrorism. The escalation in covert operations could be explained by the rise of military power and imperialism, and interventionism, where the main concern is not only security threats but also economic, military, and social interests. Future wars are likely to be undeclared, which would be a complete departure from the traditional standard of warfare. War could happen out of nowhere and therefore states are expected to always remain defensive and vigilant. Perhaps, the shift to overt is an indicator of this vigilance, a power projection of secret capabilities—something like patterns of intense colors on the bodies of poisonous animals.

When a state prepares to respond to its perceived threats in a traditional view it might opt for inaction [defense], or an offensive military confrontation. On the other, covert operations serve as a middle option, which is more effective than doing nothing and less dangerous than a direct military confrontation. Even so, covert operations should be a mere policy instrument rather than an end in itself. If the latter is the case, covert operations would be hard to control. Ends, in the context of this study, are often linked to the effectiveness of covert operation, which is determined by its outcome. Linking effectiveness to objectives as opposed to linking it with deniability reiterates the importance of utilizing covert means only as a policy tool and not an end in itself. Nevertheless, the lack of defined objectives often results in covert operations becoming an end in itself.

Covert operations do not end with the realization of their primary objective, as happened in Operation Ajax and the removal of Mosaddegh. There are ‘blowbacks’ that such operations bring about, which “is a metaphor for the unintended consequences of the US government’s international activities that have been kept secret from American people” (Johnson, 2001, p. 13), first used by the CIA in 1954 in a report on overthrowing the Iranian government in 1953. Today, the states are moving away from covert operations as a means because of significant blowbacks. Without clearly defined primary objectives, often the accomplishment of covert operations causes more problems and crises, which creates a perception that they are becoming an end in itself. For example, mixed objectives have gradually blurred the reason Operation Ajax was created in the first place. Similarly, in Project FUBELT, blurred objectives and mixed outcomes together deemed its failure in a long run. To an extent, the immediate outcome of the benchmark cases was significant, yet the ‘fog of realpolitik’ was ignored by the policymakers, making the desired outcomes of the operations rather short-termed. Therefore, it could easily be argued that with the lack of correct prediction of the outcome of a covert operation, it has become an end in itself primarily targeting public opinion through popular media.

As a first step toward resolution, it is important to ask when should the U.S. intervene in the internal affairs of other countries, especially through hidden means? Thinking through the realist perspective, self-interest is of paramount importance to any state. During the Cold War, there was a clear ideological clash between capitalism and communism blended with nuclear threats. Therefore, any suspect in overcoming communism would trigger a sensitive response from the United States—the U.S. did not wait for a mushroom cloud (Bush, 2002).

Things have not changed much since the Cold War. Today, the time between the processing of threat-related information and responding to it is almost instantaneous. Given that, for the U.S. [communism before] terrorism today constitutes an existential threat in this context the attitude of the U.S. is that it is not entirely invalid to conduct a covert operation, even at the expense of sovereignty and non-intervention that has guided its foreign policy for centuries. What is needed, therefore, is a better conceptualization of what is a *genuine* threat rather than huge defense spending. Thus, a better assessment of intelligence to ensure the presence of clear threats before acting covertly. It is worth noting that the United States operates in a complex environment with “Democracies are structured to operate in peace or in war, but they are

incapable of dealing with something in between without corrupting that very structure and the institutions their military forces are supposed to protect” (Kennedy, 1985, p. 1). Whether these Kennedy’s words indicated the dangers of secrecy to democracy itself, or precisely that the loophole of “dealing with something in between” has just given effect to covert operations, is not easy to say. Yet, what can be said with certainty is that today’s world of geopolitical struggles is precisely this world ‘in-between’, a gray zone of covert operations.

Conclusion

Overall, the analysis shows that there has been an expansion of (c)overly operations in recent years. Even with this transition, there is no significant decline in the threat they pose to democratic principles. The democratic values of non-intervention in internal affairs of state, that have guided American foreign policy before WWII have been violated by the very nature of covertness. This has also influenced the transformation of the conceptual war, which is expected to be increasingly undeclared and hybrid in the future. Covertness as part of the new tendencies in the strategic development of warfare that today fall under the notion of hybridity should not diverge completely from its traditional purpose as a means of achieving a political goal, and certainly not become an end in itself. Secrecy as an end in itself brings confusion, fear, and chaos – similar to terrorism. This can be understood from a strategic position where victory in today’s neoliberal world is evaluated concerning unwanted costs and unacceptable collateral damage [human and material]. However, in the sea of secrets, truth is as relativized as the secret itself. Hybridity in itself implies the absence or disregard of rules, which can bring short-term results, but certainly long-term instability at the international level, where trust through transparency is the only way to achieve cooperation between states

In the conclusion of this study, it can be stated that the research objective has been accomplished by exploring all aspects of the definition of covert operations, re-accessing the debate on democracy and how it drives all query that follows. Additionally, the link between the shift toward secrecy in the concept of modern warfare and its relationship to democracy has been analyzed to address the issue of covert operations as means or ends. In this regard, although this paper sought to identify oversight of earlier definitions and thus expand their scope, there is still a need to redefine the concept of modern covert operations, the degree of secrecy, or how and to what extent cover operations should stay (c)overly to governmental actors involved (executive branch, congress, governmental organizations, etc.), the general population, and the entire international community.

Since the time of the traditional conceptual determination of the meaning and scope of covert operations during the Cold War, times have changed to such an extent that the very meaning of secrecy has become unclear. Herewith, this study has left the possibility of further research and reconceptualization of this problem as well as issues arising from it, such as ‘overt turn in covertness’ and ‘threat to democracy’, which are also addressed in this paper.

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Increasing Intercultural Collaboration on College Campuses to Improve Intergroup Relations

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Abstract

There is ample evidence that the world is increasingly becoming more multiculturally diverse. Globally, many college campuses are also very diverse. Sometimes, such diversity contributes to intergroup tensions and conflicts. While some conflict is inherent in any organization, proper prevention and management strategies can reduce it. Many universities purport to uphold the values of inclusion and acceptance of diversity yet may not be doing enough to ensure they “walk the talk.” This paper explores the following question: How can the fields of peace and conflict studies and social psychology come together to offer practical solutions? Multidisciplinary collaboration between these fields will likely contribute concrete empirically based suggestions that may lead to greater intercultural collaboration and competencies on campuses which could reduce intergroup tensions and conflicts and improve interpersonal relationships. Both fields can offer empirically-backed solutions that can be applied to this complex issue; for example, intercultural collaboration has been demonstrated to be effective at reducing intergroup tensions and improving intergroup attitudes. Evidence based programming could be relevant for university administrators, student affairs staff, faculty, counseling centers, student clubs, and students themselves. Program implementation would likely be in alignment with universities’ values and have long term payoffs for both the institutions and their constituents. Future research is encouraged and directions suggested.

Keywords: college campuses, diversity, intercultural collaboration, intergroup relations,

peace psychology, social psychology

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Increasing Intercultural Collaboration on College Campuses to Improve Intergroup Relations

The world has been getting more and more diverse with every passing year (UNESCO, 2009). Many colleges and universities are increasingly becoming more diverse as well (Espinosa et al., 2019). Higher education institutions try to epitomize the ideal values of being open, accepting, and inclusive of all types of diversity (Buenestado-Fernández et al., 2019). Diversity tends to benefit higher education and subsequently trickle over into the wider society (Alger, 1997; Gurin et al., 2004). In fact, there appears to be substantial evidence from “multiple sectors” of the “educational benefits of diversity” (Milem, 2003, p. 126). These benefits start at the individual level and extend out to the institutional and then to societal levels.

Most colleges now have diversity statements and often include diversity as part of their missions (Alger, 1997). Despite higher education institutions’ missions of acceptance and attempts to provide inclusive safe/brave spaces for their diverse populations, they do not always live up to such ideals (Ali, 2017; Ash et al., 2020; Buenestado-Fernández et al., 2019). Much like the broader society, racial tensions and conflicts are common on college campuses. For example, in the United States, the Black Lives Matters movement has been as active and relevant at college as it has been in the broader society (White, 2016). Certainly institutional discrimination, racism, privilege, and bias continue to prevail on campuses (Arday & Mirza, 2018; Ash et al., 2020).

Higher education students, faculty, and staff may be interacting with people from vastly differently backgrounds, sometimes for the first time. While this has generally been seen as beneficial, particularly in an increasingly globalized economy, it also poses substantial challenges such as when tensions erupt into conflicts between groups. Every relationship and organization has some inherent conflict—or at least it should. Without any conflict, there is likely to be apathy and lack of care, involvement, and commitment among members (Myers & Twenge, 2017). Conflict can destroy relationships between individuals and groups or it can be managed and used constructively to increase intercultural understanding and build stronger relationships. There is evidence that prevention strategies such as engaging in intercultural dialogue can help universities do the latter (Ayalew, 2012; Bergan & Restoueix, 2009).

This paper begins to address the following relevant question: How can the fields of peace and conflict studies and social psychology come together to offer practical and empirically-based solutions for increasing intercultural collaboration on college campuses to improve intergroup relations? These two fields are already working on these issues. The knowledge and practices these fields have to offer are likely to reduce intergroup conflicts on campuses while improving relationships via increasing intercultural competencies and collaboration across diverse groups. It is proposed that should the two fields ramp up their collaboration, the individuals involved in higher education, the institutions themselves, and the greater society would benefit in a number of ways.

Intercultural dialogue has been seen to decrease tensions between different groups on college campuses (Bergan & Restoueix, 2009), but this paper proposes a more active

approach than just talking about it. Such an approach could include intentional intercultural collaboration programming. Intercultural collaboration has been researched and yields encouraging results. While competition tends to increase prejudice between groups, collaboration tends to reduce it (Myers & Twenge, 2017). Collaboration between groups has been shown to have multiple benefits such as reducing conflict and improving attitudes between diverse parties. For example, Israeli Jew and Palestinian Arab teens, groups with a long history of prejudice and violent conflict between them, have experienced positive and long-term improved intergroup attitudes after spending as little as three weeks collaboratively (Schroeder & Risen, 2014). In the famous Sherif (1966) study, boys were first induced to hate each other and then learned to be close friends after experimenter induced situations forcing them to collaborate.

A walk through many university campuses will likely highlight people from similar backgrounds congregating together. There are a number of social phenomena that sometimes inhibit different groups from spontaneously interacting with each other. Sometimes, people do not interact with others that they perceive as different from them because of a phenomenon called pluralistic ignorance. Pluralistic ignorance is defined as “a false impression of what most other people are thinking or feeling” (Myers & Twenge, 2017, p. 238). In other words, individuals wrongly assume that what they think others are thinking and feeling is correct. Studies have found that some college students of different races or ethnicities actually want to interact with people of another race or ethnicity but wrongly interpret the others’ perceived indifference to be lack of interest in each other (Shelton & Richeson, 2005). If perceived differences have escalated to conflict, the images each group has of the other group are likely to be distorted by a number of misperceptions and in-group/outgroup biases that can perpetuate the conflict (Pronin, 2007). Such in-group/outgroup biases may be evolutionarily ingrained in humans to be protective of threats from outsiders but the prejudice that comes with these biases is not necessarily innate (Lieberman et al., 2018). Most college students do not pose real threats to other students just because they come from a different group.

In addition to pluralistic ignorance, another reason groups sometimes avoid contact is because of the stress associated with how they are expected to behave with other outgroups (Trawalter et al., 2009). Collaboration and the close contact people have with members of the outgroup can help reduce that anxiety (Al Ramiah & Hewstone, 2013). It can further help increase empathy for and the ability to understand the perspectives of the others thus reducing the perceived threats (Al Ramiah & Hewstone, 2013). As students get to know each other through collaboration, and they compare their perceptions of each other, the pluralistic ignorance will likely decrease as they realize that people from other groups tend to have similar attitudes and that they are less likely to be rejected by the others than they initially thought. This will likely further reduce the stress and anxiety associated with interacting with other groups.

Oftentimes, attitude change follows behavior change (Myers & Twenge, 2017). If colleges can get groups that ordinarily would not interact with each other to collaborate, there is a greater chance that they will have more positive attitudes about the other groups after they engage in positive behavioral interactions. By getting college students of different groups to intermingle and collaborate, they will likely realize that many others are like them: they all likely have interest in getting to know each other.

Universities can develop programming that enhances collaboration and cooperation between groups. From college administrators to students to everyone in-between, each can potentially benefit from the use of scientific literature to develop empirically based programming. Much like what the experimenters did in the Sherif study (1966), universities can create external challenges that get the members of different groups to work together to overcome them. For example, we once organized a bike building activity that required students from different groups to collaborate in order to exchange parts and tools to complete the task of building a number of bicycles as one whole group. Based on both anecdotes and from participant observation, many students increased their interactions and liking for students different from themselves after this activity. Such practices could be infused campus wide, starting at orientations and being integrated into classrooms, sports, clubs, and other extracurricular activities and events. Implementing such programs seem to align well with colleges' values of inclusiveness and are likely to have long term payoffs for all stakeholders.

Lastly, this paper urges two things:

- 1) in a parallel process to the encouragement of the potential benefits of collaboration in universities, it proposes more interdisciplinary collaboration between the peace and conflict and social psychology fields that probably have more in common than we initially thought when it comes to improving intergroup relations and reducing tensions. Peace and conflict studies, being an interdisciplinary field in itself, already borrows some from psychology, but social psychology also has much to learn from them. Such multidisciplinary collaboration might exponentially increase the empirical base and offer practical advice that will improve collaborative programming on college campuses and extend further into society. And,
- 2) once such relationships are more firmly established, further research needs to be conducted. Empirically backed programs can be implemented on college campuses that attempt to increase collaboration; then, quantitative and qualitative longitudinal studies can be conducted to evaluate program effectiveness.

As a final thought, maybe the current global COVID-19 pandemic can be a catalyst for increased programmatic and research collaboration that starts at higher education institutions and spreads rapidly into society. Might the pandemic be harnessed to bring cohesiveness among previously divided groups? COVID-19 potentially poses a threat to every human being, if not to their physical health certainly to their mental health (World Health Organization, 2020). The pandemic might be framed as the universal enemy that humanity must overcome together. Coping with and conquering the possible adverse effects of the pandemic then becomes a superordinate goal, one that requires people from different groups to collaborate to achieve something that would otherwise be impossible through the efforts of just one individual or group (Sherif & Sherif, 1953). Such a superordinate goal might actually have the power to unite humanity. So, let's collaborate!

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Myanmar Peace Warriors: Discourses and Strategies of Identity and Interethnic Peace among Youths in Northern Myanmar

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Abstract

A decade after democratization of Myanmar in 2011 and seven decades since the country's civil wars began, the once promising peace process in Myanmar has stalled. At the same time, a new generation of young peace activists and related interethnic Youth Forums are emerging. However, they have largely been neglected by the existing literature so far: the possible positive and negative impacts of youth on peace processes is grossly understudied and poorly understood.

Are young peace activists in northern Myanmar significant for the current peace process and how are they perceiving the political process?

Using extensive networks in northern Myanmar, qualitative interviews with leading activists and quantitative data on political attitudes from members in youth organizations, this doctoral project will address this significant gap in the literature to explore these new movements' underlying agendas, values and its role in the current peace process in northern Myanmar. With a Mixed Methods Research Design, this study will make use of theoretical concepts from political psychology, namely the nexus of Ontological Security Theory (OST) and Conflict Transformation. The results will address a neglected topic in an under-studied region with a focus on a young generation of activists and critically review whether they play a role in the political process and why.

Keywords: Myanmar, conflict transformation, youth, ontological security, identity, civil society, sustainable peace, mixed methods research

Introduction

“The current leaders are just talking, you know. They have no idea what we want and how to make peace, all they know is war. So the next generation has to take matters into their hand.”³

This doctoral project aims to apply a Mixed Methods Research Design contribute to the understanding of the violent, decade old armed conflict in northern Myanmar. Specifically, it wants to focus on the socio-psychological dimension of young peace activists, how they perceive the conflict and in what way their different enemy-images shape anxieties and fears in the protracted national peace process.

When Myanmar ended its international isolation in 2011, introduced reforms and promised free and open elections, the world was stunned and full of hope for a renewed peace process. Roughly ten years later, Myanmar has arguably been the location of a genocide and the former peace idol Aung San Suu Kyi has largely fallen from grace in the eyes of the international community. The peace process is still stalled and overwhelmingly handled by elderly and male military strong-men and politicians from the Burmese military and the various ethnic armed groups in the country. Interestingly, a new generation of young, often educated activists is getting organized and has started to voice their opinions in the political arena. Who are they, what are their political ambitions, ideas and visions for the future of Myanmar?

It has been argued that most attention in conflict settings is on groups who use violence (Berghof Foundation, 2019, p. 160). Myanmar is no exception. A lot of media coverage and academic research is focusing on the traditional, mostly male leaders from ethnic armed groups (EAOs) and religious bodies, their parties and armed wings (see for example Woods, 2016; Jones, 2016; Brenner, 2019). Clean-cut hierarchies, patriarchal structures and political gerontocracy still largely dictate the shape of the political negotiations (Grizelj, 2019, p. 174). However, Myanmar is one of the youngest countries in the world, in 2014 more than half the nations’ population was younger than 30 (Census Atlas Myanmar, 2017, p. 16). Women are still discriminated on all levels: the infamous, military-drafted 2008 constitution does not define discrimination of women and grants immunity from war-related sex crimes (Tun, La Ring and Hlaing, 2019, p. 16) and in the national parliament, only 13.7 percent of Members of parliament are currently women (Khullar, 2019). In stark contrast, when it comes to leadership in civil society, faith-based groups and peace movements, it appears as if young, often female leaders⁴ are increasingly taking leadership and making their voices heard. In Kachin State, they have recently shown a lot of creativity in their peaceful protests (e.g. street performances, short plays, theatrical acts, chants) and bravery when facing oppression from state authorities. On 5th January 2018, the inter-ethnic Students and Youth Congress of Burma (SYBC) celebrated a unique victory when the national government finally adopted their National Youth Policy after heavy lobbying from young activists (personal interview with Kachin activist October 17 2019; Myanmar Times, 2018).

³ Kachin Youth Activist. Personal interview. Myitkyina, October 9 2019.

⁴ In preparation for this application, I have already conducted a dozen in-depth interviews between September to December 2019 with young Kachin peace activists based on a semi-structured questionnaire in northern Myanmar. Among them are some of the Kachin activists who recently raised international attention due to their creative ways to protest. A few of them have also been arrested due to their activism such as Lum Zawng and Seng Nu Pan:

<https://frontiermyanmar.net/en/kachin-activist-pair-picks-jail-over-fine-for-street-performance> .

During informal conversations and formal interviews in northern Myanmar from 2017-2019⁵ with dozens of young local NGO workers, students, politicians and youth activists, suspicion and frustration of them towards traditional leaders was a re-occurring theme and clearly “visible”. In order to avoid an overly idealistic construction of young leaders as possible prophets for peace and interethnic tolerance, a thorough and in-depth examination of their discursive formation is of essence.

Research Questions, Objective, and Contributions

In the following, the research questions, interest of youth in peace negotiations as objective and why it is significant will be explained.

Research questions. The main research question/puzzle of this study is whether the young peace activists in northern Myanmar are significant for the current peace process and how are they perceiving the political process in terms of alternative discourses on Myanmar identities and peacebuilding?

Sub-Questions:

- Which visible and invisible dimensions, norms and beliefs shape their various relationships with the nations’ leaders and institutions?
- *Are their ideas and approaches creating new anxieties and fears in relation to the peace process?*
- What are their attitudes towards the (ethnically and religiously) ‘other’ and national identity?
- *How do they perceive the conflicts within their own generation, especially with peers who are fighting in Ethnic Armed Organizations?*
- Do these activists reflect a broader social shift, a generational change?

Research objective. The argument of the transformative potential of youth in peace processes has already gained popularity in the international development community. Many believe that youth has great potential, yet whether or not that is based in facts or merely in fancy has yet to be shown. Even if it is true, how they can affect political dialogue and peace processes is still insufficiently understood. Either supporting or disproving this line of argument could have wide implications for a plethora of actors and institutions. This project wants to contribute to this.

Research contribution and significance. It has been pointed out by scholars in different geographical contexts that knowledge about youth in peace processes is academically limited (Grizelj, 2019) and the impact of youth on peace still understudied (Huesca, 2019). At the

⁵ Since August 2017, I have been working as a civil peace worker[□] for “World Peace Service” in Myitkyina, the capital of Kachin State in northern Myanmar. Often described as “the world’s longest running civil war” (<https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2018/may/01/myanmar-army-escalating-conflict-kachin-united-nations>), the Kachin Independence Army (KIA) has been fighting against the Burmese military since 1961. While Rakhine State and Rohingya issues are given attention by the international community, other minorities, including the Kachin, are similarly suffering from human rights violations, abductions, sexual violence and discourses of hate. While living in Kachin, I have focused on ethnic dynamics in Myanmar which are not sufficiently reported[□] and addressed. Moreover, due to the military’s oppression, foreigners were expelled and research and local narratives were banned since the 1960s. Consequently, many core narratives and research on basic political events are notoriously missing. My Chinese and Burmese language skills, reputation in the community, networks and access to young politicians in the region could fill important research gaps in these areas.

same time, it is also argued that youth (Boyden and de Berry, 2004; Shepler, 2014; Huesca, 2019) and women (Nilsson, 2012; O'Reilly, Súilleabháin & Paffenholz, 2015) could and sometimes are powerful forces for peace processes in some countries, yet they remain largely excluded in Myanmar. However, there might still be the risk that “youth” and their role in society is romanticised and over-stated. Since there is a significant lack of evidence-based research on the matter, that possibility exists.

There is a growing body of research that supports the importance of youth and encourages further research, but the findings are highly contested and methodologically controversial. For example,

- Nilsson (2012) suggests with the help of statistical analysis of peace agreements from 1989 to 2004 that the involvement of civil society, which may include youth, could dramatically increase chances of durable peace. A different study applying data from post-war countries 2008-2011 appears to draw similar conclusions (Andersson, 2012). Myanmar is a very young nation and youth are an essential part of new electorate and civil society.
- It has been argued that a lack of inclusion risks unsustainable solutions and the marginalization of youth (Houwer, 2013). Following this line of argument, youth actors could even turn into “spoilers” after armed conflict ends (Stedman, 1997).
- In contrast, youth often appear to develop alternate frameworks for problems in armed conflicts (McEvoy-Levy, 2006). This seems to have been acknowledged by the international community: Especially since the 2015 UN Youth, Peace and Security Agenda has the role of “youth” gained new momentum (Anderson, 2019).

Theoretical Framework

The framework is interdisciplinary and stems from political science, conflict transformation and insights from cognitive science. The concept of Ontological Security for the understanding of protracted conflicts and required variables will be introduced and discussed.

Political psychology. The interdisciplinary study of human psychology in the field of politics has led to significant and game-changing insights. This approach holds several assumptions: subjective are crucial to understand perceptions of reality and its responses; in order to understand group dynamics, cognitive processes need to be understood; if we want to predict the outcome between different (conflict) parties, the understanding of interaction of these parties is fundamental; multilevel analysis are necessary (Fisher and Kelman, 2011). Therefore, Ontological Security led itself for this study. It is a multi-layered security concept that highlights the connections between individual (here: single peace activists) and collective (Youth Forums, Peace Organizations) attitudes, beliefs and discourses. Moreover, it allows to study nationalism, identity and reconciliation together and how belief changes about the enemy-other can take place (Rumelili, 2015, p. 190).

Ontological security theory (OST) in conflict transformation. The incorporation of Ontological Security into political science is fairly recent, but it has since produced a diverse amount of academic literature (e.g. Kinnvall, 2004; Mitzen, 2006; Krolkowski, 2008; Kay, 2012; Rumelili, 2015). These works have largely been inspired by the writings of the British sociologist Anthony Giddens. He defines Ontological Security as something that goes beyond the traditional concept of physical safety, namely a “sense of continuity and order in events, including those not directly within the perceptual environment of the individual” (Giddens, 1991, p. 243). In other words, identity and group narratives are seen as crucial for mental stability and collective behavior in an uncertain world of threats and constant changes. The

importance of social identity and purpose is emphasized and used as a lens of analysis for actions of groups, collectives and political entities.

In fairly recent research, a number of scholars from different disciplines have used the approach developed by Rumelili (2015) to develop new and fascinating insights into the reasons of protracted conflicts in different case studies (Rumelili, 2015, p. 22):




Figure 1: Conflict resolution and ontological security according to Rumelili (2015)

Here it is argued that individuals and groups draw ontological security from clear friend-enemy differentiation, embedded habits and routinised practices in violent conflicts. Even if war is costly (high “Fear” or physical threat), over time it generates a sense of stability and low existential anxiety: the self and the enemy is known. Alas, the prospect of peace “threatens to unsettle the stability and consistency of self-narratives” (Rumelili, 2015, p. 2), thereby creating new anxiety. These “peace anxieties” are powerful and may stand in the way of new, constructive peace initiatives. Ontological Security is very useful to uncover alternative discourses and can help to study these empirically (Rumelili, 2015, p. 186). This PhD project aims to apply this framework in Myanmar. It will carefully look at socially constructed concepts and help to explore why the decade-old peace process is showing little progress despite much effort.

Age. There is a growing body of compelling research that appears to show that the inclusion of young nationals (Boyden and de Berry, 2004; Shepler, 2014) and women (Klot and Seckinelgin, 2014; Nilsson, 2012; O’Reilly, Súilleabháin & Paffenholz, 2015) is crucial for the core dynamics of war and peace. Especially since the 2015 UN Youth, Peace and Security Agenda has the role of “youth” gained new momentum (Anderson, 2019).

Intra-/Intergenerational. In addition to the obvious differences between the generations, many young ethnic people are part of the armed struggle. This is very much at odds with peace activism and it might be compelling to learn the differing discourses.

Gender. Myanmar is a largely patriarchal society, its ethnic organizations, parties and peace institutions almost exclusively male dominated (Lahtaw and Zahkung, 2012; Hedström, 2015; Tun, La Ring and Hlaing, 2019). Even though it appears as if there have recently been some more liberties for women even among EAOs, the patriarchal socio-cultural norms in law and society prevent a meaningful participation of women despite their open interest to do so (UN Women, 2018, p. 3).

This study will address all these issues. Clearly, young and female Myanmar nationals are exactly the ones who are needed – and yet systematically excluded from the formal political process. This is exactly what I observed and was often told and where I noticed an interesting trend: while the political arena is dominated by ageing men, a growing number of young and often female individuals are leading CSOs and local peace initiatives.

With their measurable frustration with their elders, a “shrinking space”, stalled peace process, exclusion from important decisions and a difficult economic situation, the chances for an open intergenerational conflict are high. In order to understand this conflict, this project aims to look at the “less visible dimensions” and “web of connections” for this generational conflict in order to find solutions for a positive transformation (Lederach 2003, p. 17). In order to achieve this, theoretical concepts from political psychology will be applied.

Methodology and Mixed Methods Research

Since this study shall be largely interpretivist, the application mainly of qualitative methods lend itself for this study. Semi-structured interviews and small focus group discussions with CSO staff, community leaders and local activists are meant to uncover “invisible” assumptions. This research project calls for a multi-level perspective. On the one hand, individual perceptions and contextual understandings need to be captured with a qualitative approach. On the other hand, a quantitative approach will allow to collect descriptive information about participants.

Qualitative Data. Semi-structured interviews with youth activists and members of nonviolent organizations are meant to uncover “invisible” socio-political assumptions. The resulting perceptions will be analyzed with the help of a Critical Discourse Analysis in order to uncover “hidden agendas” (Cameron, 2001, p. 123) and language as a power resource in these very political contexts in terms of ideology and socio-cultural change (Moses and Knutsen, 2012, p. 218) with Qualitative Data Analysis Software such as MAXQDA.

Quantitative data. In addition to the semi-structured interview questions, a second section in the interviews consisting of a structured survey will be used to capture 1. social indicators of the interviewees (such as age, gender, years of school attendance, occupation (of parents), religion) and 2. self-rated agreement levels on a number of standardized items about political statements which will measure for attitudes and values in relation to authoritarianism, interethnic cooperation, tolerance, cooperation, solidarity. This shall help to systematically understand their socio-political background. With the help of R software, it will also be possible to search for correlations between those social indicators and their self-perceived political values. Additionally, MaxQDA has powerful features which will allow to relate the quantitative results with the political discourse from the qualitative analysis.

Interview Sample and Access

Through my various networks, former students and colleagues, a number of contacts with various youth activists are already established. As gate keepers, they will be helpful to expand my networks one during the field work through introductions and snowballing via several channels:

- Individual contacts. A number of politicians and activists are already in touch with me and a couple of preliminary interviews have been conducted in preparation for this project. They can be (re-) interviewed at any time and have offered to introduce other potential participants.
- Youth Forums. The political landscape in Myanmar is dynamic and changes quickly. Since 2012, at least 4 different forums for the formulation of demands by youth have

been established. Today, the National Youth Congress (NYC, established in 2013) and the National Ethnic Youth Alliance (NEYA, 2016) remain and advocate youth participation with regular meetings (Grizelj, 2019). Since a lot of activists will be present during these meetings, these meetings present an ideal chance to collect empirical data.

- NGOs, Peace Organizations and Ethnic Youth Groups. Additionally, the number of ethnic Youth groups and NGOs has increased; they have become more outspoken and “professionalized”, with websites, contact data and memberships.

Data analysis. Qualitative Data Analysis software will be applied for the systematic analysis of collected data. Over the years, I have used several programs such as Atlas.ti and MaxQDA to analyze the data for my academic research and research-related projects in China, Kenya and Myanmar. Additionally, I am proficient with the ‘Five Level QDA Method’ by Nicholas Woolf and Christina Silver (2017) for a thorough, transparent and systematic analysis. R software environment and its packages will be used for statistical computing and to produce robust graphs.

Location and language. This project is initially designed for youth among the Kachin and Shan ethnic groups bordering China in northern Myanmar. Due to my networks among youth organizations and educational institutes in Myanmar, I can rely on extensive support to arrange the data collection. I am continuing to learn Burmese and my ability to speak Mandarin will be an advantage, too. However, many young people do speak English very well, so English might also be an option.

Research Ethics

The difficult socio-political situation in Myanmar makes it necessary to act discreetly and sensitively. As an academic, I have always strictly followed the rules applied in German and of the Swedish Research Council (2017). Secondly, my principles were enriched by Do-No-Harm approaches common in the development sector from my time as a civil peace worker in northern Myanmar. Thus, I emphasize transparency, confidentiality, and sensitivity in the field.

Transparency. Before any data is collected, there will be a proper introduction revealing the purpose and topic of the study, the way it is financed, applied methods, ways to keep the data safe, associated academic institutions and rights of the participant to skip questions and end the interview at any point. Verbal and if possible written agreements (if it is safe) to participate will be obtained and the permission to use the data for the study. Any open questions will be clarified before the data collection formally begins.

Confidentiality. Original names and locations will be changed in order to conceal and protect the participants and guarantee anonymity. I am proficient in the use of security software and web applications to protect and store data and collected sensitive information: e.g. by using a VPN, encrypted messaging applications and email accounts, a password manager, secure web browsers and encryption software⁶ for files.

Sensitivity. The physical and mental safety of my interviewees has absolute priority. Therefore, I will always double-check how to guarantee the safety of anyone agreeing to speak with me and also discuss the appropriate measures with my local contacts, supervisor and university institutions. Changes in the political landscape and daily news will be considered to always re-evaluate the situation/ Questions and inquiries will not be sensitive or

⁶ To name a few, I largely use Free and Open Security Software (FOSS) such as Tor and Firefox browser; end-to-end encrypted wire and signal messenger; highly secure email providers such as Protonmail and Tutamail; 2-IPVanish for hidden IPs; VeraCrypt for military-grade file encryption; LastPass as a secure password messenger with 2-factor identification.

endanger the participants in any way. If there are signs of distress, the question will be left out or the interview will even be skipped altogether. Naturally, research will only be conducted in safe zones and with official permission only unless that was decided differently with the research supervisor.

Conclusion

Even though the impact of youth on peace has been discussed in political science circles for a while, there are still a lot of unanswered questions. The UN and recent research have underscored the importance of a more thorough understanding. This project wants to contribute to the theory on youth in peace processes with a perspective from political psychology.

Making use of both quantitative and qualitative data and Ontological Security Theory, it will be possible to gain a better understanding of why some youths decide to join armed struggles while others oppose this and set up alternative, peaceful movements.

By focusing on the second group, the results will make a crucial contribution to the often-called for (e.g. Yao and Zhang 2018; Renwick 2016; Huesca 2019, Grizelj 2019) and much-needed, improved understanding of young groups of activists who use nonviolent means. Moreover, this research will address a crucial gap in the literature with its focus on young Peace activists and their potential to “incentivize non-violence” (Berghof Foundation 2019, p. 161) in an area where more established authorities are usually the object of research. Last but not least, this study will contribute to the field of Peace and Conflict studies: it holds the potential to provide new insights to understand the complexities of “peace anxieties” in protracted conflicts in a way that is both inclusive and constructive.

Work Plan

	1 st Year				2 nd Year				3 rd Year			
	Q1. 1	Q1. 2	Q1. 3	Q1. 4	Q2. 1	Q2. 2	Q.2 .3	Q2. 4	Q3. 1	Q3. 2	Q3. 3	Q3. 4
Orientation												
Research Planning with Supervisor												
Literature Review												
Questionnaire Design												
Draft literature/ data collection												
Fieldwork Planning												
Data/ Field Work												
Data Entry												
Data Analysis												
Thesis Writing												
Final Draft												
Thesis Defense												
Opt. Conferences												
Opt. Publications												
Supervision												

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**Peace as “Legal Common Sense”:
The Case of Cultural Governance through Human Rights Museums**

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Abstract:

This paper critically engages with the growth of cultural actions among governments, urban policy makers, and various kinds of cultural institutions to find ways to translate human rights into accessible ideas and practices for the public for the overall purpose of promoting peace. Broadly, there has been increasing interest in the utility of “cultural well-being” for promulgating a common understanding of rights and peace in conflict-ridden times. An important type of relevant project seen in the last three decades is the construction of human rights museums. As a public cultural institution, a “human rights museum” (HRM) is defined in this project as one that engages in collecting and curatorial exhibition of artifacts with a twofold mission to educate/advocate for the mainstreaming of rights and to memorialize past events of trauma. This definition is consistent with the International Council of Museums’ general definition, according to the ICOM Statutes (adopted in 2007). Added to this generality are two important dimensions pursuant to HRMs, namely their relation to cultural governance and to the engendering of a “legal common sense.” How do HRMs articulate, manage, and execute their visions of social memorialization and cultural transformation, if not reparation? What sociopolitical factors influence their work? What legal norms and mandates do they attempt to meet in order to help shift nations and groups towards a justice-oriented and “truth-telling” understanding of past violence? What cutting edge museological techniques do they employ? Overall, what is the effectiveness in their utility of culture to deliver and promote the message of peace at the grassroots level and how (or whether) their capacity to do so can be increased?

Keywords: Human Rights Museums; Cultural Governance; Legal Common Sense; Transpacific Cultural Studies; Federation of International Human Rights Museums (FIHRM)

Author's background:

John Nguyet Erni is Fung Hon Chu Endowed Chair of Humanics, Chair Professor in Humanities, and Head of the Department of Humanities & Creative Writing (2014-2020) at Hong Kong Baptist University. In 2017, he was elected President of the Hong Kong Academy of the Humanities. A former recipient of the Gustafson, Rockefeller, Lincoln, and Annenberg research fellowships, and many other awards and grants, Erni's wide-ranging work traverses international and Asia-based cultural studies, human rights legal criticism, cultural politics of race/ethnicity/migration, and critical public health. He is the author or editor of 9 academic titles, more recently *Law and Cultural Studies: A Critical Rearticulation of Human Rights* (Routledge, 2019) and *Visuality, Emotions, and Minority Culture: Feeling Ethnic* (Springer, 2017).

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**Peace as “Legal Common Sense”:
The Case of Cultural Governance through Human Rights Museums**

Introduction: Networked Museums, Interlinked Memories

I would like to take this occasion to outline a new project that I plan to undertake next year when the possibility of traveling for fieldwork can be resumed. In other words, the project is very much at the incubation stage. It is a project that attempts to critically engage with **human rights museums (HRMs)** as sites of cultural governance underlined by a “legal common sense.” I conceptualize HRMs as a type of public cultural institution that engages in collecting and curatorial exhibition of artifacts with a threefold mission to educate/advocate for the mainstreaming of rights, memorialize past traumas, and engender a legal common sense. So, how do they articulate and execute their visions? What sociopolitical factors, and legal norms/mandates, influence their work? What cutting-edge museological techniques do they employ? These questions animate this ambitious cultural survey of key HRMs in six countries across the transpacific region. The idea is to hopefully contribute to a reframing of museum studies, by mobilizing a hybrid method of analysis involving critical legal studies and cultural studies.

Indeed, immigration, racism, gender violence, social justice, climate change, among others, are pressing contemporary problems that are changing the foundational roles of museums. “The work of museums is changing, radically. As the global rise of museums and museum networks dedicated to the subject of human rights over the past few decades has confirmed, museums can be beneficial to the dialog and ongoing negotiation of human rights between civil society and government institutions,” remarked Carter and Orange (2012, p. 2111). Indeed, human rights, the environment, immigration, identity-based struggles, social justice, among others, are pressing contemporary problems that are changing the foundational roles of museums.

Both opportunity and risk, the work of HRMs as a special type of cultural institutions would need to develop their ethical sensibilities carefully, as their work will affect human rights of future generations (Duffy, 2001; Golding, 2009; Murphy, 2016). Yet long ago, Tony Bennett has warned us in his important book *The Birth of Museums* (1995) that the public museum should be understood not just as a place of instruction, but as a reformatory of conduct in which a wide range of regulated social routines and performances take place. Drawing on the Foucauldian perspective, Bennett places the modern museum at the centre of modern relations between culture and government (see also Bennett, 2005). In this way, if HRMs exist to educate and to memorialize past atrocities, how will they negotiate with the political conduct of the government and with how that government wants to manage public memories?

HRMs matter, precisely because they are constructed with one foot on the people's side, and the other on the government's. Scholars have coined the term **museums of negative memory (or museums of conscience)** to call attention to historical trauma that these museums focus on (Assmann & Schwarz, 2013; Halpin, 2007; Hamber, 2012; Opatow, 2011a; 2011b; Sandell, 2017; Sevchenko, 2002; Williams, 2008). Instead of celebrating achievements of the past, they memorialize histories of marginalization, injustice, violence, and violations of human rights; in doing so, they attempt to enjoin governments and peoples. Amy Sodaro in her new book *Exhibiting Atrocities* (2018) places memorial museums as part of the ever-growing trend of "dark tourism," reflecting a significant shift in the late twentieth century in how societies, nations, and groups memorialize past violence. From the United States, Australia, and Taiwan to Cambodia, Uruguay, Chile, South Africa, and Israel, memorial museums reveal the truth about the past, and seek to harness the perceived power of memory to heal communities and promote reconciliation.

The impulse of "**never again**" (see Hamber, 2012) has now built international networks of museums through an increasingly transnational flow of memorial museum aesthetics and design, professional skills of museum management, urban policy development, etc. that reflects the global, transcultural nature of this kind of museums. Supporters of HRMs have indeed banded together to form the **Federation of International Human Rights Museums (FIHRM)** since 2010. The origins of its institutional partners range from established to newer democracies in post-conflict societies, such as the South African Holocaust and Genocide Foundation, which runs Holocaust centers in Cape Town, Durban, and Johannesburg. Led by National Museums Liverpool under the directorship of David Fleming, FIHRM is an international initiative with over two dozen partners and supporters on five continents (<https://www.fihrm.org/>). We need to recognize HRMs as **networked institutions** that by joining hands, they share human-focused stories more powerfully, and mobilize transnational sentiments for cultural diversity more effectively. In the project, I aim to map HRMs that are considered as a regional assemblage, and through it, to theorize networked memories of rights struggles.

The Museological Practices of HRMs

Fundamentally, HRMs represent human rights triumphs and failures primarily through story-

telling. Likening the attendance of an HRM to a “type of pilgrimage to a scared landscape,” art historian Louise Purbrick (2011) observes that representations of human rights violations can lead visitors to feel helpless as such events are inevitably in the past, too late for visitors to take reparative action. Yet, the exhibition narrative often addresses visitors as if they were jurors learning details of what happened. Visitors can therefore respond by developing their interpretive and empathic connection to the victims. In this way, museum practices can help to forge an intellectually and affectively **inclusionary orientation** among the visitors toward people who were excluded, harmed, and unjustly killed in the past. This present project will follow a number of HRMs to examine closely their museological techniques in engendering the desired moral responses. For instance, how do they create their exhibitions that offer historical evidence of acts and events such as violent events, the passage of laws, and their effects? What interpretive strategies are encouraged of the visitors through exhibition narratives illustrated with selected archival documents, images, and objects? How do these narratives help to clarify the historical trajectory of inclusion/exclusion, regulation/emancipation, etc.? How do the roles of curators and historians differ or converge with the views and feelings of community members?

Indeed, over the last twenty years or so, museums have tried to forge new relationships with their publics by problematizing issues and encouraging visitor reflection (Busby et al, 2015; Dean, 2013; Frazier, 1999). To some, political agendas have come to the fore, such as a commemorative museum that memorializes atrocities, or an activism-oriented one with an agenda to combat racism and other sorts of prejudice. Some of them are not easily commensurable agendas (e.g. Adams, 2011; Opatow, 2011a). But there are examples of reconciliation, such as the Caen–Normandy Memorial for History and Peace and the Beit Hashloah Museum of Tolerance in Los Angeles.

However, researchers speak of a strange phenomenon of “**memory competition.**” This arises when different groups vie for strong memorialization of their trauma and compete for significance. Some scholars who study intersectionality politics have even coined the provocative terms “Oppression Olympics,” “victimization Olympics,” or “memory wars” to describe intergroup competition and victimhood whereby groups are pitted in a morbid competition over historical oppressions (e.g. Hancock, 2011; Yuval-Davis, 2012). The Canadian Museum of Human Rights (CMHR), for instance, experienced a troubling period of criticism made by various immigrant community leaders who struggle for adequate recognition in the museum (Adams, 2011; Busby et al, 2015; Hankivsky & Dhamoon, 2013; Moses, 2012). These leaders tend to invest their groups with “primacy of memory,” so that they view their histories ontologically, as more significant bearers of human rights and memory than others. There is, then, the difficulty of combining atrocity memorialization with human rights education/activism, in an entrenched culture of identity politics. The CMHR became a lightning rod for competing claim-making on the stories of suffering and victimization by the Indigenous people, Chinese and Ukrainian immigrants in Canada, and Jews, Armenians and Rwandans abroad (Basen, 2011; Busby et al, 2015). Moreover, this “memory competition” intensified in debates about a

government-sponsored Holocaust or genocide section of the CMHR ever since the 1990s. In the present project, special attention will be paid to scrutinize how the management of HRMs work through and negotiate with various stakeholders in the community. Working with HRMs as a group across the transpacific region, this project will also be able to think through linkages, especially among immigrant groups and their rights struggles, from the pacific countries through North and South Americas. Besides the politics of “memory competition,” what other anxieties exist in museum practice and how can they productively lead museum organizers and operators to develop a rupture in practice and theory?

Translating Law into HRMs: Toward a Legal Common Sense

HRMs are cultural institutions in another way: they are often created in accordance with human rights legal norms or mandates (Orange, 2016; Ulph, 2015). A clear example is the prevalence in museums of linking the Holocaust to human rights and genocide awareness as a response to various legally-derived motivations, including, for instance, the European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights report on Holocaust and Human Rights Education; the Committee on Conscience of the United States Holocaust Memorial Museum (USHMM); the Task Force for International Cooperation on Holocaust Education, Remembrance, and Research, etc. In all these cases, attempts had been made to build museums so as to strengthen a broad, common legal consciousness surrounding genocide in general, and the Holocaust in particular.

In her essay “Translating Law into Practice: Museums and a Human Rights Community of Practice,” Jennifer Orange (2016) points out that although states as well as transnational legal bodies have agreed to an impressive array of international human rights law in the form of treaties and declarations for over 70 years, the way that these laws impact local communities is inconsistent. Increasingly, **legal norms and mandates are linked to HRMs in a direct way**: the former have initiated the latter in order to search for ways to change values, norms, and practices of human rights in everyday lives. Orange uses the community of practice framework to demonstrate how museums are forming communities to support practices that aim to improve the **human rights legal common sense** around questions of marginality. Similarly, one of the aims of this present project is to examine how HRMs develop local and even transnational communities to support learning difficult knowledge of new norms. A “legal common sense” evokes mutually recognized standards of behaviour in a community, and is something that is established, strengthened, and disseminated among communities so as to help them learn and reinforce legal norms both locally and globally.

Orange adds: “By engaging in specific human rights practices and interacting with other

authoritative communities, museums are purposefully and inadvertently influencing legal norms” (710). Indeed, because courts and tribunals have recognized the social value of museums engaged in practices of archiving and memorializing past human rights abuses, as well as educating subsequent generations on human rights law and best practices, they have increasingly mandated the establishment of museums as part of the remedial package in settlement agreements concerning mass human rights violations. For instance, the Museo de la Memoria y Los Derechos Humanos (the Museum of Memory and Human Rights) (MMDH) in Santiago, Chile, was built in part as a result of a recommendation made by a Truth and Reconciliation Commission. The National Commission on Political Imprisonment and Torture (known as the “Valech Commission”) was established to document the crimes that occurred under the Pinochet regime from 1973 to 1990. The Valech Commission recommended reparations to individuals and families, as well as collective symbolic measures. The MMDH was supported as one of these measures (see Andermann, 2012; Estefane, 2013; Frazier, 1999; 2007; Hite and Collins, 2009; Opatow, 2015). The District Six Museum in South Africa is another example of how museums can support the practice of initiating legal claims (Rabley, 2005). The *Land Restitution Act* under South Africa’s new constitution became the legal mechanism through which people could return to the homes from which they had been removed. Researchers show us that the museum provided space for community gatherings as an institutional partner for the District Six Beneficiary Trust and the Department of Rural Development and Land Reform which orchestrated the legal process of land restitution and the Land Claims Commission.

Therefore, studies of HRMs can approach the question of the relation between these museums and the popularizing of “legal common sense” through asking, for instance: How have museums helped to realize some legal goals and recommendations issued by courts? (E.g. the National Human Rights Museum in Taiwan was established as a direct result of the National Human Rights Act passed by the country’s Legislative Yuan in 2017, see “Taiwan,” 2017; 2018). How have they used their archival expertise to support the evidentiary work of legal investigations of rights abuse, e.g. performed by truth and reconciliation commissions or domestic and international criminal tribunals? Have they been created as memorial sites themselves where legal tribunals did their work, by becoming a placed-based visual and documentary archive of the tribunals’ work even after the latter’s legal work has been completed? (E.g. the Sierra Leone Peace Museum is an example of a museum that stands after the tribunal closed. It was a project of the government of Sierra Leone and the Special Court for Sierra Leone, which was established to adjudicate crimes against civilians that occurred during the decade long civil war).

Legal anthropology scholar Rosemary Coombe (1998) reminds us that law-and-society scholarship has long looked closely at law in everyday life, in quotidian practices of struggle, and in consciousness itself. She cites sociolegal studies scholars Austin Sarat and Tom Kearns as saying that “a focus on law in everyday life can help to bridge the gap between so called ‘constitutive’ and ‘instrumentalist’ views of the law, providing a powerful means by which the everyday is understood and experienced, but also a tool that enables people to imagine

and effect social change” (cited in Coombe, 1998, p. 34). In this present project, I similarly suggest that we see **HRMs as sites of law**, which enact the very signifying forms that constitute socially salient distinctions, adjudicate their meanings, and even provoke new practices through which the meanings of rights might be debated, even disrupted. Rather than being static establishments, HRMs are dynamic legal institutions in the quest for social influence.

Human Rights (Museums) in the Transpacific

Let me now quickly speak briefly about the significance of a particular regional focus of the project. In discussions about trade and geopolitics, the importance for a critical understanding of **transnational rights** – the changing meanings, values, and identities that shape people and groups in mobility due to military conflicts, migration, and other geopolitical and economic changes – is often side-stepped. But the recent discord over international trade surrounding the now defunct **Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP)** makes explicit the necessity and timeliness for a “gateway” region to play an impactful role in shaping the region’s understanding of human rights struggles. Dynamics of rights influence societal attitudes: from how citizens treat new migrants and refugees to whether there is public support for geopolitical alliances and cross-cultural connections (Newman et al, 2005). Moreover, it is often in the cultural sense of human rights where potentially controversial social issues from racial justice to gender and sexual diversity gain initial exposure. Such exposure leads to mainstream visibility and broad awareness and debates that, in turn, can create the conditions for inclusive public policies and social innovations starting in cities of countries and then spreading across a region.

To take Canada as an example of an important country in the transpacific region, a 2012 report from Citizenship and Immigration Canada projects that by 2031, 59% of the population of the gateway city of Vancouver will be “visible minorities” who are pre-dominantly Chinese, South Asians, Filipinos, Koreans and West Asians (Hiebert, 2012). Vancouver’s School Board successfully implemented a leading-edge sexual orientation and gender identity inclusion (SOGI) policy which is now being widely adopted in other municipalities in the province. This successful mainstreaming of social inclusion should not be taken for granted, considering the long history of exclusionary practices in the province of British Columbia: from the Komagata Maru incident in 1914 when South Asia migrants were denied entry, to the imposition of a head tax on Chinese migrants leading to the Chinese Exclusion Act in 1923, to the dispossession and internment of Japanese Canadians during World War II, to the banning of books depicting same-sex intimacy by a municipal school board in 1997. The city’s remarkable emergence from a history of discrimination to becoming a so-called “model inclusive city” owes in no small part to its cultural landscape, which includes rights-inflected Asian Canadian cultural activism, a vibrant culture of film and many other creative practices, and importantly, a vocal support to the

construction of the Canadian Museum of Human Rights in nearby Winnipeg.

Other important nations and their key cities along the transpacific corridor have similar histories of transformation on their citizens' rights consciousness due to the impact brought about by various kinds of cultural and political responses, including the making of archives, libraries, and museums. Melbourne and Perth in Australia, Wellington in New Zealand, Guangju and Seoul in South Korea, New Taipei City in Taiwan, Santiago in Chile, Bogota in Colombia, Los Angeles and San Francisco in west coast U.S., so on and so forth: these represent important cities dotting the transpacific region. Some are connected through rough episodes of discriminatory and exclusionary government policies against immigrants, refugees, and political dissidents; many went through waves of racism, xenophobia, and homophobia as they experienced social and economic changes; and most share dark histories and memories of colonialism, the Pacific War, and the Cold War.

This project investigates the local as well as transnational cultural impact of HRMs in forming a kind of **transpacific cosmopolitan citizenship** stemming from rights consciousness. In doing so, it connects with the new vibrant field of **Transpacific Cultural Studies (TCS)**. Briefly, the emergent field of TCS has been a direct response to the global developments concerning the circulation of people, capital, and ideas that has been theorized as a fundamental dimension of modernity (Appadurai, 1996) and critiqued for fostering economically unequal conditions (Sassen, 2014). It fosters interdisciplinary research on the impact of mobility on notions of identity, cultural belonging, rights, and community. The field builds on previous critical interrogations of how the "Pacific" has been variously imagined historically and in the contemporary world (Dirlik, 1998; Sakai and Yoo 2012; Wilson, 2000). The term *transpacific* was initially used in Yunte Huang's (2008) study of Asian and North American literary encounters as a corollary to *transatlantic*, a well-known concept in works such as *The Black Atlantic* (Gilroy, 1995) that unsettles nationalist epistemologies and calls attention to histories of chattel slavery and racial capitalism. The field-defining anthology, *Transpacific Studies: Framing an Emerging Field* (Hoskins and Nguyen, 2014), uses *transpacific* to refer to a "history and pattern of flows across the Pacific" that signals "an inherently critical and often times oppositional approach" to political and economic uses of the term (3). Recent new publications (Dürr and Schorch, 2016; Patterson, 2018; So, 2016; Yoneyama 2016; Wong 2018) and book series (Brill's "Gendering the Trans-Pacific World") attest to the timeliness and continual relevance of transpacific inquiries. However, while the field of TCS explicitly claims to attend to alternative histories and narratives that signal the possibilities of "collaborations, alliances, and friendships between subjugated, minoritized, and marginalized peoples who might fashion a counter-hegemony to the hegemony of the U.S., China, Japan and other regional powers" (Hoskins and Nguyen, 2014: 3), the field has nonetheless been dominated by U.S.-based area studies scholarship. This project attempts to re-map TCS through an ambitious multi-country research plan.

In 2017, I was appointed a member of the Steering Committee of the **Institute for Transpacific Cultural Research (ITCR)** located in Simon Fraser University in Vancouver, Canada. His is the only non-Canadian appointment to the Steering Committee. The present project stems from his historical research and theoretical innovations made in the legal cultural studies of human rights. The study of HRMs is a natural and important outgrowth of his decade of interest and will contribute to his future teaching and knowledge transfer endeavours. While his 2019 book *Law and Cultural Studies* prepares the epistemological framework for a rigorous legal cultural studies of rights, this museum project grounds that framework in an empirical investigation of the concrete institutional spaces of rights.

I have carefully selected 6 exemplary HRMs, most of which are partners of the Federation of International Human Rights Museums (FIHRM). They are:

1. **Immigration Museum Melbourne (Melbourne, Australia, 1998)**
<https://museumsvictoria.com.au/immigrationmuseum/>
2. **National Human Rights Museum (New Taipei City, Taiwan, 2018)**
<https://en.nhrm.gov.tw>
3. **War & Women's Human Rights Museum (Seoul, South Korea, 2012)**
<http://www.warinasia.com/war-womens-human-rights-museum-seoul/>
4. **The Museum of Memory and Human Rights (Santiago, Chile, 2010)**
<https://ww3.museodelamemoria.cl/english-version/>
5. **The Beit Hashloah Museum of Tolerance (Los Angeles, USA, 1993)**
<http://www.museumoftolerance.com/site/c.tmL6KfNVLtH/b.9052747/k.BEE4/Home.htm>
6. **Canadian Museum of Human Rights (Winnipeg, Canada, 2014)**
<https://humanrights.ca>

These museums are selected for their historical span, good scale, richness of contents, and activeness in public engagement. Some are pioneers before the current trend of memorial museums. Together, they address a unique set of human rights issues that shape the transpacific region, in particular immigration, resistance movements, gender and sexual mobilities, indigenous issues, and the Cold War. The execution of the research plan will include: (i) a first phase of extensive literature review; (ii) a fieldwork phase for in-depth “institutional ethnography” of the selected HRMs; and (iii) research and analysis of sample exhibition texts and artifacts and other museum activities.

The bulk of the research work will involve an “institutional ethnography,” requiring on-site fieldwork in the 6 case studies. Research activities will contribute to tracing the evolution of

each case and the divergent political and cultural contexts in which these HRMs were created. This study is not intended to directly engage visitors on how they experience and perceive the museums but focuses instead on the forces and conditions surrounding their creation and development. The institutional ethnography will include an examination of the social, cultural, political, and legal context in which each museum was conceived, with a focus on the debates, controversies, and intentions behind each museum's creation. For this I shall rely on archival sources provided by the museums, secondary sources, and interviews with museum directors and key staff involved in each museum. The in-depth interviews of the museum director and 2-3 more staff in each case will cover, among other things, what motivations drove the creation of the museums; how they determined the interactions among primary stakeholders, creators, and intended audiences; what experiences the museums intended to provide for the visitor; how they worked to come to terms with the past; what challenges they faced; and how/whether HRMs around the world are in dialogue with one another. I shall also ask how they attempt to engage communities in order to contribute to democratic culture (see Horn, 2006). By examining their external programming, projects, websites, and speaking with individuals responsible for such programming, I shall look at how they use a range of public programs to build a better future human rights culture. As they are politically sensitive institutions, I shall also explore what the limits of their ambitions may be.

Finally, as far as the analysis of museum materials is concerned, this will entail a close reading of the HRMs' exhibitions, with a focus on their presentation of the past through narratives, exhibition design, artifacts, photographs, documentary footage, testimony, audiovisual materials, interactive activities, and other exhibition strategies. I shall visit each museum and spend extensive time in each exhibit. I shall also examine the exhibition guides. A particular focus will be on analyzing the exhibits' content and form to see how different societies attempt to assimilate the past into their present understanding of themselves and the ways in which their present concerns are reflected in their representation of the past. For their work to engage and educate the public to be moral citizens, I shall study the experiential and affective strategies used to elicit an emotional response, victim identification, empathy, and so on.

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Management of Corona Pandemic in Gujarat-India- A study based on First-hand Information at Zero Ground Level

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Abstract:-

As is well known, a deadly Corona Virus started “Flying” all over the globe from its epicenter Wuhan in China from December 2019 onwards and Created Panic among the human beings Irrespective of territorial boundaries.

In the initial stage, a section of big countries including U.S.A., U.K., and INDIA took the Spread of this killer virus lightly and basked in Complacency, so much so that the rulers of these countries were virtually mocking at all those who warned against gravity of the Situation prior to March-2020, when the corona virus had spread here, there and everywhere across the world.

The researcher having participated in 7th Annual International women leadership Conference at Bali-Indonesia on his return track alighted at Ahmadabad International Airport in Gujarat-India, on the intervening night of 11th and 12th March-2020.He was flabbergasted to be surrounded along with other the Passengers by a team of Para medical staff with digital thermometer in their hand. It was mandatory for each and every Air Passenger to fill up a prescribed Form Providing details on One’s Journey and residential address as mentioned in the Passport.

All Passengers returning to India by an International Flight had to be quarantined either at a Government Hospital or one’s home for a fortnight despite no clinical Symptom of Covid 19.

Later on, the researcher himself caught infection of Covid -19 and had to be hospitalized at a local Hospital for eleven days, from 1st October to 11th October. Having been confined to a single room of a well-known local hospital, the researcher pondered over impact of this killer virus from Socio-economic point of view and made up this mind to prepare this Paper. The researcher besides possessing a degree in Indian System of medicine has worked in different Government departments in different capacities which includes heading training institutes Understandably, the researcher has made sincere efforts to make this paper interesting and informative as the study is based on firsthand information on the ground level situation prevailing at some of the health centers and hutment areas where the people belonging to lower socio-economic strata reside.

The present study may be useful to the academicians, Sociologists, health Sector workers, feminists and all those who want to contribute to development of the Society as a whole.

Universe of the study-

Gujarat State in India with Focus on Gandhinagar and Ahmadabad districts of Gujarat.

Primary Data:-

Statistics from the state health agencies and the central government App.

Secondary Data:-

Various Journals, Newspapers and electronic media

Socio- economic effect:-

- *From Gender lens.*
- *Migrant labors*
- *Hand to Mouth daily wagers*

- *Employees of private business Sectors.*

Thousands of people with poor economic and educational background migrate from one place to the other within and outside India in search of livelihood. They manage to make both ends meet by working in Farms, Small and medium industrial units, hotels, restaurants and building and road construction sectors etc.

The government of India suddenly announced total lock down without a notice in the evening of 24th march 2020 resulting in to halting almost all economic activities. In the initial period of lock down the owners of the small, medium and large industrial units provided free Food and wages without work to their Labor force.

Some charitable and religious organizations also reach out to the needy persons who were rendered unemployed as a result of sudden closure of industrial units, Construction and development activities.

However, the spread of corona continue to play havoc with the people for a longer period than the state had expected and the state agencies found it extremely difficult to cope with the situation.

The lock down continued to be extended from time to time from march-2020 onwards. The labors and other persons who lived from hand to mouth started feeling the heat of lockdown and coercive measures by the law enforcing agencies to control the spread of corona.

There are many heart rending stories of labors desperately trying to leave for their native villages located hundreds of kilometers away from their work places. The labor force working abroad in the countries like UAE, Saudi Arabia and Oman etc were stranded as International journey was strictly restricted. The Indian tourists enjoying a short sojourn at Thailand Indonesia, Dubai and the Indian Students in foreign Universities could not return and faced untold hardships.

In the absence of public transport facilities like buses and railways during Lock down, the migrating labors had to hire whatever mode of private transport like lorry, luggage carriers, bikes, bicycle etc was available.

Heart rending stories

- An adolescent girl and her father an auto rickshaw driver were not able to get any transportation to go back to their native village during total shut down and they were without food and shelter. This brave girl took her injured father as a pillion rider on the carrier of her rickety bicycle and pedaled down approximately 1200 K.M., from Guru gram-New Delhi to reach their destination, the native village in Darbhanga - Bihar. This episode of a brave young girl received a wide publicity in the print and electronic media.



An adolescent girl pedaling her injured father for 7 days to cover the distance of 1200 K.M.

A mother of a two year child collapsed and died at a railway platform during travel to her native. Her innocent tiny child was found to trying to awaken the dead mother under an impression that she was alive and sleeping due to exertion. This real story brought tears in the eyes of many people.



A child waking up her dead mother

These stories are not from Gujarat- the universe of the present study but they are worth being shared in the context of the theme. The following images bear testimony to the plight of the migrating labors from Gujarat during shutdown related to Corona.



Pitiable plight of Migrant labors –lockdown during pandemic (Gujarat, India)

The poor migrant labors had to bear the brunt of police brutality on their way to the native as it was against the protocols of lockdown to move from one place to the other barring under exceptional circumstances.

With growing unemployment and forced home stay for earning male, the incidents of psychological issues mostly depression resulting into domestic violence against house wives also increased manifold. A woman helpline received more distress calls in 2020 than in the corresponding period of 2019.

A section of hard pressed poor people desperately expressed their anger and anguish against the state by saying “It is better to die due to corona infection rather than from hunger.”

Despite all possible efforts by the state, the enormity of spread of the corona virus made it virtually unmanageable and uncontrollable for it(the state) to provide timely help, relief and rehabilitation to the suffering masses.

However, the state having realized seriousness and gravity of the situation of late, Swung into full actions by arranging for special rail trains and public transport vehicles to facilitate the labors to move to their respective natives.

The pandemic has also exposed inadequacy of public health facilities in the developing countries. Initially the suspected patients of Covid-19 had to run from pillar to post for getting clinical tests and medical treatment.

On one hand the Government run hospitals were running out of capacity to admit the corona infected patients and on the other private hospitals and dispensaries were not permitted to treat the corona infected patients in the initial stage.

The Common People Started feeling that the state was insensitive to their woes and there appeared a lack of co-ordination among the different Government agencies like Police, Health, Revenue, Labor welfare and Social welfare etc.

With growing public anger against the state, free corona test facility centers have been set up at many places. The state also took the following steps to meet the challenge of corona.

The State’s efforts to combat the grave Situation.

- Special Fund for health care
- Prime minister’s care fund.
- Chief Minister’s Care fund.
- Setting up Special Covid-19 dedicated hospitals.
- Free of Cost Rapid antigen Test and RT-PCR Test.
- Free Medical Treatment.
- Launching a Mobile app- “Arogyasetu”

- Special Railway trains for migrating labors

The super specialty hospitals and poly clinics have been allowed to set up special wards for the corona patients. Almost after 7 months of corona outbreak the management of relief, rehabilitation measures and health care seems to be on the right Track.

Data Civil hospital, Gandhinagar the state capital Gujarat

Sr. No.	Month	No. Of Admitted Covid Positive Patients	No. Of X-Ray Chest Done	No. OF Recovery	NO. Of Death Due to Covid virus
01	April	250	300	249	01
02	May	380	550	375	05
03	June	1230	1500	1190	40
04	July	1600	2210	1510	90
05	August	2200	3120	2120	80
06	September	1335	1820	1274	61
07	October	823	1120	770	53
08	November(Till 18/11/2020)	968	1225	930	38



Arogya setu App

Covid-19 Data as on Dt.18/11/2020

Sr.No.	State/Country	Active Cases	Recovered Cases	Deceased	Confirmed
01	Gujarat	12458	174088	3815	190361
02	Across India	446805	8335109	130993	8912907

However, it cannot be claimed that the situation has been fully under control. The researcher will be Failing in his duty if he does not place on record commendable Services rendered by doctors and para medical staff like pharmacists, X-Ray technicians, laboratory technicians, Nurses to combat pandemic.



An X- Ray technician civil hospital, Gandhinagar- Gujarat

Many doctors have lost their Lives while treating the corona patients. The police Personnel have also been rendering good Services during this critical time and some of the Police officers have also lost lives attributed to exposure to the virus while on duty.

With the lifting of lock down and opening up all industrial units markets and religious places in the first week of November 2020 taking into consideration the most popular “Deepawali” festivals amongst the Indian People, there is a sudden surge in the cases of corona in different parts of India. Gujarat state has also seen an exponential surge in the corona cases attributable to air pollution from fire crackers and throwing norms of social distance to the winds by a section of undisciplined people.

Thus the state though belatedly has started taking all possible measures to combat a deadly corona virus and there by save lives of the ailing humanity

Conclusion:-

- Initially the state was in a state of frustration and confusion and could not take decisive actions to combat the menace of corona virus outbreak. The political leaders were

complacent and they took corona pandemic so lightly that they did not hesitate to mock at those who warned against taking the Spread of “Wuhan Virus” insincerely.

- However “belatedly the state left no stone unturned to combat the spread of deadly virus and it was partially successful in restoring a semblance of normality.
- Every right thinking person needs to be extra cautious in the prevailing circumstances by adhering to all necessary medical protocol like maintaining Social distance, wearing mask at public places, avoiding uncalled for outings and to inculcate a healthy life style till an efficacious vaccine for corona virus is invented and made easily available for the suffering masses.

NI UNA MAS! Not even one more!

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„Helen Mack said 700 hundred girls and women were murdered in Guatemala between 2000 and 2004. Although gangs called “Maras Salva Truchas” were blamed for most of the murders, the truth is that the authorities have not produced any credible suspects or lines of investigation to explain what is happening“(Valdez, 2006, p. 260). In 2002 alone, El Salvador reported 238 women’s murders that its government blamed on domestic abuse(Ibid, p. 262).“ In Canada, Ruth Mustus, an activist, is trying desperately to inform the world about the approximately 500 mostly indigenous women who disappeared in her country over the past twenty years“(Ibid, p. 263). El Salvador, Gutamala, Jüarez, Chile, Peru, Bolivia, are places of the highest feminicides rates. Articians in their condemnation of this brutal acts, prduced art works that condemn acts and silence over the feminicides in world. One of the most important pictures is made as pandane to Munk's *Scream*, only having female with croses inside of her mouth as symbols of feminicide in world. Goal of this paper is to represent the ideologies on feminicide in Mexico area and feminist campaign fighting against them under the slogan marker „ No una mas“/Not even one more!

Key terms: feminist activism, femicides, genocides, antifemicide artistic campaigns, Juarez, Mexico, Maras Salvass Truchas

Introduction

Ecofeminist Eislar Rian in her work *Ecofeminist manifesto* (1987) holds that the social system of Minoan period of rule on Greek island Crete, was the only true democracy. The Athenian democracy, was the rule of free aristocratic males, women and slaves (man and women of other color) were marginalized and excluded from public sphere. Only free males were subject to obligation of public speeches as a mark of true citizen. Patricia Shipley holds that Aristotle's scripts on social system represent the origin of misogyny and subordination of women. Aristotle statements that „women are disfigured man“, and „silence is an adornment of women“(Aristotle in Shipley 2001 , 102), are according to Shipley origins of exclusion of women out of academic field. Metzner (Geiger 2008 , 111-112) envisions the future ecological society form as liberal, egalitarian and based on gender equality. . „Environmentalism represents superior form of nationalism, because of its luck for tendentiousness towards the racism, ethnical violence and militarism, it is rather based on bioregionalism“ (Galić 2000, 34). Why should we accept the ecological nationalism idea? “Beck, Addam: The advancement of advance = the advancement of risks” (Skinner 2011, 82-82) :“Advocate for stronger participation of women in climate change institutions and processes: In addition to pushing for stronger political commitment to the principles of gender equality, it is essential to advocate for greater presence of women at the negotiating tables, whether at international meetings such as the COPs or at national and regional dialogues on climate change. Conduct institutional gender audits to identify gender-blind structures and processes: Social and gender audits help to assess levels of gender blindness in climate change institutions and architecture. Conduct gender-responsive budgeting to ensure that planning, programming and budgeting contribute to the realisation of gender equality and womens rights. Dona Haraway as cyber feminist believes that societies of future will be based on transgender perspective, humanism of UN and informatics dominion. Binary opposition as crucial problem of ecology, gender, and social system had shown following division:

Femininity	Masculinity
Nature	Culture
Emotion	Ratio
Subordination	Dominance
Logic of care	Logic of dominance

Table 1. Femininity vs. masculinity

Postmodern	Modern
Transnational identity	Nation-state
Transgender	Gender
Transversal politic of identity(Yuval Davis)	Nation
Transnational identity	Nation-state
Transitional justice	Nation –state justice conception

Table 2. Postmodern vs. Modern dichotomies

Terms that are related to environmental nationalism idea

Beyond generalisations that place women and men in two polarised groups, stereotypes are not helpful in understanding complex realities where both women and men are both vulnerable to the effects of climate change and – in many cases – also actors in managing its responses. Therefore, there is strong intersection in between gender, nation and ecology. “Global governance, gender, and ecology as presupposed field of future problems” by sociologist Giddens. Environmental nationalism, cosmopolitan idea of nationalism, transnationalism represent the best possible problems for this problematic intersection. Why should we embrace the environmental nationalism idea? Ecological nationalism as project rejects the racial, ethnic and sexual discrimination and promotes the idea of supranational identities formed on bases of need for better quality of life in certain areas. The concept of nation-states should be matter of past, because the areas should be divided by eco borders in order to form team of experts with common goal of formation of better life style as well as the overcoming the eco-path- psychology of postmodern time. Deconstruction of binary opposites and dichotomies by the means of Environmental Nationalism. Gender dichotomies deconstruction involves the traditional gender dichotomies or question of natural/non-natural „involves exclusion of homosexuals, women, colored people, and non-human categories of existence “(2008, 309-310). Sandilands demands formation of eco-polis sphere, and Ariel Salleh ecologically literate sociology. Transgender involves all kinds of perspective that includes transcending the traditional gender division or already mention gender binaries, female/male into postmodern status of feminine masculinity or masculine femininity. Philosopher Rosemary Tong (Haralambos and Holborn 2002)

believes that only possible stance in postmodern is masculine and feminine at the same time, or in words of Suzana Marjanić (2005) ecological androgyny. Transnational involves the idea that the borders of nation-states should be moved towards the wider areas of bioregional cooperation and communal care for climate changes. These ideas are presented in already mentioned IPCC work of transnational team of experts. Sociologist Daniel Archibugi thinks that social system has become more of a sociological idea than it The main problems of contemporary : Femicide, Urbicide, Queer bushing, Gender based violence, Ecocide, Feminisation of poverty, Biocriminal, and negative consequences of transgenderism are girls gangs. Giddens paradox means:“ Eco patho psychology of postmodernity is the fact that we are dealing with „abstract and elusive dangers, however potentially devastating they might be“(Giddens 2010 , 98). Archibugi argues that cosmopolitan democracy stops the discrimination of indigenous people, strangers, emigrants, stopping the negative side of democracy , ethnocracy noticeable in „need to homogenize those who are different by means of assimilation, expulsion, or even elimination“ (Archibugi in Giddens and Sutton 2010 , 330). The similar is with the negative or opposite side of cosmopolitanism, or fundamentalism based on lack of tolerance towards differences. Transnational citizenship : „The EU is shown that it is possible to accompany citizenship existing inside the states in some form of transnational citizenship“ (Archibugi in Giddens and Sutton 2010, 332). Human progressivism, womenism, ecological nationalism and cosmopolitan democracy, joined with ecological modernization represent significant matrix for formation of future societies and overcoming of global climate changes. Gender, ecology and social system problems are regulated properly in global legal system of cosmopolitan democracy.

Modern and postmodern dichotomies and divisions

Distinction between modern and postmodern theory envisioned by feminist, is followed by the traditional dichotomies of gender as social product and sex as biological or anatomic differences between women/man in modern period, and deconstruction of traditional approaches in postmodern statement that gender and sex are per formative and product of social construct. Post modernity involves plurality of identities, masculinities and femininities, that are per formative and that influence transgender perspective in postmodernism. Postmodern author Califia, in masculinity studies (Beasley 2006), has defined term transgender, and transsexuals. Transgender involves all kinds of perspective that includes transcending the traditional gender division or already mention gender binaries, female/male into postmodern status of feminine masculinity or masculine femininity.

Philosopher Rosemary Tong (Haralambos and Holborn 2002) believes that only possible stance in postmodern is masculine and feminine at the same time, or in words of Suzana Marjanić (2005) ecological androgyny. Ecological androgyny is actually feminine masculinity or masculine femininity. In words of Queer feminist Judith Butler in *Bodies that matter*, stated that formation of femininity and masculinity is connected with transformation or transition from heterogeneous mother law of freedom, to homogenous law of father, who demands order. That is so-called period of gender socialization. Hetero-normative order of father rejects all of identities that are not heterosexual forcing them to submit to patriarchal heterosexual rule, and defining them as abnormal. On the top of the pyramid stands hegemonic masculinity, elite masculinity that holds the centers of power under their control. Co-operative masculinity supports this kind of masculinity because of the patriarchal dividend in society. Homosexual masculinity and all sorts of subordinate masculinities (masculinities of other races, classes, and ethnicity) together with all sorts of femininity (subordinate femininity, homosexual femininity, feminists) is marginalized and subject of oppression of patriarchal rule in the same way. These masculinities and this femininities struggled and still are struggling against patriarchal rule. Even though the white feminist movement succeeded in their project, postcolonial feminist and black feminist still did not get their rights. Multicultural feminism, queer feminism, and human progressivism are together with eco feminist movements and eco feminist political activities, significant agents of change in future societies. Gayatri Ch. Spivak as postcolonial feminist, and Dianne Fuss as multiple difference authoresses in field of sexuality studies, believes that postmodern age offers different perspective, demands plural perspective on gender and sexual identities. Gayatri Spivak supports the ideas of Archibugi, developing the concept of geopolitical strategies into the example of centers of fashion in world, because centre of fashion is not Paris anymore, it is Japan, and Rei Kawakubo as feminist philosopher and prominent designer is famous name in world. Bioregionalism becomes important for regionalization and overcoming of world crisis. Transitional justice and question of collective responsibility for crimes committed, in postmodern and post transitional perspective involves relation of individual and collective consciousness and responsibility for crime as well as the dialogue in between the sides that were in war. Nenad Dimitrijevic(2011 ,15-16) from Central European University question the mass crime, denial, and collective responsibility in his recent work *Duty to respond* :“I wish to make certain distance at the very beginning: the inspiration for me to write this book was not academic. I belong to the social group in whose name recently the heavy crimes had been committed. I am chased by the spirits of innocent people that were

killed in my name. ...Hannah Arendt thinks that real question that are influenced by the issues of mass crimes involve guilt and responsibility. ... Even though I do agree with these statements, I do not agree that the emotional reaction to the crimes committed in some bodies names “totally insignificant”...” Therefore, the process of reconciliation involves the necessity of crime to be admitted and involves the need for member of collective identity to take action and take a stand in order for them to recognize the suffer of victims and those that were responsible for the crime, speaking about their own feeling of alienation inside the collective identity. In the era of ecological problems, the poverty and overpopulation are problems that concern the world in whole. Feminization of poverty is term that defines the fact that the more than half part of the poor people are women and that term poverty is more implied to women than it is to men. In period of transition and in postcolonial countries, women are living without enough resources’ for life. The world is developed into the centers, peripheries and place in between. While white feminist stand in the centre of world power and from standpoint of black feminist and postcolonial authoress and feminist they in one way imitate the tradition of omnipotence and dominance of white capitalistic hierarchical masculinity religious patriarchal order. Femicide stands for higher rates of crimes committed against women. The civilization of Freud , according to Judith Butler, is the civilization of body diminishment , while as Foucault insight to the body as place of inscriptions ,, thathre and surface of cultural inscription “ (Butler 2000, 131). When the historical developmant of philosophical systems and thoughts is analayzed , it is necessary to notice that Butler uses multiple theories , theoretial approaches , that even though they are not contemporaries, they share the same thoughts and arguments, that support transgender and transexual perspective. Body , according to Douglas Mary, represents the form with the margins that can be threating because they are not safe enough from the outside invasions. Queer bushing, femicides, urbicides, ekocides, wars and destroying tornades are only several of the violetions artificialy or naturally produced . El Salvador, Gutamala, Jüarez, Chile, Peru, Bolivia, are places of the highest feminicides rates. Articians in their condemnation of this brutal acts, prduced art works that condemn acts and silence over the feminicides in world. One of the most important pictures is made as pandane to Munk's *Scream*, only having female with crosses inside of her mouth as symbols

of

femicide

in

world.



Picture 1.. „Haunted nightmares of Juárez : NI UNA MAS! „(www. artsbymia.com no.6192 , visited on 20.05.2014). Ecocide is ecological genocide, it involves all sorts of devastation of nature caused by so called omnipotence and power of human race, and it has complex consequences on „economic, political, technological, cultural scale, as well as on individual scale namely, in crisis of identities“(Malešević 2004 , 51-53). In *The Enemy Outside :thoughts on the psychodynamics of extreme violence with special attention to men and masculinity*, Chodrow (2002 , 236) writes on

violence and aggressions in urban societies such as „collective cruelty, brutality, killing, torture, death squads, ethnic cleaning, political rage expressed thorough murder, rape, genocide murders of indigenous people, ethnocide tribal warfare’s, gang violence, gang wars“.Kira Cochrane(ed) in *Women of the revolution , forty years of feminism*(2012), together with group of feminists demarcates the places of oppression in world on individual and collective plan, therefore marking the locuses of todays oppression of women as well as the single or collective protagonists of straggle. Problems of „muslim women“⁸(Spahić Šiljak 2012, 87-160) from misconseption of Islamic feminist movements, over systematic rape of Bosnian and Herzegovinian Islamic women, to single muslim feminist identity of Taslima Nasrin (Grant in Cochrane 2012, 171)⁹, that had been „sent to exile because of feminist activism with price over her head in 1994“. The fight for equal tratmant and academic equality raised by single feminist such as professor Nawal El Sadawi in Egypt was stopped by dominant patriarchal authorities in 2010. Cases of individual ethnical problems such as case of Layla Ibrahim(Hattenstone and Hirsh 2012, 370) who had to spend 13 months in jail after reporting the assault to the police in Carlisle as recent as 2011, and Mona Eltahaway writtings on her own experience of feminist and jurnalist in Cairo when , „after punching man who had groped her police broke her left arm and hand“(Eltahaway in Cochrane 2012, 382) had shown that ethnical, religious freedoms and gender problems still exist as the Global risks report form 2013 had shown. Question of systematic sexual violence over the women in Congo(Wax in Cochrane 2012 , 257) and contraversial question raised by Chris McGril (Cochrane 2012 ,342-343) of women wining the more than a half of seats in Ruwanda parlaimant, also confirm the statemant that rising religious fanaticism still makes obstacles to democratisation of society. Queer bushing involves violence against queer persons, not because of their action but because of their beliefs. Myerson in his work *Ecology and postmodernism* writes that alienation results in eco pathologies of modern world, as a result of living in consciousness of ecological crisis and uncertainty of our existence. Sociologist Ulrich Beck stated in 1980-ies that we live in era of ecological problems, named risk society. We live in constant fear for ourselves Balkan stereotypes, according to Blagojević (2006, 230), can be investigated on following dichotomies:

Male	Female
Nature	Culture
Instinct	Words
Balkan	Europa
Natural	Technology
Original	Artificial
Superior	Inferior
Emotive	Rational
Constant	Changeable
Rural	Urban
War/conflict	Help/follower

Table 3. Balkans vs. Europe (Blagojević 2006, 230)

Recent investigation on involvement of women in religious ceremonies and rituals in Bosnia and Herzegovina had shown that women have the same role in religious ceremonies as man, “only in catholic tradition (New Travnik)” (Ivelić-Katava u Šeta et all 2013, 77,). **Migrations of Youth in contemporary world**

The recent conferences in field of Sociology of Youth are focused towards the investigations of migrations and migrations policies in Europe and around the world. Maria Pissani , focuses on the migrations and migration politics in Cyprus , specialy critisizing the problems on the border with other countries and reasons for enlargment in number of migrants, especially illegal towards the Cyprus. *Youth on the move*, at Maynooth campus Dublin(Ireland), in June 2015, focused mainly on the problematic of migration politics and imprisonment of Youth due to the illegal migrations over the European borders. Hyperfeminisation, rape, gangs of girls, rent boys masculinities, Varoç in Istanbul, forced labour, rape and prostitution are several problems of illegal emigrations. Compiting masculinities asking for the aproval and honour are other problems of legal migrations.

Rights by William Paul Simmons in spring of 2006. „As one writer put it, the kidnapping, torture, rape, and murder of women in Juárez represents “the most shameful human-rights scandal in Mexico’s recent history.” The number of murders has been disputed, but the Commission’s Special Rapporteur concluded that at least 268 women had been killed between January of 1993 and January of 2002. Amnesty International claims the total may be 370 murders and that seventy women are still missing.“(Simmons, 2006, p. 493). Simmons had also noticed that there are certain similarities in between the sample of victims, there are all workers in maquiladoras or students, and migrants for financial reasons, aged in between 15 and twenty five. In further appearances, they all look alike: „Many also have similar physical appearances, consisting of a slender physique with dark skin, shoulder-length dark hair, and “attractive” features“(Ibid, p. 494). Simmons describes the Juarez place, and geographical features of it: „Juárez is a border town and factory city that is the home of dozens of maquiladoras (large foreign-owned assembly plants) that employ much of the workforce. Nearly onehalf of the 1.5 million residents of the city migrated there from local villages and small towns searching for economic prosperity. The city’s infrastructure had been largely unprepared for such a huge migration, forcing many citizens to find residence in the local “shantytowns.” A sprawling city, Juárez also includes many square miles of empty desert, which has sadly become the resting place for many of the murdered women“(Ibid). The theories of motives for murders are different ranging from prostitution, drug trafficking, to domestic violence, finds Simmons. Simmons also offers two other possibilities such as , selling organs of this girls in USA, and the other which is in relation to assumptions in this work, presupposes that reason are „, drug rings, or

even groups of young men from wealthy families (los Juniors), might be using these girls

in macabre rituals or as part of some sporting contest“(Ibid). Irene Khan- The Secretary General of Amnesty International, , between 9 and 14 August 2003 presented an *Intolerable killings: 10 years of abductions and murder of women in Ciudad Juárez and Chihuahua*, report in numbers holds that „Over 370 women murdered, at least 137 of them after being sexually assaulted - this is the harsh reality of the violence which women and teenage girls of Chihuahua state have been subjected to since 1993, according to reports received by Amnesty International. In addition, over 70 young women are still missing, according to the authorities, though Mexican non-governmental organizations say the figure is over 400“(Khan , 2003, p. 7). According to Khan’s (2003, p. 26)

report there are situational and serial killings of women. Situational murders are described by the state authorities as “crimes of passion”, murders related to drugs trafficking or robbery, sexual offences, fights, intrafamily violence, acts of revenge and culpable homicide or killings for which the motive is unknown“(Ibid, p. 26). Identity of victims include being poor, female teenagers or female striving for better life conditions working in maquiladoras or being self-supporting students. Even two thirds of them were working women and students. Their family members stated that they wanted to become something, and were either working or studying in late hours, involving being head of a household with a one child. In this report, Khan (2003, p. 28), even states that all sorts of torture are involved next to killing, even parts of body being beaten off, so it is questionable whether it was human act of some other beings: „The types of violence include rape, biting, beatings, stab wounds and mutilation. The cause of death in over 70 percent of these murders was either asphyxia resulting from strangulation or injuries caused by blows“. In 1996, the gang members in the „central area of Ciudad Juarez resulted in the arrest of ten members of a gang called Los Rebeldes“, and later on the gang made of the bus drivers. „In talks with Amnesty International delegates, the authorities also admitted that, in order to determine the level of risk, they distinguish between the behavior of "good girls" and those who have no fixed routine or who have a difficult relationship with their parents. If the latter is the case, the authorities tend to use it to argue that the missing woman has left voluntarily to escape from her family, thereby discrediting the parents and ruling out the possibility of her being treated as the victim of abduction“(Khan, 2003, p. 32).All of the victims were raped and strangled and most of them beaten, then stabbed, often mutilated and tied up, bitten up and gagged. „Sexual violence includes other forms of torture, such as sexual humiliation and psychological torture, which were impossible to quantify for this study but are inherent to the nature of gender and the conditions of defenselessness and prolonged captivity that, as a result of forensic tests, some of the victims were shown to have suffered“(Khan, 2003, p. 81).41% of women were left in deserted areas, driven there by car(Khan, 2003, p. 82).

According to Alma Guillermoprieto, the reason for murders are drug traffickers, with good position to traffic drugs and conduct murders because of female poverty, close desert and lack of protection for them. Also, this drug trafficking is connected with , especially Mexican celebrated cult of Santa Muerte, worshipping of death and belief that because of sacrifices, those who worship her will be awarded with their rebirth. This cult also supports, all sorts of differences that are not present in formal catholicism, and represent heretical cult. Santa Muertas is protector of , homosexuals,

bisexuals, transvestites, transsexuals, transgender persons, love, against assaults, against gun violence, against violent death, prostitutes, people in poverty, police officers, smugglers, drug dealers, taxi drivers, mariachi players, bar owners, bicycle messengers“ (www.wikipedia.com 2015). Different names, to Santa Muertas such as: „Santa Muerte is also known by a wide variety of eponyms: the Skinny Lady (la flaquita),[11] the Bony Lady (la Huesuda),[11] the White Girl (la Niña Blanca),[12] the White Sister (la Hermana Blanca),[10] the Pretty Girl (la Niña Bonita),[13] the Powerful Lady (la Dama Poderosa),[13] and the Godmother (la Madrina).[12] ("Lady of the Shadows"), Señora Blanca ("White Lady"), Señora Negra ("Black Lady"), Niña Santa ("Holy Girl"), Santa Sebastiana (St. Sebastienne) or Doña Bella Sebastiana ("Our Beautiful Lady Sebastienne") and La Flaca ("The Skinny Lady"“ (www.wikipedia.com), can be found in other sources. White Girl- in matriarchy in mther cult, only the son of White Women could be ruler (Miles 2012). Explanation: „In many ways, Santa Muerte acts like Catholic saints. As Señora de la Noche ("Lady of the Night"), she is often invoked by those exposed to the dangers of working at night, such as taxi drivers, mariachi players, bar owners, police, soldiers, and prostitutes. As such, devotees believe she can protect against assaults, accidents, gun violence, and all types of violent death.“[26]. Sociology of cult involves the investigation of this cult as well, and finds that this cult is usually worshipped by teenage and adolescent women, because if the sceleton of the Santa Muerte figure is dressed in certain robe, someone can gain anything he or she desires, especially in cases of poverty and hardships. Followers of this cult are on margins with respect to the law. This deity also protects criminals, and according to certain authors (www.wikipedia) the pictures of it are found in cells. „In Mexico, authorities have linked the worship of Santa Muerte to prostitution, drug trafficking, kidnapping, smuggling, and homicides.“ Her candels are black and it is associated with black magic and witchcraft. It is condemned by Vatican.(www.wikipedia.com).

Feminist approach in work of Rosario Castellanos

Lisa Davis (<http://wwwa.cf.ac.uk/euros/subsites/newreadings/volume6/davislabs.html>, page visited on 23.05.2014.) analyses on monstorous motherhood vs. interpretations of virgin cult in theory of Rosario Castellanos, offer the different understanding on the dichotomy virgin motherhood such as Virgin Mary's or Saint Maria Guadalupe and on the contrary monstorous motherhood of the one seld into the custody and slavery such as La Malinche. Davis in line with Roger Bartra, examinimates the Virgin / La Malinche dichotomy. Virgin mother is ideal moterhood

and even purifying in comparison to La Malinche's motherhood that is humiliating Mexican ideal conception of motherhood:

„According to patriarchal myths, La Malinche is a sexualised figure, a headstrong woman, and a subject who freely chose her destiny. Such a woman is dangerous to the patriarchal order so she is presented as hateful and women are forced instead to identify and emulate the Virgin, a less threatening figure. She is guaranteed to be free from the sexuality evident in La Malinche because she is a virgin, and she is self-sacrificing, showing absolute devotion throughout her life to both God and to her son. In many ways the image of the Virgin serves as a means of suppressing the threatening and deviant femininity embodied by La Malinche“ (Ibidem) .

Even Castellanos shares the pessimistic opinions, that are result of triumph that patriarchal society produces with saint Virgin image, believing that there are no true alternatives for women. Those who manage to escape patriarchy are usually condemned with madness or death : „Like de Beauvoir, Castellanos believes that engaging in productive work outside the home is vital for women's emancipation“ (Ibidem). Myths on Virgin motherhood tend to „restrict women to the private sphere and therefore prevent them from deriving the benefits brought about from engaging in productive work“. Castellanos work had been written in 1997, and her pessimistic approach proved to be objective, because of mass killings and sloughing of women in Gulf of Mexico, some of the still have not been found. Femicide in this areas is always advancing and the forms are only being multiple and pain of the families of the victims is enlarged.

Valdez in *The Killing fields: Women harvest*, chronicle dedicated to femicide: „Several people in Juarez said they spent years compiling information on an alleged link to satanic rituals on both sides of the border. Perhaps two or three of the homicides were occult-related, but if so, they appeared to be isolated cases. Nevertheless, the Mexican team drew a sketch map of the sites where past serial murder victims had been found in Juarez and El Paso. They said that devil worshipers were using each new site to complete a pentagram shape over the El Paso-Juarez border region. The “Santa Muerte” (Saint Death) movement represents one of the fastest growing cults in Mexico. Chapels and images used to venerate the patron saint of death have turned up in Juarez as well in recent years. Some gang members wear the image of this “saint” as a tattoo“ (Valdez , 2006, p.155).

Femicides around the globe

„Helen Mack said 700 hundred girls and women were murdered in Guatemala between 2000 and 2004. Although gangs called “Maras Salva Truchas” were blamed for most of the murders, the truth is that the authorities have not produced any credible suspects or lines of investigation to explain what is happening“(Valdez, 2006, p. 260). In 2002 alone, El Salvador reported 238 women’s murders that its government blamed on domestic abuse(Ibid, p. 262).“ In Canada, Ruth Mustus, an activist, is trying desperately to inform the world about the approximately 500 mostly indigenous women who disappeared in her country over the past twenty years“(Ibid, p. 263).

Abuja, Nigeria is also place of gender based violence. The nigerian queens were famous for matriarchal reginuum, it is supposed that all places where strong cult of feminine rule existed, after the patriarchal dominion represent the place of higer crimes against women rates. Ebola and kidnapping of school girls that were pupils of emancipated high schools systems, similarly to kidnappings in Mexico have originated in patriarchal notions on good or bad girl behaviour based on stereotypes of women role in family. In Bosnia and Herzegovina post war and post transition society, there are over 100.000 dead and missing people. The highest consequences of war were forced on the Youth and Women. Many of Women faced with trauma after the death camps and rapes, are still fighting the stigmatisation of society. Some of them even give birth as a cause of the war rape. The rehabilitation Centres in Bosnia and Herzegovina are still working on rehabilitation and resocialisation of Youth and Women hit by war consequences. Some of this people left the country in pursuit of new homeland , never to return again. Gender based violence is structurally, still present in Bosnia and Herzegovina. There are different form of Youth debris in contemporary world. The main problems are illegal migration, feminisation of poverty, kidnapping the girls in Nigeria, femicides in Juarez and Mexico.

Rosi Braidotti Posthuman (2013) , Haraway Cyber world, Clarisa Pinkola Estes Femina ecologica/ Ecological women, Mary Jo Deegan Femina sociologica, Xenology and femina xenologica

Ursula Wolf , in use with new types of ethics introduces, the ecological ethics as well. In her essay „Do we need the ecological ethics“? , "As the subject of moral examinations are the essences capable

of suffering, care ethic, calls on empathy as origin of moral conduct" (Ibid pp. 165-166). Rosemarie Tong¹⁰, in lecture *Globalizing of the feminist care ethic*, thinks that the overcoming of the global ecological crisis and alienation, empathy and care ethic that is precondition of accomplishing the global egalitarian cooperation. Ethic of care demands bioregionalism that needs to involve relations in neighborhood, the respect for natural environment, the recycling the waste, the environmental cognitions, the recognitions of environment and the ecological disasters effects onto the environment is thought of as basis for the reaction. Rosemarie Tong (Haralambos i Holborn 2002:162) supports the admissions of all „ exclusionment, exiled, alienated, deviant and marginal people“. In all that , it is necessary to understand that care ethic, represents the term that strongly criticizes and opposes the anthropocentrism. There are different forms of female principle, deconstruction of traditional approach to Science, changes the world perspective, and therefore the transhuman, and transcendent female principle is mentioned. *Femina xenologica* discovers other levels of cognitions, on the question how is it possible that Alienation regains the prefix of femininity ,it is possible to reply together with Sadie Plant, who in work *Zeros and ones*, convincingly supporting this position with following words:

- „ Women were during their all work era in front of their time, taking the positions in which they could meet that changes even before they were formed, as if they were always working in future , that was only now being noticed by their male contemporaries“(Sim 2001, 51). Herbrechter defining the term posthumanity , according to newest work of Rosi Braidotti, states that it is preconditioned by developmant of „the new subjectivities, posthuman ethics, and affirmative posthuman politics“ (www.culturemachine.com, page visited on 5.10.2014). These three conditiones enable: „ construction of alternative futures and hopes horizons“ (IBID), as is it is confirmed by Braidotti. Posthuman era needs for the humanity to think outside its' own borders and therefore „ to embrace the risks that existance of becoming different than human brings“ ((IBID)). Braidotti introduces the term critical posthumanity referring to the world in which the human and nonhuman entities have to live, on which there had been signs already in introduction of principle *feminae xenologicae*. Only the understanding of the posthumanity begins from enlightening the statement that we are not all human in the same way, our humanity is different by race, classe, nation, culture, and gender, and therefore in conclusion, we can not with safety , as claimed by Braidotti, „ nor we were

always human nor we are only that“ (www.culturemachine.com, page visited on 5.10.2014). With maestral preciseness, Braidotti inscribes the quilted stitch into the intersection of system, ecology, and gender, speaking the posteucentric, and posthumanistic Europe, that does not have defined systems, of contraversal global capitalistic system, which even triumphal, on the other side is not yet developed in question of the sustainable development and social justice , therefore the Europe alone is in the transformation process. Why is it necessary to speak on discourse of human and posthuman, questions Braidotti: „ Why would we do so? Why would we do so? “, Because we have to?, Because we are people , either posthuman or to human?; Yes, but mainly, I suppose because we care for, many things, involving the people, and therefore we, have a goal, for, mainly, sustainable developments, that can construct living reality“ (www.culturemachine.com, page visited on 5.10.2014). Questioning the intersection on gender, ecology, and system, was started by profeminist author Giddens, in final remarks of his Sociology. Clarissa Pinkola Estés offers inner psychological insight into the notion of the „ the by birth given/ inborn ecology of women“ . This inner ecology demands ethic of care that is always authentically female in it's origin but even islamic conception of God believes that all of us are presented and have to learn female principles first. Therefore, Estés believes in indigenous Inuit's conception of tools of the so called right women: „ the one that women needs to inscribe/engrave/carve/ whittle out the life for herself. Her knife cuts, tails, liberates, forms and accomadates the materials. Her notion of the fire sticks helps her to light the fire in the hardest times. Her inscriptions/carvings in the stone express her mystical knowledges , her artistical healing and her inner personal union with spiritual world“ (Estés 2009, 326). There for the femina femina sociologica, femina ecologica, and femina xenologica, are possible as complete. Vlaisavljević defines Husserl's thought on Earth as „the horizon of all horizons“, therefore the defining and demistification of ethnical reality involves: „ uncovering the way in which in present time the National Assemblies , national spirits and national birthplaces, are constituted“ (2012, 119).

Gender, ecology and national system problems are regulated properly in global legal system of cosmopolitan democracy that has to demand:

- Involvement of women , people of other color, race and sexuality into religious community as equals
- Egalitarian perspective
- Avoiding the sexism, hate against other species and racism
- Working on religious and ecological consciousness simultaneously
- Creation of world as multicultural and multi confessional space of mutual understanding and dialogue

- Feminist theologians as significant force of future change in religious consciousness towards the equality of sexes
- Bio - regionalization
- Indigenization
- *Glocality* rather than locality or globalism
- World as global space with community of contemporaries sharing the same information in Global web society.

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VIOLENCE IN THE NAME OF GOD; Understanding the causes of Boko Haram

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Whereas much scholarly work has been done in attempting to provide a solution to the Boko Haram insurgency in Nigeria, little has been covered in critically unpacking the different causes and implications of the insurgency. This has in no small way, negatively impacted the efforts of government and other stake holders in proffering solutions to the insurgency. This paper therefore comes to abridge a gap that exist in the literature on Boko Haram with regards to the causes. The paper proves that Boko Haram cannot be explained by a single factor. On the contrary, Boko Haram came as a result of an interplay of several factors. The paper has three sections. Section I explains and situates Islamic religious violence in Nigeria while highlighting Boko Haram as its latest manifestation. Section II constitute the crux of the paper. It examines the politico – religious and socio-economic causes of the insurgency and unpacked them individually to unravel the different strata of causes and how they have impacted and fueled the insurgency. Section III closes the paper by concluding that there are different factors that interacted with each other in creating this violent group and recommends a thorough investigation into these factors to provide a lasting solution to the insurgency.

Keywords; Boko Haram, Violence, God, Terrorism, Insurgency, Nigeria

SECTION I

1.0 Introduction

Violence is one of those concepts that does not have a consensus definition. Depending on the discipline and the context of discourse, the notion of violence often varies but almost always include the use of force to cause or intend to cause physical and psychological pain. The World Health Organization (WHO) has provided a very compelling and encompassing definition of violence when they defined it as “the intentional use of physical force or power, threatened or actual, against oneself, another person, or against a group or community, that either results in or has a high likelihood of resulting in injury, death, psychological harm, maldevelopment or deprivation”. (Rutherford et al, 2007 p.1).

Over time, different actors have used violence to further their agenda in different spheres of live. An intriguing dimension of the use of violence for furthering of an agenda is the killing and atrocities used by terrorists in the name of God. This is true when we consider the trajectory of Islam in Nigeria. By 1804, the first wave of Islamic religious violence hit Nigeria with the launching of a Jihad by the Fulani Islamic Scholar Uthman Dan Fodiyo. Since then, different epochs of Nigeria’s fractured history have witnessed varied versions of religious violence under the banner of Islam. (Agigboa, 2013, p. 7). Episodes like the Maitatsine unrest, the Darika-Izala uprising, Maiduguri cathedral murder and the Danish Newspaper publication of Prophet Mohammed of 2006 are poster children of how violence has been employed in Nigeria using the name of God. It is within this context that the dreaded Islamic group Boko Haram was formed and since 2009, the group has consistently unleashed violence in Nigeria in the name of God.

Whereas much scholarly work has been done on attempting to provide a solution to the insurgency, little has been covered in critically unpacking the different causes and implications of the insurgency. This paper therefore comes to abridge a gap that exist in the literature on Boko Haram with regards to the causes. The paper proves that Boko Haram cannot be explained by a single factor. On the contrary, Boko Haram came as a result of an inter-play of several factors.

Specifically, the paper will examine the following research questions;

- What are the main causes of Boko Haram violence?
- How are these causes explained by different actors?

The paper has three sections. Section I explains and situates Islamic religious violence in Nigeria while highlighting Boko Haram as its latest manifestation. Section II constitutes the crux of the paper. It examines the politico – religious and socio-economic causes of the insurgency and

unpacked them individually to unravel the different strata of causes and how they have impacted and fueled the insurgency. Section III is the conclusion and recommendations.

1.2 Origin of Boko Haram

There is no scholarly consensus as to the origin of Boko Haram. Analysts and authors have traced the emergence of the dreaded Islamic sect to assorted places, different personalities, and varied points in history's calendar. Audu Bulama Bukarti supports this position when he opines that "[a]uthors disagree with one another regarding not only the interpretation of events but on specific facts and figures...In several accounts of Boko Haram's early days, questions of leadership are also contradictory. Various authors have mentioned at least three different people as the leader of the commune." (Bukarti, 2020, p. 2). Jidefor Adibe could not agree less when he argued that "[w]hile the popular belief is that it was founded around 2001 or 2002 by Mohammed Yusuf, some have argued that the sect was actually started in 1995 as Sahaba." (Adibe, 2014, p. 1). Andrew Walker in his special report to the United State Institute of Peace traces the origin of the Boko Haram to Yobe State and considers the founder to be Mohammed Ali. Walker (2016) opined that Boko Haram is an offspring of a radical group of young Muslims who under the leadership of a certain Mohammed Ali, moved from Maiduguri - Borno State to Kanama – Yobe State of northern Nigeria describing their transition to be hijara akin to the hijara of Prophet Mohammed from Mecca to Medina. John Campbell will agree with Adibe as to the founder but will differ with him in terms of the date. Campbell posits that "Mohammed Yusuf, a charismatic preacher, organised his community in the city of Maiduguri around 2003. It sought to establish God's kingdom on earth by isolating itself from wider society." (Campbell, 2014, p. 2).

Irrespective of the avalanche of different accounts that are available in the scholarly space on the origin of Boko Haram, two issues stand out as common denominators. In the first case, the name of Mohammed Ali and Yusuf Mohammed keeps recurring in most of the accounts and secondly, the year 2009 has consistently stood out as the major tipping point in the violent strategies of the organization. From this perspective, the account of Audu Bulama Bukarti seems to provide a balance narration as to the origin of the organization. Bukarti traces the origin of the organization to both Yusuf Muhammad and Mohammad Ali and argued that both had believed in the waging of a Jihad against the Nigerian State but had different opinions on the timing. Their differences led to the first division of the group and Muhammad Ali will eventually be killed in a raid of 2003 while attempting to carve a secluded society ruled only by Sharia Law. This left Muhammad Yusuf to continue with the agenda that saw its major inroad of violence in 2009.

From the above therefore, one can conveniently infer that, the growing concern by radical Islamic preachers as far back as the 80s had inspired the dream of a Nigerian society to be governed predominantly by the Sharia Law. This dream eventually found expression in the doctrines of Muhammed Yusuf and Mohammed Ali who nurtured and gave birth to the organization that has come to be known popularly today as Boko Haram.

Another germane inference from the above is that the inability of scholars to have a consensus on the origin of the Boko Haram has constituted a major impediment in resolving the crisis. Different accounts as to the origin and foundations of the sects becomes a major impediment for policy analysts to design informed policy briefs that will address the root factors that led to the founding of this sects.

Course or Evolution of Boko Haram

Boko haram has evolved largely since its inception. Its evolution can be analysed in terms of its composition, its strategies, its network and its means of funding.

Boko Haram started as a small group in Maiduguri, the capital of Borno State in

Nigeria with mainly almajiris who attended Qur'anic lessons with Muhammed Yusuf (Boko Haram's acclaimed founder). Cohen (2015) brings this to the fore when he opined that many have systematically accused almajiris, pupils of schools set up by self-proclaimed religious teachers. Overtime, the group has increased in membership. While some of the new recruits join the sects because the preaching of the leaders were usually appealing to them, others joined because of the financial incentive the group availed to its members and yet others were forcibly recruited during village raids and kidnapping. Today the small sect that started in

Maiduguri has evolved into the fiercest insurgent group in the Lake Tchad region.

The strategies of Boko Haram have equally evolved with the passage of time. The group started with the long range attacking of targets (initially police stations and security agents) from motorbikes and graduated to a more formidable assault as was seen in the Bauchi jail break of 2010 where they released 729 inmates. After the jail break, the group increased its assault by attacking different military bases in North East Nigeria. From their aggressive assault against the security operatives, Boko Haram started the long-distance detonation of bombs at different soft targets. By 2012, they had progressed from long distance bomb detonation to suicide bombing. The climax of the suicide bombing was seen when they attacked the Police Force Headquarters and the United Nations Office all in the Federal Capital territory of Abuja. (Walker, 2012, p. 6).

In April 2014 Boko Haram stepped up their game by embarking on a large-scale kidnapping mission. That month, sect members abducted 276 girls from a secondary school in Chibok. "The kidnapping received global condemnation and sparked the solidarity campaign #BringBackOurGirls." (Aljazeera, 22 December 2016). This was only the beginning as the media report and general condemnation of the incident by the international community only showed the group that kidnapping young girls was a strong bargaining chip. Little wonder then, why On

February 19, 2018 the sect again kidnapped 110 schoolgirls from the Government Girls' Science and Technical College. Dapchi in Bulabulin, Yunusari Local Government area of Yobe. (Cockburn, 2018, p. 1).

In terms of their network, Boko Haram started by idolizing Bin Laden and identifying with his ideologies. Zenn argues that “[a]l-Qaida had a significant impact on Boko Haram’s founding. This is evidenced by the operational coordination between Yusuf Ahmed and Muhammed Ashafa with Ibrahim Harun and al-Qaida’s external operations unit in 2003” (Zenn, 2017, p. 1). But it is not only Zenn who thinks that Boko Haram had its influence from other jihadist groups. Ambassador Anthony Holmes commented that “members of Boko Haram are being trained by Al Qaeda in the Lands of the Islamic Maghreb. They are also believed to have ties to the Somalian militant group” (Meehand & Speier, 2011).

In 2004, the government of Nigeria charged Mohammed Ashafa (a Nigerian) for receiving money from Al-Qaeda for the purposes of recruiting and training terrorists to attack Americans in Nigeria. Four years later, Mike Okiro, the then Inspector General of Police would claim that he had recovered evidence revealing a plot by bin Laden to conduct a bombing within Nigeria. (Meehand & Speier, 2011). In June 2011 Boko Haram confirmed their ties with Al Shabab in a statement that read in part “Very soon, we will wage jihad . . . We want to make it known that our jihadists have arrived in Nigeria from Somalia where they received real training on warfare from our brethren who made that country

ungovernable...This time round, our attacks will be fiercer and wider than they have been.” (Zimmerman, 2011, pg. 1). And in March 2015, the group officially pledge allegiance to ISIS.

In terms of funding, Boko started by getting funds from membership contributions but as they grew more violent and their operations became more sophisticated, their funding means equally evolved. Eventually they started engaging in arms dealing, bank robbery, and presently, kidnapping for ransom. Agbiboa (2013) identifies the following as sources of Boko Haram funding; donations from members, support from Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM, Al Muntada Trust Fund, The Islamic World Society, kidnapped for ransom and robbing of local banks. With regards to bank robbery, Mohammed Abdullahi, Central Bank of Nigeria spokesman on the 10th of December 2011 claimed that 'At least 30 bank attacks attributed to Boko Haram have been reported this year' (Onu & Muhammad, 2011). Beyond bank robberies and individual financiers, there have also been rumours of Boko Haram’s involvement in trafficking illicit weapons, albeit there has been no hard evidence to confirm such claims. (Agbiboa, 2013, p. 10).

From the above analysis, one can easily deduced the sects has evolved greatly over time. From a small religious group in Maiduguri it has become the fiercest Islamic terrorist group in Nigeria. Its network has followers not just from the small town Maiduguri but across the Lake Tchad region. Its operations have equally metamorphosed from local targets to regional onslaughts in neighbouring countries like Cameroon, Niger and Tchad.

SECTION II

FACTORS RESPONSIBLE FOR THE BOKO HARAM INSURGENCY

2.0 Introduction

The Boko Haram insurgency cannot be explained by just a single factor or reason. Several factors interplay to fuel the violence that is being unleashed by Boko Haram. It may amount to academic imprudence to assume that a single factor was or is responsible for the insurgency. Religion, politics, and relative deprivation are all interwoven in the general scheme of events that brought about the Boko Haram and continues to fuel the conflict. These factors have different implications. Boko Haram leaders have used some of these factors to justify why they resorted to violence in the name of God. Scholars have used these factors to explain the Boko Haram phenomenon and proposed solutions that will bring the crisis to an end. Policy makers and governments must look into this factors to make better and informed policies to prevent a recurrence in future.

In the paragraphs that follow, I will group these factors into three categories: religious, political and relative deprivation. I will analyse each factor and provide an explanation of how that particular factor brought about and the conflict and how it continues to sustain the insurgency.

2.1 Religion as a factor.

Religion has been consistently used by both the Boko Haram leaders as well as a multitude of authors on Boko Haram to explain the reason and activities of this insurgent group. The best way to appreciate the role of religion in the origin and sustenance of Boko Haram is by analysing the voice and video messages of its leaders.

The Boko Haram leaders used primarily voice and video messages through social media to convey their propaganda. An analysis of those messages reveals a pattern of religious bigotry and tactics to explain their violence and further their agenda. One author that has provided an epic analysis of this tactic is Omar S Mahmood. In an unprecedented analyses of Boko Haram's messages and addresses to the public titled More than propaganda A review of Boko Haram's public messages he showed that the sect has consistently used Islam as one of the major reasons for their violence. Mahmood (2017) argued that mistreatment of Muslims in Nigeria has always form the core fabric of Boko Haram messages. According to him, the group's Islamic-centrism has made them frequently call for a division between Christians and Muslims and the eventual expulsion of Christians from Northern

Nigeria. Mahmood contends that this focus on creating a division between Muslims and Christians in Nigeria was accentuated when Qaqa(Boko Haram spokesman) issued an ultimatum to all southerners (and by association presumed Christians) to leave the northern part of the country within three days, in January

2012. He also quotes Shekau to have said “We are also at war with Christians because the whole world knows what they did to us ... they kill us, they burn our houses, they burn our mosques”. (Mahmood, 2017, p. 15).

These messages from the sect leaders has further influenced scholarship on the subject as it has framed the discourses of many scholars who have used it to explain the Boko Haram phenomenon and have given the impression that Boko

Haram is a group of religious zealots that simply wanted to purify Islam in Nigeria. Jacob Zenn chronicled a classical summary of how the factor of religion has been used by different authors to explain the activities of the notorious sect in the following words “Thurston, for example, considers al-Qaida’s influence on Boko Haram to have been marginal to the group’s overall development and argues that Boko Haram was a mass religious movement before transitioning to armed struggle. Jean Herskovits, similarly, has argued that Boko Haram began in 2002 as a peaceful Islamic splinter group. Consistent with this, Hilary Matfess argues that “Boko Haram was a largely peaceful, dissident religious sect that had been founded by Muhammed Yusuf in 2002 and that Boko Haram’s purported relationship with global Salafi-Jihadist groups began as late as Boko Haram’s joint training with AQIM in 2009-2010”. (Zenn, 2017, p. 1).

Similarly, Walker (2012) posits that Boko Haram is an Islamic sect that believes Northern politics has been seized by a group of corrupt Muslims. It wants to wage a war against them, and the Federal Republic of Nigeria generally, to create a “pure” Islamic state ruled by sharia law. Campbell (2014) supports Walker when he contends that the goal of Boko Haram is to create God’s kingdom on earth through justice for the poor achieved by the rigid application of Islamic law, or sharia. Cox et al (2019) argues that Boko Haram was founded in 2002 by the Salafist cleric Mohammed Yusuf as a moderate organisation that did not employ violence. John Vol (2015) posited that Boko Haram emerged in 2002 as a religious sect by an Islamic scholar and student leader Muhammed Yusuf with puritanical interpretation of the Qur’an and hadiths. Whereas the above assertion was partly true, they are not the whole story to the crisis. In conflict analysis, half-truth can be as dangerous as lies because they have a potential of inspiring a less informed and sometimes counterproductive strategies in dealing with the conflict. These shallow founded truths of Boko Haram being just a religious organization had two counterproductive results. In the first place, it made the government to treat the early signals of the sects with kid gloves. Igboin opine that in July 2009, Boko Haram unleashed violence on thousands of innocent people in the pretext of reprisal attacks on the police but former President Umaru Musa Yar ‘Adua thought the attacks were just religious riots which were common in the north (Igboin, 2014, p. 18).

Secondly, the religious bigotry created a sympathy for the group among the predominantly Muslim North. Most of the Northern elite were sympathetic to the group and did not initially openly condemn them not until when they started bombing mosques and killing Islamic clerics. One can infer that, had Boko Haram attacks, been limited to churches and Christians, they would still be enjoying the sympathy of many Muslims today. The point to underscore here is that Boko Haram was indeed founded along religious grounds, but the embellishment of the religious narrative impaired a comprehensive analysis of their proper agenda and as such delayed a decisive response that would have come during the early stages which would have greatly

incapacitated the organization. Beyond the religious considerations, there were and still exists other factors that influence and sustain the Boko Haram

2.2 Politics as a factor

Political manoeuvres have equally been used to explain the cause of Boko Haram. Political considerations were majorly used by politicians across of the geopolitical divide of Nigeria to explain how Boko Haram came to existence and how politics and not deprivation or religion was what was sustaining the insurgency.

The Southerners and a Southern incumbent president - Dr. Goodluck Ebelle Jonathan were pitched against a Northern opposition political elite class. The rancor between these two groups came as a result of a distortion in a power sharing/rotation agreement within the echelons of power in the People's Democratic Party (PDP) which was the ruling party at the time. (Adeniyi; 2011).

Boko Haram came to prominence when it was the time for the Northerners to rule (according to the above power sharing agreement). In actual fact, Muhammed Yusuf was killed while President Umar Musa Yaradua (a Muslim Northerner) was in power. However, (Adeniyi, 2011 & 2017; Iwowo, 2013) argue that Yaradua died from a protracted illness and his Vice President, Dr. Ebelle Goodluck Jonathan (a Southerner), assumed the reins of power and did not just complete Yaradua's tenure but went ahead to run and won the 2011 presidential elections. (Adeniyi, 2017 p.23). This altered the power sharing arrangement and did not go down well with the Northern political class. Within this framework, some Northern Politicians vowed to make the country ungovernable for Jonathan. (Iwowo, 2013, p. 3). It was against this background that many Southerners including president Jonathan felt that Boko Haram attacks was nothing but a fulfilment of the promise the Northerners had made at the eve of the elections.

Walker (2012) captures this most succinctly when he contends that "in January 2012 President Goodluck Jonathan announced that Boko Haram had infiltrated the highest levels of politics and the military. The president painted a picture of a puppet group that was being used by aggrieved northern politicians to bring down his southern government" (Walker, 2012, p. 8). To make matters worse, in

November 2011, the Nigerian State Secret Service (SSS) discovered links between Boko Haram and some Northern politicians after the arrest and questioning of the group's alleged spokesman Ali Sanda Umar Konduga on 3 November 2011. Notable among those politicians was a then servicing Senator – Ali Ndume. The arrested spokesman revealed that he had been behind threatening text messages sent to judges and politicians, which he said Mr. Ndume had paid for. This further confirmed the president's suspicion and reinforced the ideology that Boko Haram was only a political gimmick. (BBC, 22 November 2011).

Applying politics as a factor in explaining the insurgency made the government of Goodluck Jonathan to at first perceive Boko Haram as a political manoeuvre and not as a regional terrorist sect with links to Al Qaida and Al Shabab. As a result, valuable time was spent looking for political solutions among the power brokers instead of facing the imminent threat that will become Nigeria's most, deadliest terrorist group.

2.3 Relative deprivation as a factor

Several authors have used the relative deprivation theory to explain why people rebel. Proponents of this theory include but not limited to Gurr (1970), Birrel (1972), Davies (1962, p. 5) and Agigboa (2013). Gurr (1970) argued that people would become dissatisfied if they felt they have less than they should and could have. Overtime, such dissatisfaction leads to frustration and then rebellion against the (real or perceived) source of their deprivation. Elsewhere, Gurr (2005) argued that structural poverty and inequality within countries are “breeding grounds for violent political movements in general and terrorism specifically.” Gurr (2005, p. 20). Drawing on his studies of relative deprivation and conflict in Northern Ireland, Birrel (1972, p. 317) contended that “group tensions developed from a discrepancy between the “ought” and the “is” of collective value satisfaction. In his article, titled Towards a Theory of Revolution, Davies (196, p. 5) argued that the occasion of political violence was due to the insurmountable gap between what people wanted and what they could get. The relative deprivation theory provides a useful insight into why Boko Haram rebels” (Agigboa, 2013, p. 11). It is no coincidence that one of the worst forms of political violence in Nigeria today originates in the most socio-economically deprived parts of the country (Agigboa, *ibid*).

While borrowing a leaf from Rogers, and the National bureau of statistics, Agigboa (2013) provides a staggering statistics of the level of deprivation in Northern Nigeria. In Borno State, the birthplace of Boko Haram, only 2% of children under 25 months have been vaccinated; 83% of young people are illiterate; 48.5% of children do not go to school (Rogers, 2012, p. 3). Also, the National Bureau of Statistics data on poverty in Nigeria shows that looking into each specific zone, the highest poverty rate of 64.8% is recorded in the North-East zone, followed by 61.2% in the North-West (NBS, 2010).

Northern Nigeria as a whole has very deep development problems, perhaps deeper than the rest of the country. It has some of the worst maternal and infant mortality rates in the world. The level of poverty and deprivation is higher than the rest of the country, while active participation in politics, beyond fealty to a thin band of political and religious godfathers who hold power, is low. (Walker, 2011, p. 14).

This level of deprivation is reinforced by high level of corruption and inequality in the Nigerian society especially in Northern Nigeria. The implication is that, over time the endemic deprivation, corruption and inequality in Northern Nigeria found expression in rebellion as was the case with the Maitasine in the 80s. Boko

Haram today is a consequence of this endemic deprivation.

2.4 General Consequences of These Tactics

As shown above, most of the factors used to explain the causes of Boko Haram are loop-sided and hardly substantial if examined in their individual capacities and dimensions. Obvious facts are usually stated without an intellectual and investigative immersion to understudy their linkages and interconnection. And how the cumulation of these factors is what has sustained the insurgency for this long. Issues such as the origin of the group, still remain highly contestable among scholars even to this day. Consequently, these factors in their individual capacity provides a one-dimensional simple solution to the insurgency. Religion as a cause will suggest that a stringent implementation of Sharia law will resolve the conflict. Relative deprivation will recommend infrastructural development and economic empowerment as the key to eliminate the threat. And yet political considerations imply that power broking between the elitist class and the elimination of the Boko Haram leaders will be the panacea. But beyond this individual dimension a more comprehensive approach is needed to provide a long term sustainable resolution of the insurgency.

In brief, elements of religion, politics and relative deprivation have provided some insights into the activities and operations of the insurgent group. However, these explanations need to be reviewed in a wholistic manner and not in isolation of each other. A thorough analysis of all these factors with their underlining overlapping needs to be adopted by scholars and policy makers alike to get a more comprehensive understanding of the operations and activities of Boko Haram. This will provide a more informed and lasting strategy in dealing with the sect and other insurgent groups that may arise in future.

SECTION III

Conclusions and Recommendations

In summary, the factors advanced by different stake holders; sect members, politicians, religious leaders, media and the international community to explain the phenomenon of Boko Haram has helped in shading lights to the different activities and operations of Boko Haram. Issues bordering on religion, politics and relative deprivation have been recurrent themes and at the core of the explanations that have been advanced to explain the sect's activities and operations. Islam has been used by the group to frame their agenda as a jihadist struggle. Politics was employed by politicians to settle political differences between the North and the South and relative deprivation was propagated to gain easy recruits by the sect. Analysing these factors in isolation has had different implications. Religion for example made the sect to get loyalty from Muslim at the initial stages but their motive and strategies over time have come under great criticism especially with their indiscriminate bombing of mosques and killing of Islamic clerics. Political explanations beclouded the gravity of sect's ruthlessness and as such affected the timely arrest of the crisis and gave the group the leverage to buy time and get more sophisticated in their operations. Relative deprivation provided the group with easy recruits and have exposed the endemic inequality and corruption that exists in Northern Nigeria.

In terms of policy recommendations, the following needs to be done; Firstly, a further comprehensive study of the phenomenon is needed. The factors above have provided a framework that can guide a more robust study of the Boko Haram insurgency. A further dive

into religion, politics and deprivation will show a correlation and intersection between these issues and how they have fed the insurgency over time. To this end, it is incumbent for scholars to embark on a thorough investigative study backed with empirical field work rather than rely on the half-hearted secondary data which in most cases are unverified. Most scholars of Boko Haram usually conduct desk research from their big offices in Europe and USA without going to the field to ascertain the facts. Field work can easily reduce the ambiguity that exists on issues relating to the origin and foundations of Boko Haram. This will have two positive impacts. In the first place, it will unpack the real grievances and motivations that led to the emergence of Boko Haram and as such provide the government and other stake holders with information that will help them fully dimension the root causes of the problem and develop a well-informed strategy of curbing it. Secondly, it will give the government and other stake holders a template that can be used to monitor early signals of similar groups that may emerge in future. For mankind to be able to reduce the occurrence of conflicts, there is need for scholars, policy makers and governments to be proactive and not reactive to early warning signs of conflicts.

Another policy recommendation is that, considering the trajectory of repeated recurrence of Islamic sects in Northern Nigeria with a manifesto to fight corruption and cleans the society, there is need for a widespread and long term structural reforms to abridge the inequality gap that exists in Northern Nigeria. Walker (2011) opined that this will be the only way to remove the threat of the group while at the same time improving the livelihoods of northern Nigerians. To prevent the emergence of another group of this nature in future, there is a need to create more opportunities, reduce the inequality gap, attack corruption, and increase government presence in many of the Northern States of Nigeria.

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Narcissism and Inner Peace

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When human body gets sick, we can prevent it with vaccination. One good example is that when Coronavirus or Covid-19 outbreak has started in Wuhan, China in late 2019, people around the world have been panic and working on vaccination. It is believed many of vaccination production has been successful and gradually distributed to all over the world. Unfortunately, there are no such vaccination for human's mental illness. We are living in modern societies with many technological facilities provided. However, there are still high rates of suicide in many countries. According to World Health Organization (WHO), there are almost 800,000 people committed suicide every year. Mental illness is believed as one of the major causes of this incident. And one of human mental illnesses that has been discussed widely these days is Narcissism or Narcissistic Personality Disorder (NPD).

Narcissism has been around since the time of Ovid more than 2000 years ago and the concept has long been a source of study, intrigue, fascination and literature both within and beyond the psychoanalytic community. While Narcissistic Personality Disorder remains a severe and fairly rare clinically diagnosed condition, sub-clinical narcissism or narcissistic traits have reached epidemic proportions with serious consequences. Ever increasing levels of greed, self-obsession, superficial relationships, arrogance and vanity are everywhere apparent and not making us any happier, with common mental health problems on the increase, especially among the young people.¹¹ Referring to WHO's key facts, suicide is the third leading cause of death in 15-19-year-olds. There are links between suicides and mental disorders especially depression and alcohol or drug abuse.¹²

However, when we talk about Narcissist or people with NPD, family members and friends tend to get suffered rather than Narcissist themselves. This is because they are self-centered or egoism and lack of empathy to others. When this kind of person in the position of power, it could cause frustration to people in society. Donald Trump the 45th president of the United States is one of the examples and he is often used in the classes of Sander Thomaes, a professor of developmental psychology at Utrecht University, the Netherlands. He featured some characteristics of Trump as a classical narcissist: grandiose self-imagined, very inflated ego, continuous need for attention, big urge to be admired, and if that admiration is lacking or the narcissist is criticized, which is even worse, he lashes out recklessly.¹³ Apart from what

1. <https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/14753634.2014.894225?journalCode=rpco20>

2. <https://www.who.int/news-room/fact-sheets/detail/suicide>

3. <https://www.uu.nl/en/node/541/donald-trump-textbook-narcissist>

aforesaid, Narcissist also controls and gaslights¹⁴ to people around them. They could create dramatic scenes easily if things are not going as they wish. Due to their strong reactions to others, people around Narcissist tend to get suffered mentally or even physically.

The reason I chose to write about Narcissism because of my personal experience. Although I had a bachelor degree in Psychology, I never felt fascinated in this field until recently when I had discovered a person I know was a Narcissist. She is a mother of two and we knew each other through a friend of mine. At the beginning of our relationship, I found she was a friendly and talented person, and I was welcomed by her. I always come to visit her with some gifts. After we were getting closed for a while, my gut feeling has started to tell me there is something wrong. I noticed she only talks about herself in positive ways and said she never mistreated other people. However, my observation tells a different version as I saw her complaining about everything around her especially to her daughter.

There was once three of us went out for a beach trip and everything went well. However, when she realized us (I and her daughter) didn't ask her to join the next trip, she was very upset for no reasons. She also started to complaint with her daughter about me staying overnight at her place few days a month as it costed her more in utility bills. This incident have not surprised me at all rather urged me to do a research on Narcissism after a few year of observation to this person. Another incident that encouraged my thought was when I told her how her daughter gets suffered with a certain situation. Instead of talking and caring to her daughter, she was getting angry before ignoring her daughter's emotion. Being lack of empathy is one of narcissistic traits enabled me to confirm my suspicion she was a Narcissist.

I have learnt a Narcissist could have many faces or selves. While some said a Narcissist could even have up to three selves: public, private, and secret,¹⁵ the most well-known theory said they have two selves: False self and True self. These two terms introduced into psychoanalysis by D. W. Winnicott in 1960. Winnicott thought that in health, a False Self was what allowed one to present a "polite and mannered attitude" in public. He used the term "True Self" to describe a sense of self based on spontaneous, authentic experience, a sense of "all-out personal aliveness," or "feeling real." The "False Self" was, for Winnicott, a defense designed to protect the True Self by hiding it.¹⁶ That is why these terms are often called Public self and Private self. They always keep their Public self looks good yet being self-centered in their Private self.

There are many types of Narcissism at least TWO: 1) Grandiose narcissism, characterized by the personality traits of grandiosity, arrogance, and boldness; and 2) Vulnerable narcissism, characterized by the personality traits of defensiveness and hypersensitivity. One research indicates that people with grandiose narcissism express behavior "through interpersonally

4. Gaslighting is a form of emotional abuse that's seen in abusive relationships. It's the act of manipulating a person by forcing them to question their thoughts, memories, and the events occurring around them. A victim of gaslighting can be pushed so far that they question their own sanity.
(<https://www.healthline.com/health/gaslighting#:~:text=Gaslighting%20is%20a%20form%20of,they%20question%20their%20own%20sanity.>)

5. <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=kG1tAvjyilE>

6. https://psychology.wikia.org/wiki/True_self_and_false_self

exploitative acts, lack of empathy, intense envy, aggression, and exhibitionism."¹⁷ This lady has many traits of the grandiose narcissism so she also craving for entitlement and being a center of attention. This explained why she was angry just for not being asked to join the trip as she could felt overlooked whereas I just wanted to spend time alone with her daughter.

There is a saying that some artists or masterful musicians and craftsmen are “born, not made,” Narcissism is one of those traits that appears to be made, not born. These traits were programmed into a person’s behavioral repertoire after birth, not before. Therefore, it is worth looking where this woman came from. She was brought up in a middle-class family of six: her parents and three elder brothers. As the only girl and the youngest sister of three boys, her strict yet capable mother often contained her at home when she was a child so she could not go out like her brothers. I believe this confinement could happen in many aspects: physically and mentally, and made her feel disadvantaged. Although she was sent abroad for a bachelor degree that was quite privileged at her time, she still has a feeling of inferior and become jealous to her brothers, especially when one of them has become a state minister. My friend told me that her mom once said “we have to compete with that family no matter what!” Unfortunately, her goal caused more destruction than construction as it caused stressed to everyone in her family. Apart from she herself has many Narcissistic traits, both of her children have signs of being raised by a Narcissist i.e. low self-esteem, sensitivity of criticism, depression and anxiety, and competitiveness that make them always compare themselves with others.¹⁸

When I started sharing these findings and observations to my friend, I told her “There is nothing wrong with you”. I saw her felt relief from the way she raised in a broken family where her mother never do wrong while others always have to serve her whatever she wants. My friend used to tell me that she was often feeling anxious when she gets up and knows her mother is around. I think my friend feels reborn after this realization at her late 30s as those negative feeling are getting minimized though not totally disappeared. It also explains why her father and brother live separately from her mother. Her brother is very introvert and has a sleep problem. Usually, sons of narcissistic mothers suffer damage to their autonomy, self-worth, and future relationships with women. In order to heal, children of a Narcissist must come to terms with their mother’s disordered personality, their anger toward her, and their grieves.¹⁹ Therefore, I hope if he realizes the same as his sister did, he could get relief and feeling better as well.

Thanks to my background in Psychology, I was able to detect Narcissistic traits in this family. It has also enlightened me how self-mechanism of a human being could be very complicated and make a great impact to their surroundings. I also felt good about revealing this truth and improving mental health of people around the issues. I think my friend was lucky to find out what caused her family problems. However, not all families are able to discover the family truth

7.https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Narcissistic_personality_disorder#:~:text=The%20study%20Narcissistic%20Personality%20Disorder,characterized%20by%20the%20personality%20traits

8.<https://medium.com/invisible-illness/10-signs-you-were-raised-by-narcissists-5c4e73f3b27e>

9.<https://www.psychologytoday.com/us/blog/toxic-relationships/202003/sons-narcissistic-mothers>

or resolve their inner conflicts. As family is the basic social unit of society, if it is ruled and/or ruined by people with personality disorder, how could society be stable and sustain in peace?

The Buddhist inner peace and its social consequences: a few additional observations.

Several important studies on the concept of “inner peace” (*ajjhattasanti*) in Buddhism and its impact on the society have been published in the last decades. One of the first scholars who wrote on it was the late Kulatissa Nanda Jayatillake, followed by many other great Buddhist researchers, including Bhikkhu Bodhi who has recently published a fundamental book on Social and Communal Harmony.²⁰ In this short contribution I would like to briefly concentrate my analysis on the shift of this form of “peace” from an inner dimension to an external social significance and *vice versa*, clearly showing a sort of osmosis between a perfect mental peace and a social harmony, which are indissolubly connected.

In the Pali Canon we find several words that might be close to the concept expressed by the English word “peace”:²¹ among them we can notice a certain emphasis given on the terms *passaddhi*, *sama*, and above all *santi*. The first one, *passaddhi*, is one of the seven factors of awakening (*sambojjhaṅga*). A good explanation of it is in the *Majjhima Nikāya* 118:

“In one who is rapturous, the body and the mind become tranquil (*passambhati*). On whatever occasion the body and the mind become tranquil in a bhikkhu who is rapturous—on that occasion the tranquillity (*passaddhi*) enlightenment factor is aroused in him, and he develops it, and by development it comes to fulfilment in him”.²²

Here it is evident how their inner peace is one of the crucial elements that bring to the supreme form of peace, which is Nibbāna.

10. Kulatissa Nanda Jayatillake, *Buddhism and Peace*, Wheel Series Publications, no. 41, Buddhist Publication Society, Kandy, 1962 and Bhikkhu Bodhi, *The Buddha’s Teachings on Social and Communal Harmony*, Somerville 2016.

11. The word “peace” comes from the Latin *pax*, peace, calm, tranquillity; peace treaty, peacetime; equanimity.
12. *Ānāpānassatisuttaṃ*, MN 118, PTS III, 85: *pīṭimanassa kāyopi passambhati, cittampi passambhati. Yasmim samaye, bhikkhave, bhikkhuno pīṭimanassa kāyopi passambhati, cittampi passambhati, passaddhisambojjhaṅgo tasmim samaye bhikkhuno āradho hoti, passaddhisambojjhaṅgaṃ tasmim samaye bhikkhu bhāveti, passaddhisambojjhaṅgo tasmim samaye bhikkhuno bhāvanāpāripūriṃ gacchati*. Translation by Bhikkhu Bodhi in Bhikkhu Bodhi, *The Middle Length Discourses of the Buddha*, Kandi 1995, p. 947.

We rarely find *sama* with the sense of calmness, tranquillity and peace. One occurrence is in the *Mahāvīyūha-sutta* of the *Suttanipāta*:

“Those who are settled in views,
who dispute, saying, ‘This alone is truth’:
do all of them receive only blame,
or do some there also win praise?”

“This [praise] is slight, not sufficient for peace (*sama*);
I say there are two fruits of disputes.
Having seen this too, one should not dispute,
seeing as security the stage of non-dispute.²³

In the commentary on these two stanzas,²⁴ we find several synonyms of the word *sama*: they belong to the stock phrase used to indicate the state of inner peace attained to in the Nibbāna: peace, calmness, relief, Nibbāna (instead of the usual word *amata*, deathless, which is also referred to Nibbāna itself), renunciation, repose. In this passage we see again that “inner peace” is strictly related to Nibbāna.

The Pali term *santi* (in Sanskrit *śānti*) appears more frequently in the Canonical texts and it is also connected to the Nibbāna. For instance in the *Suttanipāta* we read: “But seeing into views, not grasping any of them [i.e. wrong views], investigating, I saw the peace within (*ajjhattasanti*)”.²⁵ In the commentary it is written that the expression “internal peace”, here, means “Nibbāna”: “because seeing the danger in views, not grasping any view, investigating the truths, I saw Nibbāna, called the “peace within” because it is the stilling of internal lust and other defilements.”²⁶

13. *Suttanipāta* 895-896, PTS 174: *Appaṇhi etaṃ na alaṃ samāya, duve vivādassa phalāni brūmi; Etampi disvā na vivādayetha, khemābhīpassaṃ avivādabhūmiṃ*. Translation by Bhikkhu Bodhi in Bhikkhu Bodhi, *The Suttanipāta. An Ancient Collection of the Buddha’s Discourses Together with its Commentaries*, Somerville 2017, p. 309.

14. See *Mahāniddeśa*, PTS II, 306: *samāya upasamāya vūpasamāya nibbānāya paṭinissaggāya paṭipassaddhiyāti*.

15. *Suttanipāta* 837 (*passañca diṭṭhīsu anuggahāya, Ajjhattasantiṃ pacinaṃ adassaṃ*), translation by Bhikkhu Bodhi in Bhikkhu Bodhi, *The Suttanipāta. An Ancient Collection of the Buddha’s Discourses Together with its Commentaries*, Somerville 2017, p. 301.

16. PTS I, 186, *Kimkāraṇā? Ahaṇhi passanto diṭṭhīsu ādīnavaṃ kañci diṭṭhiṃ aggahetvā saccāni pavicinanto ajjhattaṃ rāgādīnaṃ santibhāvena ajjhattasantisāṅkhātāṃ nibbānameva addasanti*. Translation by Bhikkhu Bodhi in Bhikkhu Bodhi, *The Suttanipāta. An Ancient Collection of the Buddha’s Discourses Together with its Commentaries*, Somerville 2017, p. 1107-1108.

“Peace” (*santi*) seems to have a double aspect, one internal, based on the calm mental condition that is a positive effect produced by the practice of the Buddhist path (*magga*) that will eventually lead to the Nibbāna, and one external, which is the effect of this internal peace on the mundane reality. The worldly condition is often represented as plagued by conflicts, quarrels, wars, etc.: the inner peace can calm down the negative effects that these hostilities produce in our own mind, but it also functions as an antidote to these external sufferings, being able to change the course of the society itself.

The conclusive stanzas of the two “Discourses of the Battle” in the Saṃyutta Nikāya are clearly showing the inescapable connection between the external and the internal struggles, and the diametrically opposed behaviour of Buddhist practitioners who go beyond any divisions and antagonism, having developed a basic form of inner peace.

Victory breeds enemy, the defeated one sleeps badly.

The peaceful one sleeps at ease, having abandoned victory and defeat.²⁷

A man will go on plundering
So long as it serves his ends,
But when others plunder him,
The plunderer is plundered.

The fool thinks fortune is on his side
So long as his evil does not ripen,
But when the evil ripens
The fool incurs suffering.

The killer begets a killer,
One who conquers a conqueror.
The abuser begets abuse,

17.PTS 1.83 (= *Dhammapada* 201, PTS, 30): *jayaṃ veraṃ pasavati dukkhaṃ seti parājīto, upasanto sukhaṃ seti hitvā jayaparājayanti*. Translation by Bhikkhu Bodhi, in Bhikkhu Bodhi (tr.), *The Connected Discourses of the Buddha*, Somerville 2000, p. 177.

The reviler, one who reviles.

Thus by the unfolding of kamma

The plunderer is plundered.²⁸

Renunciation of violence and adoption of a peaceful attitude arisen from the inner peace will sooner or later produce a beneficial effect also in the society. On the contrary, our adherence to unwholesome (*akusala*) thoughts and behaviours generated by craving (*taṇhā*) and lack of awareness will perpetuate not only our own suffering but also serious social problems. This is clearly said in the section of the *Mahānidānasutta* (from the Dīgha Nikāya) where a slightly different Dependent Origination (*paṭiccasamuppāda*) process is described:

Thus, Ānanda, in dependence upon feeling there is craving; in dependence upon craving there is pursuit; in dependence upon pursuit there is gain; in dependence upon gain there is decision-making; in dependence upon decision-making there is desire and lust; in dependence upon desire and lust there is attachment; in dependence upon attachment there is possessiveness; in dependence upon possessiveness there is stinginess; in dependence upon stinginess there is safeguarding; and because of safeguarding, various evil unwholesome phenomena originate—the taking up of clubs and weapons, conflicts, quarrels, and disputes, insulting speech, slander, and falsehoods.²⁹

In this passage the development of cravings (*taṇhā*), which depend on feelings, generates the necessity of protection (*ārakkha*) and, then, unwholesome actions that include also conflicts and even wars. The final dissolution of this vicious circle is the goal of all Buddhist schools, and the

18.PTS I, 85: *Vilumpateva puriso yāvassa upakappati, Yadā caññe vilumpanti so vilutto viluppati.*

Thānaṃ hi maññati bālo yāva pāpaṃ na paccati, Yadā ca paccati pāpaṃ atha bālo dukkhaṃ nigacchati.

Hantā labhati hantāraṃ jetāraṃ labhate jayaṃ, Akkosako ca akkosam rosetārañca rosako, Atha kammavivaṭṭena so vilutto viluppatīti. Translation by Bhikkhu Bodhi, in Bhikkhu Bodhi (tr.), *The Connected Discourses of the Buddha*, Somerville 2000, p. 178.

19.PTS 2.58: *iti kho panetaṃ, ānanda, vedanaṃ paṭicca taṇhā, taṇhaṃ paṭicca pariyesanā, pariyesanaṃ paṭicca lābho, lābhaṃ paṭicca vinicchayo, vinicchayaṃ paṭicca chandarāgo, chandarāgaṃ paṭicca ajjhosānaṃ, ajjhosānaṃ paṭicca pariggaho, pariggahaṃ paṭicca macchariyaṃ, macchariyaṃ paṭicca ārakkho. Ārakkhādhikaraṇaṃ daṇḍādānasatthādāna-kalahaviggahavivādatuvamtuvaṃpesuññāmusāvādā aneke pāpakā akusalā dhammā sambhavanti.* Translation by Bhikkhu Bodhi in Bhikkhu Bodhi, *The Great Discourse on Causation. The Mahānidāna Sutta and its Commentarial Exegesis*, Kandy 1984, pp. 55–56, 93–94.

consequent realization of the inner peace is not only a personal achievement but it will be shared with all the other living beings.

This concept is evident in several parts of the Canonical texts. It is particularly significant in one stanza of the *Suttanipāta*,³⁰ where the process of the “triple purification” (*tikoṭiparisuddha*) applies to householders and not the Bhikkhus.³¹ The first precept – abstaining from taking life (*pāṇātipātā veramaṇī*) – is here used as example of the correct practice:

Having put down the rod toward all beings, toward those in the world
both firm and frail, one should not kill living beings or cause to kill, nor
should one allow others to kill.³²

A careful analysis of the text reveals that there are three stages that purify this precept. The first one is directly concerning the person who is respecting this precept: “one should not kill living beings” (*pāṇaṃ na hane*). The second one is eliminating also the risk that we ask to somebody else to act instead of us, unwisely imagining that this could save us from the negative consequences of the crime: “[one should] not cause to kill” (*na ca ghātayeyya*). This meaning is masterfully obtained using the causative form of the same verb used for the first stage. The third one is showing a sort of obligation to apply this precept also in the society, preventing any sort of violence around us: “nor should one allow others to kill” (*cānujaññā hanataṃ paresaṃ*).

The concept of “inner peace” (*ajjhantasanti*), as it is found in the Pali canonical texts related to the three terms I briefly analysed, is always connected to the achievement of a form of permanent and deep “peace” that is called Nibbāna. The mind of the Arahant is not only experiencing such ineffable form of peace, but this wholesome mental state reverberates and spreads among other living beings who are close to him.

20. *Suttanipāta* 394, PTS 69.

21. In the *Veḷudvāreyyasutta* (Saṃyutta Nikāya, PTS V, 353, BB 1797) there is the exposition of the process of the triple purification (*tikoṭiparisuddha*) that applies to bhikkhus: *so iti paṭisaṅkhāya (a) attanā ca pāṇātipātā paṭivirato hoti, (b) parañca pāṇātipātā veramaṇiyā samādapeti, (c) pāṇātipātā veramaṇiyā ca vaṇṇaṃ bhāsati. Evamassāyaṃ kāyasamācāro tikoṭiparisuddho hoti.* “Having reflected thus, he himself abstains from the destruction of life, exhorts others to abstain from the destruction of life, and speaks in praise of abstinence from the destruction of life. Thus this bodily conduct of his is purified in three respects”. Translation by Bhikkhu Bodhi, in Bhikkhu Bodhi (tr.), *The Connected Discourses of the Buddha*, Somerville 2000, p. 1797. On the idea of the *tikoṭiparisuddha* related to the prohibition to eat meat in a Mahāyānic context, see Śraddhāpa Welsh, *Food for Bodhisattvas An Intertextual Study of the Māṃsabhakṣaṇaparivarta of the Laṅkāvatārasūtra*, Master’s Thesis in Sanskrit, University of Oslo, 2017 (not yet published), and for a general overview of this concept see Prasad, Chandra Shekhar, “Meat-Eating and the Rule of Tikoṭiparisuddha”, in Narayan, A.K. (ed), *Studies in Pali Buddhism. A Memorial Volume in Honor of Bhikkhu Jagdish Kashyap*, Delhi 1979, pp. 289–295.

22. *Suttanipāta* 394, PTS 69: *pāṇaṃ na hane, na ca ghātayeyya, na cānujaññā hanataṃ paresaṃ, sabbesu bhūtesu nidhāya daṇḍaṃ, ye thāvarā ye ca tasā santi loke.* Translation partially taken from Bhikkhu Bodhi, *The Suttanipāta. An Ancient Collection of the Buddha’s Discourses Together with its Commentaries*, Somerville 2017, p. 220.

As long as they live the arahants abandon and abstain from the destruction of life; with the rod and weapon laid aside, conscientious and kindly, they dwell compassionate toward all living beings.³³

Even if this peaceful mental state is difficult to achieve, a small portion of it will surely contribute to a reduction of suffering within our own life and, then, in the entire society.

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23.AN 1.70 (PTS I, 211): *yāvajīvaṃ arahanto paṇātipātāṃ pahāya paṇātipātā paṭiviratā nihitadaṇḍā nihitasatthā lajjī dayāpannā sabbapāṇabhūtāhitānukampino viharanti*. Translation by Bhikkhu Bodhi in Bhikkhu Bodhi, *The Numerical Discourses of the Buddha. A Translation of the Aṅguttara Nikāya*, Somerville 2012, pp. 211–212. See also the chapter "The Personality of the Arahant" in Rune E.A. Johnasson, *The Psychology of Nirvana*, London 1969, pp. 116–130, where a slightly different translation of this passage is offered (see p. 120): "as long as they live, the arahants, by abandoning the slaying of creatures, are abstainers from the slaying of creatures, have laid aside the rod and the sword; they are modest, show kindness, remain friendly and compassionate to all living beings".

The Business and Human Rights Project Turns 10

Where We've Been and Where Might We Be Going

Jonathan Blaine [Webster University Thailand]

In July of this year the UN Working Group on Business and Human Rights (“Working Group”) in recognition of the upcoming 10 year anniversary of the “unanimous endorsement of the United Nations Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights (UNGPs)”¹ announced the establishment of a new project, the “UNGPs10+ project”². The goal of this project is to “drive and scale up implementation of the UNGPs more widely over the next 10 years”.³ As part of the announcement of the project the Working Group made an open call for contributions from the global community regarding experiences over the past 10 years and proposals for a way forward for the next 10.

While the Ruggie⁴ report⁵ and its progeny, the UNGP, have been around for 10 years, the project is still a nascent one and only now really beginning to its legs. Over the last 10 years numerous forums and programs have taken on the challenge of raising global awareness of the “problem” of businesses and transnational corporations engaging in human rights abuses and sought to highlight the lack of a workable regulatory framework for holding them accountable. These discussions have also highlighted the lack of access to domestic courts and other adequate remedies available to the victims of such abuses. Clearly this is a program still in search of a workable regulatory framework.

The international and business communities are indeed witnessing the structuring of a regulatory framework in real time. This multifaceted framework includes several hard law and soft regulatory tools. In some respects, these various tools are complementary and in others they compete. While a discussion of the numerous aspects of this developing regulatory framework will no doubt fill days of upcoming fora and events, this paper will focus on three specific and materially significant developments that have been initiated over the past 10 years.

Firstly, consideration will be given to the initiation of a legally binding treaty on business and human rights.⁶ This project was initiated in 2014 and has already resulted in the production of a draft agreement, the language of which is currently the subject of debate by various state actors.⁷ Secondly, attention will turn to current calls for mandatory due diligence legislation with particular focus on Europe, where progress towards legislation appears to be the most advanced. Thirdly, the recent establishment of a forum specifically dedicated to exploring the synergies between the BHR project and the global anti- corruption agenda will serve to round out the discussion of these three recent developments before

¹ <https://www.ohchr.org/EN/Issues/Business/Pages/UNGPsBizHRsnext10.aspx>

² <https://www.business-humanrights.org/en/big-issues/un-guiding-principles-on-business-human-rights/un-guiding-principles-the-next-decade/>

³ <https://www.business-humanrights.org/en/big-issues/un-guiding-principles-on-business-human-rights/un-guiding-principles-the-next-decade/>

⁴ Mr. John Ruggie (*United States of America*), Special Representative of the Secretary-General on the issue of human rights and transnational corporations and other business enterprises: 2005-2011.

⁵ John Ruggie, *Report of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General on the Issue of Human Rights and Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises: Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights : Implementing the United Nations "Protect, Respect and Remedy" Framework*, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/17/31 (March 21, 2011).

⁶ Legally Binding Instrument to Regulate, in International Human Rights Law, the Activities of Transnational Corporations and other Business Enterprises, OEIGWG Chairmanship Revised Draft 16.7.2019, *available online at:*

https://www.ohchr.org/Documents/HRBodies/HRCouncil/WGTransCorp/OEIGWG_RevisedDraft_LBI.pdf

⁷ Ibid.

concluding with some thoughts on the potential success of each of the proposals and what might be expected over BHR's next ten years.

The Hard Law Approach – A Legally Binding Treaty?

Calls for treaties to fold corporate actors into the human rights agenda are not new. Initial considerations for inclusion originated in the international criminal law context and form part of the negotiations that resulted in the founding of the International Criminal Court during 1990's. The impetus for their inclusion in human rights regulatory regimes grew out of developments in national jurisprudence limiting victims' access to national courts as a means of obtaining remedies for corporate actors' violations of human rights and international criminal law.

Throughout the 1980's and 1990's advances had been made by the IHRL bar in gaining access to national courts, namely US federal courts, as a means of potentially obtaining remedies for victims of human rights abuses at the hands of corporate actors. Especially emblematic was the use of the Alien Tort Claims Act, ("ATCA") by foreign (i.e., non-US) citizens for making claims against companies for human rights abuses occurring outside the US. This avenue of access to redress was seen as promising until the US Supreme Court all but shut off access in an infamous combination of cases, the most well know of which is *Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum*.⁸

In this case, Nigerian nationals sued Royal Dutch Petroleum in U.S. federal court under the U.S. Alien Tort Statute ("ATS") for violations of international criminal law that took place in Nigeria. While the Court held that the ATS did not apply extraterritorially, the more difficult issue which the court eventually chose not to decide, was whether corporations could be held liable for violations of international criminal law. The argument was that international criminal law had never been applied to corporations and as such was not a norm of international law.

The unsettled argument that companies are not governed by human rights or international criminal law caused many in the human rights community to begin searching for a means by which these legally recognized "persons" could be held liable as are other persons for violations of international crimes and other human rights laws. This led some commentators to opine that there should be an international convention that would specifically "define the limits of corporate liability"⁹ in this context. Out of this grew a recognition that the liability protections afforded by the corporate form could never have been intended to act as a shield behind which human rights violators could act with impunity. If so, then such protections could potentially render the entire IHRL project illusory.

In addition to these developments at the national level, calls for a legally binding international instrument began to grow out of criticism of the failure of the Ruggie Report to "expressly recognize binding legal obligations of corporations for violations of human rights in the second pillar"¹⁰ of the UNGP. Following on the heels of the initial criticism, a meeting was arranged in Chiang Mai, Thailand, followed by two additional meetings both of which

⁸ See *Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co.*, 569 U.S. 108 (2013); *Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain*, 542 U.S. 692 (2004) For a summary of these cases and discussion of issues around these developments, see generally,

Jonathan Blaine, *Sosa, Kiobel and Pirates Inc.: Defining the 'Modern' Parameters of the Archaic Alien Tort Statute*, 26 HAGUE YEARBOOK OF INT'L LAW, 116 (2013).

⁹ *Ibid* at 135, citing, G. C. Hufbauer, *Why Shouldn't Corporations Be Liable under the ATS?*, 43 GEORGETOWN J. OF INT'L LAW 1011 (2012).

¹⁰ David Bilchitz & Surya Deva, *Building a Treaty on Business and Human Rights: Context and Contours* 16 – 20 (2013).

For a detailed critique of the Ruggie Framework and UNGP, see generally, David Bilchitz & Surya Deva, *Human Rights Obligations of Business: Beyond the Corporate Responsibility to Respect?* (2013).

served as an initial exploration of the feasibility of promoting a treaty and led eventually to a formal request in 2014 whereby the UNHRC was called upon to establish an:

“open-ended intergovernmental working group (OEIGWG) on a legally binding instrument on transnational corporations and other business enterprises with respect to human rights; whose mandate shall be to elaborate an international legally binding instrument to regulate, in international human rights law, the activities of transnational corporations and other business enterprises.”¹¹

Accordingly, a formal and legally binding treaty covering transnational transactions has been drafted and is undergoing review and consideration by those impacted by such an instrument.

The arguments in support of the treaty as set out by its supporters include the legally binding nature of the agreement on both States and corporate actors. The treaty obligates States to pass legislation that legally obligates companies operating across borders to comply with human rights obligations. It also provides States with an internationally agreed support mechanism upon which to ground the passage of legislation at the domestic level, similar to other international human rights treaties. The binding nature of the legal obligations also serves to directly connect human rights violations with a right to access to a remedy.¹²

The treaty does have its detractors, not the least of which is John Ruggie, himself.¹³ The arguments against the convention in its current incarnation¹⁴ range from claims of distortion in market competition to potentially immeasurable (read, uninsurable) levels of liability for companies with cross-border operations.¹⁵ Additional arguments point to the treaty not making even a passing reference to the UNGP and thus, appears to ignore the advances made over the past ten years through the UNGP program.¹⁶ Finally, some argue that the treaty would effectively place the responsibility to protect human rights on corporations instead of having it sit with States, as is the case under the UNGP. This appears to escalate the role of companies over States, which inverts the normal balance of power in such contexts.¹⁷

Yet, even with these objections, implementation of a binding legal convention on businesses would provide a strong incentive for corporate compliance by “legalizing” the obligations of companies instead of relying on unenforceable, entirely voluntary standards or principles, especially where financial incentives exist to not abide by voluntary standards. In addition, given the fundamental legal obligation of corporate directors to act in the best interests of the organization and its owners, it would seem that the most effective counterbalance to this legal obligation would be a competing legal obligation as

¹¹ Human Rights Council Res. 26/9, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/RES/26/9 (July 14, 2014) *available online at*: <https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/G14/082/52/PDF/G1408252.pdf?OpenElement>. ¹² See, Bilchitz FN10, above, at 9.

¹³ John Ruggie, *Quo Vadis? Unsolicited Advice to Business and Human Rights Treaty Sponsors*, (September 9, 2014), *available online at*: <https://www.ihrb.org/other/treaty-on-business-human-rights/quo-vadis-unsolicited-advice-to-business-and-human-rights-treaty-sponsors>. For a general discussion of other objections, see, David Bilchitz & Surya Deva, *Building a Treaty on Business and Human Rights: Context and Contours* 9 (2017).

¹⁴ Legally Binding Instrument to Regulate, in International Human Rights Law, the Activities of Transnational Corporations and other Business Enterprises, OEIGWG Chairmanship Revised Draft 16.7.2019, *available online at*: https://www.ohchr.org/Documents/HRBodies/HRCouncil/WGTransCorp/OEIGWG_RevisedDraft_LBI.pdf.

¹⁵ Treaty Alliance, *Briefing Paper on the Zero Draft: Unpacking Arguments Against a Treaty* (2019), *available online at*: https://media.businesshumanrights.org/media/documents/files/documents/TreatyAllianceGermany_CounterArguments_Briefing_2-2019_en.pdf.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*

¹⁷ *Ibid.*

opposed voluntary or moral obligations. A legal framework for holding corporations legally liable for violations of a list of human rights, including war crimes, torture, forced labor, human trafficking, and sexual or gender-based violence, among others would prove to be a more effective deterrent in this context.¹⁸

Mandatory Due Diligence – A Workable Approach?

The UNGP explicitly indicate that companies should be encouraged to perform human rights Due diligence as a means of demonstrating respect for human rights.¹⁹ UNGP 17 through 21 detail out the parameters of what is meant by “Due Diligence”. This guidance points to a type of risk-based, company specific system of due diligence with an aim to conferring on businesses the obligations to perform the identification, review and monitoring procedures that would help to prevent human rights abuses. This approach appears to deputize companies into taking on what could arguably be seen as the State’s role in protecting human rights, without obligating them to do so legally. This have given rise to consideration in some quarters of a formalized system of mandatory due diligence, through the passage of legislation.

This call to action is currently under consideration at the European Parliament and is the subject of a recent report issued by the Directorate General for External Policies of the Union.²⁰ This report highlighted the need for due diligence to serve as the basis for ensuring companies demonstrate respect for human rights and suggests that this system be built on existing international due diligence standards. These standards include 1) identifying and assessing the risks of harm; 2) ceasing, preventing and mitigating harm; 3) monitoring and tracking the measures adopted, and 4) publicly communicate information about risks and procedures adopted.²¹ This effort is a direct call for passage of legislation at the EU level and would apply only to EU member States. This limitation as well as others might impact the effectiveness of such legislation as a tool to accomplishing the goals of UNGP – Pillar II.

If states mandate this without being able to point to an international consensus on the approach they will be met with strong opposition from the corporate community. In addition, it is often the failure of States to currently enforce already existing rules that lead to failures to protect human rights so reliance on them to enforce additional laws may be misplaced. This system would also impose a significant administrative burden and cost given the enforcement bureaucracy that would be needed to ensure compliance with due diligence obligations.

Partnering with Anti-corruption - A Match Made in London?

Given the challenges in developing a workable and effective approach to BHR and in light of the relative successes of the global anti-corruption agenda, consideration is being given to whether the latter agenda can be leveraged as a means of more broadly implementing the BHR program. Separately, yet simultaneous to the Treaty process, the UN Working Group on Business and Human Rights’ convened a consultation on “Connecting the business and human rights and anti-corruption agendas” that led to the

¹⁸ See, Ibid Art. 6(7)(a), (b), (e), (j), (k).

¹⁹ Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, *Mandatory Human Rights Due Diligence Regimes Some Key Considerations* (June 2020) available online at: https://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Issues/Business/MandatoryHR_Due_Diligence_Key_Considerations.pdf.

²⁰ *Human Rights Due Diligence Legislation - Options for the EU*, Directorate General for External Policies of the Union (PE 603.495) (June 2020).

²¹ Amnesty International, *Report: An EU mandatory due diligence legislation to promoted businesses’ respect for human rights and the environment* (September 2020), available online at: <https://www.amnesty.org/download/Documents/IOR6029592020ENGLISH.PDF>

publication of a report to the UNHRC²² discussing how a risk-based due diligence approach to both anti- corruption and HRL can be coherently coordinated and proposing that the approach of the risk analysis be shifted from risk-to-business to risk-to-people.²³ In light of the relative success of the format used in expanding the footprint of the anti-corruption agenda through the strategic use of a strict liability + adequate procedures defense,²⁴ whereby companies are incentivized to implement a risk-based compliance program, which is fully consistent with the guidance provided for under UNGP Principles 14 and 17. Indeed, the language of the commentary for UNGP 17 reads, “Human rights due diligence can be included within broader enterprise risk management systems”²⁵, which again comports with the risk based systems of anti-bribery as set out in guidance issued by both the US Department of Justice and the UK Special Frauds Office.²⁶

These two efforts are closely tied in that corruption often leads to and provides support for human rights violations and as such efforts to combat one will inevitably lead to improvements in the other. Additionally, the connection appear an almost organic one even on first blush given the usage of similar language within the instruments underlying both projects. For example, the UK Bribery Act’s “adequate procedures” defence and the UNGP’s reference to “adequate measures”²⁷ have not only a similar ring to them but also appear to call for similar actions on behalf of businesses. In both cases, companies are encouraged or incentivized through one means or another to take action on their own initiative to develop procedures or measures designed to prevent violations of the relevant obligations. Both of these exemplify a sort of hybrid form of public-private partnership in the context of regulatory compliance systems development and implementation. To the extent they do overlap and the BHR project can piggy- back on the developments of the anti-corruption agenda, they should take advantage of these synergies.

A Proposed Regulatory Approach – Integrating the Pieces

To help achieve the stated goals of Protection, Respect, and Remedy set out in the UNGP and with a view toward advancing a more integrated regulatory system for business actors as regards their human rights responsibilities, the following potential regulatory solution is proposed. First, the language of the Zero Draft should be adjusted to include a State obligation to enact legislation at the State level with explicit reference to State duties as provided for under the UNGP. Second, the legislation would adopt a strict liability standard for corporate actors along with an adequate measures defense similar to the structure utilized in the UK Bribery Act 2010. Third, States should provide companies with stated guidance on adequate measure by pointing to the risk-based due diligence procedures provided for in UNGP 17 through 21. Fourth, States should consider adopting the deferred prosecution agreement model, whereby corporate actors found to have deficient systems for deferring human rights violations are given a chance to avoid prosecution if they agree to develop and implement such a system under the monitorship of the State. Finally, States should provide victims access to domestic courts systems for causes of action against any company over which they have jurisdiction. These steps would provide for an integrated approach at the international, State and private actor levels and would build on some of the strengths of each of the

²² A/HRC/44/43.

²³ See, Ibid at I(A)(2).

²⁴ Bribery Act 2010 c (7)(2) (UK), <https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2010/23/section/7>.

²⁵ UNGP – Principle 17, commentary.

²⁶ U.S. Department of Justice, *A Resource Guide to the U.S. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act* (2020), available online at: <https://www.justice.gov/criminal-fraud/file/1292051/download>; Serious Frauds Office, *SFO Operational Handbook* (2020), available online at: <https://www.sfo.gov.uk/publications/guidance-policy-and-protocols/sfo-operational-handbook/>.

²⁷ UNGP - Principle 11, commentary.

three proposals under consideration. It would also address some of the criticisms leveled at the separate approaches that have been noted above.

Utilizing the treaty would provide for a binding legal framework, which would obligate States to take action to pass legislation, thereby adding a legal flavor to the entire project. This would raise the level of importance being given the projects in the minds of both State and private actors. This would tend to further incentivize corporate actors to take action under color of law as opposed to voluntarily “complying with” a vague duty to respect standard. A global treaty would also benefit States in that their passage of legislation at the local level would be based on consensus at the international level and pursuant to international obligations. While this may not have much sway in the current political environment, it would seem to have more sway than simply encouraging businesses to respect human rights.

By leveraging the strict liability + adequate procedures model utilized in the UK Bribery Act 2010, States would be able to provide businesses with a strong internalized incentive to adopt risk-based due diligence procedures, without having to detail out exactly what those procedures should be. The policies and procedures to be adopted would sit with the organization and likely be integrated into existing compliance and enterprise risk management systems, as was anticipated by UNGP 17. In addition, States would not need to individually review or assess these systems nor the efficacy of such procedures. This could achieve the desired result of systemic regulation without creating an unmanageable administrative burden or cost. This would free up States to focus their resources on “problem children” and continuously expanding the agenda through the system. The same can be said for utilization of the deferred prosecution agreement model, as this would put the burden on companies to design, implement, monitor and modify human rights risk management systems as opposed to immediately prosecuting “bad actors”. Finally, expanding the treaty language to include access to domestic courts for actions by any company within the country’s jurisdiction would ensure that UNGP - Pillar III is also being incorporated into the process. This would integrate the State obligation to protect human rights with the obligation to provide access to remedies, which is often a missing link in the chain of protection. This would also send a message to companies that their obligations to respect human rights are taken seriously. All of these measures when taken together would, in this author’s judgement, provide for a more integrated and formalistic approach to Protecting, Respecting, and Remediating human rights involving all the relevant players, while not placing too much of the burden on any one particular link in the chain.

Concluding Thoughts

It may just be that Ruggie had it right from the beginning. By not “creating” a formalized regulatory system, his framework seems to have provided a foundation upon which could be built a more robust and broader regulatory system that took into consideration the wider perspectives of the various stakeholders, including the ultimate victims of human rights abuses. By calling on States’ duties to protect and asserting that Companies have a duty to respect human rights, his framework has fostered an expansive and more inclusive discussion of how to structure the regulatory framework. This space has allowed for consideration of both hard law and alternative regulatory tools. The hard law tools include the drafting of a formal legally binding treaty and proposals for mandatory due diligence legislation. The alternative tools include nudging and other methods of State backed incentivization to encourage privatized, risk-based compliance systems. The proposed solution discussed above is an additional step towards using these tools to meet the duties provided for in UNGP.

On a separate note, it is the intention of the author of this piece to submit it to the UNGP10+ Project as part of the open comments, submissions call. Hopefully, the structure presented here will serve to stimulate discussion of how to structure the developing regulatory framework and make a contribution to this program over the next 10 years.

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